Columbia  ©nitof  m'tp 
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THE  LIBRARIES 

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GIVEN  BY 

F.   N.   Coxintiss 

THE  LITERARY  DIGEST 

History  of  the  World  War 


ARCHDUKE  FRANCIS  FERDINAND   AND   HIS   FAMILY 
In  this  picture  are  the  murdered  Archduke,  his  murdered  wife,  the  Duchess 
of  Ilohenburg,  and  their  children 
I. 


THE  LITERARY  DIGEST 

History  of  the  World  War 

Compiled    from    Original    and  Contemporary 

Sources:  American,   British,  French, 

German,  and  Others 


BY 

FRANCIS  WHITING  HALSEY 

Author  of  "The  Old  New  York  Frontier,"  Editor  of  "Great  Epochs  in 

American  History,"  "Seeing  Europe  with  Famous  Authors/' 

''Balfour,  Viviani,  and  Joffre,  THieir  Speeches 

in  America,"  etc. 


IN  TEN  VOLUMES— ILLUSTRATED 


VOLUME  I 

Introduction:  Why  This  War — The  Outbreak  and  the  Causes- 
The  Invasion  of  Belgium,  Luxemburg  and 
Alsace-Lorraine 

June  28,   1914— October   15,   1914 


FUNK  &  WAGNALLS  COMPANY 

NEW  Y^ORK  AND  LONDON 

1919 


COPYRIGHT,    1919,    B.  lO-MuymlO 


FUNK  &  WAGNALLS  COMPANY 

(Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America) 

Copyright  Under  the  Articles  of  the  Copyright  Convention  of  the 
Pan-American  Republics  and  the  United  States,   August  11,  1910 


3 


4 


CONTENTS— VOLUME    ONE 


PAGE 

The  Sources  for  This   History xi 

Introduction:  Why  This  War — Its  Magnitude,  Many  Causes, 
Early  Consequences,  New  Methods  and  Decisive  Later 
Aspects. 1 


THE  OUTBREAK  AND  THE  CAUSES 

PAET  I.     AUSTEIA  AND  SEKBIA 

1.  The    Tragedy   at    Serajevo   and    Austria's    Ultimatum   to 

Serbia  (June  28,  1914— July  31,  1914) 59 

II.  Austro-Serbo-Montenegrin  Fighting  (July  28,  1914 — Decem- 
ber 30,  1914) 86 


PAET  II.  CAUSES  OF  THE  GEEATEE  CONFLICT, 
NEAE  AND  EEMOTE 

I.  The  Forcing  of  a  Local  Into  a  World  War — The  Disclos- 
ures OF  Lichnowsky,  Muehlon,  and  Others — The  Pots- 
dam Conference   (1912-1914) 99 

II.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  Affairs  in  Morocco  (1878-1911)   118 
HI.  The  Eesources  of  the  Belligerents  and  the  Transforma- 
tion  OF  Europe 139 


PAET   III.     DECLAEATIONS   OF   WAE   AMONG 
THE  POWEES 

Declarations  in  the  First  Months  of  the  War: 

Germany  Against  Eussia  (August  1,  1914) 157 

France  and  Germany   (August  4,  1914) 167 

Germany  Against  Belgium  (August  4,  1914)      ....   169 
Great  Britain  Against  Germany — The  ''Scrap  of  Paper''  Epi- 
sode  (August  4,  1914) 173 

Neutrality  Declared  by  Italy 181 

Japan  Against  Germany   (August  23,  1914) — Other  Declara- 
tions       185 

President    Wilson's   Appeal    to    His    ''Fellow    Countrymen" 

(August  18,  1914) 187 

The  Allies  Form  a  New  Bond  of  Union  (September  5,  1914)   .    189 

V 


CONTENTS— VOLUME  ONE 

PAGE 

II.  Other  States  Eventually  Drawn  Into  the  Conflict: 

Eussia  Against   Bulgaria — Bulgaria  Against   Serbia — Affairs 

in  Greece  (October  4,  1915 — October  8,  1915)    .        .        .  192 
_     -          --                                                         ^  ^^^ 

.  205 

.  209 

.  213 

.  215 
nited 

.  217 

.  221 


The  Allies  Against  Turkey  (November  5,  1914) 

Italy  Against  Austria  (May  23,  1915)   . 

Germany  Against  Portugal   (March  9,  1916) 

Eoumania  Against  Austria   (August  27,  1916) 

Italy  Against  Germany  (August  27,  1916)    . 

A   "State  of   War"  with  Germany  Declared  by   the 

States    (April  6,   1917) 

Cuba  and  Panama  Against  Germany  (April  7,  1917) 
Brazil  Against  Germany — The  Status  of  Other  Latin  American 
Countries — The    Luxburg    Disclosures    (May    28,    1917 — 

October  26,   1917) 223 

Greece  Against  Germany    (July  2,   1917) 229 

Siam  and  China  Against  Germany  (July  21    1917 — August  14, 

1917) 230 

Liberia  Against  Germany    (August  4,  1917)      ....    231 
The  United  States  Against  Austria  (December  7,  1Q17)  .        .    231 

Peru  with  the  Allies 232 

Haiti  Against  Germany 233 

The  Onondaga  and  Oneida  Indians  Against  Germany      .        .    233 

As  to    Spain "      .        .   234 

The  Scandinavian  States  and  Holland 235 

As  to  Luxemburg 237 

Iceland's  Own  Flag  First  in  a  Foreign  Port      ....    238 
A  Summary  of  States  Involved  in  the  War  witli  Their  Popu- 
lations   240 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

PAET  L     THE  INVASION  OF  BELGIUM,  LUXEMBUEG 
AND  ALSACI^-LOEEAINE 

PAGE 
I.    EOADS    FROM    THE    EHINE    VaLLEY    INTO    FrANCE — THE   ''COCK- 
PIT OF  Europe" ...    245 

II.  Liege  and  Longwy  (August  1,  1914— August  28,  1914) .        .   255 

III.  The  Dash  Into  Alsace-Lorraine  (August  4,  1914 — August 

25,  1914) 272 

IV.  Haelen,  Louvain,  and  Brussels  (August  12,  1914 — August 

26,  1914) 290 

V.  Namur  Falls — As  to  Modern  Siege  Guns  (August  13,  1914 

—August   23,   1914) 305 

VI.  DiNANT,    Tamines,    Malines,    Aerschot,    Termonde,    Mau- 

beuge    (August  15,  1914 — September  7,  1914)      .        .        .   317 
VII.  Zeppelin  Bombs  on  Antwerp:  the  Siege,  Fall  and  Exodus 

(August  25,  1914— October  15,  1914)      .        .        .        .        .   326 
VIII.  As   TO   Atrocities   in   Belgium — Edith   Cavell's  Death — 

Deportations  and  Eeliep  Work 351 


VI 


ILLUSTRATIONS— VOLUME  ONE 

FULL  PAGES 

Tpie  Archduke  Francis  Ferdixaxd  axd  His  FaisliIjY .Frontispiece 

PAGE 

A    Group  of  War  Correspoxdexts x 

A  Group  of  Writers  ox  War  News     .       .  .       .       .     xx 

COXGRESS   OF   BeRLIX 2 

Serajevo,  Capital  of  Bosxia 58 

Fraxcis  Joseph,  Emperor  of  Austria  ...         ...     65 

Peter,  Kixg  of  Serbia 71 

Balkax  Peace  Coxferexce  of  1913  ix  Loxdox  ...  96 
The  Meetixg  of  Bismarck,  Thiers  axd  Favre  ix  1871  .  .  98 
The  Germax  Emperor  William  II  .  .  .  facing  page  104 
George  Y,  Kixg  of  Great  Britaix  ....  facing  page  152 
The  Former  Ivaiser's  Yacht,  the  "Hohexzollerx"  .  .  .  156 
Raymoxd  Poixcare,  Presidext  of  the  Frexch  Republic 

facing  page  168 
Albert,  Kixg  of  the  Belgiaxs  ....  facing  page  176 
At  Buckixgham  Palace  Whex  Y'^ar  Y"as  Declared 

facing  page  181 

At  the  Mosque  of  Faith  ix   Coxstaxtixople  Durixg  the 

Declaratiox  of  Y^ar 203 

Lost  ox  the  "Lusitaxia" 219 

A  Group  of  Germax  Officees  Durixg  the  Advaxce   .       .  244 

The  River  Meuse  at  Dixaxt 251 

Loxgwy    ox    the    Fraxco-Luxemburg    Froxtier    After    Its 

Bombardmext 271 

Ferdixaxd  Foch,  Marshal  of  Fraxce  .  .  .  facing  page  280 
Germax  Troops  Haltixg  at  Brussels  .  .  .  facing  page  300 
Memorial  to  Edith  Cavell 368 

TEXT  ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Archduke  Fraxcis  Ferdixaxd  of  Austria  .  .  .  .  .60 
Nicholas  Pashitch,  Premier  of  Serbia       .        .       .       .       .     74 

Sir  Edward  (Yiscouxt)  Grey 75 

CouxT  Leopold  Berchtold,  Austrian  Foreigx  Mixister  ix 

1914 80 

vii 


ILLUSTRATIONS— VOLUME  ONE 

PAGE 

War  News  in  Berlin.       .       . 83 

G-ERMAN  17-iN.  Siege  Gun 85 

Belgrade,  the  Capital  of  Serbia 87 

Lady  Facet's  Hospital  in  Serbia .,91 

Nicholas,  the  Former  King  of  Montenegro     ....  92 

A  Montenegrin  Soldier  of  Rank 98 

Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain 

in  1914 106 

Gottlieb  von  Jagow,  German  Foreign  Minister  in  1911  .  107 
Henry  Morgenthau,  American   Ambassador  to   Turkey  in 

1914 112 

Baron  von  Wangenheim,   German   Ambassador  to   Turkey 

IN  1914 113 

Rene  Yiviani,  Prime  Minister  of  France  in  1914  .        .        .  115 

RoLLO  Ogden 121 

Field-Marshal  Viscount  Kitchener 125 

Theophile  Delcasse^  a  Former  French  Foreign  Minister     .  129 

The  Julius  Tower  at  Spandau 133 

Commandeering  War  Horses 145 

M.  Sazonof,  Foreign  Minister  of  Russia  in  1914     .       .       .  159 

Theodore  von  Bethmann-Hollweg 165 

Sir  Edward  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  to  Germany  in 

1914 179 

Prince  von  Bulow 184 

John  E.  Redmond  and  A.  Bonar  Law 191 

Ferdinand,  Former  King  of  Bulgaria 193 

Premier  Venizelos  of  Greece 195 

Sophia,  Former  Queen  of  Greece 196 

constantine,  former  king  of  greece 197 

Enver  Pasha,  Tltikish  Minister  of  War 199 

Constantinople  During  Mobilization 201 

Salandra,  Former  Italian  Premier 205 

Victor  Emanuel,  King  of  Italy 209 

Ferdinand,  King  of  Roumania 214 

Count  Johann  von  Bernstorff 220 

President  Braz  of  Brazil 224 

Dr.  Constantin  T.  Dumba       . 227 

viii 


ILLUSTRATIONS— VOLUME  ONE 

PAGE 

Marie  Adelaide,  Former  Grand  Duchess  of  Luxemburg  .        .  238 

El  Hussaix,  Kixg  of  Hejas   ........  242 

Albert  of  Belgium  ax^d  Officers 247 

Off  for  the  Frox-^t 254 

Bridge  Over  the  Meuse  at  Vise 257 

A  Church  ix  Vise  After  a  Bombardmext   .      .          ...  258 

General  vox'  Emmich 263 

Fort  Loxcix  Near  Liege  After  a  Bombardment     .        .        .   265 

Gexeral  de  Castelx'au 274 

Gex'eral  von  Heerix'Gex" 281 

Gexeral  Paul  Pau • .        .        .  286 

LouvAiN  After  the  Germax^  Bombardmext 294 

The  Library  of  Louvain  Before  It  was  Destroyed  .        .        .  295 

Belgiaxs  Diggixg  Trenches 309 

Siege  Gux'  Used  to  Reduce  Belgiax'  Forts 313 

The  Fortress  of  Dix^ant  on  the  Meuse 318 

Malines  After  the  Bombardmex^t 321 

Part  of  the  Waterfront  op  Axtwerp 329 

Protectix'G  a  Rubex'S  ix"^  Ax^twerp 335 

Belgian  Armored  Train 337 

German  Soldiers  Sharing  Food  with  Belgiax^  Orphaxs.        .  349 

Cardinal  Mercier  of  Belgium 355 

James  Yiscoux^t  Bryce 358 

Edith  Cavell  in  Brussels 364 

Brane  Whitlock,  American  Minister  to  Belgium   .        .        .  366 

Lox^don  Hoxors  to  Miss  Cavell's  Memory 367 

General  Baron  von  Bissing 373 

Herbert  A.  Hoover 374 

MAPS 

Bosnia,  Herzegovina  and  Serbia  ....     facing  page  72 

The  Balkan^  Wars  Before  axd  After 77 

The  German  Advax^ce  Across  Belgium      .       .     facing  page  256 

Liege  ax^d  Its  Rix^g  of  Forts 260 

The  Rhine  Frontier  of  Germany  ax^d  France  .     facing  page  272 

The  Approaches  to  Antwerp facing  page  328 

Antwerp  and  Its  Ring  of  Forts 331 

ix 


A  GROUP  OF  WAR  CORRESPONDENTS 
Will  Irwin  Herbert  Bayard  Swope 


Ellis  Ash  mead  Bartlett 

©   INTERNATIONAL   FILM   SERVICE,    N.   Y. 


Richard  Harding  Davis 

©  international  film  service.  n.  y. 


Karl  H.  von  Wieganu 


Walter  Duranty 
Caspar  Whitney  Edwin  L.  James 


THE  SOURCES  FOR  THIS  HISTORY 

IN  the  first  year  of  the  war  a  press  censorship,  more  severe  than 
ever  known  before,  w^as  imposed  on  news  from  all  battlefronts, 
the  result  being-  that  it  w^as  not  until  long  after  events  occurred  that 
the  public  acquired  any  clear  knowledge  of  them.  This  was  con- 
spicuously true  of  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne,  and  the  means  by 
which  Joffre  effected  his  great  victory,  and  especially  the  relation 
of  that  battle  to  Castelnau's  resistance  to  the  Germans  at  the  Grand 
Couronne.  Of  the  battle  of  Morhange — the  only  considerable  battle 
in  the  whole  war  that  was  fought  on  German  soil,  and  a  greater  battle 
than  any  of  those  fought  in  the  same  period  in  Belgium  and  during 
the  retreat  to  Paris — nothing  whatever  was  really  known,  not  even 
the  name  Morhange,  until  so  long  afterward  that  the  public  mind 
had  then  become  too  much  absorbed  in  other  battles  to  be  interested 
in  Morhange.  Even  when  gTeat  battles  began  to  take  place  in 
Flanders  and  Northern  France,  coherent  details  of  what  had  occurred 
were  lacking  for  many  months.  Of  the  long  struggle  on  the  Yser 
in  October,  1914,  and  of  the  first  battle  of  Ypres  in  October  and 
November  of  the  same  year, — the  latter  being  perhaps  the  most 
wonderful  effort  put  forth  by  the  British  during  the  whole  conflict, 
— such  accounts  as  we  had  were  pitifully  meager  and  disconnected. 
This  was  still  more  true  of  operations  on  the  Russian  front,  and 
conspicuously  true  of  the  Dunajec  battle,  which,  more  than  any  other 
battle  previous  to  August,  1918,  could  have  been  called  an  approach 
to  a  decisive  battle;  indeed  it  might  be  held  that  it  was  decisive, 
since  it  led  to  the  ultimate  elimination  of  Russia  as  a  factor  in  the 
war. 

There  were  correspondents  at  the  front  in  those  first  months,  and 
they  were  provided  with  special  credentials,  but  they  served  under 
disadvantages,  owing  to  the  restrictions  imposed.  One  of  these  was 
Frederick  Palmer,  who  represented  groups  of  American  newspapers 
and  was  accredited  to  the  headquarters  of  the  British  Army  and 
Navy.  Another  was  H.  Warner  Allen,  accredited  to  French  head- 
quarters as  representative  of  the  British  press,  while  Ellis  Ash- 
mead-Bartlett,  serving  on  board  a  British  warship  off  the  Dar- 
danelles, supplied  British  papers  with  what  real  news  they  had  from 
Gallipoli.  Another  name  familiar  to  newspaper  readers  at  that 
time  was  Colonel  E.  Swinton,  better  known  as  the  "Eye-Witness," 
whose  accounts  of  events  on  the  Western  Front  were  accepted  in 
England  for  many  months  as  the  only  ones  really  official,  or  believed 


THE  SOURCES  FOR  THIS  HISTORY 

to  be  authentic.  Among  writers  who  commented  on  each  day's  news, 
making  it  understandable  to  Americans,  a  place  of  distinction  was 
won  by  Frank  H.  Simonds,  who  wrote  from  tlie  beginning  of  the 
war  until  the  end;  indeed,  until  the  Peace  Congress  closed  its  labors, 
first  for  the  New  York  Sun,  then  for  The  Review  of  Reviews, 
New  York  Tribune,  The  New  Republic,  and  the  McClure  Syndicate. 

As  the  censorship,  in  the  course  of  the  second  year,  gradually  re- 
laxed, special  correspondents  were  able  to  send  dispatches  from  the 
fighting  front  and  did  not  suffer  from  serious  restrictions,  conditions 
in  which  there  came  into  existence  a  service,  which,  for  efficiency  and 
literary  excellence,  surpassed  anything  ever  known  in  previous  wars. 
Our  Civil  War  had  brought  to  the  front  correspondents  who  then, 
and  afterward  in  various  vocations,  achieved  distinction,  among 
them  "Bull  Run"  Russell,  famous  already  for  his  newspaper  work 
in  the  Crimean  War,  Edmund  Clarence  Stedman,  of  the  New  York 
World,  who  became  better  known  as  a  poet  and  critic,  George  W. 
Smalley,  of  the  New  York'  Tribune,  who  for  more  than  thirty  years 
was  known  as  its  London  correspondent,  and  Whitelaw  Reid,  of 
The  Cincinnati  Gazette,  who  in  1873  succeeded  Horace  Greeley  as 
editor  of  The  New  York  Tribute,  and  died  in  London  nearly  forty 
years  afterward  as  American  Ambassador  to  the  Court  of  St. 
James'.  But  none  of  these  Civil  War  writers,  largely  because  of 
limited  mechanical  facilities  and  the.  cost  of  telegraphic  service,  ap- 
proached in  the  fulness  and  excellence  of  their  work  the  dispatches 
which  became  familiar  everywhere  in  the  last  three  years  of  the 
world-war. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  present  history,  the  compiler  was  con- 
stantly embarrassed  by  the  volume  and  excellence  of  the  correspon- 
dence that  now  appeared  every  day  in  leading  newspapers  all  over 
the  world,  and,  besides  correspondence,  much  other  war  material 
continued  to  be  printed  in  daily  and  weekly  newspapers,  and  in 
monthly  magazines,  the  supply  after  nearly  five  years  becoming  a 
truly  formidable  output.  Most  monthly  and  weekly  magazines 
printed  at  least  one  war  article  in  each  issue,  and  often  two  or  three ; 
while  a  few  'issued  numbers  that  contained  nothing  except  war 
matter.  The  war  was  the  chief  topic,  not  only  with  general  papers, 
but  with  financial,  religious,  naval,  military,  scientific,  and  technical 
journals,  and  with  country  weeklies.  One  New  York  daily  paper, 
in  the  first  week  of  August,  1914,  printed  380  columns  of  war  mat- 
ter; or  an  average  of  fifty-three  columns  a  day.  Books  soon  began 
to  appear  and  ere  long  numbered  hundreds,  and  then  thousands, 
until,  when  the  war  ended,  tens  of  thousands  had  been  published. 

That  this  mass  of  literature  far  exceeded  everything  written  for 
a  hundred  years  on  the  Napoleonic  wars,  that  it  exceeded  all  that  had 

xii 


THE  SOURCES  FOR  THIS  HISTORY 

been  written  for  fifty  years  on  our  Civil  War — two  topics,  which, 
before  this  conflict,  were  known  to  have  produced  the  largest 
amounts  of  literature  extant  in  the  world  pertaining-  to  single 
themes,  except  the  Bible — admitted  of  easy  demonstration.  Articles 
in  newspapers  and  periodicals  made  the  largest  part  of  it,  but  the 
number  of  books  and  pamphlets  was  in  excess  of  anything  that  the 
wildest  human  imagination  would  have  dared  to  say  was  possible. 
At  the  end  of  the  first  year,  the  war  books  published  in  Great 
Britain  had  numbered  more  than  two  thousand,  and  at  the  end  of 
1915  the  number  in  Germany,  including  pamphlets,  had  reached 
more  than  8,000,  while  the  number  issued  in  all  countries  by  the  end 
of  the  war  probably  exceeded  50,000. 

Meanwhile,  had  appeared,  early  in  the  war,  the  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence of  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  Belgium,  and  Ger- 
many, covering  the  weeks  that  immediately  preceded  the  outbreak, 
and  from  which  narratives  as  to  immediate  causes  could  readily  be 
constructed.  A  large  number  of  statements,  made  in  public  as  in- 
terviews or  as  speeches,  and  many  volumes  of  reminiscences  after- 
ward appeared,  from  men  closely  related  to  the  conflict.  Among 
those  representing  the  Teutonic  side  were  Prince  Lichnowsky,  the 
former  German  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain ;  Dr.  MUehlon,  a 
former  Krupp  director;  Dr.  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  and  Count 
von  Hertling,  two  of  the  four  Imperial  German  Chancellors  of  the 
war  period;  Gottlieb  von  Jagow,  the  German  Foreign  Minister  in 
1914;  Baron  von  Wangenheim,  the  Gennan  Ambassador  to  Turkey 
in  the  first  years  of  the  war ;  Matthias  Erzberger,  head  of  the  German 
Armistice  Commission  of  November,  1918;  General  Ludendorff,  the 
organizer  of  the  great  German  offensive  of  March,  1918;  Kurt 
Eisner,  the  Bavarian  Prime  Minister  under  the  revolution,  who  was 
assassinated  in  1919;  General  Comit  Sixt  von  Arnim,  who  had  a 
command  in  the  Somme  battle  and  other  commands  on  the  Western 
Front  during  the  entire  war,  and  who  perished  at  the  hands  of 
assassins  in  1919;  General  Hoffmann,  who  commanded  on  the  Rus- 
sian front  in  1917  and  was  the  military  representative  of  Germany 
in  the  Brest-Litovsk  treaty;  Field-Marshal  von  Holtzendorf,  chief 
in  command  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  at  the  outbreak  of  war. 
Count  Czemin,  the  Austrian  Foreign  IMJinister,  who  also  was  at 
Brest-Litovsk,  and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  the  head  of  the  German 
Navy. 

On  the  Entente  side  were  Field-Marshal  Haig,  who  published 
notable  official  reports;  Field-Marshal  French,  who  also  wrote  re- 
ports, and  published  a  book  of  reminiscences;  Admiral  Jellico,  who 
wrote  a  book,  widely  quoted,  dealing  with  British  naval  operations, 
including  the  battle  of  Jutland;   Sir  Edward  Goschen,  the  British 

V.  1—2  ^;;; 


THE  SOURCES  FOR  THIS  HISTORY 

Ambassador  to  Geimany  in  1914.  Jules  Cambon,  the  French  Am- 
bassador to  Germany  in  1914;  four  American  ambassadors,  or  min- 
isters, to  European  states,  James  W.  Gerard,  who  was  in  Berlin; 
Henry  Morgenthau,  in  Constantinople;  Brand  Whitlock,  in  Brus- 
sels; and  Maurice  F.  Eg-an,  in  Copenhagen;  all  of  whom  narrated 
their  experiences  in  book  form;  Rear  Admiral  Rodman,  who  under 
Admiral  Sims,  was  in  command  of  American  warships  in  the  North 
Sea,  and  Gen.  Basil  Gourko,  at  one  time  Chief  of  Staff  of  the 
Russian  Army. 

Such  were  a  few  of  the  sources  that  became  available  to  writers 
and  compilers  during  the  war,  or  within  a  year  after  the  armistice 
was  signed.  Only  a  formal  bibliography  that  embraced  books,  mag- 
azines, newspapers,  bulletins,  monographs,  interviews,  and  official  re- 
ports, and  of  itself  filling  a  volume  of  considerable  size,  could  with 
real  adequacy  indicate  in  a  larger  sense  the  wide  and  varied  sources 
from  whicb  the  compiler  of  this  work  has  been  able  to  draw  informa- 
tion, but  among  the  number — and  to  some  of  these  the  obligation 
has  been  almost  constant — several  should  be  particularly  named: 
The  London  Times'  "History  of  the  War,"  of  which  twenty  large 
octavo  volumes,  illustrated,  had  reached  this  country  by  May,  1919; 
Nelson's  History  of  the  War,"  by  John  Buchan,  completed  in  twenty- 
four  twelvemo  volumes;  ^'The  Fortnightly  History  of  the  War,"  by 
Col.  A.  M.  Murray,  C.  B. ;  cable  dispatches,  editorial  articles  and 
special  contributions  in  The  New  York  Times,  The  New  York 
Evening  Post,  The  New  York  Tribune,  The  New  York  World,  The 
Philadelphia  Evening  Public  Ledger,  The  New  York  Sun,  The  New 
York  Evening  Sun,  The  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce,  The  New 
York  Herald,  Current  Opinion,  The  Review  of  Reviews,  The  World's 
Work,  The  Outlook,  The  Independent,  Bradstreet's,  The  Wall  Street 
Journal,  The  London  Times,  The  London  Daily  News,  The  London 
Economist,  The  London  Morning  Post,  The  London  Daily  Chronicle, 
The  London  Daily  Mail,  The  London  Daily  News,  The  Fortnightly 
Review,  The  Atlantic  Monthly,  The  North  American  Review,  "Bul- 
letins" of  the  National  Geographic  Society,  and  despatches  of  The 
Associated  and  United  Presses. 

Among  writers  in  magazines  and  writers  of  editorial  articles 
in  newspapers,  and  among  men  otherwise  helpful  to  the  compiler 
in  gaining  information,  were :  M*ajor-General  Francis  Vinton  Greene, 
who  had  known  all  the  conflicts  of  his  time  either  from  personal 
service  in  them  or  as  a  student  and  a  writer;  Charles  R.  Miller,  edi- 
tor, and  Carr  Y.  van  Anda,  managing  editor,  of  The  New  York 
Times;  Rollo  Ogden,  editor  of  The  New  York  Evening  Post;  Colonel 
George  Harvey,  editor  of  The  North  American  Revietv  and  of  Har- 
vey's Weekly;  Dr.  Edward  J.  Wheeler,  editor  of  Current  Opinion; 

xiv 


THE  SOURCES  FOR  THIS  HISTORY 

Dr.  Frank  H.  Vizetelly,  managing  editor  of  "The  Standard  Diction- 
ary"; Dr.  Albert  Shaw,  editor  of  The  Review  of  Reviews,  Ellery 
Sedgwick,  editor  of  The  Atlantic  Monthly;  Hamilton  Holt,  editor 
of  The  Independent ;  John  W.  Dodsworth,  president,  and  Amos 
Kidder  Fiske,  chief  editorial  writer,  of  the  New  York  Journal  of 
Commerce;  Edward  P.  Mitchell,  editor  of  the  New  York  Sun; 
Garret  Garrett,  managing  editor  of  the  New  York  Tribune;  Profes- 
sor Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  of  Harvard  University;  J.  de  B.  W.  Gar- 
diner, the  "Military  Expert,"  and  Charles  Willis  Thompson,  an 
editorial  waiter  for  The  New  York  Times;  William  L.  McPherson, 
the  "Military  Expert"  of  The  New  York  Tribune;  Col.  A.  M. 
Murray,  waiter  of  monthly  war  outlines  for  The  Fortnightly  Review; 
Dr.  John  H.  Finley,  who  was  twice  in  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia 
for  the  Red  Cross;  Stephen  Lausanne,  editor  of  The  Paris  Matin; 
William  C.  Dreher,  for  fifteen  years  an  Associated  Press  corre- 
spondent in  Berlin;  George  Kennan,  a  writer  par  excellence  on 
Russian  affairs,  who  contributed  important  articles  to  The  Outlook; 
Montgomery  Schuyler,  who  during  the  war  made  official  visits  to 
Russia  for  the  United  States  Government;  Frederick  Palmer  and 
Hilaire  Belloc,  who  first  made  the  battle  of  the  Marne  understand- 
able to  English  and  American  readers;  Walter  Littlefield,  of  The 
New  York  Times,  and  Whitney  Warren,  the  New  York  architect. 
Among  war  correspondents  who  wrote  under  their  own  names  par- 
ticular mention  should  be  made  of  the  following  representatives  of 
the  newspapers  named : 

The  New  York  Times:  Philip  Gibbs,  George  H.  Perris,  General 
Sir  Frederick  D.  Maurice,  Walter  Duranty,  Ed^vin  L.  James,  George 
Renwick,  Harold  Begbee,  Cyril  Brown,  Garret  Garrett,  Carl  W. 
Ackerman,  W.  T.  Massey,  Harold  Williams,  Austin  West,  Perry 
Robinson,  Cameron  McKenzie,  Percival  Gibbons,  Charles  H.  Grasty. 

The  New  York  Tribune:  Richard  Harding  Davis,  Will  Irwin, 
Arthur  S.  Draper,  Caspar  Whitney,  C.  W.  Gilbert,  Fred  B.  Pitney, 
Wilbur  S.  Forrest,  J.  L.  Garvin. 

The  New  York  World:  E.  Alexander  Powell,  Karl  H.  von  Wie- 
gand,  General  Frederick  von  Bemhardi,  Lincoln  Eyre,  Arno  Dosch- 
Fleurot,  Herbert  Bayard  Swope. 

The  New  York  Evening  Sun:  Thomas  M.  Johnson,  Will  J.  Guard. 

The  New  York  Sun:  Perry  Robinson,  Raymond  G.  Carroll,  Ger- 
ald Campbell,  G.  Ward  Price,  B.  N.  Norregaard,  William  Philip 
Simms,  H.  Sidebotham,  Henry  Wood,  Percival  Phillips. 

The  New  York  Independent :  Dr.  Louis  Livingston  Seaman. 

The  New  York  Evening  Post:  David  Lawrence,  Horace  Green. 

The  Chicago  Daily  News:  Ben  Hecht,  Lewis  Edgar  Brown. 

The  Chicago  Tribune:  Floyd  Gibbons. 

XV 


THE  SOURCES  FOR  THIS  HISTORY 

The  Chicago  Herald:  James  Keeley. 

The  Minneapolis  Journal:  Jefferson  Jones. 

The  Saturday  Evening  Post:  Reginald  W.  Kaufmann. 

Many  of  these  wrote  also  for  London  newspapers,  including  The 
Times,  The  Morning  Post,  The  Daily  Mail,  The  Daily  News,  The 
Daily  Clironicle,  The  Standard  and  The  Daily  Telegraph.  Dr.  E.  J. 
Dillon  was  notable  among  writers  for  English  newspa^Ders  and  reviews. 
Eor  news  from  the  Russian  front  much  dependence  was  placed  on 
Stanley  Washburn,  of  the  London  Times,  and  Stephen  Graham,  of 
The  London  Morning  Post.  Among  notable  German  correspondents 
were  Karl  Rosner  of  the  Berlin  Localanzeiger,  Baron  Karl  von  Reden 
of  the  Berlin  Tagehlatt,  and  Max  Osborne,  of  the  Berlin  Vossische 
Zeitung.  Among  German  newspaper  writers  who  were  not  cor- 
respondents, were  Maximilian  Harden  of  Die  Zuhunft,  George  Ber- 
nard of  the  Berlin  Vossische  Zeitung,  Count  zu  Reventlow  of  the 
Berlin  Tageszeitung,  Theodore  Wolff,  of  the  Berlin  Tagehlatt,  Major 
Moraht,  the  military  critic,  Sven  Hedin,  who  was  accredited  to  Ger- 
man headquarters,  and  writers  for  The  Frankfurter  Zeitung.  Fol- 
lowing are  other  newspapers  and  periodicals  from  which  informa- 
tion was  derived : 


NEWSPAPEES  EEPEESENTING  THE  CENTEAL  POWEES 


The  Berlin  Ahendpost. 
The  Berlin  Vonvaerts. 
The  Berlin  Overseas  Agency. 
The  Berlin  TdgliscJie  Eundscliau. 
The  Berlin  Kreuzzeitung. 
The  Berlin  Germania. 
The  Berlin  Deutsche  Tageszeitung, 
The  Berlin  Zeitung  am  Mittag. 
The  Berlin  Tag. 
The  Berlin  National  ^eitung. 
The  Berlin  Woche. 
The  Berlin  Morgen  Post. 
The  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zei- 
tung. 
The  Munich  Neueste  Nachrichten. 
The  Munich  Allgemeine  Zeitung. 
The  Munich  Bayerische  Kurier. 
The  Vienna  Neue  Freie  Presse. 
The  Vienna  Fremdenhlatt. 
The  Vienna  Neues  Wiener  Journal. 
The  Vienna  Wiener  Zeitung. 
The  Leipzig  General  Anzeiger. 
The  Hamburger  Nachrichten. 
The  Koelnische  VolJcszeitung. 


The  Koelnische  Zeitung. 

The  Essen  Bheinische   Westpha- 

lische  Anzeiger. 
The  Vienna  Extrablatt. 
The  Vienna  Eeichspost. 
The  Budapest  Nepszava. 
The  Budapest  Pester  Lloyd. 
The  Budapest  Pest  Eirlap. 
The  Budapest  Az  Est. 
The  Wolfe  Bureau  News  Service. 
** Bulletins''    of    the    Bureau    der 

Deutschen  Handelstag. 
Kriegs  KroniTc. 
Die  Illustrierte  Geschichte  des  Welt 

Kriegs 
Weltlrieg. 

The  Constantinople  Tanine. 
The  Constantinople  Ikdam. 
The  Constantinople  WaTcit. 
The  Constantinople  TerakM. 
The  Constantinople  Istikeal. 
The  Constantinople  Tasfiri  Exkyar. 
The  Sofia  Dnevnik. 
The  Sofia  Narodni  Prava. 


THE  SOURCES  FOR  THIS  HISTORY 


The  Sofia  Narodna  Volia. 

The  Sofia  Narod. 

The  Sofia  Mir. 

The  Sofia  Ben. 

The  New  York  Staats-Zeitung. 


The  New  York  Morgen  Journal. 
The  New  York  Fatherland. 
The  Overseas  News  Agency. 
The  Wolff  Bureau. 


EUROPEAN   ENTENTE    NEWSPAPERS  AND   MAGAZINES 


The  London  Standard. 

The  London  Daily  Graphic. 

The  London  Globe. 

The  London  Evening  Standard. 

The  London  Pall  Mall  Gazette. 

The  London  Daily  Express. 

The  London  Evening  News. 

The  London  Observer. 

The  London  Indian. 

The  London  Truth. 

The  London  Saturday  Eeview. 

The  London  Statist. 

The  London  Spectator, 

The  London  Sphere. 

The  London  iVews  Witriess. 

The  London  Nation. 

The  London  Illustrated  News. 

The  London  Outlook. 

The  London  A^ei<;  Statesman. 

The  London  i^air  PZay. 

The  Manchester  Guardian. 

The  Manchester  Examiner. 

The  Calcutta  Englishman. 

The  Westminster  Gazette. 

Renter's  News  Service. 

T/ie  Contemporary  Review. 

The  Independence  Beige. 

The  National  Bevieiu. 

The  Nineteenth  Century. 

The  Quarterly  Eeview. 

The  Edinburgh  Eeview. 

Blackwood's  Magazine. 

Great  Eastern  Eailway  Magazine. 

The  Paris  Temps. 

The  Paris  Gaulois. 

The  Paris  Petit  Journal. 

The  Paris  Matin. 

The  Paris  Figaro. 

The  Paris  Journal. 

The  Paris  Uumanite. 

The  Paris  L  'Eomme  Libre. 

The  Paris  Illustration. 


The  Paris  L'Homme  Enchaine. 

The  Paris  La  Victoire: 

The  Paris  Le  Peti*  Parisien. 

The  Paris  Xa  Liberie. 

The  Havas  News  Service. 

The  Petrograd  Novoye  Vremya. 

The  Petrograd  Kolotkol. 

The  Petrograd  Birzheniya  Nedo- 

niost. 
The  Bevue  de  Paris. 
The  New  Europe. 
The  Tokyo  Nictri-NictrL 
The  Tokyo  Yomiuri. 
The  Osaka  Asahi  Jap. 
The  Petrograd  Birzheniya  Nedo- 

niosti. 
The  Petrograd  Eyetch. 
The  Petrograd  Golos. 
The  Moscow  Eusskiya  Vyedomosti. 
The  Moscow  Outro. 
The  Moscow  Eusskoye  Slovo. 
The  Moscow  ;iboZ^s  Moskuy. 
The  Tiflis  Horizon. 
The  Archangel  Sovernue  Utro. 
The  Rome  Tribuna. 
The  Rome  Osservatore  Eomano. 
The  Rome  Messagero. 
The  Rome  Concire  d'ltalia. 
The  Rome  Liberte. 
The  Rome  Corriere  d'ltalia. 
The  Rome  Secolo. 
The  Milan  Corriere  Delia  Sera.    ^ 
The  Turin  Stampa. 
The  Bucharest  Ademerul. 
The  Bucharest  Universid. 
The 'Bucharest  Epocha. 
The  Bucharest  Independence  Eou- 

mania. 
The  Belgrade  Balkan. 
The  Belgrade  Pravda. 
The  Belgrade  Narodni  Dnevnik. 


THE  SOURCES  FOR  THIS  HISTORY 


AMERICAN  NEWSPAPEES  AND  PERIODICALS 


The  New  York  Globe. 

The  New  York  Commercial. 

The  Philadelphia  Public  Ledger. 

The  Philadelphia  Evening  Public 
Ledger. 

The  Philadelphia  Press. 

The  Boston  Transcript. 

The  Boston  Herald. 

The  Boston  Congregationalist. 

The  Boston  News  Bureau. 

The  Springfield  Republican. 

The  Providence  Journal. 

The  Hartford  Courant. 

The  Buffalo  Express. 

The  Buffalo  Commercial  Adver- 
tiser. 

The  Minneapolis  Journal. 

The  Cleveland  Leader. 

The  Cleveland  Plain-Dealer. 

The  Brooklyn  Eagle. 

The'Washington  Post. 

The  Baltimore  Sun. 

The  St.  Louis  Globe  Democrat. 

The  Louisville  Courier-Jourrial. 

The  Kansas  City  /S^or. 

The  Toronto  Globe. 

The  Montreal  >Sifar. 


The  Richmond  Times-Dispatch. 
The  Atlanta  Constitution. 
The  Detroit  jPree  Press. 
The  Portland  Oregonian. 
The  San  Francisco  Ca^?. 
The  New  Orleans  /^em. 
The  Los  Angeles  Times. 
The  San  Francisco  Bulletin. 
The  Pittsburgh  Times-Dispatch. 
The  Columbus  /S'tate  Journal. 
The  Omaha  jKee. 
The  Salt  Lake  Tribune. 
The  Literary  Digest. 
Collier's  WeeMy. 
The  New  Bepublic. 
The  North  American  Eevieiv. 
Everybody 's  Magazine. 
Moody's  Magazine. 
The  American  Forestry  Magazine. 
Modern  Mechanics. 
The  Field  Artillery  Journal. 
The  Journal  of  the  Arnerican  Medi- 
cal Association. 
The  Commercial  Vehicle. 
The  Horseless  Age. 
The  Congressional  Becord. 


PAPERS  PUBLISHED  IN  NEUTRAL  COUNTRIES 


The  Amsterdam  Telegraf. 

The  Rotterdam  Telegraf. 

The  Rotterdam  Nieuw  Courant. 

The  Copenhagen  National  Tidende. 

The  Journal  de  Geneve. 


The  Zuricher  Zeitung. 

The  Zurich  Berner  Tagwacht. 

The  Zurich  Gazette  de  Lausaine. 

The  Madrid  Epoca. 

The  Barcelona  Noticias. 


Such  in  brief  was  the  character  of  the  first-hand  source  material 
employed  in  compiling  the  historj\  An  outline  narrative  was  at  first 
undertaken,  after  wdiich  ensued  a  long'  process — never  quite  com- 
pleted in  any  chapter  until  months  after  the  war  closed — of  re- 
writing and  adjusting  the  material,  with  constant  substitutions, 
modifications,  corrections  and  re-arrangements  in  the  light  of  newer 
information,  so  that,  what  had  often  seemed  a  final  revision,  was 
again  and  again  superseded  by  another,  until  a  fifth.,  or  even  sixth, 
copy  might  be  produced.  With  the  passing  of  nearly  five  years,  in 
which  every  day  and  most  nights,  holidays  and  Sundays  were  de- 


XVlll 


THE  SOURCES  FOR  THIS  HISTORY 

voted  to  the  work,  the  record  obtained  the  form*  in  which  the  reader 
now  sees  it. 

Not*  that  b}^  this  process  the  langaiage  become,  in  the  main,  the 
compiler's  own.  It  is  sometimes  his;  on  occasions  it  may  be  entirely 
his,  and  usually  it  is  his  in  some  degree,  but,  in  essence,  it  is  more 
strictly  that  of  others,  as  condensed,  re-arranged,  re-written,  and, 
by  a  sort  of  melting-pot  process,  adapted  to  the  purposes  of  a  com- 
prehensive and  co-ordinated  narrative.  Aside  from  passages'  di^^-ectly 
quoted,  there  are  practically  none — or  there  are  extremely  few — 
which,  if  they  have  not  been  materially  re-written,  have  not,  in  some 
degTee,  been  changed  from  their  original  forms.  Apart  from  other 
considerations,  it  was  important  that  the  style,  in  so  far  as  possible, 
should  be  made  uniform.  If  the  narrative  reads  as  if  it  were  the 
production  of  one  pen,  when,  in  its  remoter  origins,  it  is  that  of 
several  hundred  pens,  a  hope  will  have  been  realized. 

Ephemeral  as*  much  of  the  compiler's  source  material  essentially 
was,  fated  to  perish  with  the  day  for  which  it  was  written,  it  is  a 
pleasing  thought  that,  by  reviving  in  book  form  the  vital  substance 
of  so  much  of  it,  he  may  have  done  something  to  secure  a  longer 
life  and  deeper  appreciation  for  the  industry  and  fine  spirit  so 
conspicuously  shown  by  those  who  produced  it.  In  frequent  in- 
stances writers,  working  under  great  difficulties,  in  the  midst  of  the 
events  they  described,  produced,  not  alone  journalistic  "stories  "  but 
literature. 

F.  TV.  H. 

Xew  York,  June,  1910, 


A   GROUP   OF   WRITERS   ON   WAR   NEWS 


Charles  R.  Miller 

Editor-in-Chief  of  The  New  York 
Times 


The 


Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon 

Writer  for  English  Newspapers 
and  Magazines 

©  INTERNATIONAL  FILM   SERVICE.    N.   Y. 

J.  DE  B.  W.  Gardiner 
Military  Expert"  of  The  New  York  Times 


Maj.-Gen.  Francis  V.  Greene  Frank   H.   Simonds 

Of  The  Review  of  Reviews  and 
The  New  York  Tribune 
Amos  Kidder  Fiske 
Chief  Editorial  Writer  of  The  New  York  Journal  0/  Commerce 
Albert  Bushnell  Hart  William   L.  McPherson 

Of  Harvard  University  The  "Military  Expert"  of  The 

New  York  Tribune 
XX 


INTRODUCTION 

WHY    THIS    WAE 


V.  I— 1 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

ITS  MAGNITUDE,  MANY  CAUSES,   EARLY   CON- 
SEQUENCES,   NEW   METHODS    AND 
DECISIVE   LATER  ASPECTS 

BECAUSE  a  poor  Bosnian  student  named  Gavrio  Prinzip, 
eighteen  years  old,  fired  two  shots  from  a  revolver  which 
killed  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  Crown  Prince  of 
Austria,  and  his  wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg,  when 
driving  through  the  streets  of  Serajevo  in  broad  daylight  in 
June,  1914 — that  is,  as  immediate  or  ensuing  results  of  that 
act — more  than  thirty  states,  great  and  small,  entered  into 
w^ar  on  the  two  sides,  six  others  severed  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany,  and  our  own  country,  before  going  into  the 
war,  was  several  times  on  the  verge  of  doing  so ;  the  material 
civilization  of  Europe  was  set  back  several  decades;  some 
millions  of  men,  women,  and  children — perhaps  30,000,000 — 
were  killed  or  injured ;  quite  6,000  ships,  of  which  some  200 
that  were  warships  were  sunk;  large  parts  of  Belgium, 
Poland,  and  Serbia  were  laid  waste,  together  with  fertile 
stretches  in  France,  Austria,  Roumania  and  Russia ;  national 
debts  were  increased  to  figures  which  a  generation  before 
would  have  meant  wholesale  bankruptcy;  and  industry,  com- 
merce, arts  and  letters  over  half  the  globe  for  four  and  a 
half  years  stood  still.  Gavrio  Prinzip,  then  too  young  under 
Austrian  law  for  execution,  by  many  regarded  as  a  martyr, 
by  others  as  a  madman,  was  condemned  to  spend  twenty 
years  as  a  prisoner  in  an  Austrian  fortress  near  Prague, 
where  he  died  of  tuberculosis  on  April  30,  1918,  his  name 
perhaps  destined  in  later  times  to  be  quite  unknown  to  men 
who  should  talk  with  intelligence  of  the  great  war.^ 

Almost  overnight  was  the  world  involved  in  this  war,  a 
conflict  which  transcended  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  as  those 
dwarfed  the  Thirty  Years' War,  and  as  that  in  turn  dwarfed 

1  With  Prinzip  twenty-two  other  men  had  been  arraigned  at  the  trial,  the 
evidence  at  which  was  never  made  public.  Four  were  executed,  but  Prinzip, 
who  was  the  actual  murderer,  and  Gabrinovitch.  who  threw  a  bomb,  both 
being  under  age.  got  only  twenty  years  each.  One  of  the  other  men  was 
sentenced  to  life  imprisonment,  one  to  thirteen  years,  two  to  ten,  one  to 
seven,  and  one  to  three  years. 


INTRODUCTION 

the  Hundred  Years'  War.  Because  an  ancient  empire  be- 
lieved she  saw  a  chance  to  humiliate  and  place  in  sub- 
servience an  obnoxious  neighbor  one-twelfth  her  size,  and 
because  a  greater  sister  empire,  in  the  opportunity  thus 
presented  saw  a  chance  to  extend  her  dominion  in  Europe, 
or,  as  she  steadily  contended,  without  convincing  anyone 
else,  because  she  had  to  defend  herself  against  Russia, 
France,  and  England,  more  than  550,000,000  people  were  at 
once  torn  from  the  peaceful  routine  of  their  daily  lives  and 
thrust  directly,  or  indirectly,  into  a  war  that  was  waged  by 
Prussianized  Germany  more  barbarously  than  any  other  war 
since  fighting  men  were  flayed  alive  or  drawn  and  quartered. 
More  than  one  writer  was  reminded  of  the  comment  of 
Macaulay  on  the  assault  made  by  Frederick  the  Great  on 
Austria  in  1740,  in  order  that  he  might  add  Silesia  to  his 
Kingdom : 

"On  the  head  of  Frederick  is  all  the  blood  which  was  shed  in  a 
war  which  raged  during  many  years  and  in  every  quarter  of  the 
globe,  the  blood  of  the  column  of  Fontenoy,  the  blood  of  the  brave 
mountaineers  who  were  slaughtered  at  Culloden.  The  evils  produced 
by  this  wickedness  were  felt  in  lands  where  the  name  of  Prussia  was 
unknown;  and  in  order  that  he  might  rob  a  neighbor  whom  he  had 
promised  to  defend,  black  men  fought  on  the  coast  of  Coromandel, 
and  red  men  scalped  each  other  by  the  Great  Lakes  of  North 
America." 

This,  however,  was  a  mild  comparison.  Because  Austria 
/  and  Germany  saw  an  opportunity  of  crushing  France, 
Russia,  and  Serbia,  black  men  fought  each  other  in  Nigeria, 
on  the  Gold  Coast,  and  on  the  Kongo;  Boer  Burghers  broke 
into  revolt  and  were  supprest  by  the  sword  in  South  Africa ; 
Turkey  came  into  a  conflict  which  cost  her  many  thousands 
of  lives,  made  her  treasury  more  bankrupt  than  ever,  and 
stript  her  of  all  that  she  had  left  of  European,  and  much 
she  had  of  Asiatic,  territory;  in  great  waters,  from  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  to  the  North  Sea,  from  the  Strait  of 
Magellan  to  the  Indian  Ocean,  from  the  English  Channel  to 
the  Bay  of  Biscay,  from  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar  to  the  Suez 
Canal,  half  a  score  of  battles  were  fought  by  great  ships  of 
war;  on  thousands  of  square  miles  of  land,  not  alone  in  Bel- 
gium, France,  Italy,  the  Balkans,  and  Russia,  but  in  regions 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

near  the  heart  of  African  jungles,  along  the  mountain  passes 
of  Caucasia,  and  in  that  cracllje  of  the  human  race  where 
the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  mingle  their  waters  before  enter- 
ing the  Persian  Gulf,  there  was  desperate  and  bitter  fight- 
ing; ruthless  devastation  was  wrought  by  warships,  which 
were  themselves  afterward  turned  into  blazing  hulks ;  off 
the  coast  of  Ireland  more  than  twelve  hundred  non-com- 
batants, men,  women,  and  children,  were  drowned  by  the 
sinking  of  one  of  the  world's  largest  Atlantic  passenger- 
ships  ;  in  an  unrestricted  submarine  warfare,  savagely  prose- 
cuted by  Germany,  more  than  one-third  of  the  world's  pre- 
war mercantile  tonnage  was  destroyed ;  Constantinople,  the 
ancient  city  of  Byzantine  Greeks,  of  Imperial  Romans,  and 
of  Ottoman  Turks,  suffered  bombardment  from  airplanes 
and  eventually,  after  nearly  500  years,  ceased  to  be  a 
possession  of  the  Turks,  while  at  Gallipoli,  in  defense  of 
Constantinople,  there  occurred  one  of  the  most  memorable 
seiges,  in  combined  naval  and  military  warfare,  that  the 
world  has  ever  known. 

In  the  last  year  and  a  half  of  the  war  still  more 
momentous  events  occurred.  Russia,  for  several  centuries 
the  most  complete  autocracy  in  Europe,  was  wholly  trans- 
formed— politically,  industrially,  and  socially — by  a  revo- 
lution which,  in  the  first  six  months  of  its  progress,  was  far 
less  remarkable  than  the  French  revolution  for  the  violence 
that  attended  it,  but  which  eventually  inflicted  such  blood- 
shed and  social  misery  as  never  before  had  occurred  in  any 
national  upheaval  known  to  history,  while  the  Czar  and  other 
members  of  the  Romanoff  family  were  pitilessly  put  to 
death.  Germany,  which  in  barbarous  ways  sought  to  exploit 
the  Russian  revolution  to  her  own  territorial  and  economic 
advantage,  in  the  folloAving  year  herself  became  the  victim 
of  a  revolution  in  which  the  Kaiser  and  Crown  Prince  of 
the  Empire  were  forced  to  abdicate,  the  King  of  Bavaria 
was  deposed  and  all  the  other  kings  and  reigning  grand 
dukes  of  the  federated  empire  lost  their  thrones.  In  Austria 
a  great  dismemberment  of  the  "ramshackle  empire"  began 
as  if  automatically,  before  the  peace  terms  were  laid  down 
by  the  Paris  conference,  the  Emperor  abdicating,  Hungary 
and  Bohemia  declaring  their  independence,  and  new  states 


INTRODUCTION 

being  raised  up  from  other  non-Teutonic  peoples.  Turkey 
emerged,  not  only  as  no  longer  a  European  power  seated  at 
Constantinople,  but  as  a  greatly  reduced  Asiatic  power, 
losing  as  she  did  Arabia,  Mesopotamia,  Palestine,  and  Syria. 
Germany's  fourth  ally,  Bulgaria,  saw  her  King,  under  com- 
pulsion, abdicate  in  favor  of  his  son,  who  after  a  reign  of 
only  a  few  weeks  was  deposed  and  a  republic  proclaimed. 

Simply  to  say  that  this  was  the  greatest  of  wars,  ancient 
or  modern,  would  fail  to  indicate  its  proportions.  No  other 
war  approached  it  in  numbers  engaged,  in  killed  and 
wounded,  or  in  expenditure  of  money.  Traditional  details 
have  come  down  to  us  of  vast  hordes  who  crossed  the 
Hellespont  with  Xerxes  and  Alexander  the  Great,  but  their 
numbers  were  far  surpassed  by  the  armies  engaged  in  this 
great  conflict.  No  fewer  than'  13,000,000  men  were  under 
arms  in  the  first  year,  and  in  the  same  period  2,000,000  were 
killed,  nearly  4,000,000  wounded,  and  more  than  2,000,000 
became  prisoners.  Our  Civil  War  had  commonly  been 
called  the  greatest  conflict  of  modern  times,  but  apparently 
it  was  only  one-tenth  the  magnitude  that  this  twentieth  cen- 
tury war  reached  in  the  first  year.  At  no  time  did  the 
number  of  men  under  arms  for  both  North  and  South  ex- 
ceed 1,300,000,  while  the  total  of  those  who  were  killed  in 
battle  or  w^ho  died  in  four  years  of  wounds  on  the  Northern 
side  was  only  110,000,  and  on  the  Southern  side  probably 
not  more  than  80,000.  In  the  four  years  the  destruction  of 
life  was  less  than  one-tenth  of  what  it  was  during  a  little 
more  than  one  year  of  the  recent  war,  while  in  the  four 
years  and  four  months  of  the  greater  conflict  7,354,000  men 
were  killed  in  battle  or  died  of  wounds. 

In  the  Napoleonic  wars,  from  1796  to  1815,  the  largest 
army  ever  assembled  was  that  which  Napoleon  led  into 
Russia  in  1812,  but  the  number  was  only  somewhat  in 
excess  of  500,000.  The  German  armies  sent  in  1914  against 
Russia  on  the  east,  and  France,  on  the  west,  were  more 
than  six  times*  larger  than  Napoleon's  armies.  The  greatest 
battle  in  previous  history  was  probably  what  is  known  as 
the  ''Battle  of  the  Nations,"  fought  at  Leipzig  in  1813,  but 
the  combatants  in  that  struggle  numbered  only  474,000.  At 
Sadowa,   in  the  war   of  Prussia   against   Austria   in   1866, 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

436,000  men  were  engaged;  a^  Gravelotte,  in  the  war  of 
Prussia  against  France  in  1870,  300,000;  at  Mukden,  in  the 
Eusso-Japanese  \yar  of  1904,  fought  on  a  front  of  eighty 
miles  and  lasting  three  weeks,  700,000.  In  the  World  War 
the  battle-front  in  Europe  sometimes  extended  over  twice 
or  three  times  eighty  miles  and  battles  lasted  for  weeks  and 
even  months.  At  Verdun  in  1916  the  battle  lasted  for 
several  months,  and  again  on  the  western  front  in  1918  men 
fought  for  several  months.  The  total  number  of  men  en- 
gaged on  a  single  front  more  than  once  was  in  excess  of 
two  millions. 

Our  War  of  1812  caused  the  death  of  about  50,000  men, 
and  the  Mexic'an  War  cost  us  a  like  number — 50,000 — most 
of  the  deaths  being  due  to  disease.  The  Crimean  War  cost 
France;  England,  Piedmont,  Turkey,  and  Russia,  785,000 
men,  600,000  of  whom  died  from  neglect,  privation,  and 
disease.  Our  Civil  War  caused  the  loss  of  between  600,000 
and  800,000  lives  from  wounds  and  disease — by  far  the 
greater  number  being  from,  exposure  and  disease.  The  war  of 
Prussia  and  Italy  against  Austria  in  1866  cost  45,000  men. 
In  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870  more  than  225,000  lives 
were  sacrificed,  and  during  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877 
not  less  than  250,000 ;  the  Boer  War, .  125,000,  of  whom 
100,000  were  British.  The  losses  from  wounds  and  disease 
on.  both  sides  during  the  Spanish-American  War  totalled 
6.000.  Allison,  the  historian  of  modem  Europe,  estimated 
that  the  French  lost  about  two  million  men  in  killed  during 
the  wars  of  the  Revolution  and  under  Napoleon  (1793-1815). 
In  nine  battles  in  which  Napoleon  himself  took  part,  the 
losses  were  as  follows: 

Name  of  Battle  Date 

Austerlitz  .  .      . .  1805 

Jena  .  .• 1805 

Eylau 1807 

Friedland  ..      ..  1807 

Eckmuhl 1809 

WagTam 1809 

Borodino 1812 

Leipzig      1813 

Waterloo 1815 


Men 

Killed 

Engaged 

and  Wounded 

148,000 

25,000 

98,000 

17,000 

133,000 

42,000 

142,000 

34,000 

145,000 

15,000 

370,000 

44,000 

263,000 

75,^00 

440,000 

92,000 

170,000 

42,000 

INTRODUCTION 

The  Napoleonic  wars  have  been  estimated  to  have  cost 
France,  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Italy,  Austria,  Spain, 
Russia,  and  Turkey  in  actual  expenditure  and  destruction, 
not  including  losses  of  trade  and  other  economic  waste,  not 
less  than  $15,000,000,000.  Our  War  of  1812  cost  $300,000,- 
000;  our  Mexican  War,  $180,000,000;  the  Crimean  War, 
$1,660,000;  the  Italian  War  of  1859,  $294,000,000;  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  War  of  1864,  $85,000,000;  our  Civil  War, 
$8,000,000,000 ;  the  Prusso-Austrian  War  of  1866,  $325,000,- 
000;  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870,  $3,000,000,000;  the 
Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877,  $1,100,000,000;  the  Zulu  and 
Afghan  Wars  of  1879,  $150,000,000;  the  Chino-Japanese 
War  of  1894-5,  $60,000,000;  the  Spanish  War  of  1898  cost 
Spain,  the  Philippines  and  the  United  States,  $800,000,000; 
the  Boer  War  of  1899-1901,  $1,300,000,000;  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  of  1904,  $1,735,000,000,  of  which  Japan's 
share  was  $800,000,000. 

The  grand  total  of  this  vast  expenditure — about  $33,000,- 
000,000 — if  combined  with  the  cost  of  innumerable  little 
wars,  of  which  England  alone  fought  eighty  during  the  past 
century,  and  of  which  there  have  been  also  an  uncomputed 
number  in  South  and  Central  America  as  well  as  in  the 
foreign  possessions  of  various  European  nations,  would  give 
an  approximate  total  cost  of  $38,000,000,000,  which,  with  no 
fear  of  real  exaggeration,  may  be  raised  to  $40,000,000,000,  to 
represent  the  cost  of  wars  extending  over  a  period  of  120 
years,  or  from  the  beginning  of  the  French  Revolutionary 
wars  in  1793  to  the  end  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in  1905.^ 
The  World  War  enormously  exceeded  these  figures.  The 
outlay  of  Germany  alone  has  probably  reached  $40,000,000,- 
000.  For  all  the  nations  engaged  the  best  obtainable  data 
show  a  total  of  at  least  $150,000,000,000;  another  estimate 
has  placed  it  at  $200,000,000,000. 

TCauses  innumerable  have  been  cited  for  -the  first  outbreak, 
some  as  if  they  were  the  sole  causes.  The  long  list  might 
be  classified  as  psychological,  racial,  political,  military,  eco- 
nomical,   industrial,    and    diplomatic.      Among   these    causes 

2  Sumnjarized  from  an  address  by  General  Francis  Vinton  Greene  before  the 
New  York  State  Historical  Association  at  West  Point  in  1915.  Printed 
afterward  in  The  Outlook. 

8 


WHY  THIS  .WAR? 

have  been  named  conflicting  territorial  ambitions;  Germany's 
belief  that  Great  Britain  unlawfully  repressed  her,  and  Ger- 
many 's  consequent  resentment ;  a  growing  organization  of 
•states  on  a  capitalistic  basis;  colonial  expansion  by  Great 
Britain  and  France  to  the  detriment  of  Germany;  tariff 
barriers;  a  nervous  tension  at  the  breaking-point  after  war 
crises;  the  continued  expansion  of  rival  military  and  naval 
establishments;  political  ignorance  and  mistrust  of  certain 
nations  by  other  nations ;  an  unequal  capacity  for  rapidity 
of  mobilization ;  the  division  of  European  states  into  two 
distinct  groups  of  alliances;  the  displacement  of  the  balance 
of  power  in  Eastern  Europe  by  Austria's  attack  on  Serbia, 
as  backed  by  Germany,  in  violation  of ''the  law  of  Europe"; 
secret  methods  in  diplomacy ;  a  greater  proportionate  growth 
of  wealth  and  population  in  Germany  than  in  England  and 
France,  and  in  a  too  restricted  area;  Russia's  partial 
mobilization  in  July,  1914,  against  Austria  and  possibly 
against  Germany;  Germany's  definite  refusal,  late  in  July, 
to  join  in  the  mediation  definitely  proposed  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey;  an  excessive  nationalism,  or  an  exalted  patriotism, 
leading  to  the  exclusion  of  international  feelings  and 
sympathies;  Darwin's  doctrines  of  evolution,  and  the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest  as  developed  in  Germany  by  Nietzsche 
into  a  cult  of  the  superman ;  a  mistaken  conception  ,of  the 
State,  as  something  above  all  law,  national  and  inter- 
national ;  the  deification  of  force  by  Germany,  and  especially 
of  military  force;  Great  Britain's  hesitation  to  side  promptly 
with  Russia  and  France  against  Germany  at  the  end  of  July 
or  in  ^the  first  days  of  August,  1914,  which  by  ''calling" 
Germany's  bluff  to  Russia,  might  have  averted  war. ) 

Under  conditions  such  as  these,  and  especially  in  view  of 
the  relation  of  these  conditions  to  various  crises  which  had 
occurred  in  European  affairs  for  forty  years,  were  found 
real  and  remote  causes.  Back  of  many  apparent  causes, 
however,  back  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente ; 
back  of  the   Fashoda  incident   of   1898,^   and   of   affairs   in 

3  Fashoda  was  a  military  post  which  a  French  officer  named  Marchand 
established  in  1898,  on  the  White  Nile  in  the  Sudan  country,  where  he 
came  into  conflict  with  the  British  under  General  Kitchener.  The  inter- 
national complications  which  ensued  ended  in  the  French  withdrawing  from 
the  post.     Out  of  the  better  feeling  between  France  and  Great  Britain,  which 

V.  1—3  9 


INTRODUCTION 

Morocco  in  1907-11;  back  of  Austria's  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  with  Germany's  support  in  1908;  back  of 
the  two  Balkan  Wars  of  1912  and  1913;  back  also  of  the 
tragedy  of  Serajevo  in  June,  1"914,  lay  another  and  far 
older  cause — one  vital  and  fundamental  because  it  was  not 
military,  not  diplomatic,  not  political,  but  something  more, 
being  rooted  in  human  nature — this  was  the  cause  of  race. 
More  and  more  as  the  war  went  on  did  close  observers  give 
weight  to  the  movemeruts  of  races  striving  to  expand  their 
governments  on  lines  co-extensive  with  their  racial  identities. 

Such  movements  had  come  violently  into  conflict  with  an 
existing  order  of  things.  To  the  twentieth  century  they 
were  what  the  movement  of  Liberalism  against  another  ex- 
isting order  of  things  had  been  to  the  nineteenth  century, 
around  about  1848;  what  hatred  of  monarch  against  mon- 
arch had  been  to  the  century  of  Frederick  the  Great;  what 
the  movement  for  religious  change  had  been  to  the  century 
of  Luther  and  Gustavus  Adolphus,  of  Philip  II,  and  the 
Duke  of  Alva ;  or  what  the  movement  against  feudalism  had 
been  to  the  century  of  Louis  XI.  Each  was  the  great 
motive  force  of  its  age,  and  in  each  was  involved  practically 
the  whole  of  Europe,  just  as  all  Europe  became  involved  in 
the  great  conflict  that  began  in  August,  1914.  In  the  re- 
adjustments of  the  Balkan  States  in  1878,  -after  the  Russo- 
Turkish  War,  and  again  in  1913,  after  the  Balkan  War, 
according  to  political  and  diplomatic  wisdom  rather  than 
according  to  racial  needs  and  ambitions,  might  be  found  a 
parent,  or  perhaps  a  grandparent,  of  the  World  War. 

The  chief  political  cause  was  probably  the  crisis  in 
Morocco.  After  its  settlement  in  1911,  many  observers  be- 
lieved that  a  great  catastrophe  had  been  only  postponed; 
that  war  was  eventually  inevitable.  The  German  people 
were  deeply  convinced  that  they  had  been  humiliated  in 
Morocco.  They  felt  that,  having  taken  a  strong  position, 
Germany  should  not  have  receded  from  it  and  that  the 
maximum,  not  the  minimum,   "compensation"   should  have 

began  with  this  settlement,  and  especially  after  the  ascension  to  the  British 
throne  of  Edward  VII.,  in  January,  1901.  there  came  a  condition  of  actual 
friendliness,  that  led  eventually  to  the  Franco-British  Entente,  which  how- 
ever, in  the  larger  sense,  dates  from  the  Algeciras  conference  of  1906. 

10 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

been  obtained  by  .her  from  France.     Fierce  irritation  against 
Great  Britain  was  developed,  due  mainly  to  an  almost  uni- 
versal belief  in   Germany  that  British  intervention  in   sup- 
port of  France  had  been  the  decisive  factor  in  German  de- 
feat.     AYith    France    in    Morocco    and    Great    Britain    in 
Gibraltar,   both   entrances   to   the   Mediterranean   were   con- 
trolled by  these  Powers  and  yet  all  the  Powers  had  a  vital 
interest  in  the  Mediterranean.     For  generations  control  of 
the   Mediterranean   had   been   an   object   of   British   foreign 
policy,  and  that  policy  explained  to  the   German  mind  the 
diplomatic  support,  which  Great  Britain  gave  to  France  in 
Morocco  and  the  British  efforts  to  block  Germany  from  ex- 
tending   the    Bagdad    railway    to    the    Persian    Gulf.      The 
Mediterranean    to    German   minds   had    become    in    effect    a 
British  sea,  in  consequence  of  Great  Britain's  command  of 
its  entrance   at.  Gibraltar  and   the   Suez   Canal,   and  yet  it 
was  the   greatest   trade   route   of  the   world.      The    German 
complaint  was  that   Great  Britain  by  this  control  had  be- 
come a  menace  to  the  commerce  of  all  European  countries, 
so    that   world    commerce   was    not    really    free.      Germany, 
under  this  obsession,  in  order  to  enforce  her  claims  for  free- 
dom of  the  sea,  had  fostered  a  policy  of  naval  construction. 
Great   Britain   meanwhile    had    tightened   her   hold    on    the 
Mediterranean  by  entering  into  a  close  alliance  with  France, 
and  had  combined  with  Russia  for   further   control  of  the 
eastern    end    through   .the    partitioning    of    Persia.      Great 
Britain  had  also  blocked  the  completion  by  Germany  of  her 
"Bagdad  railway  by  assuming  a  protectorate  over  Koweit,  its 
eastern  terminus  on  the  Persian  Gulf. 

(^he  fact  that  Great  Britain  desired  peace,  and  as  late  as 
the  end  of  July,  1914,  was  willing  to  go  to  the  limit  of 
diplomacy  to  secure  it,  did  not  relieve  the  situation  from 
the  official  German  point  of  view — a  point  of  view  sub- 
jectively* influenced  by  Germany's  devotion  for  generations  to 
military  power — because  diplomacy  had  already  been  tried 
and  had  resulted  in  defeats  for  Germany.  Germany  had 
been  outplayed  in  Morocco  and  had  been  excluded  from  the 
Persian  Gulf.  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  encircled 
her,  and  in  diplomatic  conventions  and  agreements  had  over- 
powered her.     Each  year  she  saw  some  part  of  the  world 

11 


INTRODUCTION 

pass  to  the  control  of  one  of  the  Entente  powers,  or  closed 
to  her  own  trade  by  preferential  tariffs — all  notwithstanding 
her  long  preparation,  for  militar}^  superiority.  While  none 
of  these  events  could  in  itself  be  regarded  as  a  main  cause 
of  war,  when  taken  collectively  they  boded  for  Germany,  as 
the  militaristic  German  mind  saw  them,  her  economic  as 
well  as  her  political  isolation."^ 

Some  students  of  causes,  holding  to  this  view,  believed 
the  real,  if  remote,  origin  of  the  war  would  thus  be  found 
hidden  partly  in  diplomatic  victories  and  resentments  over 
Morocco  and  Turkey.  Ellercy  C.  Stowell  ^  found  as  an  un- 
derlying cause  a  disturbance,  extending  over  several  years, 
of  the  balance  of  power  between  the  Triple  Alliance  and 
the  Triple  Entente.  Ever  since  the  Fashoda  affair,  the 
Entente  had  been  gaining  so  steadily  over  the  Alliance  that 
it  had  become  clear  that  time  was  working,  and  would  still 
work,  against  the  Alliance.  In  succession  the  Alliance  had 
been  weakened  by  Italy's  desertion  of  Germany  at  Algeciras 
in  1907;  by  Italy's  attack  on  Tripoli  in  1911,  in  which  she 
gained  territory  belonging  to  Germany's  Turkish  friend; 
by  the  settlement  of  the  Agadir  incident  in  a  manner  re- 
garded as  a  diplomatic  defeat  for  Germany ;  and  by  the 
Balkan  settlement  of  1913,  under  which  the  Balkan  Allies 
divided  among  themselves  territory  in  Europe  ^belonging  to 
Germany's  right-hand  man  in  Constantinople.  fTo  Germany 
the  crime  of  Serajevo  came  as  a  last  straw.  She  had  seen 
France  take  Tunis  and  Madagascar;  had  seen  her  expand 
her  African  colonies  into  an  empire  and  round  them  out 
with  Morocco,  and  in  Asia,  had  seen  her  consolidate  in 
Indo-China  a  colony  territorially  larger  than  Germany.  She 
had  seen  Great  Britain  fortify  her  position  in  Egypt  and 
develop  South  African  territory.  At  the  same  time  the 
British  domains  in  Australia  and  America  grew  in  wealth 
and  population.  Germany  concurrently  had  seen  Russia, 
expand  in  Asia  and  transform  the  wastes  of  Siberia  into  a 
second  American  Far  West,  while  Japan  more  and  more 
openly  assumed  supremacy  in  the  Far  East.  Italy  by  taking 
Tripoli  had  seated  herself  on  the  other  side  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean and,   in  taking  the   Greek   Isles,   had   seized   a  post 

*  "The  Diplomacy  of  tbe  War."      (Houghton,  Mifflin  Co.) 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

h'ing  at  the  gate  of  Smyrna.  Even  the  United  States,  grow- 
ing with  the  years,  was  becoming  too  powerful  for  her  to 
challenge  over  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  so  that  South  America 
also  might,  in  the  future,  be  closed  to  Germany!^ 

That  in  Bismarck's  time  Germany  had  not  sought  colonial 
expansion ;  that  her  colonial  ambitions  were  of  comparatively 
recent  date  compared  with  those  of  France  and  Great 
Britain,  did  not  ameliorate  the  distress  that  had  come  into 
official  German  minds.  As  a  balance  to  successful  and  great 
expansion  by  other  States,  Germany  could  point  only  to 
her  African  possessions,  walled  in  by  British  and  French 
colonies,  and  her  widely  scattered,  territory  in  the 
Pacific,  all  at  the  mercy  of  the  British  fleet,  which 
was  a  bare  colonial  outlook  for  a  nation  of  70,000,000 
people,  with  an  industrial  organization  which  surpassed 
anything  that  the  world  had  ever  seen,  not  merely  in  actual 
efficiency  but  in  the  intelligence  w^ith  which  it  cared  for  its 
workers.  As  a  nation  bursting  into  new  life,  making'  new 
progress  industrially,  achieving  new  triumphs  commercially, 
Germany  thus  looked  out  upon  a  future  of  restraint  that 
was  greater  than  the  expansive,  militaristic,  romantic  Ger- 
man could  endure.  Professor  Stowell  held,  however,  that  the 
state  of  mind  in  Germany  ''influenced  her  Government  to 
assume  an  extremely  uncompromising  attitude,"  and  that 
her  ''refusal  to  cooperate  with  her  sister  States,  among 
whom  was  her  ally  Italy,  must  place  upon  Germany  the 
first,  and  by  far  the  heaviest,  responsibility  for  the  war." 
(Jn  most  Entente  circles  it  became  more  and  more  a  matter 
of  conviction  that  the  military  masters  of  Germany  had 
forced  this  war  on  a  world  wholly  unprepared  for  it,  in 
confident  reliance  upon  a  great  national  delusion,  among 
Germans,  due  to  a  generation  of  systematic  teaching  in 
homes,  schools  and  public  life,  that  Germany  out  there 
alone  in  Central  Europe,  was  surrounded  by  a  world  of 
enemies,  and  that,  to  save  her  national  existence,  she  had 
reached  a  point  where  she  had  to  fight.  Through  deliberate 
and  constant  suppression  afterward  of  real  truths  about  the 
war,  and  through  a  clever  manufacture  of  falsehoods  about 
it,  this  great  delusion  ran  parallel  year  by  year,  even  down 
to  the  summer  of  1918,  to  an  unshaken  belief  among  the 

13 


INTRODUCTION 

German  people  that  the  German  army  was  invincible,  and 
that  Germany  had  won  the  war.  Maximilian  Harden,  the 
famous  editor  of  Die  Zukunft,  of  Berlin,  who,  altho  in  the 
first  year  of  the  war  almost  as  frankly  subject  to  the 
national  delusion  as  any  other  newspaper  writer  in  Berlin, 
began  soon  afterward  gradually  to  see  the  light,  until  in 
1917  and  1918  he  had  been  disillusioned  to  a  point  where 
he  possest  an  international  mind. 

Harden,  in  January,  1919,  reminded  Germans  that  in  the 
first  German  White  Book  important  passages  had  been 
supprest,  that  from  the  Belgian  archives,  seized  in  1914,  the 
most  important  matters  disclosed  were  forgeries ;  that  the 
report  of  the  trial  of  Sukhomlinoff  in  Petrograd  for  treason 
had  been  colored  in  Germany  by  a  purpose  repugnant  to 
justice,  ''even  as  had  every  presentation  of  the  economic 
and  financial  status,  the  intentions  and  conduct  of  our  foes 
and  of  our  allies."  It  seemed  as  if  some  one  on  the  first 
day  of  the  war  "had  yelled  'We  must  lie  until  the  hour  of 
victory,  lie  until  the  rafters  split,'  "  and  this  command  was 
followed  so  thoroughly  that  "no  true  word,  if  it  were  an 
inconvenient  one,  was  permitted  to  reach  the  popular  ear." 
People  were  told  that  "a  horde  of  scabby  scoundrels  had 
conspired  to  attack  us";  that  France  "was  a  world  brothel, 
disintegrating  beneath  its  varnish";  Britain  "a  shop- 
keeper's booth,  threatened  with  collapse  far  and  near"; 
North  America,  "a  nest  of  hypocrites  and  ghouls,  who  must 
draw  dividends  from  our  misery ' ' ;  Italy  and  Roumania 
lands  that  "had  faithlessly  broken  their  bonds  of  alliance," 
while  "in  fleckless  purity  there  shone  afar  only  as  shields 
of  honor  those  of  the  Magyars,  Bulgars  and  Turks." 

Meanwhile,  the  massacres  of  Armenians,  the  violation  and 
sale  of  Serbian  girls,  the  deportation  of  hostages  from  Bel- 
gium and  northern  France,  the  contract  negotiated  with  the 
Irishman  Casement  and  the  attempt  to  have  his  captured 
countrymen  released  from,  their  oath  of  allegiance  by  priests, 
with  punishment  if  they  refused,  of  requisitions  and  cor- 
ruption to  an  extent  never  before  known,  "of  all  this  the 
Germans  were  permitted  to  learn  nothing."  Nor  were  they 
permitted,  continued  Harden,  to  learn  that  the  President  of 
the  United  States  "had  been  lied  to  by  order  of  our  Chan- 

14 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

cellor,  even  until  the  day  of  the  announcement  of  the  sub- 
marine warfare,  and  that  our  Ambassador  had  often  enough 
warned  against  such  dangerous  fraud  practises  upon  a 
genuine  idealist."  The  fact  and  the  significance  of  the  first 
retreat  from  the  Marne,  the  terrible  failures  at  Ypres  and 
Verdun,  the  bankruptcy  of  Zeppelinism,  the  total  losses  in 
killed,  prisoners,  ships,  airships — ''these  things  were  de- 
liberately hushed  up."  All  around  one  saw  "nothing  but 
liars,  plunderers,  lawbreakers  and  frauds;  all  of  whom, 
however,  had  been  decorated  with  honors." 

That  the  war  originally  sprang  from  "the  rivalry  of 
States  in  pursuit  of  power  and  wealth,"  was  believed  by  G. 
Lowes  Dickinson  ^  to  have  been  ' '  universally  admitted ' '  by 
the  end  of  the  second  year.  Whatever  diversities  of  opinion 
might  still  prevail  in  different  countries,  nobody  pretended 
any  longer  that  it  had  risen  from  actual  needs  of  civiliza- 
tion, from  any  generous  impulse,  or  from  any  noble  ambi- 
tion. According  to  the  popular  view  in  Great  Britain,  it 
rose  solely  and  exclusively  from  the  ambition  of  Germany  to 
seize  territory  and  power  and,  according  to  the  popular 
view  in  Germany,  out  of  the  ambition  of  Great  Britain  to 
attack  and  destroy  the  rising  power  and  wealth  of  Germany. 
But  in  its  remote  causes  the  war  proceeded  rather  from 
rivalry  for  territory  in  every  part  of  the  world  between  all 
the  Great  Powers.  There  was  contention  between  France 
and  Germany  for  control  of  Morocco;  between  Russia  and 
Austria  for  control  of  the  Balkans;  between  Germany  and 
the  other  Powers  for  control  of  Turkey — and  "these  were 
the  causes  of  the  war."  Territory  may  sometimes  be  sought 
for  its  own  sake,  but  in  earlier  times  it  was  not  commonly 
sought  by  States  as.  a  means  to  wealth.  Now,  however, 
rivalry  in  pursuit  of  markets,  concessions  and  outlets  for 
capital,  as  forces  lying  behind  a  colonial  policy,  had  led  to 
war.  States  competed  for  the  right  to  exploit  the  weak  and 
in  the  competition  that  ensued  Governments  were  prompted 
or   even   controlled   by  financial   interests. 

"Frenzied  trade"  as  a  cause  was  forcibly  outlined  by 
Professor  Maurice  Millioud.^^     Such  were  the  conditions  it 

^  "The  European  Anarchy." 

5"  A  Swiss  economist,  author  of  "The  Ruling  Caste  and  Frenzied  Trade  in 
Germany." 

15 


INTRODUCTION 

had  created  that,  altho  threatened  by  no  one,  Germany  felt 
herself  menaced  by  every  one  and  she  claimed  to  be  fight- 
ing for  her  existence,  which  in  one  sense  was  true,  because 
her  manufacturers,  financiers,  and  statesmen  had  dragged 
her  so  deeply  into  a  war  of  economic  conquest  that  she  could 
not  withdraw,  and  yet  to  achieve  a  peaceful  victory  was  be- 
yond her  power.  Rather  than  wait  for  a  crash  that  was 
inevitable,  for  a  stoppage  of  trade,  a  downfall  of  credit,  and 
the  misery  that  would  overwhelm  her  people,  she  believed 
it  was  better  to  make  war  while  there  was  some  likelihood 
of  its  ending  rapidly  and  victoriously  in  her  favor,  which 
made  the  issue  what  General  Von  Bernhardi  ^  had  said  it 
was,  "world-power  or  downfall."  Professor  Millioud  traced 
an  alliance  for  conquest  between  the  German  military  aris- 
tocracy and  the  German  industrial  and  commercial  elements 
as  dominated  by  nine  great  banks.  In  a  struggle  to  secure 
and  control  foreign  markets,  it  had  become  necessary  for 
German  industrial  leaders  to  save  themselves  by  advancing 
prices  on  all  commodities  to  the  domestic  consumer,  until  the 
breaking-point  at  home  was  reached,  with  enormous  inflation 
and  an  over-extension  of  credit  based  on  German  prestige. 
This  condition  of  over-expansion  and  borrowed  capital  had 
brought  about  a  crisis  in  which  a  rapid  and  victorious  war 
seemed  to  offer  the  only  relief.  "Given  such  a  condition," 
said  the  Wall  Street  Journal  in  comments  on  Professor 
Millioud 's  work,  "to(2:ether  with  that  extraordinary  obses- 
sion, so  terrible  in  its  consequences,  that  between  Germans 
and  other  men  there  exists  a  difference  not  of  degree  but 
of  kind,  and  that  others  have  no  rights,  as  against  Germany, 
which  Germany  was  bound  to  respect,  and  war  had  become 
inevitable  long  before  the  pretext  of  the  assassination  of 
the  Austrian  Archduke  precipitated  the  actual  conflict." 

Germany's  industrial  progress  imprest  many  other  minds 
as  a  leading  cause. ^  Efficiency  and  economy,  as  developed 
in  Germany  in  forty  years,  had  become  the  supreme  indus- 
trial marvel  of  modern  times,  but  their  fearful  cost  to  the 
whole  world  was  now  to  be  realized.  Nobody  had  questioned 
their  material  value,  but  Germany  had  given  such  exclusive 

""Germany  and  the  Next  War." 

■^  Among  them  Amos  Kidder  Fiske,  editorial  writer  for  the  New  York 
Journal  of  Commerce,  one  of  whose  articles  is  summarized  here. 

16 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

attention  to  them  as  to  dwarf,  if  not  to  extinguish,  certain 
other  qualities,  moral  and  spiritual,  of  far  greater  value, 
not  to  the  German  people  alone  but  to  the  world  at  large. 
By  a  centralized  government,  in  the  hands  of  a  few  strong 
men,  under  a  leadership  unrestrained  by  those  who  were 
subject  to  it,  efficiency  and  economy  had  been  carried  to" 
logical  conclusions  in  Germany.  Never,  probably  since  the 
time  of  the  Babylonian  and  Egyptian  empires,  had  cen- 
tralized government  been  carried  so  far.  In  those  ancient 
empires  the  people  became  only  instruments  in  the  hands 
of  powerful  men  under  whose  rule  palaces,  towers,  and 
pyramids  were  built ;  deserts,  through  irrigation  and  fertili- 
zation, were  made  to  blossom  like  the  rose;  powerful  armies 
were  maintained,  victories  '\von  or  lost,  and  the  seeds  of 
ultimate  national  decay  were  sown. 

With  modern  methods  and  appliances,  something  of  the 
same  thing  had  been  attempted  in  Germany  under  the 
house  of  Hohenzollern.  Attention  was  given  almost  wholly, 
and  energies  were  directed  with  extraordinary  zeal,  to  the 
production  of  wealth  by  the  most  effective  and  least  costly 
processes,  and  to  the  building  up  of  an  invincible  power.- 
This  purpose  absorbed  the  efforts  of  statesmen  and  scholars, 
and  of  directors  of  incKistry  and  trade.  To  it  as  an  end 
were  devoted  practically  all  general  education  and  all  per- 
sonal ambition.  Every  resource  of  science  and  invention 
was  invoked  in  its  aid.  Manufacturing  industries  were  de- 
veloped in  such  manner  as  enabled  Germany  to  pervade  the 
markets  of  the  world  until  her  shipping  w^as  iu  operation  in 
all  known  seas.  An  inevitable  consequence  was  that  the 
whole  nation  entered  upon  a  policy  of  territorial  and  in- 
dustrial-, expansion.  Neglected  and  backward  spaces  of  the 
earth  became  subjected  to  fruitful  processes  under  which 
an  imperial  realm  in  Europe  sought  greater  wealth  and 
power,  all  of  which  made  imperative  to  the  German  mind 
the  maintenance  of  a  great  military  force,  in  order  to  pre- 
serve the  authority  of  a^  government  completely  dominating 
all  national  activities.  (  Thus  militarism,  in  itself  a  costly 
instrument,  was  regarded  as  a  necessity  in  the  work  of 
giving  to  national  economic  forces  their  full  effects,  since  a 
pushing  and  grasping  policy  was  likely   to  excite  jealousy 


INTRODUCTION 

and  provoke  enmity,  and  if  it  should  fail  to  succeed  by  in- 
timidation, might  produce  actual  war,  in  which  case  there 
would  be  need  for  a  great  military  power. 

These  interrelated  forces  had  great  influence  in  overturn- 
ing old  ideals  and  raising  up  njew  ones  until  an  entirely 
new  national  spirit  posses-t  the  German  people.  For  such 
complete  absorption  of  minds  and  bodies,  of  thoughts  and 
energies,  alike  by  rulers  and  subjects,  by  teachers  and 
learners,  by  capitalists  and  laborers,  in  the  work  of  building 
up  a  great  empire  that  should  dominate  the  world's  civiliza- 
tion— a  Deutschland  that  should  be  "liber  alles  in  der  Welt'^ 
— the  price  had  to  be  paid.  Efficiency  and  economy  bore 
their  frui*t,  in  the  sacrifice  of  older  and  better  things  born 
of  the  spirit.  Everything  that  was  necessary  for  success 
was  brought  into  subjection.  Sympathies,  except  for  those 
working  in  the  common  cause,  were  kept  down.  Generosity 
to  others  became  out  of  place. 

One  fatal  result  among  many  was  a  narrowing  of  vision. 
A  generation  grew  up  under  a  kind  of  obsession  that,  what- 
ever this  dominating  power  sought  or  demanded  must  be 
entirely  right,  since  it  had  divine  sanction  and  was  for  the 
benefit  of  the  whole  world.  How  other  people  felt  about 
this?  What  were  their  rights?  What  views  did  they  hold 
of  Germ'an  domination?  All  this  was  ignored.  Hence  the 
war,  to  the  Entente  Allies,  became  a  struggle  to  destroy  a 
fabric  of  imperial  domination,  supported  by  the  menace  of 
a  great  military  machine.  Shortness  of  sight,  narrowness 
of  vision ;  failure  to  understand  the  unconquerable  forces 
that  would  be  raised  up  among  other  nations  in  opposition; 
failure  to  see  the  effects  produced*  on  other  minds,  even  on 
neutral  minds  not  trained  by  German  methods,  multiplied 
from  month  to  month,  until  the  new  imperialism  found  itself 
face  to  face  with  a  world  in  arms.  For  weary  months,  drag- 
ging on  into  weary  years,  the  colossus  struggled  desperately 
and  to  the  point  of  exhaustion,  like  some  huge  Cyclops,  in 
an  effort  to  destroy  the  many  powers  that  arrayed  them- 
selves in  a  common  cause  against  Germany. 

So  argued  and  judged  as  to  causes,  the  historian,  the 
sociologist,  the  economist,  the  statesman,  the  journalist,  the 
average  citizen.     Then  came  the  psychologist  and  the  phil- 

18 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

osopher,  bu-t  not  until  long  after  the  war  began,  when  funda- 
mentals were  becoming  clear.  The  psychologist^  believed 
that  the  causes  lay  much  deeper  than  political  or  economic 
conditions,  and  were  to  be  sought  in  the  constitution  of  the 
human  mind.  Biological,  psychological,  and  sociological 
points  of  view  had  to  be  taken  into-  the  reckoning.  Ours  had 
been  an  age  of  hard  mental  work  of  a  highly  specialized 
kind,  and  had  involved  stress  on  the  most  intensely  de- 
veloped bnain-centers.  Tremendous  activity  had  occurred 
under  what  might  be  called  a  gospel  of  striving,  dating  from 
Lessing  and  Fichte,  but  which  found  poetic  expression  in 
Goethe.  This  striving  had  been  elevated  into  a  sort  of 
gos.pel  of  modern  life.  Manifesting  itself  in  an  intense  de- 
sire for  expansion  and  self-expression  stupendous  results 
were  produced  by  it,  in  scientific  inventions  and  discovery, 
in  indus-trial  and  commercial  expansion.  Then  followed  a 
desire  for  political  and  territorial  expansion,  and  with  that 
oame  occasions  for  war.  The  normal  man  wants  not  so 
much  peace  and  tranquillity  as  strife.  To  him  actual  tran- 
quillity is  close  to*  ennid,  and  that  is  his  greatest  dread. 
Wh'at  he  wants  mos.t  is  not  peace,  but  a  chance*  to  pit  his 
force  against  th.e  force  of  some  one  else,  or  against  some  new 
thing.  ]\ran  was*  not  originally  a  working  animal;  it  was 
civilization  that  im.posed  work  upon  him.  But  when  you 
wark  a  man  too  hand  he  will  quit  work,  and  gb  to  war  or 
to*  -a.  football  game.  Man  emerged  from  his-  primeval  ^ate 
through  work  and  pain;  he  struggled  up,  fought  his  way 
and  went  through,  a  never-ceasing  experience  of  pain  and 
battle.  He  was  still  wbat  he*  always  had  been,  not  so 
mucii  a  mere  working  animal  as-  an  animal  given  to-  fighting. 
It  was  inevitable  ta  the  psychologist  that  disaster  of 
some  kind,  or  a  reaction  of  some  kind,  should  follow  that 
high-tension,  that  one-sided  life.  Something  was  bound  to 
snap  and  so  something  did  snap.  Nature  had  overreached 
herself.  The  form  that  reaction  took  was  the  form  which 
the  psychologist  had  seen  it  must  inevitably  take;  namely, 
a  temporary  reassertion  of  the  primitive  impulses  of  men 
to  fight  one  another.     The  world  had  had  a  long  orgy  of 

^  See.  for  ideas  here  set  forth  on  this  phase  of  the  causes,  George  T.  W. 
Patrick's  chapter  on  "The  Psychology  of  War"  in  his  book  entitled  "The 
Psychology  of  Relaxation." 

19 


INTRODUCTION 

thinkings,  unusual  in  severity  and  tension,  and  now  had 
to  have  its  '^ fling."  In  Europe  this  led  to  war;  in  Arierica, 
where  the  conditions  of  unbalance  were  much  the  same,  the 
reaction,  until  America  herself  got  into  the  war,  had  taken 
the  milder  fonii  of  amusement  crazes,  dances,  moving-picture 
"shows,"  automobiles,  crowded  baseball  and  football  games 
witnessed  by  tens  of  thousands  of  wrought-up  spectators. 
To  the  psychologist,  the  manifestations  in  both  hemispheres 
meant  a  temporary  reversion  to  primitive  instincts  seeking 
to  restore  the  balance  in  an  overwrought  social  brain. 

Before  the  war,  the  real  significance  of  an  all-pervading, 
long-continued,  state  of  ''unrest,"  alike  in  this  country  and 
Europe,  had  been  little  understood.  The  marvel  was  that  it 
existed  amid  so  many  conditions — social,  economic,  and 
hygienic — that  apparently  were  the  most  favorable  for 
human  happiness  that  the  world  had  ever  known.  There 
had,  however,  been  an  unsymmetrical  development  in  the 
human  personality.  Men  had  been  given  overmuch  to  mere 
thought  and  effort,  to  efficiency  and  achievement  as  sole 
ends,  and  not  enough  to  balance,  not  enough  to  bodily 
vitality.  Efficiency  demands  great  powers  of  attention,  con- 
centration, analysis,  self-control,  and  sustained  effort,  all  of 
which  in  time  become  extremely  fatiguing,  and  call  for  re- 
laxation, until  society  goes  back  to  the  prehistoric  type,  to 
the  primitive  mortal  combat  of  man  with  man,  in  order  to 
bring  rest  to  tired  brains,  and  obtain  release  from  high 
tension.  The  twentieth  century,  altho  comparatively  a  time 
of  great  plenty,  thus  witnessed  the  most  ferocious  and 
bloody  of  all  wars.  An  increase  of  riches,  national  and  in- 
dividual, had  not  conduced  to  peace,  but  rather  to  irritabil- 
ity and  contention.  So  it  might  be  contended  that  the  war 
sprang  in  a  large  measure  from  an  enormous  increase  in 
national  wealth,  that  was  not  tempered  by  a  corresponding 
increase  in  morality  and  self-control. 

The  philosopher''  saw  how  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  it 
was  for  the  passive  onlooker  to  understand  the  war ;  because, 

^  One  of  these  was  Count  Herman  Keyserling,  whose  reputation  was  Euro- 
pean and  whose  presentation  of  the  case  in  The  Atlantic  Monthly  is  briefly 
summarized  here.  Altho  his  name  suggests  a  German,  Count  Keyserling  was 
understood  to  be  a  Russian  of  noble  birth,  with  estates  in  one  of  the  Baltic 
provinces. 

20 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

to  the  passive  onlooker,  war  always  was  an  altogether  beastly 
business.  Noble  deeds  of  sacrifice  and  courage  could  not  to 
him  redeem  its  essential  atrocity  as  a  case  of  wholesale  man- 
slaughter. Whether  committed  by  nations  or  by  individuals 
manslaughter  to  him  was  the  same.  If  nations  in  war  are  to 
be  judged  as  individuals  are  judged,  war  certainly  could 
not  be  defended  or  understood,  but  the  philosopher  con- 
tended that  war  should  not  and  could  not  be  judged  from 
that  point  of  view,  being,  as  it  was,  an  expression  of  "super- 
individual  necessity."  He  believed  that  war  should  by  all 
means  be  avoided,  just  as  disease  should  be;  but  disease,  as 
well  as  war,  can  not  always  be  avoided,  and  once  caught 
must  follow  its  own  particular  course.  Disease,  however 
hideous  in  its  symptoms,  must  be  taken  as  a  natural  ex- 
pression of  nature,  and  it  not  infrequently  has  appeared 
that  what  was  temporary  ill  health  led  afterward  to  a 
permanent  state  of  good  health. 

Wars  such  as  this  world-war,  from  this  point  of  view,  w^ere 
constitutional  diseases,  evil  in  themselves,  but  inevitable  in 
human  society  as  phases  of  growth.  But  wars,  whether 
inevitable  or  not,  when  once  entered  upon,  had  to  be  pur- 
sued to  their  ends,  and  no  medicine  could  change  the  gen- 
eral character  of  their  courses.  The  question  of  right  and 
wrong,  as  usually  discust  by  neutrals  and  passive  onlookers, 
was  not  to  the  point.  If  one  had  to  think  of  right  and 
wrong  the  Greek  idea  of  fate  came  nearer  the  truth  than 
did  the  modern  idea  of  responsible  freedom.  The  respective 
wrongs  of  Germany  and  the  Allies  were  fated  to  emerge  in 
hideous  calamity.  That  did  not  excuse  them,  but  it  did 
give  them  a  meaning  transcending  by  far  their  immediate 
moral  significance.  All  great  wars  had  been  fated  and  all 
had  been  inevitable.  It  w^as  of  little  importance  to  de- 
termine what  were  the  immediate  causes  that  occasioned 
them.  Had  Germany's  conscious  intentions  been  ever  so 
kind,  and  her  official  morals  never  so  exemplary,  the  mere 
fact  of  her  tremendous  expansion  when  bound  in  there  by 
an  outer  world  of  Great  Powers,  loaded  down  with  ag- 
gressive traditions,  whose  equilibrium  depended  on  oppo- 
sition instead  of  on  collaboration,  would  sooner  or  later  have 
caused  a  conflict  which,  in  turn,  would  have  expanded  into 

21 


INTRODUCTION 

a  AVorld  War,  because,  in  an  age  of  universal  independence, 
any  serious  shock  to  the  larger  part  of  the  whole  needs 
must  have  upset  the  entire  whole. 

Germany's  ambitions,  this  philosopher  declared,  were  no 
more  the  primum  movers  of  the  catastrophe  than  Bona- 
parte's dreams  of  world-power  were  the  first  causes  of  the 
European  catastrophe  of  a  century  before.  As  Napoleon 
always  maintained  that  his  was  not  a  premeditated  career, 
so  the  Germans  had  not  striven  consciously  to  set  the  world 
on  fire.  Napoleon  and  the  Germans  were  both  driven  to 
act  as  they  did  by  circumstances  over  which  they  had  little 
or  no  command.  In  both  cases,  uprisings  and  revolutions 
would  have  happened  in  some  form  or  other,  even  if  the 
immediate  causes,  so  obvious  and  seemingly  so  important 
and  conclusive  at  the  time,  had  not  been  operative.  The 
ancien  regime  would  have  fallen  in  Western  Europe  without 
the  Corsican's  sword,  and  it  is  quite  as  true  that  the 
European  equilibrium  of  July,  1914,  would  have  been 
upset  without  pressure  having  been  brought  to  bear  against 
it  by  increasing  armaments.  Both  events  were  inevitable 
states  in  social,  political,  and  commercial  evolution. 
(/  That  Germany  early  in  1914  considered  war  inevitable  at 
no  distant  date  was  probably  certain.  The  caution,  not  to 
say  the  defensive  and  disquieting  steps  taken  in  May  and 
June,  1914,  by  financial  houses  in  America  having  Austrian 
and  German  connections,  pointed  to  premonitions  of  war 
on  their  part,  based  on  hints  or  suggestions  they  had  re- 
ceived from  exalted  quarters.  Perhaps  Germany  had  no 
deliberate  intention  at  that  time  of  forcing  a  European  war 
by  sudden  violence  of  her  own,  but  she  must  have  believed 
in  the  certainty  of  war  coming  soon,  and  when  the  chance 
appeared  she  was  probably  not  averse  to  seizing  it.  Long 
before  Russian  mobilization  was  announced,  and  military 
law  was  proclaimed  in  Germany,  the  German  army  had 
known  what  was  coming.  When  sanguine  diplomatists  were 
still  striving  for  peace,  the  Great  General  Staff  was  selecting 
maps  that  showed  where  future  battles  would  be  fought.\) 

There  were  men  in  the  Entente  world  having  knowledge 
of  the  inside  history  of  events  leading  to  the  war,  who  were 
not  inclined  to  place  the   chief  personal  responsibility  for 

99 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

the  outbreak  on  the  Kaiser.  One  of  these  was  Colonel  E.  M. 
House,  President  Wilson's  friend  and  adviser,  who  before 
and  during  the  war  had  made  several  trips  to  Europe  in 
order  to  obtain  information  for  the  President  at  first  hand. 
He  was  represented  ^^  as  disposed  to  believe  from  close  ob- 
servation that  the  Kaiser's  responsibility,  great  as  it  was, 
was  not  the  major  part;  that  he  did  not  actually  wish  to 
force  the  war  but  feared  to  take  a  positive  stand  against  it, 
lest  he  be  pushed  out  of  the  way  by  an  arrogant  clique  of 
generals  and  great  industrial  potentates  who  had  long  con- 
tended that  Germany  must  have  war  or  lose  her  supremacy. 
Colonel  House,  who  was  in  Berlin  only  a  few  weeks  before 
the  war  began,  ''found  plenty  of  evidence  of  a  state  of 
mind  to  increase  the  world's  uneasiness."  German  military 
leaders  were  "crazy  with  excitement"  and  had  been  living 
under  high  tension  since  the  trouble  over  Morocco,,  while 
the  disturbed  course  of  events  in  1913-14  had  "stimulated 
their  hysteria."  Field-marshals  and  generals  who  had  built 
up  Germany's  great  military  machine,  and  had  been 
subalterns  in  the  War  of  1870-71,  "felt  themselves  growing 
old  without  having  had  a  chance  to  play  with  their  mar- 
velous toy — this  stupendous  engine  of  their  own  genius," 
almost  a  possession  of  their  own,  which  they  "had  forged, 
tempered,  and  tested  in  play" — and  they  hated  the  thought 
of  dying  the  death  of  old  men  "without  the  satisfaction  of 
having  tried  it  out  in  battle  under  their  own  leadership." 
/"This,  in  Colonel  House's  view,  was  really  the  psychology 
01  the  German  military  chieftains  in  the  early  summer  of 
1914;  they  were  "hungry  for  war,  their  nerves  on  edge." 
It  was  they  who  talked  loudly  of  the  "insolence"  of  the 
Serbians  to  Austria;  of  the  need  of  teaching  Russia  to  keep 
her  hands  off  the  Balkans;  of  the  commercial  tyranny  of 
Great  Britain,  and  of  the  degeneracy  of  France.  In  so 
many  words,  they  were  saying:  "We  have  been  on  the 
edge  of  war  now  for  ten  years.  It  has  been  one  incident  after 
another.  It  has  been  unhealthy  and  unsettling.  Well,  we 
Germans  are  ready  for  war  now.  We  shall  never  be  in 
better  shape  for  it.     Let  us  end  the  uncertainty  and  have 

1°  By  Arthur  D.  Howden  Smith,  in  the  New  York  Evening  Post  in  April, 
1918. 

23 


INTRODUCTION 

war.y  Count  Czernin,  a  former  Austrian  minister  of  for- 
eign affairs,  gave  color  to  the  view  that  the  Kaiser  did  not 
want  war  in  a  public  statement  made  after  the  armistice 
was  signed.  ''Emperor  William/'  said  he,  "did  not  want 
the  war,  but  he  did  not  know  how  to  get  out  of  it.  No  one 
wanted  hostilities.  Neither  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  nor 
Emperor  William,  nor  their  ministers  wanted  war.  There 
was  too  much  diplomatic  bluffing,  everyone  looking  for  the 
other  fellow  to  recede  from  his  position."  In  conditions 
such  as  these  the  assassination  of  the  Austrian  Archduke, 
following  closely  on  that  of  King  George  of  Greece  (March 
18,  1913),  who  stood  "in  the  way"  of  German  expansion  in 
the  Near  East,  became  the  immediate  cause  of  the  war — a 
cause  such  as  the  Imperial  War  Lords  of  Germany  had  long 
looked  for  with  some  eagerness.  Thus  it  was  the  lighted 
match  that  caused  a  great  conflagration  when  thrown  into 
a  mass  of  highly  combustible  material. 

Germany's  case  in  1914,  viewed  solely  from  the  diplomatic 
angle,  "was  not  bad"  in  Professor  Morris  Jastrow's 
opinion. ^^  She  had  some  justification  for  feeling  that  she 
had  been  hemmed  in  by  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia, 
and  some  reason  to  fear  Russian  aggression.  With  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  pooling  their  interests  in  Persia  in  1910, 
she  thought  she  saw  a  new  enemy  showing  its  hand,  but  she 
probably  failed  altogether  to  see  that  it  was  fear  of  Ger- 
many's growing  power  in  the  East  that  had  brought  Great 
Britain  to  the  side  of  Russia  in  that  aft'air.  Again,  she 
thought  the  Agadir  incident  of  1911  had  revealed  a  definite 
alinement  of  Great  Britain  and  France  against  Germany, 
and  that  it  foreshadowed  from  the  Triple  Entente  an  ag- 
gressive act  directed  primarily  against  Germany.  These 
facts  Professor  Jastrow  thought  should  not  be  entirely 
brushed  aside  in  any  fair  review  of  the  European  situation 
as  it  existed  just  before  the  war  began,  and  which  had 
grown  more  complicated  as  Germany  saw  France  and  Spain 
in  control  of  ]\Iorocco  and  Italy  getting  a  slice  of  Turkey, 
while  she  herself  was  left  out  "without  prospect  of  getting 
so  much  as  a  bone."  Germany  also  had  "some  academic 
justification    for  .her    contention    that    the    quarrel    between 

""The  WarUnd  the  Bagdad  Railway."     (J.  B.  Lippincott  Co.) 

24 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

Austria  and  Serbia  should  be  fought  out  by  these  two  con- 
testants," albeit  the  position  she  took  "may  have  had  a 
sinister  su»bstratum, "  which  her  subsequent  course  made 
clear  beyond  any  doubt. 

Whatever  be  the  responsibilities,  however,  this  writer  be- 
lieved Germany  "entirely  spoiled  her  case  by  her  conduct 
of  the  war."  It  was  that  conduct  rather  than  her  responsi- 
bility that  "aroused  at  once  the  fear  and  the  hostility  of 
practically  the  entire  world,  outside  of  the  groups  arrayed 
on  her  side,  and  even  those  groups  stood  in  fear  of  her." 
While  the  official  mobilization  of  the  Russian  army  in  the 
last  week  of  July  he  regards  as  "a  contributing  factor,"  for 
no  one  who  was  in  Germany  at  that  time,  as  Professor 
Jastrow  was,  "could  have  had  any  doubt  of  the  genuine 
fear  of  Russia  felt  in  Germany,"  Germany  nevertheless 
"could  have  prevented  the  war,  and  that  is  quite  as  serious 
a  charge  against  her  as  the  general  belief  that  she  Willed 
it."  Her  rejection  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  a 
European  conference  to  take  up  the  Austro-Serbian  question, 
"when  it  was  perfectly  evident  that  the'  question,  without 
such  a  conference,  would  lead  to  a  general  European  war, 
revealed  Germany's  unwillingness  to  prevent  war."  Of  this 
unwillingness,  indeed  of  a  definite  policy  on  Germany's  part 
for  war,  ample  evidence  from  Germany  herself  was  pub- 
lished in  the  last  year  of  the.  war  by  Prince  Lichnowsky, 
Doctor  Muehlon  and  the  government  of  Bavaria. 

As  to  Germany's  conduct  of  the  war.  Professor  Jastrow 
said  there  could  be  "no  difference  of  opinion,"  because  "the 
facts 'are  there  and  speak  for  themselves."  By  her  conduct 
he  means  "the  military  policy  adopted  by  the  General  Staff 
and  executed  as  the  official  acts  of  the  German  govern- 
ment,"— that  is,  the  official  violation  of  Belgium's  neutral- 
ity; the  official  imposition  of  exorbitant  fines  on  Belgian 
cities  and  towns;  the  official  recourse  to  such  medieval, 
almost  primitive,  methods  of  warfare  as  taking  hostages,  and 
deporting  the  population  of  invaded  districts;  the  official 
order  to  burn  and  sack  a  large  portion  of  Louvain;  the 
official  sinking  of  ships  carrying  non-combatants;  the  official 
destruction  of  towns  and  villages  in  the  line  of  retreat;  the 
official  raiding  of  cities  and  towns-  by  airplanes  and  airships. 

v.  1—4  25 


INTRODUCTION 

The  feature  common  to  these  acts,  apart  from  their  in- 
human aspects,  was  that  they  affected  "to  an  almost  ex- 
clusive degree  the  civilian  non-combatant  population,"  and 
the  effect  was  to  bring  ''the  entire  world  to  a  realization  of 
the  menace  involved  in  the  existence  of  a  government  acting 
autocratically,  without  any  responsibility  to  the  people,  and, 
therefore,  without  control." 

After  the  war  had  been  in  progress  for  a  year  there  grew 
up  a  conviction  that  no  punishment  could  adequately  fit  the 
crimes  of  Germany.  The  rape  of  Belgium;  the  sinking  of 
the  Lusitania  and  of  other  ships  that  carried  women  and 
children  to  their  ocean  graves;  the  pillage,  destruction,  and 
desecration  of  sacred  shrines;  the  cold-blooded  murder  of 
the  helpless;  the  handing  over  of  innocent  girls  to  a  fate 
worse  than  death — all  were  '^made  in  Germany."  Before 
the  war  ended,  Germany  had  in  consequence  arrayed  against 
her  thirty  sovereign  states,  great  and  small,  and  the  words 
"made  in  Germany!"  for  years  to  come  were  to  stand  as 
a  memorial  of  her  incredible  violations  of  law.  Besides 
these  thirty  states  there  were  six  which  had  severed  rela- 
tions with  Germany,  or  were  in  "a  state  of  benevolent 
neutrality  toward  the  United  States."  Following  is  a  list 
of  these  states: 


Entente 

Belligerents 

Serbia 

Portugal 

Cuba 

Montenegro 

Italy 

Panama 

Russia 

Arabia  (Hejaz) 

Haiti 

France 

San  Marino 

Dominican  Re 

Belgium 

Roumania 

Greece 

Great  Britain 

Monaco 

Nicaragua 

Japan' 

United  States 

Guatemala 

Brazil 

Honduras 

China 

Siam 

Liberia 

Ecuador 

Costa  Rica 

Czecho-Slavs 

Jui?o-Slavs 


Severed  Relations  with  Germany,  or  were  Benevolently 
Neutral  Toward  the  United  States 


Chile 
Bolivia 


Argentina 
Uruguay 


Peru 
Egypt 


In  Professor  Jastrow's  opinion,  Germany,  in  her  conduct 
of  the  war  was  responsible  for  the  new  situation  that  arose 


26 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

in  1917  after  she  began  her  intensified  submarine  warfare. 
Even  those  who  might  have  been  disposed  to  justify  her 
on  grounds  of  military  necessity,  had  to  *' recognize  the 
result  as  a  natural  and  logical  sequence  of  autocratic  rule." 
Eesponsibility  for  this  new  aspect  of  the  war  as  for  having 
forced  it  at  the  beginning,  therefore  rested  primarily  with 
the  German  government,  rather  than  with  the  German  peo- 
ple, ''who  were  not  consulted,  either  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  or  at  any  time  during  the  war."  The  German  gov- 
ernment declared  war  on  Russia  before  calling  in  the  Reichs- 
tag ;  Germany  invaded  Belgium  before  she  told  the  Reichstag 
she  was  going  to  do  it,  and  she  carried  on  war  to  the  very 
end,  with  all  its  ^unspeakable  barbarities,  ''with  little  regard 
to  the  national  legislative  body  which  merely  passed 
credits."  The  German  government  never  had  from  the 
people  a  mandate  for  w^ar,  or  for  the  crimes  it  committed  in 
conducting  the  war.  It  simply  imposed  its  authority  on  the 
Reichstag  and  the  people.  Germany's  conduct  of  the  war 
was  "the  chief  factor  in  creating  the  new  war  spirit  of 
1917."  It  was  that  spirit  which  brought  the  United  States 
into  the  war  and  which,  by  November,  1918,  had  landed 
nearly  2,000,000  American  soldiers  in  France,  with  as  many 
more  preparing  to  sail.  The  idea  of  popular  government — 
of  government  with  the  consent  of  the  governed — was  part 
and  parcel  of  the  political  spirit  of  the  age,  and  the  German 
government,  in  opposing  itself  to  that  spirit,  had  become 
"an  enemy  of  mankind."  The  war  in  and  after  1917  be- 
came simply  a  struggle  forced  upon  the  world  to  secure  the 
triumph  and  the  duration  of  democracy. 

The  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  made  the 
issue  clear  as  a  struggle  for  ther  preservation  of  democracy, 
and  President  Wilson  became  the  world's  spokesman.  He 
made  the  program  so  definite  that  he  who  ran  could  read. 
He  clarified  the  issue  in  such  manner  as  to  make  it  evident, 
even  to  the  people  of  Germany,  had  they  been  able  to  think 
about  it,  that  America's  part  in  the  war  against  Germany 
was  "actually  a  war  for  the  German  people,  as  much  as  for 
the  preservation  of  American  democracy."  We  as  Ameri- 
cans had  no  special  concern  with  the  issues  of  1914.  We 
were    concerned    with    "securing   the    peace    of    the    world 

27 


INTRODUCTION 

through  popular  government" — ^the  complete  responsibility 
of  a  government  to  its  people  through  its  elected  representa- 
tives. 

As  the  war  went  on  it  was  seen  that  the  methods  of 
waging  it  had  introduced  greater  changes  in  the  art  of  war- 
fare than  had  been  made  in  the  previous  fifty  years.^-  Some 
of  these  were  more  important  than  any  that  had  occurred  in 
five  centuries — that  is  to  say,  since  the  first  use  of  gun- 
powder. IXiring  the  ten  years  that  preceded  it  the 
aeroplane,  the  motor-vehicle,  the  submarine,  and  wireless 
telegraphy  had  been  so  perfected  as  to  be  effectively  useful 
in  war,  just  as  in  the  preceding  fifty  years  the  railway,  the 
steamboat,  and  the  electric  telegraph  had  first  come  into 
military  use,  and  had  completely  transformed  methods  of 
transportation  and  communication  which  had  remained  sub- 
stantially the  same  in  the  time  of  Napoleon  as  they  were  in 
the  days  of  Pompey  and  C^sar.  In  Napoleon's  time,  as  in 
Caesar's,  rapidity  in  the  transmitting  of  orders  had  been 
limited  to  the  speed  of  a  horse,  and  the  ability  to  move 
troops  was  dependent  on  the  endurance  of  a  man's  heart 
and  legs.  The  only  advance  in  methods  of  warfare  from 
Csesar's  time  to  that  of  Napoleon's  was  in  the  use  of  gun- 
powder and  in  the  improvement  of  weapons  resulting  there- 
from. 

Since  Napoleon's  time  the  art  of  warfare  had  added  to  its 
equipment,  instantaneous  communications  of  intelligence, 
marvelously  rapid  transportation  of  troops,  and  ability  to 
feed  and  supply  unheard  of  numbers  of  men  in  the  field; 
power  to  fly  through  the  air  and  so  from  above  to  detect 
the  enemy's  movements,  power  to  operate  under  the  water 
and  so  to  destroy  an  enemy's  ships,  power  to  hurl  projectiles 
of  unprecedented  size  great  distances  against  forts,  and 
facilities  for  caring  for  hundreds  and  thousands  of  wounded, 
who  but  for  the  motor-ambulance  would  have  perished  on 
the  battlefield.  These  new  methods  differentiated  the  World 
War  from  all  previous  wars.  Indeed,  they  differentiated 
this  war  from  the  wars  of  comparatively  recent  years  almost 
as  much  as  from  the  wars  of  antiquity.     While  the  steam- 

'2.These  are  set  forth  here  at  some  length  as  presented  by  Gen.  Francis 
Vinton  Greene  in  his  West  Point  address. 

28 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

railway  had  been  used  in  war  for  sixty  years,  this  wa^  the 
first  confiiet  in  which  the  motor-truck  was  employed.  With- 
out the  motor-truck  the  task  of  supplying  such  vast  armies 
would  have  been  an  impossible  one.  Hitherto  the  distribu- 
tion of  supplies,  from  the  nearest  point  of  a  railway  to  the 
a-ctual  position  of  troops  in  the  field,  w-as  accomplished  by 
means  of  wagons  drawn  by  mules,  horses,  and  sometimes 
oxen,  but  the  capacity  of  the  wagons,  depending  as  it  did  on 
the  condition  of  roads,  was  from  500  pounds  to  one  ton  per 
animal,  and  the  food  of  the  animal  wa^  always  no  incon- 
sideralale  part  of  the  load,  while  the  distance  covered  rarely 
exceeded  twenty  miles  per  day.  The  motor-trucks,  with  a 
few  gallons  of  oil,  lighter  than  water,  carried  at  least  four 
times  as  heavy  a  load  as  a  wagon  of  equal  size  drawn  by 
animals,  and  carried  it  at  a  speed  at  least  ten  times  greater. 
As  compared  with  animal  traction,  the  motor-truck  had  a 
capacity  for  military  purposes  of  perhaps  forty  to  one. 
Much  had  been  expected  of  the  motor-truck  in  time  of  war, 
but  few  anticipated  such  extraordinary  results  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  food  and  ammunition. 

The  vast  numbers  of  men  employed  in  the  war,  and.  the 
enormous  quantities  of  ammunition  consumed,  made  it  neces- 
sary that  almost  the  entire  industrial  development  of  each 
nation  be  devoted  to  military  purposes.  The  effect  of  this 
was  that  resources  in  coal  and  iron — the  bases  of  all  indus- 
tries—became distinct  military  factors.  Germany  had 
already  become  the  first  of  European  States  in  the  produc- 
tion of  iron  and  steel.  By  overrunning  and  holding  Belgium 
and  northern  France,  and  getting  possession  of  the  mines,  iron- 
works, and  manufacturing  establishments  in  those  regions, 
Germany  and  her  ally,  Austria,  secured  greater  resources  in 
fuel  and  iron  than  all  the  rest  of  Europe  com'bined.  Altho 
her  ships  were  driven  from  the  seas,  and  her  foreign  com- 
merce was  completely  paralyzed,  her  internal  resources  and 
those  of  her  ally,  because  of  conquered  territory,  became 
apparently  sufficient  to  keep  her  constantly  supplied  with 
ammunition,  while  her  enemies,  with  the  markets  of  the 
world  open  to  them  in  addition  to  their  own.  resources,  failed 
for  many  months  to  keep  their  troops  supplied.  The  chief 
cause  of  the  long  series  of  Russian  defeats  extending  over 

29 


INTRODUCTION 

five  m-onths  in  1915,  including  a  retreat  of  nearly  four 
hundred  miles  from  Galicia  across  Poland  and  well  into 
Russia,  was  lack  of  ammunition.  In  Great  Britain,  notwith- 
standing ^n  industrial  development  which  at  one  time  had 
placed  her  first  among  industrial  nations,  lajsk  of  ammuni- 
tion for-  many  months  in  the  first  year  o-f  the  war  prevented 
her  from  putting  into  the  field  in  France  more  than  600,000 
men,  altho  her  enlistments  numbered  over  3,000,000.  Her 
troops  occupied  only  thirty  or  forty  miles  of  the  fighting 
line,  whereas  her  allies  occupied  nearly  a  thousand  miles — 
300  miles  on.  the.  Western*  Front  and.  650  miles  on  the 
Eastern. 

From  Napoleon '-s  time  until  the  beginning  of  the  AVorld 
War,  the  manner  of  conducting  a.  battle  had  not  substantially 
ch-anged.  Thene  were  three  distinct  stages,  in  which  each  of 
the  three  arms  performed  its  distinctive  part.  Cavalry  kept 
in  touch  with  the  enemy,  and  discovered  his  movements;  the 
battle  was  opened  by  an  artillery  duel  in  which  it  was 
sought  to  silence  the  enemy 's  artillery ,  and  to  shake  the 
morale  of  his  infantry,  and  then  came  the  final  and  decisive 
stage,  an  infantry  attack,  first  at  long  range,  then,  an  advance 
to  shorter  range,  ending  possibly  in  a  hand-to-hand  combat, 
or,  at  th.e  final  critical  moment,  cavalry  might  be  sent  in  to 
turn  the  scale  with  a  vigorous  charge  in  which,  in  case  of 
the  enemy's  retreat,  the  cavalry  would  be  sent  in  pursuit  in 
the  hope  of  converting  the  retreat  into  a  rout.  This  method 
of  fighting  was  now  greatly  modified,  if  not  completely 
changed.  Cavalry  was  no  longer  the  only  means  of  keeping 
in  touch  with  the  enemy  and  discovering  his  positions.  This 
was  far  more  completely  and  satisfactorily  done  by  the 
aeroplane,  the  balloon,  and  the  airship,  which  soared  above 
the  enemy's  position,  while  aviators  made  sketches  or  took 
photographs  of  it,  counted,  or  estimated  ninnbers,  and  re- 
turned with  the  speed  of  a  bird  to  report  to  the-  commanding 
general.  While  cavalry  did  not  cease  to  be  ^'the  eyes  of  the 
army,"  its  role  in  this  respect  was  greatly  diminished,  and, 
except  in  the  Near  East,  became  almost  insignificant  in  com- 
parison with  its  work  in  previous  wars. 

The  role  of  artillery  increased  in  importance  as  much 
as  that  of  cavalry  decreased.     Again  it  was  a  case  of  im- 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

proved  mecbanism.  The  size  of  the  guns,  the  weight  of  the 
projectiles  and  the  distaiijce  they  cauld  be  fired  had  been 
increased  to  an  extent  not  possible  before  the  coming  of  the 
mechanical  tractor  and  its  internal  combustion  engine.  Enor- 
mous projectiles  were  now  able  to  destitoy  permanent  fortifi- 
cations at  very  long  range,  and  shrapnel  -could  be  fired  with 
such  rapidity  and  accuracy  at  long  range  as  to  annihilate,  a 
line  of  infantry  and  so  make  an  advance  across  open  ground 
impossible.  The  manner  of  handling  and  firing  guns  was 
also  changed  completely.  The  gunner  no  longer  saw  the 
enemy,  the  piece  being  concealed,  as  in  a  thicket  or  behind  a 
brush.  The  gun-carriage  did  not  recoil,  the  recoil  being  ab- 
sorbed by  pistons  and  cylinders  filled  with  oil.  The  gunner 
got  his  instructions  as  to  azimuth  and  altitude  from  a  battery- 
officer,  with  a  range-finder,  who  might  be  located,  in  a  tree  or 
on  the  top  of  a  house,  or  in  some  other  elevated  position  from 
which  the  enemy  cauld  be  seen.  The  aeroplane  came  to  the 
assistance  of  the  gunner  and  helped  him  to  correct  range 
and  direction.  Flying  over  the  enemy  and  discovering  his 
position,  an  aviator  could  drop  a  sm-all  bomb  leaving  a 
vertical  trail  of  white  smoke,  from  which  the  battery-officer, 
with  instruments  of  precision,  could  obtain  the  correct  dis- 
tance and  direction. 

The  number  of  sick  on  both  sides  apparently  was  very 
small.  In  our  Civil  War  deaths  from  sickness  were  probably 
twice  as  many  as  from  wounds;  but.  in  this  war  modern 
methods  for  preventing  typhoid  and  malaria  were  used  with 
great  success.  As  the  killed  and  wounded  were  numbered  in 
seven  figures  immunity  from  sickness  meant  the  saving  of 
other  millions  of  lives.  With  reference  to  the  wounded 
German  reports  stated  that  the  deaths  were  less  than  two 
per  cent. ;  the  recoveries,  with  permanent  disability,  about 
eight  per  cent.,  and  the  complete  recoveries  about  ninety 
per  cent.  In  our  Civil  War  the  deaths  among  the  wounded 
in  hospitals  were,  about  ten  per  cent.,  of  more  than  five 
times  as  many  as  in  the  World  War.  The  ratio  of  killed  to 
wounded  was  formerly  as  one  to  five ;  now  apparently  it  was 
as  one  to  one  and  three-quarters. 

Another  striking  fact  in  the  war  was  the  number  of 
elderly,  or  old  men,  who,  when  the  war  began,  were  among 

31 


INTRODUCTION 

conspicuous  leaders  on  both  sides.  As  in  the  previous  war 
between  France  and  Germany  when  the  Emperor  William, 
then  King  of  Prussia,  was  in  his  seventy-fourth  year ;  Moltke 
in  his  seventy-second ;  Roon  in  his  sixty-ninth,  and  Bismarck 
in  his  fifty-sixth,  so  in  this  war  the  commanding  men  were 
past  middle  life,  and  some  were  unquestionably  old.  Moltke 
was  sixty-six;  Haaseler  was  seventy-eight;  Von  der  Goltz, 
seventy-one ;  General  von  Kluck,  sixty-seven ;  Emmich, 
Mackensen  and  Von  Tirpitz  were  sixty-six,  and  Hindenburg, 
sixty-seven.  Kitchener,  the  organizing  genius  of  the  British 
Army,  was  sixty-four  when  the  war  began ;  French,  com- 
manding the  British  forces  in  the  field,  was  sixty-two 
Fisher,  First  Sea  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  was  seventy-two 
Joffre,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  French  Army,  was  sixty-two 
Pau  was  well  advanced  in  the  sixties,  and  Gallieni  was 
seventy.  In  contrast  with  these  figures  are  those  for  several 
of  the  world's  greatest  military  leaders  of  earlier  times. 
Julius  Caesar  defeated  Pompey  at  Pharsalia  when  he  was 
fifty-two  and  was  assassinated  at  fifty-six;  Marlborough  won 
the  battle  of  Blenheim  at  fifty-four;  Washington  took  com- 
mand of  the  American  Army  at  forty-four;  Napoleon  won 
the  battle  of  Austerlitz  at  thirty-six ;  Wellington,  the  battle 
of  Waterloo  at  fortj^-six;  Grant  was  in  command  of  the 
Union  Army  at  forty-one,  and  Lee  of  the  Confederate  at 
fifty-four. 

This  war  proved  once  more  how  important  a  factor  in  war 
is  control  of  the  sea.  It  was  contended  by  not  a  few  authori- 
ties that  the  war  in  the  last  analysis  was  a  naval  war,  and 
that  the  British  fleet  had  decided  the  issue.  Within  a  few 
months  after  the  outbreak,  the  naval  superiority  of  Great 
Britain  enabled  her  to  destroy  every  warship  of  Germany  on 
the  high  seas,  to  paralyze  German  commerce,  to  keep  open 
British  commerce  with  every  part  of  the  world,  and  to  main- 
tain uninterrupted  her  military  lines  of  communication  with 
the  Continent  and  with  her  allies.  Meanwhile  the  German 
fleet  which  had  been  toasting  ''Der  Tag!"^^  for  many  years, 
remained  for  nearly  two  years — until  May  31,  1916 — idle 
and  useless  in  harbor  and  when  it  did  emerge  seeking  battle 
was  so  badly  beaten  that  it  never  again  came  out  to  fight. 

13  "The  Day  !"  In  allusion  to  the  day  when  the  German  fleet  would  meet 
the  British  fleet  in  battle. 

32 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

Germany  endeavored  to  restore  the  balance  by  a  submarine 
warfare,  which  was  absolutely  novel,  both  in  the  mechanism 
of  the  submarines  and  in  the  magnitude  of  the  destruction 
accomplished.  The  total  of  the  ships  destroyed  in  the  first 
year  was  in  excess  of  300,  the  total  tonnage  about  600,000, 
the  lives  lost  about  6,000.  In  the  list  were  several  warships 
and  neutral  ships,  and  some  of  the  most  modern  and  splendid 
passenger  vessels  afloat  and  freighters.  Of  the  lives  lost, 
nearly  one-half  were  those  of  non-combatants.  These  figures 
while  absolutely  large  were  relatively  small.  The  merchant 
shipping  of  Great  Britain  was  more  than  20,000,000  tons  so 
that  the  destruction  by  submarines  thus  far  represented  less 
than  three  per  cent,  and  considerably  less  than  that  of  the 
new  vessels  built  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  number 
of  lives  lost,  in  comparison  with  those  killed  in  battle,  was 
insignificant,  and  the  damage  done  to  vessels  of  war  by 
submarines  was  not  sufficient  to  produce  any  serious  effect. 
It  remained  a  question  whether  the  submarine  was  really 
an  important  military  arm.  The  U-boats  gave  rise  to  endless 
diplomatic  disputes.  During  the  first  year  of  the  war  more 
than  fifty  of  them  were  reported  sunk  with  all  on  board. 

The  menace  of  Germany's  submarine  warfare,  in  a  later 
period,  beginning  on  February  1,  1917,  reached  proportions 
that  aroused  world-wide  alarm  and  seemed  for  a  time  to 
promise  ultimate  success.  Germany's  faith  in  it  remained 
fixt  until  near  the  end.  Unrestricted  submarine  warfare 
was  declared,  and  all  the  arts  and  energies  of  Germany's 
naval  powers  were  employed  in  carrying  it  on,  until  by 
September,  1918,  the  deadweight  of  tonnage  sunk,  allied  and 
neutral,  reached  an  appalling  total,  estimates  of  which  ranged 
as  high  as  15,000,000  tons  or  higher.  The  average  was  about 
400,000  tons  monthly.  The  offsets  to  these  figures  were 
3,795,000  tons  of  tonnage  belonging  to  the  Central  Powers, 
which  had  been  seized,  and  new  construction,  which,  at  the 
end,  was  considerably  in  excess  of  sinkings.  The  net  result 
was  that  allied  and  neutral  nations  at  the  end  of  the  war 
had  3,362,088  fewer  tons  in  operation  than  in  August,  1914. 

The  Allies  at  the  beginning  established  a  definite  mastery 
in  the  air,  and,  tho  much  alarm  was  caused  by  the  feats  of 
the  Fokkers,  that  mastery  was  usually  maintained.     So  far 

33 


INTRODUCTION 

as  Zeppelins  were  concerned,  however,  the  Germans  long 
remained  unchallenged.  They  had  devoted  much  thought 
and  heavy  expenditure  to  this  weapon  and  looked  to  it  as 
destined  to  offset,  in  a  measure,  the  naval  supremacy  of 
Britain.  As  an  instrument  of  "f rightfulness"  the  Zeppelin 
for  a  time  justified  itself,  but  about  two  years  later  it  was 
abandoned  after  the  loss  of  many  ships.  It  had  added  terror 
to  darkness,  not  only  in  London  but  over  all  England ;  it 
had  destroyed  many  innocent  lives  and  created  widespread 
alarm;  but  in  a  strict  military  sense  the  value  of  its  work 
was  negligible,  for  it  could  operate  only  in  the  dark  and 
drop  its  bombs  at  random  or,  at  best,  by  guesswork.  But 
it  proved  of  real  service  to  the  Allied  cause  by  awakening 
Great  Britain  to  the  actualities  of  war  and  so  acted  as  he^: 
best  recruiting  sergeant. 

The  effect  of  the  war  on  the  aeroplane  promised  to  be 
one  of  permanent  good.  An  improved  state  of  development 
in  aerial  navigation  was  produced  which  prominent  birdmen 
said  could  not  have  been  attained  in  many  generations  of 
normal  progress  in  the  art.  There  had  been  great  improve- 
ment in  the  skill  of  aviators  and  a  development  of  flying 
machines  hitherto  uncontemplated.  The  old  way  of  flying 
had  made  all  aeroplanes  easy  prey  to  anti-aircraft  guns  and 
to  attacking  machines,  but  when  it  became  necessary  to  dart 
out  of  the  range  of  any  enemy  who  had  suddenly  revealed 
his  presence  with  bursting  shrapnel,  or  when  only  a  quick 
maneuver  could  prevent  him  from  blocking  the  way  home, 
the  old-fashioned,  steady,  level  flyer  and  slow  climber  became 
deathtraps.  Loop-the-loop,  caper-cutting,  all  the  acrobatic 
performances  that  at  first  attended  exhibition  flying,  became 
in  the  war  normal  evolutions.  Only  excess  power  for  sudden 
bursts  of  speed  and  climbing  could  now  save  one  in  a  peril- 
ous moment.  Daily  encounters  in  the  sky  proved  conclusively 
that  flying  had  been  as  thoroughly  mastered  as  horseback 
riding.  Machines  were  made  to  respond  to  the  subconscious 
action  of  the  rider  as  obediently  as  a  cavalry  horse  responds. 
Indeed,  fighting  aeroplanes  were  often  under  better  control 
than  cavalry  horses. 

So  rapid  and  extensive  was  the  expansion  of  the  military 
air  service  that  it  suggested  the  miraculous.     At   the   out- 

34 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

break  of  Uie  war  Britain's  total  fighting  strength  in  aircraft 
consisted  of  six  squadrons  of  aeroplanes — 80  in  number — 
manned,  approximately,  by  250  officers  and  1,000  men,  and 
the  military  wing  of  the  aerial  fighting  forces  regarded  itself 
as  fortunate  if  it  could  obtain  fop  its  purpose  an  appropria- 
tion of  £1,000,000.  In  1916  the  annual  expenditure  of  the 
Flying  Corps  was  several  million  pounds.  The  country's 
total  investment  in  military  aircraft  was  not  short  of 
£38,000,000  or  £40,000,000  and  eventually  was  considerably 
more.  The  Flying  Corps  which,  in  August,  1914,  had  found 
an  adequate  home-  in  six  or  seven  rooms  in  the  War  Office 
building  in  Whitehall,  London,  occupied,  by  1916,  an  im- 
mense building  of  its  own  m  Blackfriars,  with  375  rooms. 
Among  the  wonderful  things  accomplished  by  British  aero- 
planes was  the  dropping  100,000  pounds  of  food  into  Towns- 
hend's  camp  at  Kut,  on  the  Tigris  river,  in*  1916 — an 
operation  attended  with  great  danger,  and  a  considerable 
number  of  men  were  lost.  Early  in  the  war  there  were 
cases  on  the  Western  Front  of  two  or  three  British  machines 
accepting  battle  with  twenty  Fokkers.  Many  were  the  in- 
stances of  British  airmen  chasing  German  machinjes  to  the 
ground,  and  firing  upon  them  from  a  height  of  fifty  feet. 
From  this  level  they  shot  at  the  Germans  as  they  scrambled  out 
of  their  machines.  They  even  landed  and  fought  with  them 
on  the  ground.^^  Before  the  battle  of  Arras  in  the  Spring 
of  1917,  they  took  nearly  1,700  photographs  of  the  German 
line  which  were  of  inestimable  service  in  the  conduct  of  that 
battle. 

In  this  war  Germany,  for  lack  of  the  far-sighted  diplomacy 
of  Bismarck,  had  to  rely  on  the  genius  of  her  generals  and 
the  efficiency  of  her  militarj^  machine.  In  preparedness 
there  had  been  no  parallel  to  her  astonishing  position  when 
the  war  burst  on  Europe.  Her  commerce,  financial  methods, 
railways,  education,  social  reform,  and  even  her  recreations 
had  had  as  their  ultimate  purpose  the  securing  of  her 
supremacy  on  the  battlefield.  War  had  been  conceived  by 
her,  not  as  a  thing  of  swift  inspiration,  but  as  something 
prepared  long  before  in  the  scientist's  laboratory — the  per- 
sonal factor  subordinated  to  the' machine.     Conquest  of  the 

"  Edward  P.  Bell  in  the  Chicago  Daily  News. 

35 


INTRODUCTION 

air,  the  discovery  of  wireless  telegraphy,  the  development 
of  motor-traction,  the  achievements  of  chemistry  in  the 
matter  of  high  explosives,  all  had  worked  to  the  advantage 
of  the  Power  which  had  been  most  industrious  in  the 
practical  applications  of  science  and  most  concerned  in 
making  them  subservient  to  war. 

The  contidence  of  the  Germans  in  their  machine  had  a 
foundation  that  was  solid  and  absolute.  It  was  on  the 
spiritual  side  that  they  were  wrong.  They  miscalculated 
Belgium,  misread  Great  Britain,  underrated  France  and  the 
United  States  and  blundered  in  their  estimate  of  the  ability 
of  Austria  to  hold  Russia.  On  the  material  side  they  were 
substantially  right,  for  if  preparedness  for  war  had  been  the 
final  condition  of  victory  they  would  have  been  masters  of 
Europe  and  indeed,  of  the  world,  in  six  months.  The  Allies 
had  little  to  offer  against  them  except  improvised  methods. 
They  had  no  common  strategy  and  no  body  of  agreed  doc- 
trine. France  had  passed  through  a  series  of  military 
convulsions  which  made  a  coherent  theory  impossible.  The 
Russian  military  system  was  corrupt  and  inefficient  and  was 
in  a  state  of  reorganization.  Of  the  younger  Russian  gen- 
erals only  twenty-five  per  cent,  had  passed  through  the 
regimental  mill.  Of  300  colonels  of  recent  promotion  only 
one  had  gone  through  a  military  academy.  In  Great  Britain 
the  idea  of  intervention  in  Continental  warfare  had  almost 
ceased  to  belong  to  the  realm  of  practical  considerations. 
In  the  past  generation  no  army  had  been  seen  fighting  in 
so  many  and  in  such  varied  fields  as  the  British  Army,  but 
the  fields  were  remote,  the  scale  in  general  was  small,  and 
the  methods  were  antiquated.  Up  to  the  Great  Boer  AYar 
the  British  Army  was  looked  upon  as  a  social  asset  into 
which  ''sons  of  the  aristocracy  went  to  learn  polo." 

AYhen  the  clash  came,  it  was  found  that  the  Germans  were 
easily  first.  In  the  matter  of  fortifications,  they  had  seen 
how  modern  weapons  of  offense  had  made  the  fortress  obso- 
lete except  as  a  center  of  widespread  operations.  The  collapse 
of  i\hL±±c.^.  "^as^the  first  evidence  that,  in^  military  thought  the 
Germans  were  decisively  superior.  As  the  war  went  on, 
especially  on  the  Russian  front,  the  fact  that  the  modern 
gun  would  dominate  the  fort  was  established  with   terrible 

36 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

emphasis.  It  was  only  on  the  Verdun-Toul  line  that  fort- 
resses retained  an  appearance  of  supremacy,  but  there  this 
supremacy  was  based  on  the  fact  that  the  land  lent  itself 
to  such  a  wide  defensive  system  as  to  reduce  forts  to  the 
function  of  depots  for  field  operations.  Not  less  sound  was 
the  doctrine  of  the  'Germans  as  to  the  use  of  big  guns  in 
field  warfare.  The  French  General  Staff  had  pinned  its 
faith  to  the  75  mm.  and  had  resisted  every  proposal  for  the 
employment  of  heavy  artillery  in  the  field.  The  ground  of 
objection  was  that  the  use  of  heavy  guns  would  destroy  the 
mobility  of  the  army  and  embarrass  its  operations'.  But 
when  the  struggle  settled  down  into  permanent  trench  war- 
fare, big  guns  for  the  field  became  a  factor  of  the  first 
importance. 

That  the  Germans  looked  confidently  for  a  swift  triumph 
in  the  field  is  undoubted;  but  that  they  had  also  foreseen 
the  'possibility  of  trench  warfare  became  evident,  not  only 
from,  their  preparations,  but  from  the  promptness  with  which 
they  brougiit  into  play  the  hand-grenade  and  the  trench- 
mortar.  The  revival  of  these  obsolete  weapons  was  an 
inevitable  consequence  of  siege  warfare,  but  only  the  Ger- 
mans were  prepared.  Evidently  they  alone  had  seriously 
and  minutely  considered  the  possibility  of  a  static  struggle. 
For  a.  considerable  time  after  the  great  parallel  lines  from 
Flanders  to  Switzerland  had  been  drawn,  the  Germans  were 
using  an  abundance  of  perfectly  manufactured  hand-bombs, 
while  their  foes  could  reply  only  with  crude  improvisations 
of  an  inferior  sort.  The  Germans  started  with  sounder 
theories  as  to  methods  of  war,  and  their  advantage  in  the 
matter  of  strategy  should  have  beeru  even  more  decisive  than 
it  was.  They  alone  had  a  strategj^  that  was  conceived  on 
large  and  comprehensive  lines.  The  Allies  had  never  discust 
the  strategy  of  a'  possible  Continental  war  in  a  collective 
way.  Beyond  a  secret  understanding  between  Great  Britain 
and  France  that,  in  the  event  of  an  invasion  of  Belgium, 
the  British  Army  should  go  to  the  defense  of  that  country, 
there  was  no  strategic  preparation  on  the  part  of  the  two 
countries.  The  idea  that  Great  Britain  would  raise  an  army 
on  the  Continental  scale  had  never  been  contemplated.  Her 
task  was  to  command  the  sea,  and  defend  her  own  shores. 

37 


INTRODUCTION 

Italy,  so  far  from  being  involved  in  the  general  strategy  of 
the  Allies,  was  at  that  time  nominally  an  ally  of  Germany. 
The  relations  between  France  and  Russia  had  been  more 
intimate,  but,  in  so  far  as  the  two  governments  had  discust 
a  common  strategy,  it  was  the  strategy  of  defense  in  un- 
known circumstances  at  an  unknown  time.  The  geographical 
position  of  Germany  alone  was  a  decisive  factor  in  the 
dictation  of  the  initiative.  Her  chief  ally,  Austria,  was  not 
separated  from  her  by  land  as  the  Entente  Allies  were  one 
from  the  others,  but  was  solidly  at  her  back.  Working  on 
interior  lines,  Germany  could  calculate  on  dealing  with  her 
enemies  in  detail,  and  on  bringing  the  whole  weight  of  her 
resources  to   any  given   point  with   a  minimum  of   delay.^^ 

After  April,  1917,  the  war  was  not  the  same  war  as  in 
earlier  years,  but  an  entirely  different  war.  The  first  explo- 
sion had  been  a  result  of  ''over-pressure  exerted  on  the 
European  body  politic  by  conflicting  national  ambitions,  by 
Pan-Germanism  on  the  one  side,  by  Pan-Slavism  on  the 
other'*;  and  by  growing  mutual  distrust  and  fear  among 
nations,  which  had  led  to  the  Triple  Entente  as  a  counter- 
balance to  the  Triple  Alliance.  Another  cause  was  European 
economic  rivalry.  Definite  issues  of  a  political,  racial,  and 
economic  character  were  thus  involved  when  the  war  first 
broke  out,  but  these  all  moved  into  the  background  before 
the  paramount  infiuences  that  characterized  the  war  in  1917, 
when  it  had  become  ''a  struggle  on  a  gigantic  scale  for 
popular  government,"  the  United  States  having  gone  into 
it  not  only  because  Germany  committed  acts  of  war  against 
us,  but  because  she  represented  a  ''powerful  and  menacing 
government  based  on  the  autocratic  principle."  As  her  vio- 
lation of  Belgium's  guaranteed  neutrality  had  been  the 
occasion  for  the  entrance  of  Great  Britain  into  the  war,  so 
was  the  sinking  by  Germany  of  the  Lusitania,  and  the 
resumption  of  a  ruthless  sink-at-sight  submarine  policy  the 
occasion  for  ours. 

It  was  not  until  at  Seicheprey  on  April  20,  1918,  that  the 
Americans  saw  fighting  that  tested  their  quality  as  soldiers. 
Seicheprey   was   only   a   skirmish,    but   was    memorable    for 

"  This  and  several  preceding  paragraphs  are  condensed  from  parts  of  an 
article  by  Alfred  C.  Gardiner  in  The  Atlantic  Monthly  for  May^  1916.  Mr. 
Gardiner  was  the  editor-in-chief  of  the  London  Daily  News. 

38 


^7HY  THIS  WAR? 

a  certain  quality  which  it  disclosed  in  our  young  troops. 
Next  our  First  Division  went  into  action  and  on  May  28 
took  Cantigny,  held  it  and  broke  the  German  counter  attack. 
Cantigny  was  our  real  beginning  as  combatants  in  the  war. 
Our  troops  arrived  there  after  the  first  flood  of  the  German 
rush  had  been  checked,  and  so  we  began  in  a  small  way  the 
process  of  regaining  lost  ground.  A  little  more  than  a 
month  later  Ludendorff  had  won  his  last  victory  when  he 
burst  across  the  Aisne  and  reached  the  Marne.  It  was  in 
that  critical  time  that  two  American  divisions,  including  the 
Marines,  gathered  up  from  rest  camps,  seized  upon  a  moment 
of  supreme  necessity,  and  appeared  on  the  road  to  Paris  and 
south  of  the  bridge  across  the  Marne  at  Chateau-Thierry.  By 
them  the  road  to  Paris  was  barred,  and  after  another  month 
the  tide  had  turned.  While  these  American  divisions  shared 
in  the  work  of  first  checking  Ludendorff 's  final  bid  for  suc- 
cess, other  divisions  were  soon  serving  with  Mangin's  spear- 
head in  Foch's  great  coimter  offensive  of  July  18,  and  still 
others,  including  the  Twenty-seventh  Division,  were  with  the 
British  in  the  north,  where  early  in  August  they  forced  the 
Germans  back  from  positions  they  still  held  around  Kemmel 
Hill.  Whether  it  was  Kemmel  Hill  or  Chateau-Thierry  that 
would  rank  in  history  as  the  high-water  mark  of  the  Ger- 
man invasion  of  France,  in  the  sense  that  the  '' bloody 
angle'*  at  Gettysburg  became  the  high-water  point  of  the 
Confederacy,  might  be  long  debated;  but  in  any  case  it 
was  American  soldiers  who  struck  the  final  blow  that  dis- 
lodged the  Germans  from  both  places. 

With  Gouraud  east  of  Rheims  were  a  few  Americans  in 
July,  but  in  the  Marne  salient  more  Americans  were  with 
Mangin  on  the  Ourcq.  It  was  not  until  mid-September  that 
the  Americans  had  an  army  of  their  own.  Its  first  battle 
was  fought  at  St.  Mihiel  where  it  caused  a  recession  of  the 
Germans  from  ground  they  had  held  since  1914,  a  defeat 
which  cost  the  Germans  many  towns,  large  territory,  and 
16,000  prisoners,  our  casualties  being  only  7,000.  Elsewhere 
on  the  western  front  another  notable  strike  was  made  in 
September  by  American  troops — one  that  stood  out  large  in 
records  of  this  war.  This  was  work  done  by  the  Twenty- 
seventh  Division,  which  comprised  troops  made  up  from  the 

39 


INTRODUCTION 

National  Guard  of  New  York  State.  Late  in  the  month, 
acting  with  the  Thirtieth  Division/^^  the  Twenty-seventh  took 
over  a  front  that  had  been  occupied  by  British  divisions  in 
the  St.  Quentin  sector,  drove  the  Germans  from  a  tunnel  of 
the  St.  Quentin  Canal,  and  broke  through  the  Hindenburg 
Line.  By  the  last  days  of  Septem'ber,  the  Germans  were 
hard  prest  on  all  fronts  and  their  retreat  had  begun.  For 
this  retreat  they  had  two  routes  available  —  northward 
through  Liege,  southward  through  Sedan.  Our  assignment 
in  the  fighting  was  to  clear  fhe  Argonne  of  Germans  and 
close  the  Sedan  door.  From  September  26th  to  November 
11th  our  men  fought  to  close  that  door.  At  the  same  time 
we  had  kept  divisions  in  Flanders  and  in  Champagne. 

The  German  saw  his  peril  in  the  Argonne  and  sent  his 
best  troops  to  face  us — forty  divisions,  first  arid  last.  For 
more  than  a  month  he  held  his  ground,  aided  by  a  formidable 
terrain,  but  finally  his  strength  began  to  ebb  until  he  could 
not  keep  up  the  pace  and,  on  November  1,  our  men  broke 
through.  Six  days  later  our  troops  reached  Sedan ;  and 
when  the  armistice  was  signed  the  southern  route  of  retreat 
had  been  closed.  To  Ludendorff  was  left  surrender  or  a 
supreme  disaster,  and  he  chose  to  surrender.  The  thing 
that  had  happened  to  Napoleon  had  happened  to  Wilhelm 
II.  The  troops  of  the  aroused  nationalities  of  Europe  had 
worn  down  his  veterans  until  his  victories  became  local  and 
of  passing  importance,  his  defeats  heavy  and  his  battle-losses 
irreplaceable.  Then  followed  the  signing  of  the  armistice  in 
Foch's  railway  car,  side-tracked  in  a  forest  near  Senlis,  as 
a  companion-piece  to  the  abdication  of  Napoleon  at  Fon- 
tainebleau  in  1814. 

As  to  the  part  taken  by  the  United  States  in  the  war,  an 
admirable  report  to  the  War  Department  was  made  early 
in  December  by  General  Pershing  in  which  he  showed  him- 
self a  reporter  in  Cesar's  class,  his  story  being  terse,  lucid, 
and  rapid.  When  he  placed  American  troops  at  the  disposal 
of  Marshal  Foch  at  the  end  of  March,  1918,  they  numbered 
only  343,000  men,  but  by  the  second  week  of  October  there 

]5a  T^g  Thirtieth  Division  was  made  up  of  men  from  the  South,  and  was 
known  familiarly  as  the  "Old  Hickory  Division."  On  coming  home  in  March. 
1919.  it  landed  at  Charleston,  S.  C.  about  the  same  time  that  the  Twenty- 
seventh  was  having  its  formal  welcome  home  in.  New  York. 

40 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

were  twenty-eight  American  divisions,  or  more  than  750,000 
men  in  the  battle  line,  and  we  had  sent  two  million  men 
overseas.  In  three  years  the  British  had  raised  only  two 
million;  the  British  forces,  however,  had  been  cut  down  by 
heavy  casualties,  which  they  had  had  to  fill  up,  "while  the 
American  forces  could  for  many  months  find  practically 
every  man  needed  to  build  up  the  force."  Nevertheless  the 
building  up  of  oversea.s  communications  and  the  equipping 
and  supplying  of  an  overseas  army,  Pershing  said,  "must 
rank  as  one  of  the  great  military  achievements  of  all  time." 
Pershing's  story  was  that  of  an  army  which  established  its 
fame  from  the  beginning.  In  May,  1918,  the  First  American 
Division  had  the  honor  of  sharing  in  Foch's  gigantic  resist- 
ance which  after  first  holding  the  Germans  back,  then  de- 
feated them,  and  finally  ended  the  war.  Attached,  at  Foch's 
request,  to  a  position  in  reserve  at  Chaumont-en-Vexin,  in  the 
Montdidier  salient,  they  had  gone  into  action  at  Cantigny 
and  captured  the  place  in  what  Pershing  described  as  "  a  bril- 
liant action."  When  the  Germans  undertook  their  offensive 
toward  the  Marne,  the  Third  Division  was  hurried  to  the 
danger-point  and  made  itself  famous  at  Chateau-Thierry, 
while  the  Second  Division,  which  had  been  held  in  reserve, 
and  in  which  were  the  Marines,  drove  the  enemy  out  of 
Bouresches,  captured  Belleau  Wood,  and  took  the  village  of 
Vaux  "with  most  splendid  precision."  Again  in  the 
Chateau-Thierry  sector,  during  July,  a  single  American 
regiment  "wrote  one  of  the  most  brilliant  pages .  in  our 
military  annals." 

Pershing's  report  revealed  the  reason  why  in  1917  our 
men  had  taken  their  first  position  in  France  on  the  Toul 
sector.  It  was  due  to  "the  vital  questions  of  communication 
and  supply."  Northern  French  ports  were  so  crowded  by 
British  shipping  that  the  "already  overtaxed  railway  system 
behind  the  active  front"  was  not  available.  The  southern 
ports  and  the  comparatively  unused  railway  systems  leading 
from  them  to  the  northeast,  which  meant  Toul,  were  all 
that  was  left.  Two  other  notable  things  shone  out  from 
Pershing's  report.  One  was  the  extent  to  which  we  were 
assisted  in  the  training  and  equipment  of  our  armies  by  the 
French  and  the  British,  and  the  other  was  the  good  feeling 

v.  1—3  41 


INTRODUCTION 

that  accompanied  the  cooperation  of  diverse  nationalities 
between  the  appearance  of  our  troops  in  France  and  the 
decisive  victories  of  the  war.  In  Pershing's  phrase,  "our 
entry  into  the  war  found  us  with  few  of  the  auxiliaries 
necessary  for  its  conduct  in  the  modern  sense,"  and  these 
deficiencies  could  not  be  supplied  at  a  moment's  notice.  In 
this  emergency  the  French  supplied  guns,  aeroplanes  and 
tanks  to  the  limit  of  their  ability.  Pershing's  tribute  to  the 
French  for  what  they  did  in  these  matters  was  frank  and 
open,  but  he  was  careful  to  add  that  American  manufac- 
turers deserved  credit  for  what  they  had  accomplished  in 
the  time  set.  When  the.  armistice  was  signed  he  was  "able 
to  look  forward  to  the  early  .supply  of  practically  all  our 
necessities  from  our  own  factories."  Pershing  said,  of  the 
relations  that  existed  between  French,  British,  and  the 
Americans : 

"Cooperation  among  the  Allies  has  at  all  times  been  most  cordial. 
...  A  far  greater  effort  has  been  put  forth  by  the  Allied  armies 
and  staffs  to  assist  us  than  could  have  been  expected.  .  .  .  The 
French  Government  and  Army  have  always  stood  ready  to  furnish 
us  with  supplies,  equipment  and  transportation  and  to  aid  us  in 
every  way.  ...  In  the  towns  and  hamlets  wherever  our  troops 
have  been  stationed  or  billeted  the  French  people  have  everywhere 
received  them  more  as  relatives  and  intimate  friends  than  as  soldiers 
of  a  foreign  army.  .  .  .  For  these  things  words  are  quite  inade- 
quate to  express  our  gratitude.  .  .  .  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  relations  growing  out  of  our  associations  here  assure  a  permanent 
friendship  between  the  two  peoples.  .  .  .  Altho  we  have  not  been 
so  intimately  associated  with  the  people  of  Great  Britain,  yet  their 
troops  and  ours  when  thrown  together  have  always  warmly  frater- 
nized. .  .  .  The  reception  of  those  of  our  forces  who  have  passed 
through  England  and  of  those  who  have  been  stationed  there  has 
always  been  enthusiastic.  .  .  .  Altogether  it  has  been  deeply  im- 
prest upon  us  that  the  ties  of  language  and  blood  bring  the  British 
and  ourselves  together  completely  and  inseparably." 

Pershing's  testimony  to  the  courage,  resourcefulness,  and 
quick  intelligence  of  our  troops  supported  and  confirmed 
observations  that  had  been  previously  made  on  the  subject 
by  others.     The  American  soldier  won  the  respect  and  confi- 

42 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

dence  of  the  veterans  of  France  and  England.  He  brought 
to  the  battle  front  "eager  desire  for  knowledge,  quick  com- 
prehension of  instructions,  and  a  confidence  in  himself  which 
his  conduct  amply  justified."  From  Pershing  we  got  a 
clearer  notion  than  we  had  before  of  the  difficulties  and 
complexities  of  the  work  of  defeating  the  Germans.  The 
principal  fact  as  to  strategy  that  was  revealed  by  his  report 
w^as  the  tremendous  contribution  to  success  made  by  a  unified 
command  under  Foch  of  which  Pershing  and  President 
Wilson  had  been  among  the  earliest  advocates. 

By  December  1,  1917,  the  United  States  had  sent  only 
145,198  men  overseas.  When  the  armistice  w^as  signed  we 
had  sent  1,950,513,  an  average  of  162,542  each  month,  the 
number,  in  fact,  rising  in  May,  1918,  to  245,951,  in  June  to 
278,850,  in  July  to  307,182,  in  August,  289,570,  and  in 
September,  257,438.  No  such  movement  of  troops  ever  took 
place  before  across  3,000  miles  of  sea,  followed  by  adequate 
equipment  and  supplies,  and  carried  safely  through  extraor- 
dinary dangers  of  attack — dangers  which  were  alike  strange 
and  infinitely  difficult  to  guard  against.  In  all  this  move- 
ment only  758  men  were  lost  by  enemy  attacks — 630  of 
whom  were  upon  a  single  transport  which  was  sunk  near 
the  Orkney  Islands.-^*^ 

Lloyd  George  early  in  December  said  at  Leeds  that  he 
could  never  forget  that  morning  early  in  1918  when  he  sent 
a  cable  message  to  President  Wilson  telling  him  "how  essen- 
tial it  was  that  we  should  get  American  help  at  the  speediest 
possible  rate,  and  inviting  him  to  send  120,000  infantry  and 
machine-gunners  to  Europe."  The  following  day  he  received 
a  cablegram  from  President  Wilson,  "Send  your  ships 
across  and  we  will  send  the  120,000  men."  All  British 
shipping  was  then  engaged  in  essential  trades,  and  as 
Britain,  in  ships,  had  been  "cut  down  to  the  bone,"  this 
change  meant  taking  chances  "even  with  our  food  and 
essential  raw  materials."  But  the  thing  to  do  was  to  get 
Americans  across  at  all  hazards.  The  result  has  already  been 
stated — two  million  men  were  sent  overseas,  and  out  of  that 
number   approximately   half    (forty-eight   and   one-half   per 

"  President  Wilson,  in  his  address  before  Congress,  December  2,  1918,  two 
days  before  he  sailed  to  France  to  take  part  in  the  Peace  Congress. 

43 


INTRODUCTION 

cent.)  were  carried  by  the  British  merchant  marine.  The 
good  old  ships  of  Britain  had  saved  the  liberty  of  the  world 
many  times,  said  Lloyd  George.  They  had  saved  it  in  the 
days  of  Queen  Elizabeth ;  had  saved  it  in  the  days  of 
Louis  XIV. ;  had  saved  it  in  the  days  of  Napoleon,  and  had 
now  saved  it  in  the  days  of  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II.  American 
ships  carried  overseas  forty-six  and  one-half  per  cent,  of 
these  troops,  or  not  quite  as  many  as  British  ships  carried. 

When  Ludendorft'  began  his  last  campaign  in  March,  the 
Entente  allies  had  been  outnumbered  by  upward  of  forty 
divisions  and  the  Americans  had  only  one  division  ready. 
When  that  campaign  ended  in  November  the  Americans  had 
forty  divisions  in  France — thirty  in  the  field,  and  ten  serv- 
ing as  material  to  replace  wastage.  We  had  fought  at 
Seicheprey  with  a  regiment;  at  Cantigny,  with  a  division; 
at  the  Marne  in  June,  with  not  more  than  three  divisions; 
at  the  Marne  in  July,  with  twice  or  three  times  as  many; 
and  at  St.  Mihiel  in  September,  with  an  army,  and  in  the 
Argonne  in  October,  with  two  armies.  We  gave  to  this 
cause  the  last  reserves  of  civilization.  We  arrived  terribly 
late  on  a  field  where  disaster  had  again  and  again  been 
avoided  only  by  supreme  and  unbelievable  heroism  from  our 
associates.  But,  having  arrived,  we  unhesitatingly  gave  all 
we  had  and  what  we  gave  we  had  committed  to  the  hands 
of  one  of  the  greatest  captains  of  all  time.  The  winning  of 
this  war  was  not  the  single  achievement  of  any  nation. 
Comparisons  of  amounts  contributed  could  not,  and  would 
not,  be  made  by  those  who  shared  the  tasks.  It  was  for  the 
European  Allies  to  appraise  the  real  value  of  our  services, 
but  they  would  have  been  the  first  to  recognize  our  national 
sense  of  pride  in  the  achievement  of  that  young  army,  newly 
come  from  store,  farm,  factory,  and  college  campus,  while 
the  personal  achievement  of  Pershing  was  revealed  in  that 
of  his  army. 

The  Sixty-fifth  Congress  of  the  United  States,  which 
entering  into  its  first  session  on  March  4,  1917,  had  declared 
war  on  Germany  on  the  ensuing  April  6th,  and  closed  its 
two  years'  labors  on  March  4,  1918,  promised  always  to  hold 
a  memorable  place  in  our  annals.  None  of  its  predecessors 
had  ever  faced  such  vast  problems  in  respect  to  mobilization 

44 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

of  men  and  resources  and  providing  funds  to  carry  on  the 
war.  It  called  into  being  an  army  of  about  3,700,000  men, 
and  made  provision  for  about  1,000,000  more,  the  great  bulk 
of  them  raised  by  conscription.  The  total  of  its  appropriations 
amounted  to  about  $60,000,000,000,  and  the  bonds  authorized 
by  it  to  about  $25*000,000,000.  It  had  passed  the  greatest 
loan  and  tax  measures  ever  enacted  by  a  national  legislature. 
Not  only  was  its  military  legislation  unprecedented  in  our 
history,  but  acts  of  an  ancillary  character  which  it  placed 
upon  the  statute  books  were  numerous  and  important.  It 
had  had  very  little  respite  from  its  labors  in  the  course  of 
its  existence,  its  three  sessions  covering  a  total  of  635  days, 
so  that  its  recesses  were  few  and  short. 

With  the  war  suspended,  by  the  signing  of  the  armistice 
on  November  11,  1918,  attempts  were  made  to  count  up  the 
direct — none  dared  to  estimate  the  indirect — costs  in  lives 
and  property.  Estimates  of  the  direct  money-cost  varied 
from  $150,000,000,000  to  $200,000,000,000  of*  which  Ger- 
many's part  was  set  at  about  $40,000,000,000.  As  to  lives, 
"let  us  visualize  a  march  of  the  British  dead  down  Fifth 
Avenue,"  suggested  a  waiter  in  the  New  York  Tribune,  in 
an  endeavor  to  make  the  staggering  casualty  lists  of  the  war 
more  real  than  mere  figures  could  do.  '^At  daybreak  they 
start,"  said  he,  "twenty  abreast.  Until  sundown  they  march, 
and  the  next  day,  and  the  next,  and  the  next.  For  ten  days 
British  dead  pass  in  review.  For  eleven  days  more  French 
dead  file  down  'the  Avenue  of  the  Allies.'  For  the  Russians 
it  would  require  the  daylight  of  five  weeks  more.  Thus, 
tw^o  months  and  a  half  would  be  required  for  the  Allied 
dead  to  pass  a  given  point.  While  the  enemj^  dead  would 
require  more  than  six  weeks."  In  this  four  months'  march 
twenty  abreast,  by  men  who  were  actually  killed  in  the 
war,  the  w^riter  suggests,  a  fitting  punishment  could  have 
been  found  for  the  former  German  Kaiser,  provided  he  were 
forced  to  stand  at  attention  and  review  the  stupendous 
ghastly  procession,  from  the  first  to  the  last  rank.  In  the 
following  table,  showing  men  in  arms,  lives  lost,  and  total 
casualties  of  the  leading  nations  involved  in  the  war,  the 
list  of  killed  follows,  in  general,  figures  as  they  were 
gathered  by  the  New  York  Evening  Post  and  the  New  York 

45 


Total 

Lives  Lost 

Casualties 

71,700 

275,500 

658,665 

3,049,991 

1,400,000 

4,000,000 

500,000 

2,000,000 

1,700,000 

9,150,000 

50,000 

300,000 

150,000 

200,000 

200,000 

300,000 

2,000,000 

6,068,000 

800,000 

4,000,000 

250,000 

750,000 

50,000 

200,000 

INTRODUCTION 

Tribune,  but  corrected  by  such  official  reports  as  were  issued 
early  in  1919  after  the  original  estimates  were  made. 


Nation  Men  in  Arms 

United  States       ..  3,764,700 

Great  Britain        . .  7,500,000 

France 6,900,000 

Italy        5,000,000 

Russia 14,000,000 

Belgium 350,000 

Serbia 300,000 

Roumania       ..      ..  600,000 

Germany 11,000,000 

'  Austria-Hungary  . .  7,500,000 

Turkey 1,500,000 

Bulgaria         ..      ..  1,000,000 

Totals 59,414,700        7,830,365      30,293,501 

The  British  total  of  658,704  losses  did  not  take  into  con- 
sideration men  reported  missing  and  who  actually  lost  their 
lives,  but  of  whom  there  was  no  trace,  nor  did  it  account 
for  men  who  died  at  the  front  from  sickness.  With  these 
additions,  the  total  of  British  deaths  perhaps  reached 
900,000.  The  British  ships  sunk  during  the  war  numbered 
5,622,  of  which  2,475  were  sunk  with  their  crews  and  3,147 
with  their  crews  left  adrift.  Fishing  vessels  to  the  number 
of  670  were  lost.  The  merchant  marine  service  suffered 
casualties  exceeding  15,000  men. 

It  was  doubted  if  the  whole  truth  as  to  the  loss  of  life 
among  the  belligerents  would  ever  be  known,  or  whether  the 
maimed  men — doomed  to  be  remnants  of  humanity — and 
the  many  who  completely  disappeared  would  ever  be 
accounted  for.  The  casualties  of  the  Russians  could  only 
be  conjectured ;  records  were  kept  loosely  during  the  imperial 
regime,  and  such  records  as  existed  had  been  engulfed  in 
chaos.  It  was  estimated,  or  perhaps  guessed,  that  1,700,000 
Russians  were  killed  in  the  war,  3,500,000  wounded,  and 
that  the  sum  of  "missing  or  prisoners"  was  2,500,000,  the 
grand  total  being  7,700,000.     French  casualties  were  regis- 

46 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

tered  with  some  care,  but  during  the  war  not  a  figure  was 
published,  and  when  the  war  was  over  admitted  losses  were 
limited  to  the  dead,  of  which  the  number  was  1,071,300. 
How  many  French  soldiers  and  sailors  were  wounded,  and 
how  many  were  captured  or  ''missing''  had  not  been 
divulged.  The  Austrian  casualty  list  left  a  good  deal  to 
be  desired.  The  dead  were  given  as  800,000;  nothing  was 
said  about  the  wounded,  missing,  or  prisoners.  The  Italian 
figures  had  the  color  of  truth— 460,000  dead,  947,000 
wounded,  and  500,000  ''missing  or  prisoners,"  most  of 
whom  the  disaster  following  Caporetto  accounted  for.  The 
German  dead  were  given  as  1,600,000,  the  wounded  as 
3,683,143,  and  the  "missing  or  prisoners"  as  772,512,  a 
total  of  6,055,655.  Great  Britain  had  published  her  losses 
by  the  month  regularly.  Her  dead  were  706,726;  wounded, 
2,032,142;  "missing  or  prisoners,"  359,145— a  total  of 
3,098,013.  It  has  been  intimated  that  the  "dead"  did  not 
include  a  considerable  number  of  losses  by  accident,  disease, 
and  unexplained  causes.  In  the  American  totals  all  deaths 
overseas,  from  whatever  causes,  were  counted.  The  list  of 
January  1st  made  the  army  casualties  (the  naval  had  not 
been  numerous)  as ,  59,111  dead,  126,435  wounded,  and 
"missing"  19,399,  exclusive  of  the  marines,  which  body  had 
had  2,042  deaths,  3,014  wounded,  423  "missing,"  and  fifty- 
four  taken  prisoners.  The  total  in  the  table,  71,700,  includes 
all  Americans  reported  dead  from  battle,  accident,  and  dis- 
ease to  March  31,  1919.  The  latest  available  table  of  all 
men  who  died  in  war  service  gave  a  total  of  6,396,504,  but 
that  did  not  include  Serbians,  Greeks,  Montenegrins,  Rou- 
manians, Bulgarians,  and  Turks.  When  all  returns  were  in, 
it  might  be  found  that  10,000,000  men  had  laid  down  their 
lives  in  the  great  war. 

The  First  American  (Regular  Army)  Division  sustained 
more  battle-deaths,  missing,  and  prisoners  than  any  other. 
This  Division,  which  had  been  highly  praised  for  its  work 
in  France,  and  which  was  feared  by  crack  German  forces, 
sustained  2,303  killed  in  action  alone,  while  1,050  of  its  men 
died  of  wounds,  and  1,789  were  reported  missing  in  action. 
Ranking  second  in  the  total  number  of  battle-deaths,  missing 
and  prisoners  was  the  Twenty-eighth,  or  Pennsylvania  Na- 

*  47 


INTRODUCTION 

tional  Guard  Division,  for  which  the  total  given  was  3,890. 
The  only  other  divisions,  aside  from  the  First  and  the 
Twenty-eighth,  to  sustain  more  than  3,000  in  deaths,  missing 
and  prisoners  were  the  Third  (Regular  Army)  Division  and 
the  Thirty-second  (National  Guard)  Division  from  Michigan 
and  Wisconsin.  The  divisions  in  which  New  York  combat 
troops  served,  the  Twenty-seventh,  Seventy-seventh,  and 
Forty-second,  stood  well  up  in  the  list  in  battle-deaths, 
missing,  and  prisoners.  The  Rainbow  Division  (Forty- 
second)  was  exceeded  in  battle-deaths,  missing,  and  prisoners 
only  by  the  First,  Second,  Third,  Fourth  (Regulars),  and 
Twenty-eighth  and  Thirty-second  (National  Guard)  Divi- 
sions. The  Twenty-seventh  Division,  composed  of  the  New 
York  National  Guard,  stood  tenth  on  the  list,  and  the  Seventy- 
seventh,  of  the  draft  army  division  from  New  York  City, 
trained  at  Camp  Upton,  stood  twelfth.  Approximately 
10,000  men  remained  wholly  unaccounted  for  nearly  three 
months  after  the  ending  of  hostilities.  A  total  of  17,434 
were  classified  as  missing  or  captured;  1,551  men  of  the 
Marine  Brigade  also  had  to  be  added  but  were  not  carried 
in  the  tables,  altho  obtained  from  official  sources.  Battle 
casualty  figures,  issued  by  General  March  on  March  8,  1919, 
gave  divisional  totals  as  follows: 

Second  (Regular),  24,429;  First  (Regular),  23,974;  Third  (Reg- 
ular), 16,356;  Twenty-eighth  (Pennsylvania),  14,417;  Thirty-second 
(Michigan,  Wisconsin),  14,268;  Fourth  (Regular),  12,948;  Forty- 
second  (Rainbow),  12,252;  Ninetieth  (Texas,  Oklahoma),  9,710; 
Seventy-seventh  (Metropolitan  New  York),  9,423;  Twenty-sixth 
(New  England),  8,955;  Eighty-second  (Georgia,  Alabama,  Ten- 
nessee), 8,300-  Fifth  (Regular) ,8,280;  Seventy-eighth  (western  New 
York,  New  Jersey,  Delaware),  8,133;  Twenty-seventh  (New  York), 
7,940;  Thirty-third  (Illinois),  7,860;  Thirty-fifth  (Missouri,  Kansas), 
7,745;  Eighty-ninth  (Kansas,  Missouri,  South  Dakota,  Nebraska, 
Colorado,  New  Mexico,  Arizona),  7,093;  Thirtieth  (Tennessee,  North 
Carolina,  South  Carolina),  6,893;  Twenty-ninth  (New  Jersey,  Dela- 
ware, Virginia,  Maryland,  District  of  Columbia),  5,972;  Ninety-first 
(Alaska,  Washington,  Oregon,  California,  Idaho,  Nevada,  Montana, 
Wyoming,  Utah),  5.838;  Eightieth  (Virginia,  West  Virginia,  western 
Pennsylvania),  5,133;  Thirty-seventh  (Ohio),  4,303;  Seventy-ninth 
(Pennsylvania,  eastern  Maryland,  District  of  Columbia),  3,223; 
Thirty-sixth   (Texas,  Oklahoma),  2,397;  Seventh   (Regular),  1,546; 

48 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

Kinety-seeond  (negro,  National  Army),  1,399;  Eighty-first  (North 
Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Florida,  Porto  Rieo),  1,062;  Sixth  (Reg- 
ular), 285;  Eighty-eighth  (North  Dakota,  Minnesota,  Iowa,  western 
Illinois),  63. 

America,  at  the  time  of  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  had 
on  the  western  front  the  second  largest  allied  army.  France 
stood  first  with  2,559,000  men,  the  United  States  second  with 
1,C50,000  men,  and  Great  Britain  third  with  1,718,000  men, 
including  the  Portuguese.^' 

In  describing  the  casualties  among  German  officers  the 
Cologne  Gazette  used  the  word  "appalling. ''  Those  on 
October  24,  1918,  included  44,000  officers  killed,  82,460 
officers  wounded,  and  13,600  missing,  a  total  of  140,760. 
The  loss  in  officers  alone,  this  paper  said,  "exceeded  the 
total  casualties  of  Germany  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of 
1870,  when  the  total  losses  were  129,698.''  The  surrender 
by  Germany,  under  the  terms  of  the  armistice,  of  ten  battle- 
ships (all  dreadnoughts),  six  battle-cruisers,  eight  light 
cruisers,  fifty  destroyers,  and  all  her  submarines,  deprived 
the  German  fleet  of  practically  sixty  per  cent,  of  its  modern 
battle  strength,  including  100  per  cent,  of  her  submarine 
force.  Omitting  the  latter,  this  meant  the  surrender  of 
seventy-four  ships  approximating  480,200  tons  and  costing 
nearly  $180,000,000.  The  naval  loss  to  the  Allies  in  the 
war,  taking  into  consideration  nothing  under  the  light  or 
protected  cruiser  type,  was  estimated  as  124  ships  of  705,598 
tons,  altho  the  German  Admiralty  estimated  the  total  down 
to  January,  1918,  as  196  ships  of  759,430  tons.  Germany 
and  her  allies  were  estimated  to  have  lost  124  ships  of 
399,111  tons.  The  dreadnoughts,  battle-cruisers,  and  light 
cruisers  involved  in  the  surrender,  in  accordance  with  the 
date  at  which  they  were  laid  down  and  their  tonnage,  con- 
stituted the  best  of  the  German  sea-force. 

The  total  submarine  sinkings  were  not  less  than  13,250,000 
tons  gross,  of  which  Great  Britain's  share  was  9,050,000. 
Translated  into  deadweight  tonnage,  the  total  loss  was 
roughly  21,500,000  tons,  and  Great  Britain's  share  about 
14,750,000  tons — this  against  a  total  merchant  tonnage   for 

*^  statement  by  Gen.  Peyton  C.  March  in  February,  1919. 


INTRODUCTION 

the  whole  world,  when  the  war  began,  of  73,640,000  tons. 
Our  own  Government  shipbuilding-program,  as  originally 
outlined,  exceeded  the  British  loss  but  by  no  large  margin. 
By  outright  sinkings  Britain  had  lost  about  a  fifth  of  the 
world's  tonnage,  and  more  than  eight  times  as  much  as 
France  or  Italy;  seventeen  times  as  much  as  the  United 
States,  and  almost  forty  times  as  much  as  Holland.  But  in 
computing  the  net  deficit  due  to  the  war  it  was  usual  to 
include  an  estimate  of  about  15,000,000  deadweight  tons  that 
would  have  been  built  above  all  losses  if  the  war  had  not 
occurred;  and  Britain's  share  of  the  world's  shipbuilding 
varied  in  1911-1913  between  fifty-eight  and  sixty-eight 
per  cent. 

Of  the  200  German  submarines  lost  during  the  war  it  was 
estimated  that  120  were  sunk  with  all  on  board.  On  an 
average  half  the  crews  of  the  rest  of  the  U-boats  perished. 
The  complement  of  German  submarines  varied.  Small  boats 
had  only  thirty  men  on  board,  while  a  boat  of  the  cruiser 
type  would  average  fifty  to  sixty.  Of  the  fifty-nine  British 
submarines  lost,  thirty-nine  were  destroyed  by  the  enemy, 
four  were  interned  by  neutrals,  seven  were  blown  up  in  the 
Baltic  Sea,  four  were  sunk  by  accident  on  trial  cruises,  and 
five  were  wrecked  in  collisions. 

When  the  armistice  was  signed  the  Allies  had  more  than 
30,000  aeroplanes,  while  the  Germans  had  run  short  of  them. 
Canada  had  developed  15,000  aviators  in  eight  big  flying- 
camps.  The  Allies,  not  counting  America,  had  from  25,000 
to  30,000  trained  men  during  the  war;  America  had  from 
15,000  to  20,000. 

Part  of  the  portentous  cost  of  the  war  in  money  had  been 
paid  through  taxes.  But  in  no  belligerent  country  did 
taxation  provide  for  more  than  a  third  of  the  total  war 
expenditure;  in  some  countries,  such  as  Germany,  only  a 
trifling  percentage  of  it  was  thus  met.  The  national  debt 
of  the  leading  belligerent  States  before  the  war  had  been 
something  less  than  $26,000,000,000;  it  was  now  not  far 
short  of  $170,000,000,000.  Careful  observers  had  noticed, 
more  than  a  year  before  the  war  ended,  that  the  mere  annual 
interest  on  the  debt  of  several  belligerents  exceeded  their 
total  public  revenue  before  the  war.     It  was  France   and 

50 


"WHY  THIS  WAR? 

Germany  whose  situation  presented  the  greatest  difficulties. 
The  financial  burden  left  on  each  was  appalling.  This  was 
not  only  because  they  were  the  main  protagonists,  but  in 
the  case  of  France,  the  fact  of  invasion  and  prolonged  occu- 
pation of  part  of  the  national  domain  had  crippled  the 
country's  economic  pt)wer,  while,  in  the  case  of  Germany, 
the  government's  overweening  confidence  in  a  short  war 
and  a  huge  indemnity  had  led  to  thoroughly  unsound 
methods  of  war  finance.  As  a  result,  both  nations  had  re- 
sorted to  inflation  on  a  large  scale  of  the  currency  for  the 
direct  financing  of  the  war.  The  paper  money  of  France 
represented  nearly  five  times  as  great  a  sum  as  it  did  in 
July,  1914;  $6,500,000,000  was  outstanding.  In  Germany, 
including  the  ''Loan  Bank"  issues,  more  than  $8,700,000,000 
was  outstanding,  or  seventeen  times  as  much  as  in  1914,  and 
in  January,  1919,  was  still  increasing  at  the  rate  of  $100,- 
000,000  weekly. 

Statements  published  in  December,  1918,  giving  details  of 
paper  currency  inflation  in  Russia  and  Germany,  pointed 
to  one  of  the  gravest  economic  problems  that  the  war  had 
raised.  Russia  in  particular  was  in  a  situation  which  had 
not  been  paralleled  in  history  since  the  assignats  era  of  the 
French  Revolution.  Russia's  paper  currency  had  risen,  in 
American  values,  from  $930,000,000  in  July  of  1914,  to 
$4,900,000,000   at  the   time   of  the   revolution   in   March   of 

1917,  and  to  $9,180,000,000  during  seven  months  that  fol- 
lowed. After  the  revolution  the  course  of  paper  inflation 
was  five  times  as  rapid  as  in  the  war-time  period  preceding 
it.  By  December,  1918,  the  amount  of  notes  in  circulation 
was  fifty  billion  rubles,  or  approximately  $25,000,000,000, 
of  which  $15,000,000,000  had  been  put  out  during  the  year 

1918.  While  Russian  notes  purported  originally  to  have 
been  issued  as  ordinary  circulation  of  the  Bank,  supported 
by  its  gold  reserve,  they  were  actually  based  only  on  govern- 
ment-paper obligations  lodged  with  the  Bank.  The  gold  in 
the  institution's  vaults  in  October,  1918,  was  only  $657,- 
000,000,  as  against  $802,000,000  in  July,  1914,  and  it  was 
certainly  smaller  in  December. 

Bolshevik  government  finance  had  been  based  on  nothing 
but  the  most  profuse  sort  of  fiat-money  issues.     With  such 

51 


INTRODUCTION 

prodigious  sums  outstanding,  partial  or  complete  repudiation 
of  the  currency  was  inevitable.  Even  a  stable  and  intelli- 
gent government  could  do  nothing  less  than  scale  down 
Russia's  paper  debt.  ]\Ieanwhile  paper  inflation  which,  since 
Ludendorff's  defeat  became  known,  had  been  at  work  in 
Germany  was  in  its  way  even  more  impressive.  In  July, 
1918,  the  Imperial  Bank  had  $3,100,000,000  circulation  out- 
standing, which  was  itself  an  increase  of  $2,600,000,000  over 
1914 ;  but  after  July  the  progressive  output  of  paper  issues 
added  nearly  $1,800,000,000  more,  and  this  had  occurred 
while  the  Reichsbank's  gold,  reserve,  already  relatively  small, 
had  been  decreasing,  and  when  the  ''Loan  Bank"  currency 
issues  of  the  war  had  run  well  beyond  a  $3,000,000,000  total. 
For  this  formidable  situation,  coming  in  the  onetime  home 
of  scientific  banking,  the  fundamental  cause  was  the  illusion 
into  which  even  German  bankers  fell,  that  Germany's 
enemies  would  have  to  pay  the  cost  of  the  war.  More  than 
one-third  of  the  cost  of  the  war  to  the  United  States  to 
December  30,  1918,  in  actual  Treasury  disbursements,  was 
represented  by  cash  advanced  to  the  Allies.  From  April  1, 
1917,  to  Dec.  31,  1918,  the  United  States  had  spent  on  its 
own  account  about  $14,904,986,000.  The  credits  to  other 
countries  were  as  follows: 

CouxTRY  Amount 

Belgium      $252,895,000 

Czecho-Slovaks 7,000,000 

Cuba 15,000,000 

France        2,436,427,000 

Great   Britain 4,175,981,000 

Greece 39,554,036 

Italy 1,310,000,000       ^ 

Liberia        5;000,000 

Roumania 6,666,666 

Russia 325,000,000 

Serbia 12,000,000 


Total        $8,585,523,70: 


The  German  people  had  placed  great  faith  in  their  navy; 
they  believed  the  English   and  French  were  decadent,   that 

52 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

British  naval  supremacy  was  largely  delusional.  Consider- 
ing- the  enormous  sums  spent  on  their  own  navy,  its  ina  tiv- 
ity  proved  in  time  a  disappointment  to  Germans,  who  for 
twenty  years  had  contributed  enthusiastically  to  its  creation, 
because  it  could  do  nothing.  Some  6,500,000  tons  of  German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  shipping  was  captured  or  driven  off 
the  seas,  with  immense  loss  in  income  and  enormous  charges 
for  the  maintenance  of  interned  vessels.  Overseas  trade 
was  throttled,  with  a  net  loss  estimated  before  the  end  cf 
the  first  year  of  the  war  at  $2,000,000,000.  Besides  these 
losses  Germany's  colonial  empire  was  wiped  out,  largely 
because  of  naval  operations,  and  probably  a  million  men  of 
military  age,  living  in  foreign  lands,  were  prevented  by  the 
Allied  command  of  the  seas  from  returning  to  fight  for 
their  fatherland. 

British  shipping  continued  almost  as  active  after  the  war 
began  as  it  had  been  in  times  of  peace.  The  losses  were 
many,  but  in  relation  to  the  whole  were  for  a  long  time 
inconsiderable.  In  the  first  six  months  the  naval  losses  of 
Germany  and  her  allies  amounted  to  about  7  per  cent. ; 
those  of  Great  Britain  and  her  allies  to  less  than  3  per  cent. 
Additions  made  in  the  meantime  to  the  British  fleet  far 
exceeded  those  made  to  the  German  fleet.  At  the  end  of 
nine  months,  at  the  end  of  twelve,  even  at  the  end  of  the 
war,  the  most  noteworthy  achievement  in  the  war  was  the 
work  of  the  British  fleet.  In  the  Napoleonic  war  it  took  the 
British  navy  sixteen  years  to  accomplish  what  the  Briti.sh 
navy  of  1914  accomplished  in  as  many  weeks.  With  Ger- 
man armies  advancing  into  France  and  Russia,  the  high  seas 
were  in  possession  of  an  enemy  of  Germany,  and  Germany 
had  lost  all  the  advantages  which  sea-command  confers. 

To  appreciate  the  significance  of  this,  we  must  imagine 
its  counterpart  in  terms  of  land-warfare.  Had  the  German 
and  Austrian  armies  retired  within  a  few  fortified  positions, 
leaving  the  armies  of  France,  Russia,  Belgium,  and  Great 
Britain  to  march  through  their  territories,  seizing  private 
and  public  property,  and  exercising  every  possible  pro- 
prietorial right,  one  would  not  have  questioned  on  which 
side  lay  the  balance  of  advantage  in  the  war.  But  such  a 
situation  would  have  given  a  parallel  to  what  had  now  hap- 

53 


INTRODUCTION 

pened  on  the  sea;  the  two  navies — the  German  and  Anstro- 
Hungarian — had  retreated  into  strongly  defended  ports, 
while  the  British  and  French  fleets  exercised  every  naviga- 
tion right  over  the  world's  great  water  highways.  History 
never  recorded  a  more  remarkable  illustration  of  the  value 
of  naval  power;  and  altho  there  long  existed  a  possibility 
that  the  German  navy  might  strike  the  kind  of  blow  con- 
templated by  its  creators,  the  probability  decreased  with 
every  week.  Meanwhile  the  relative  superiority  of  the 
British  navy  was  increasing.  While  the  British  were  hold- 
ing the  North  Sea  with  practically  all  their  strength,  the 
French  were  holding  the  Mediterranean.  British  finances 
were  greatly  reinforced  by  the  completeness  with  which  the 
British  navy  supported  British  prestige  in  the  world.  So 
also  did  the  supremacy  of  British  sea  power  contribute 
largely  to  bringing  unemployment  in  the  United  Kingdom 
to  a  lower  figure  than  it  had  reached  for  many  years.  This 
was  all  accomplished  with  relatively  small  destruction  of 
life  and  property,  and  at  a  comparatively  small  increase  in 
the  cost  of  the  navy. 

Nor  should  the  services  which  the  British  navy  rendered 
to  neutral  commerce  be  ignored.  In  the  absence  of  an  over- 
whelming power  opposed  to  her,  Germany  could  have 
utilized  her  geographical  position  not  only  to  the  detriment 
of  the  United  Kingdom,  but  of  the  world.  There  is  no  trade 
route  upon  which  dozens  of  German  cruisers  and  armed 
merchantmen  might  not  have  operated,  to  the  complete  dis- 
location .of  the  sea  communications  of  the  British  Empire. 
Had  the  British  fleet  been  engaged  for  months  in  struggling 
to  win  the  mastery  of  the  seas  against  the  active  naval 
forces  of  Germany,  the  whole  foreign  commerce,  not  only 
of  the  United  States,  but  of  every  neutral  nation,  would 
have  been  brought  practically  to  a  standstill.  No  endurable 
rate  of  marine  insurance  would  have  covered  the  risk  of 
ships  and  cargoes  falling  into  the  hands  of  British  or  Ger- 
man men-of-war.  Thus  neutral  nations  might  have  been 
forced,  by  the  very  weakness  of  British  sea  power,  to  submit 
to  losses  almost  as  serious  as  those  imposed  on  the  bel- 
ligerents. 

Without   the   British   fleet,   France   would   have   lost   her 

54 


WHY  THIS  WAR? 

colonies  and  lier  cause,  and  Italy  could  not  have  entered  the 
war.  The  Mediterranean  would  have  been  a  German  and 
Austrian  lake.  The  primary  value  of  the  British  fleet  to 
the  Allies  was  too  often  overlooked.  It  had  practically 
swept  German  vessels  from  the  high  seas.  A  raider  or  two 
might  still  be  lurking  somewhere  in  the  vast  expanse  of 
oceans,  but  German  commerce  was  bottled  up  except  in  the 
Baltic  and  the  German  fleet  had  been  bottled  up,  save  for 
sporadic  demonstrations  for  home  effect.  In  vain  did  Ger- 
man irresistible  artillery  smash  land  defenses.  In  vain  were 
German  soldiers  slaughtered  in  pursuit  of  the  German 
dream.  The  floating  steel  bulwarks  of  the  British  fleet 
walled  up  Germany  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  She  might 
win  splendid  but  costly  triumphs,  wearing  herself  down 
with  the  winning,  but  the  real  enemy,  the  fatal  adversary, 
remained.  Germany  was  cut  off  from  the  oceans.  The 
great  sea-born  commerce  she  had  built  up  with  marvelous 
energy,  enterprise,  and  comprehensive  design,  which  she  had 
flung  away  so  rashly,  was  gone.  To  such  petty  limits  as 
Scandinavia  and  Holland  had  that  world-wide  interchange 
of  products  shrunk.  To  the  east  was  Russia,  made  uncon- 
querable by  her  vastness  and  resources;  to  the  west  France, 
who  would  fight  to  the  last  extremity,  and  whatever  France, 
or  Italy,  or  Russia  might  do  or  might  not  do,  there  was 
still  left  the  British  fleet,  and  Germany,  as  long  as  the  war 
lasted,  was  threatened  with  strangulation  unless  she  could 
defeat  it. 

Tragic  as  had  been  the  sacrifices  exacted  from  the  world 
by  Teutonic  ambition,  the  cost  in  lives  and  money  was  not 
quite  so  heavy  as  some  estimates  had  indicated  in  forecasts 
made  at  various  times  during  the  war.  In  absolute  figures 
the  Teutonic  Powers,  as  chief  instigators  of  the  war,  had 
made  their  enemies  pay  the  higher  price;  but,  relative  to 
their  population,  the  Allies,  with  the  exception  of  France, 
had  suffered  more  lightly,  and  even  in  the  case  of  France, 
if  we  included  the  large  number  of  colonial  troops  she  em- 
ployed, it  might  yet  appear  that  the  relative  losses  of  the 
French  mother  country  were  not  so  heavy  as  those  of  her 
chief  assailant,  Germany.  More  tragic  than  all  other  costs 
to  Germany,  however,  must  have  been  her  appalling  con- 

55 


INTRODUCTION 

sciousness  that,  had  she  played  the  war-game  fairly — tha,t  is, 
had  she  kept  out  of  Belgium;  had  she  confined  her  U-boat 
attacks  to  warships;  had  she  refrained  from  taking  the  lives 
of  women  and  children  and  of  other  non-combatant  civilians ; 
had  she  not  executed  Edith  Cavell  and  Captain  Fryatt ;  had 
she  kept  her  covenant  with  this  country  as  to  submarine 
warfare;  had  she  dealt  with  Russia  on  the  basis  of  the 
Reichstag  resolution  of  ''no  annexations  and  no  indemni- 
ties"— she  might  have  won  the  war.^^ 

18  Principal  Sources  :  Charles  Willis  Thompson  in  The  New  York  Times, 
Amos  Kidder  Fiske  in  The  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce,  Morris  Jastrow's 
"The  War  and  the  Bagdad  Railway"  (J.  B.  Lippincott  Co.),  Gen,  Francis 
Vinton  Greene's  address  at  W^est  Point  in  1915,  Ellery  C.  Stowell's  "The 
Diplomacy  of  the  War"  (Houghton,  Mifflin  Co.),  The  Popular  Science  Month! y. 
The  New  York  Tribune,  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  The  New  York  Times, 
The  New  York  Sun,  The  New  York  Tribune,  Bradstreet's,  Robert  F.  McCor- 
mick's  "With  the  Russian  Army"   (Macmillan  Co.). 


56 


THE  OUTBREAK  AND  THE 
CAUSES 

Part  I 
AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 


V.  1—4  57 


THE   TRAGEDY  AT   SERAJEVO  AND  AUSTRIA'S 
ULTIMATUM  TO  SERBIA 

June  28,  1914— July  31,  1914 

IMMEDIATELY  back  of  the  incidental  cause  of  the  World 
"War — that  cause  being  the  assassination  of  the  Austrian 
Crown  Prince,  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  and  his  wife 
at  Serajevo,  on  June  28,  1914 — lay  the  act  of  Austria  in  an- 
nexing in  1908,  as  an  additional  province  of  her  empire,  the 
Slavonic  States,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  an  act  contrary  to 
the  Berlin  Treaty  of  1878,  w^hich  concluded  the  Russo-Turkish 
war.  Protests  were  made  by  some  of  the  Powers  at  the  time  of 
the  annexation,  but  these  were  disregarded,  or  withdrawn. 
Serbia,  the  State  most  concerned,  under  pressure  that  made  her 
powerless  to  protest  further,  directed  her  minister  at  Vienna, 
in  March,  1909,  to  declare  that  '' following  the  councils  of  the 
Powers,"  she  bound  herself  to  ''cease  the  attitude  of  protest 
and  resistance  which  she  had  assumed,"  and  to  "change  the 
direction  of  her  present  policies  toward  Austria-Hungary,  and, 
in  future  to  live  with  the  latter  in  friendly  and  neighborly 
relations."  Serbia's  humiliation,  as  here  exprest,  was  called 
''the  price  of  European  peace"  at  that  time — but  it  meant 
peace  for  a  time  only.  After  the  second  Balkan  War  of 
1913,  by  which  Serbia  nearly  doubled  her  territory,  Austria- 
Hungary  saw  a  necessity  for  watching  Serbia  keenly.  Serbia, 
naturally  elated  by  her  military  successes,  had  been  careful 
to  avoid  "knocking  the  chip  off  the  shoulder"  of  her  powerful 
neighbor.  If  traps  were  being  laid  for  her  Serbia  was  careful 
not  to  fall  into  them.  Austria's  occasion  for  striking  at  her 
finally  came  when  the  Archduke  and  his  wife  were  assassin- 
ated in  June,  1914. 

As  for  some  time  matters  in  Bosnia  had  been  going  from 
bad  to  worse,  the  visit  of  the  Crown  Prince  to  Serajevo  was 
fraught  with  dangers  only  too  well  known  in  Vienna  as  well 
as  in  Bosnia.    Shortly  before  the  visit  the  flag  of  Austria  had 

59 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

been  publicly  burned  there  and  the  garrison  was  called  upon 
to  restore  order.  Twice  had  the  local  Bosnian  Diet  been 
prorogued,  while  in  May,  1913,  the  Constitution  had  been 
suspended  and  a  state  of  siege  declared.  Meanwhile,  Serbian 
secret  societies  had  become  active  and  force  had  befen  requested 
to   check   incipient   rebellions.     At   the   time   of  the   Crown 

Prince 's  visit  the  province  was 
in  a  state  of  inflammable  un- 
rest. Under  these  circum- 
stances, the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment was  keenly  apprehensive 
when  it  learned  that  the  visit 
was  to  be  made.  It  feared 
that  nothing  less  than  an  at- 
tempt against  the  life  of  the 
Archduke  might  result.  Only 
a  week  before  the  date  an- 
nounced for  the  visit  the 
Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna 
had  informed  the  Austrian 
Government  that  there  was 
reason  to  fear  a  plot  had  been 
laid*  to  assassinate,  him.  In 
spite  of  this  warning  the  Arch- 
duke made  the  visit  and  he 
and  his  wife  were  killed  as  described  in  the  following  con- 
temporary dispatches :  ^ 

^'Vienna,  June  28,  1914. — The  Austro-Hungarian  Heir-Presump- 
tive, the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  and  his  wife,  the  Duchess  of 
Hohenberg,  were  assassinated  yesterday  morning  at  Serajevo,  the 
capital  of  Bosnia.  The  actual  assassin  is  described  as  a  high  school 
student,  who  fired  bullets  at  his  victims  with  fatal  effect  from  an 
automatic  pistol  as  they  were  returning  from  a  reception,  at  the 
Town  Hall.  The  outrages  were  evidently  the  fruit  of  a  carefully 
laid  plot.  On  their  way  to  the  Town  Hall,  the  Archduke  and  his 
Consort  had  already  escaped  death,  an.  individual  described  as  a 
compositor  from  Trebinje,  a  garrison  town  in-  the  extreme  south  of 
Herzegovina,  having  thrown  a  bomb  at  their  motor-car.    It  is  stated 

1  The  Times,  London. 


Akchdike  Francis  Feiidinand 


60 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

that  the  Arelidnke  warded  off  tbe  bomb  with  his  arm,  and  that  it 
exploded  behind  the  car,  injuring-  the  occupants  of  the  second  car- 
riage. The  author  of  the  second  outrage  is  stated  to  be  a  native 
of  Grahovo,  in  Bosnia.  It  is  presumed  that  he  belongs  to  the  Serb 
or  Orthodox  section  of  the  Bosnian  population.  Both  criminals  were 
immediately  arrested,  and  were  with  difficulty  saved  from  being 
lynched.  While  this  tragedy  was  being  enacted  in  the  Bosnian  capi- 
tal, the  aged  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  was  on  his  way  from  Vienna 
to  his  summer  residence 'at  Ischl.  He  had  an  enthusiastic  send-off 
from  his  subjects  in  Vienna  and  an  even  more  enthusiastic  reception 
on  reaching  Ischl. 

''Reports  received  here  from  Serajevo  represent  the  assassination 
to 'have  had  its  mainspring  in  the  Pan-Serb  agitation.  Cabrinovitch,^ 
who  threw  the  first  bomb  and  is  stated  to  have  tried  to  escape  by 
jumping  into  the  river,  is  reported  to  have  affirmed  in  examination 
that  he  had  received  the  bomb  from  Belgxade,  while  Prinzip,  wlio 
fired  the  fatal  shots,  stated  that  he  had  been  for  some  time  in  the 
Serbian  capital  and  for  nationalistic  reasons  he  had  made  up  his 
mind  to  assassinate  at  the  first  opportunity  some  important  Austro- 
Hungarian  personage.  The  supposition  that  the  crime  is  the  result 
of  a  plot  is  strengthened  by  a  report  that  close  to  the  place  where 
the  assassination  took  place  a  second  unused  bomb  was  found." 

'^  Serajevo.  June  28,  9.30  p.  m. — The  Imperial'  train  conveying  the 
Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  and  his  Consort  arrived  at  Serajevo 
from  Ilidzhe  yesterday.  After  inspecting  the  troops  on  the  Filipo- 
vitch  parade-ground,  the  august  visitors  drove  in  a  motor-car  along 
the  station  road  and  the  Appel  Quay  to  th'e  Town  Hall.  The  first 
attempt,  when  the  bomb  was  thrown,  took  place  at  10.15,  as  the  car 
was  driving  along  the  Appel  Quay,  just  before  reaching  the 
Chumuria  Bridge.  An  aide-de-camp  seated  in  one  of  the  motor-cars 
which  followed  the  Archduke's  ear  was  wounded  in  the  neck  by  frag- 
ments of  the  bomb  and  several  passers-by  also  received  slight  in- 
juries. The  perpetrator  was  arrested.  He  is  a  young  printer,  twenty 
years  of  age,  Nedjeliko  Cabrinovitch*  by  name,  and  a  native  of 
Herzegovina,  belonging  to  the  Serl>Orthodox  faith. 

^'When  the  motor-car  conveying  the  Archduke  and  his  Consort 
reached  the  Town  Hall  his  Imperial  Highness  said  to  the  Mayor: 
'What  is  the  good  of  speeches?  I  come  to  Serajevo-  on  a.  visit,  and 
I  get  bombs  "thrown  at  me.  It  is  outrageous.'  When  the  procession 
drove  back  from  the  Town  Hall  the  second  attempt  was  made.  At 
10.40,  as  the  Heir  Apj^arent's  motor-car  reached  the  corner  of  the 

-  The  name  has  been  variously  spelled.  The  spelling  retained  here  is  that 
in  the  dispatch. 

n 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Appel  Quay  and  of  the  Franz-Josefsgasse,  another  bomb  was  thrown 
at  the  car  by  Gavrilo  Prinzip,  a  Bosnian  high-school  student,  also 
belonging  to  the  Serb-Orthodox  faith.  This  bomb  did  not  explode. 
Thereupon  the  assassin  fired  three  shots  from  a  pistol.  The  first 
shot  hit  the  Archduke  in  the  neck,  the  second  hit  him  in  the  leg,  and 
the  third  hit  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg-  in  the  lower  part  of  the  body. 
General  Potiorek,  chief 'of  the  administration,  who  was  sitting  in  the 
Archduke's  motor-car,  escaped  injuiy.  The  perpetrator  was  seized 
by  the  crowd  and  severely  mauled. 

"The  Archduke  and  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg  were  rapidly  con- 
veyed to  General  Potiorek's  official  residence.  Both  were  past  all 
"human  aid  and  received  the  last  Sacrament.  The  Archduke  expired 
a  few  minutes  after  his  Consort.  The  town  has  been  plunged  into 
the  deepest  mourning.  The  national  flags  have  been  hauled  down, 
and  black  emblems  have  been  hoisted  in  their  stead.  Several 
suspicious-looking  persons  have  been  arrested.  The  approaches  to 
the  palace  are  barred  and  guarded  by  the  military." 

Anti-Serb  disturbances  soon  broke  out  in  various  parts  of 
the  Austrian  empire.  Enraged  at  the  killing  of  a  prince 
who  was  looked  upon  as  the  guarantor  of  Austria's  political 
future — for  only  the  Archduke  was  felt  capable  of  holding 
togethefr,  after  the  death  of  Francis  Joseph,  the  antagonistic 
racjes  of  the  empire — the  loyal  part  of  the  population,  that 
is  the  Teutonic,  demanded  vengeance  on  the  Serbs.  Martial 
larw  was  declared  at  Serajevo  and  was  extended  later  to  all 
parts  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  In  Mostar,  the  capital 
of  Herzegovina,  two  hundred  Serbs  were  reported  to  have 
been  killed.  In  Vienna,  mobs  of  students  tore  the  Serbian 
fla^  from  the  Serbian  legation  and  burned  it  in  the  street. 
Later,  another  mob,  more  than  a  thousand  strong,  tried  to 
storm  the  legation,  and  with  the  greatest  difficulty  was  re- 
pulsed by  the  police. 

The  bodies  of  the  Archduke  and  the  Duchess  were  taken 
to  Trieste  on  board  the  battleship  Virihiis  Unitus,^  and 
thence  to  Vienna  by  special  train,  where  they  were  met  by 
the  new  heir,  the  Archduke  Charles  Francis  Joseph.  The 
'German  Emperor,  King  Alfonso  of  Spain,  and  some  of  the 
German  kings  had  exprest   the   intention   of   attending  the 

^  Just  before  Austria  signed  tlie  armistice  by  which  she  ceased  to  be  a 
factor  in  the  war  (October.  1918),  the  Virihus  Unitus  was  sunk  by  the 
Italians  in  the  Adriatic  Sea. 

62 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

funeral,  but  at  the  last  moment  it  was  announced  that  the 
Kaiser  could  not  go.  Nor  did  any  other  royal  personages 
attend.  Intimations  from  Vienna,  either  that  the  aged 
Emperor  desired  to  be  alone  with  his  grief,  or  that,  on  ac- 
count of  anarchists,  he  feared  for  the  safety  of  his  guepts, 
caused  all  rgyal  visits  to  be  canceled.  Following  a  short 
ceremony  at  the  Hofburg,  attended  only  by  members  of  the 
imperial  family,  the  bodies  were  removed  to  Artstetten,  in 
Lower  Austria,  where  the  Archduke  had  exprest  a  wish  to 
be  buried,  inasmuch  as  burial  in  the  Hapsburg  vaults  under 
the  Capuchin  Church  in  Vienna  w^as  forbidden  to  his  wife, 
who  was  not  of  royal  blood. 

Serbia  had  now  become  an  aggressive  military  State.  By 
propaganda  encouraged  from  Belgrade  Serbians  had  tam- 
pered with  the  loyalty  of  Serb  subjects  of  Austria-Hungary. 
Indeed,  the  existence  in  the  Balkans  of  a  Pan-Serb  propa- 
ganda could  scarcely  have  been  denied,  for  it  had  been 
actively  promoted,  especially  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
where  lived  a  Serb  population  of  nearly  two  millions.  Serbia 
in  fact  had  become  the  focus  of  an  aggressive  Slav  move- 
ment which,  if  it  had  not  been  actually  encouraged  by  the 
Serbian  Government,  had  at  least  received  support  in  official 
circles.  Except  for  Assertions  made  in  Austro-Hungary, 
there  was,  however,  nothing  directly  to  identify  the  Serbian 
Government  with  the  crime  at  Serajevo;  nothing  that  could 
be  called  evidence  was  produced  in  support  of  the  charge. 
The  murders  were  committed  at  a  time  when  Serbia  was 
busy  with  critical  affairs,  economic,  military,  and  dynastic. 
Whatever  it  was  that  gave  so  free  a  hand  to  the  Serb  fana- 
tics, whether  negligence  or  crime,  the  murder  of  the  Arch- 
duke was  a  deep  personal  tragedy,  and  perhaps  the  gravest 
of  many  calamities  which  had  befallen  the  Austrian  dynasty 
in  modern  times.  Francis  Ferdinand  was  the  hope  and 
embodiment  of  a  liberal  policy  for  the  Empire.  It  was  be- 
lieved that  when  he  came  to  the  throne  he  would  work  for 
a  drastic  change  in  the  dual  system  by  which  subject  races 
would  be  raised  to  positions  of  equality  with  Germans  and 
Magyars.  Practically,  this  would  have  meant  the  rise  of 
the  Slavs  and  the  destruction  of  Hungarian  dominance — 
ending  in  a  triple  monarchy  instead  of  a  dual  one.     That 

63 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

any  modern  ruler  could*  Jiave  carried  through  such  a  trans- 
formation may  be  doubtful,  but  there  were  many  considera- 
tions that  favored  Francis  Ferdinand  in  this  ambition. 
First  was  his  own  strong,  tho  erratic  will,  that  had  made 
him  an  outstanding  figure  in  Europe.  People  had  come  to 
realize  that  he  was  devoting  himself  with  singular  resolution 
to  what  was  perhaps  the  one  hopeful  plan  for  the  future 
of  Austria-Hungary.  In  this  lay  the  deeper  aspect  of  the 
tragedy  of  his  taking  off. 

It  was  apparent  at  the  time  that  no  adequate  police  pro- 
tection had  been  given  in  Serajevo  to  the  imperial  couple. 
FirFt  a  bomb  was  thrown  at  the  heir-apparent,  but  it  fell 
outside  his  carriage  altho  it  injured  a  member  of  his  escort 
riding  in  the  carriage  behind.  Only  a  little  later  Ferdinand 
and  his  wife  were  shot  dead  in  a  street  while  still  driving. 
Not  even  ordinary  precautions  were  taken  to  insure  their 
safety.  Even  the  trial  of  the  assassins  ended  unsatis- 
factorily. It  was  held  behind  closed  doors  and  light  sen- 
tences were  imposed.  The  crime  had  apparently  produced 
its  desired  political  effect ;  it  offered  a  pretext  for  an  Austro- 
Hungarian  attack  on  Serbia  and  there  was  a  marked  dis- 
position to  treat  it  as  a  closed  incident.  The  ruling  clique 
at  Vienna  hated  Francis  Ferdinand.  He  was  opposed  to 
seeking  a  quarrel  with  Serbia.  He  had  fallen  out  with 
William  II  over  Germany's  policy  of  military  expansion. 
Many  powerful  elements  in  the  monarchy  were  interested 
in  preventing  his  succession  to  the  thro.ne  after  the  aged 
Francis  Joseph  died.  In  a  pamphlet^  published  in  Austria 
early  in  1919,  and  written  by  a  priest  who  was  formerly 
spiritual  adviser  to  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg,  it  was 
directly  charged  that  the  court  of  Vienna  and  the  Hungarian 
nobility  had  instigated  the  Serajevo  assassinations.  The 
author's  theory  was  that  Ferdinand  and  his  wife  were  sac- 
rificed in  order  to  pave  the  way  for  a  break  with  the 
Serbians.  The  author  declared  that  Francis:  Ferdinand  had 
repeatedly  refused  to  go  to  Serajevo,  and  it  was  only  an 
appeal  to  his  courage  that  induced  him  to  make  the  trip. 
"He  was  simply  led  into  a  trap  prepared  by  the  Court  at 

*  The  pamphlet  was  entitled  "The  Serajevo  Murder  and  Count  Tisza's 
Responsibility  for  the  World  War." 

64 


FRANCIS  JOSEPH, 
Emperor  of  Austria,  whose  death,  in  1916,  closed  a  reign  of  68  years 

I — 5  65 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Vienna  and  by  the  Hungarian  aristocracy,  headed  by  Count 
Tisza." 

Serajevo,  the  scene  of  the  tragedy  and  the  capital  of 
Bosnia,  is  situated  on  a  small  tributary  of  the  river  Bosna, 
forty-seven  miles  from  the  Serbian,  and  forty-two  from  the 
Montenegrin  border.  Its  population  in  1910  was  51,919, 
chiefly  Serbo-Croatians,  with  small  colonies  of  Gipsies  and 
Jews.  Frequently  called  the  ''Damascus  of  the  North,"  it 
spread  over  a  narrow  valley  closed  on  the  east  by  a  semi- 
circle of  hills.  It  was  still  half  Oriental,  but  had  been 
largely  rebuilt  in  Western  fashion.  A  castle  and  barracks, 
formerly  occupied  by  an  Austrian  garrison,  stood  on  a  cliff 
overlooking  the  city.  The  sale  of  embroideries,  rugs,  em- 
bossed firearms,  gold  and  silver  filigree-w^ork,  and  other 
native  w^ares,  and  the  manufacture  of  pottery,  beer,  silk, 
and  tobacco,  comprised  its  industries.  The  neighborhood 
was  rich  in  prehistoric  remains.  Serajevo  has  repeatedly 
been  destroyed  by  fire— in  1490,  1644,  1656,  1687,  and  1789 
— and  in  1878  it  was  seized  by  the  Austrians. 

With  the  world  expecting  soon  to  hear  the  news  of  the  death 
of  Francis  Joseph,  w^ho  was  then  eighty-four  years  old  and 
in  feeble  health,  there  came  instead,  •news  of  these  assassina- 
tions, as  a  direct  outcome  of  l-esentment  by  the  Serbs  at 
the  formal  incorporation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  into 
the  empire.  At  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878,  these 
provinces  had  been  separated  from  the  Turkish  empire,  and 
placed  under  the  administration  of  Austria.  When,  in 
1908,  the  Emperor-King,  against  the  wishes  of  Russia,  but 
supported  by  Germany,  announced  their  annexation  to  his 
empire,  he  frustrated  the  ambition  of  Serbia  for  a  union 
of  the  southeastern  Slavonic  races,  and  so  aided  in  pre- 
cipitating the  Balkan  wars  of  1912-13.  The  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand,  a  strong  imperialist,  by  efforts  to  extend 
the  Austrian  empire  eastward  through  incorporation  in  it 
of  further  Slavic  territory,  had  more  than  once  come  near 
provoking  a  war  with  Serbia,  or  Russia. 

The  immediate  question  before  Europe  now  was  the 
possible  result  of  this  murder  in  its  influence  on  the  Slavs, 
their  hopes  and  ideals.  The  people  of  Bosnia,  both  Serb 
and  Mussulman,  had  always  resented  annexation.     The  Diet 

C6 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

which  Austria  had  established  for  them  at  Serajevo  had 
very  limited  powers.  While  it  was  thought  the  murders 
might  tend  to  strengthen  the  dual  system  for  a  time,  it  had 
long-  been  felt  that  the  more  the  southern  Slavs  saw  their 
hopes  recede,  the  greater  would  be  the  danger  of  an  ultimate 
explosion.  They  had  grown  restive  under  repression  and 
with  their  dreams  now  thwarted  were  liable  to  break  out 
violently. 

The  Archduke  was  recalled  as  a  man  of  vast  ambitions, 
whose  purpose  was  to  make  Austria  a  commanding  power 
in  Europe  through  his  aim,  known  in  Austria-Hungary  as 
*'trialism,"  which  has  already  been  outlined,  and  meant  a 
reconstitution  of  the  Empire  with  three,  instead  of  two, 
races,  the  first  predominantly  Slav,  the  second,  pre- 
dominantly German,  and  the  third,  predominantly  Magyar 
or  Hungarian.  What  was  described  as  "a  necessary  corollary 
of  trialism,"  was  the  inclusion  in  the  empire  of  the  Slavonic 
races  of  the  Balkans  in  order  to  increase  the  Slav  element. 
That  meant  the  inclusion  of  Serbia  and  some  other  territory. 
It  was  a  curious  example  of  the  irony  of  fate  that  the  Arch- 
duke was  struck  down  by  a  youthful  enthusiast  who  also 
had  had  his  dream,  but  his  was  not  one  of  a  greater 
Austria  but  of  a  greater  Serbia — one  that  would  unite  under 
a  Slavonic  scepter  her  Slavonic  brethren  of  Bosnia,  Herze- 
govina, Dalmatia,  and  Croatia  with  the  existing  kingdom  of 
Serbia.  Even  if  the  attempt  of  Prinzip  had  failed,  as  had 
the  previous  attack  of  the  bomb-thrower,  Gabrinovics,  the 
conspiracy  against  the  lives  of  the  Archduke  and  his  wife 
had  been  so  well  planned  that  probably  it  would  have  been 
impossible  for  them  during  this  visit  to  escape  from  Bosnia 
alive,  for  afterward  bombs  were  found  in  various  other 
places. 

Columns  had  been  devoted  in  newspapers  to  the  romantic 
marriage  of  the  Archduke  to  Sophia  Chotek,  a  lady-in- 
waiting  to  Archduchess  Isabella  who  had  confidently  ex- 
pected that  the  Archduke  would  marry,  not  a  lady-in-wait- 
ing, but  her  own  daughter.  As  a  sequel  to  this  unexpected 
outcome  Isabella's  daughter,  after  an  unfortunate  matri- 
monial career,  became  a  hospital-nun.  The  Emperor,  Francis 
Joseph,  in  response  to  the  pleading  of  his  heir,  had   con- 

67 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

sented  to  the  morganatic  union  but  exacted  two  conditions: 
the  Archduke  was  to  promise  that  his  bride  would  never 
become  empress  and  that  none  of  his  children  by  her  would 
lay  claim  to  the  throne.  In  Hungary,  however,  the  mar- 
riage was  dynastically  valid ;  whether  she  became  Empress 
of  Austria  or  not,  the  Archduke's  wife  would  have  had  a 
right  to  the  throne  of  Hungary.  She  had  been  accused  of 
inspiring  her  husband's  political  "indiscretions."  She  was 
a  Czech,  and  the  Czechs  were  Federalists.  Five  years  after 
the  marriage  the  aged  Emperor  gave  her  the  title  of 
''Durchlaucht,"  ^  and  four  years  later,  made  her  ''Duchess 
of  Hohenberg,"  with  the  privilege  of  being  addrest  as 
"Highness."  At  official  ceremonies,  her  place  was  imme- 
diately after  that  of  archduchesses,  but  on  one  occasion  she 
was  placed  ahead  of  them — at  the  time  of  the  visit  of 
Crown  Prince  Frederick  "William  of  Germany  to  Vienna, 
when  she  occupied  the  seat  of  honor  between  Francis  Joseph 
and  the  Crown  Prince.  It  was  often  said  in  Vienna  that, 
on  the  death  of  Francis  Joseph,  the  first  official  act  of 
Francis  Ferdinand,  notwithstanding  his  promise,  would  be 
to  make  his  wife  Empress  of  Austria  and,  as  the  Austrian 
Court  had  so  long  been  without  an  empress,  the  elevation 
of  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg  might  have  been  welcomed  by 
the  people. 

This  tragedy  added  greatly  to  the  somber  record  of  the 
House  of  Hapsburg.  It  recalled  the  mystery  of  Meyerling, 
the  disappearance  of  Francis  Joseph's  brother,  John  Orth, 
and  the  taking  off  of  the  Empress  Eliza'beth.  It  was  likened 
to  an  earthquake  whose  shock  had  passed  through  Europe, 
making  fissures  which  laid  bare  things  of  which  the  world 
outside  had  not  dreamed.  Altho  the  attributed  cause  of  the 
world  conflict,  it  was  nothing  more.  Other  momentous  up- 
heavals in  world  history  have  had  for  their  immediate 
cruses  comparatively  small  affairs.  From  the  flight  to 
Troy  of  Helen  of  Greece,  in  the  ninth  century  B.C.,  down 
to  Bismarck's  Ems  dispatch  of  1871,  only  some  minor  in- 
cident was  needed  for  an  explosive  charge  that  should  fire 
a  huge  waiting  magazine  of  strife.  It  was  the  throwing  of 
two   men   named   Martinitz   and   Slawata   out   of   an   upper 

^  Highness. 

68 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

window  of  a  palace  in  Prague  that  precipitated  the  Thirty 
Years'  "War.  It  was  a  sentence,  spoken  by  the  King  of 
France  from  a  balcony  at  Versailles,  that  began  the  War 
of  the  Spanish  Succession.  It  was  the  firing  on  Jumonville, 
in  a  forest  in  Western  Pennsylvania,  by  George  Washing- 
ton's squad  of  militiamen  that  set  the  world  of  Europe  and 
America  on  fire  in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  centur3^ 
It  was  the  so-called  battle  on  Golden  Hill  in  New  York 
City,  or  the  Boston  Tea  Party,  or  a  skirmish  on  Lexington 
Green,  that  set  on  foot  the  American  Revolution.  So  again 
it  was  the  firing  on  Fort  Sumter  that  precipitated  the 
American  Civil  War,  and  it  was  the  sinking  of  the  warship 
MaiJie,,  in  Havana  harbor  (perhaps  accidental),  that  led  to 
our  war  with  Spain.  What  happened  on  that  June  morning 
in  Serajevo,  tho  dramatic  in  itself,  was  a  small  affair,  but 
its  sequel  makes  it  rank  among  the  fateful  moments  in 
human  history.  Eventually  it  brought  into  a  death  grapple 
the  age-long  antagonism  between  Slav  and  Teuton,  and 
what  was  far  more,  it  dragged  out  with  it  all  the  dormant 
ambitions  and  smothered  fears  of  every  great  power  in 
Europe. 

Europe  in  the  ensuing  four  weeks  waited  with  keen 
anxiety,  expecting  from  Vienna  severe  measures  against 
Serbia,  but  the  month  passed  and  none  appeared,  so  that 
slowly,  if  not  completely,  the  Serajevo  crime  slipt  from  the 
headlines  of  newspapers  and  out  of  the  minds  of  most  men. 
European  politics  seemed  once  more  to  have  entered  upon 
a  period  of  genuine  tranquillity.  A  British  fleet  was  con- 
ducting maneuvers  in  the  North  Sea  and  made  a  friendly 
visit  to  Kiel.  The  President  of  France,  M.  Poincare,  and 
the  Prime  Minister,  M.  Viviani,  left  France  for  a  visit  to 
St.  Petersburg,  which  was  to  be  known  later  as  Petrograd. 
Not  a  ripple,  or  a  storm  cloud,  was  seen  anywhere  on  the 
surface  of  the  water  or  in  the  sky;  all  of  which  was  merely 
a  calm  preceding  a  world-wide  cataclysmic  storm.  It  was 
recalled  afterward  that  there  had  been  good  reason  for  the 
month's  delay  in  sending  Austria's  ultimatum  to  Serbia. 
In  the  first  place  time  was  needed  in  which  to  assemble  the 
famous  conference  at  Potsdam  on  July  5.  It  was  only  then 
that  Germany  reached  her  decision  to  do  one  of  two  things 

69 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

— either  actually  to  go  to  war,  or  to  get  the  fruits  of  war 
without  fighting.  "When  this  decision  had  been  reached,  it 
was  learned  unexpectedly  that  Poincare  and  Viviani  were 
about  to  visit  St.  Petersburg,  that  they  were  going  there  later 
in  the  month,  and  so  it  was  decided  not  to  issue  the  ulti- 
matum until  they  had  sailed  from  France,  and  so  produced 
conditions  in  which  it  was  unlikely  that  the  Great  Powers 
would  interfere  with  the  Teutonic  plans.  In  other  words, 
it  was  expected  thus  to  make  it  probable  that  Their  '"'bluff"' 
with  Serbia  would  succeed  as  well  as  the  one  with  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  had  succeeded  in  1908. 

Vienna  was  under  a  fixt  conviction  that  the  plot  which 
underlay  the  murders  at  Serajevo  had  ivS  origin  in  Belgrade, 
the  capital  of  Serbia,  and  an  investigation,  undertaken  by 
the  Serbian  Government,  had  proved  unsatisfactory  to  her. 
Meanwhile,  the  Serbian  press  had  become  boastful  and  even 
defiant.  "When  the  Austrian  Consul-General  at  Belgrade 
dropt  dead  in  the  consulate,  Belgrade  newspapers  did  not 
attempt  to  conceal  their  satisfaction  and  to  hint  that  he  had 
been  poisoned.  Rumors  were  current  that  the  Austrian 
legation  had  been  undermined  and  would  be  blown  up. 
Matters  w^ent  on  from  bad  to  worse  until  July  23,  when  the 
Austrian  Minister  at  Belgrade  presented  the  ultimatum  as 
finally  composed,  after  six,  or  more,  revisions  made  with  a 
view  to  making  its  acceptance  impossible,  and  demanded  a 
reply  by  six  o'clock  two  days  later. 

Austria  required  from  the  Serbian  Government  that  it  print 
in  its  official  journal  an  apology  for  all  Pan-Serbian  propa- 
ganda, and  for  the  participation  of  Serbian  army  officers 
in  it ;  that  it  give  warning  to  all  Serbians  and  to  the 
Serbian  army  in  future  to  desist  from  anti-Austrian  demon- 
strations; that  Serbia  dissolve  all  societies  capable  of  con- 
ducting intrigues  against  Austria;  that  she  curb  the  activi- 
ties of  the  Serbian  press  in  regard  to  Austria;  and  that 
Austrian  officials,  independent  of  the  Serbian  Government, 
be  permitted  to  conduct  an  inquiry  in  Serbia  into  the 
Serajevo  plot.  At  ten  minutes  to  six  o'clock  on  July  25, 
the  Serbian  Government  delivered  its  reply,  in  which  all 
the  terms  imposed  by  Austria,  except  the  one  providing 
that  Austrian  officials  be  allowed  to  conduct  investigations 

70 


PETER,  KING  OF  SERBIA 
71 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

on  the  soil  of  Serbia,  were  accepted.  That  one  provision 
Serbia  did  not  regard  as  ''in  accordance  with  international 
law  and  good  neighborly  relations, '^  and  asked  that  it  be 
referred  to  The  Hague  for  adjudication.  Austria  refused 
to  accept  this  reply  as  satisfactory,  and  her  Minister,  with 
his  entire  staff,  left  the  Serbian  capital. 

''The  most  formidable  ultimatum  that  one  State  had 
ever  addrest  to  another, '^  were  the  terms  in  which  the 
ultimatum  was  described  by  Sir  Edward  Grey.  It  raised  a 
new  crisis,  graver  than  any  that  had  preceded  it  in  ten 
years.  While  ostensibly  seeking  to  punish  agitators,  and 
aiming  to  put  an  end  to  an  agitation  injurious  to  Austrian 
safety,  the  Government  of  Vienna  had  in  reality  challenged 
Russia — Russia  being  the  avowed  protector  of  Serbia.  Both 
Austria  and  Serbia  prepared  for  war.  Serbian  Government 
offices  and  all  reserves  of  jnoney  in  banks  were  removed 
from  Belgrade  (Belgrade,  being  situated  on  the  Danube, 
and  so  exposed  to  a  direct  Austrian  attack)  to  the  old 
capital  of  Nish  and  to  the  interior  fortress  of  Kragonyevatz. 
The  railway  bridge  connecting  Belgrade  with  the  Austrian 
town  o-f  Semlin  meanwhile  was  blown  up.  So  unexpectedly 
had  war  come  that'  the  Serbian,  chief-of-staff  and.  four  of  his 
staif  officers,  then  in  Hungary  wearing  civilian  clothes,  did 
not  have  time  to  reach  Serbia  before  being  arrested  by 
Austrian  authorities — to  be  released  afterward. 

War  between  two  such  countries — an  empire  of  50,000,000 
and  a  state  of  only  4,000,000  impoverished  by  two  recent 
wars — foreshadowed  nothing  but  the  defeat  of  the  weaker 
State.  Serbia  is  a  country  about  the  size  of  Maryland,  with 
twice  Maryland's  population,  but  witiiout  Maryland's  min- 
eral and  maritime  wealth  ;•  it  is  generally  mountainous,  four- 
fifths  of  its  land  -being  uncultiva,ted  and  much  of  it  is  oak- 
forest.  Serbia,  as  a,  consequence  of  -two  wars,  had  been  re- 
duced almost  to  a  condition  bordering  on  effacement.  Many 
of  its  upper  classes  had  been  killed  -and  others  driven  awa.y. 
The  country  had  few  magnates  left  and  fewer  capitalists,  or 
large  landowners  such  -as  dominated  her  neighbor,  Roumania. 
Serbia  was  a  land  of  peasant  proprietors — "a  poor  man's 
paradise,"  tourists  called  it — the  people  Slavic  by  race,  and 
Asiatic  in  culture,  four-fifth's  o-f  the  adults  illiterate,  Greek 


Longitude  East  from  20    Gnenwicb 


22° 


Tyrnauj 


OybrUsJ 
',Guns^ 
SttitiamanKerX 


tsar   ^ 


BOSNU 

HERZEGOVINA 

SERBIA 

and  part  of 

AUSTRIA -HUNGARY 

as  in  July,  1914 


SCALE  OF  MILES 


ilatgi  LakLJ  Piks 

I 


Ji>gy , 


\   /Eesic/a|b4nyal     .T/^ 


\j    ^Jv    f.  ^'        /I  V  ^^       /SJerve 

'    <yarihac    Bahjnluka}!,  xj^boj' 


iSi-mi- 


Paa^arow itzN    nl)  ( 

Brzal'olaiiUa    ,      ^    . 
\   pr-ihovo>k  ^.    I 


Tako>ao  KraKUlg.J^ 

hil/e 


Longitude  East  from  20  Greenwi"h; 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

Orthodox  in  religion,  frugal,  hard-working,  independent, 
democratic,  and  patriotic. 

Given  such  a  people,  in  such  a  country,  what  could  they 
do  for  a  living  but  grow  grain  and  produce  meat  for  export. 
In  most  of  Serbia's  oak-forests  hogs  could  find  food  or  they 
could  be  fattened  on  corn  from  the  fields.  They  could  not 
be  sold  to  the  southward,  however,  for  the  Mohammedans  of 
Macedonia  and  the  Jews  of  Saloniki  did  not  eat  pork,  but 
to  the  north,  just  across  the  Danube,  lay  a  big  country,  in- 
habited mostly  by  Catholics,  who  had  no  aversion  to  swine- 
flesh,  except  on  one  day  of  the  week.  This  made  Austria- 
Hungary  a  natural  market  for  Serbian  products,  and  here 
those  products  mostly  went.  But  whenever  Austria  wanted 
to  annoy  Serbia,  or  to  please  Hungary,  all  she  had  to  do 
was  to  raise  the  tariff  rates  on  trans-Danubian  produce,  or 
by  quarantine  rules  to  prohibit  the  importation  into  the 
empire  of  Serbian  pigs  and  poultry.  By  such  practises, 
called  by  German  writers  Schwein-politik^  Austria  at  any 
time  could  reduce  Serbia  to  a  condition  of  economic  de- 
pendence— a  danger  from,  which  Serbia  had  long  sought  to 
free  herself  by  securing  an  outlet  on  the  sea,  and  so  to  a 
world  market.  Austria  always  checkmated  this  endeavor 
to  secure  a  port — for  example,  in  1913  when,  after  the 
sacrifice  of  some  seventy  thousand  men,  Serbia  had  cleared 
her  way  to  the  Adriatic,  but  found  herself  shut  out  by  the 
interposition,  between  her  and  the  sea,  of  the  Albanian 
principality  which  had  been  raised  up  at  the  instance  of 
Austria  for  that  very  purpose. 

Far  more  serious,  however,  than  any  mere  Austro-Serbian 
hostilities  was  the  danger  of  involving  all  Europe  in  wat* — 
the  precipitation,  in  fact,  of  that  Armageddon  which  had 
been  the  nightmare  of  the  Powers  ever  since  their  alinement, 
drawn  up  years  before,  as  the  Triple  Entente  and  the  Triple 
Alliance.  By  those  pacts,  if  one  of  the  Powers  should  be 
attacked  by  another  Power,  or  any  outside  Power  should 
threaten  to  interfere,  the  other  parties  to  the  agreement 
were  bound  to  come  to  the  first  Power's  defense.  It  was 
under  these  conditions  that  Russia  now  notified  Austria  and 
Germany  that  she  could  not  remain  indifferent  in  a  contest 
between   Serbia   and   Austria.      Inasmuch   as   a   rigid   press 

V.  1—5  73 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


censorship  was  established  at  this  time  all  over  the*  con- 
tinent, what  actually  took  place  no  one  knew;  but  it  was 
believed,  in  the  last  week  of  July,  that  Russian  trbops  were 
being    mdbilized    against    Austria,    and    that    Germany    had 

given  to  Austria  full  support 
in  her  dealings  with  Serbia, 
or,  as  Germany  admitted,  "a 
free  hand."  The  German  Am- 
bassador to  the  -United  States® 
a  few  weeks  after  the  war 
began  contributed  an  article 
to  The  Independent,  in  which 
he  declared*  that  Germany 
had  "approved  in  advance 
the  Austrian  ultimatum  to 
Serbia." 

A  master-stroke  could 
scai^cel.y  have  caught  the  Triple 
Entente  —  that  is  Great 
Britain,  France,  anji  Russia — 
less  prepared  for  war.  The 
ultimatum  came  when  Russia 
was  occupied  with  internal 
strikes,  and  Great  Britain  with 
the  Irish  Home  Rule  contest,  while  President  Poincare,  of 
France,  and  M.  Viviani,  the  Premier,  were  absent  in  Russia, 
having  with  them  the  two  most  effective  units  of  the  French 
navy.  Peace,  under  these  circumstances,  was  seen  to  de- 
pend on  Emperor  William  and  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain. 
As  the  Emperor  had  formerly  shown  himself  favorable  to 
peace  it  was  thought  he  might  now  lend  his  influence  to  an 
acceptance  of  the  proposition,  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  for  a  conference  in  London 
between  the  French,  German,  and  Italian  Governments,  with 
a  view  to  cooperative  mediation.  On  July  26,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  announced,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  that  he  under- 
stood Germany  was  favorable  to  mediation  between  Russia 
and  Austria — at  least  in  principle — and  that  Italy  had  ac- 
cepted  the    proposal;    but,    in    his    opinion,    the    failure    of 


Nicholas  Pashitch 
Prime  Minister  of  Serbia 


*  Count  von  Bernstorff. 


74 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

efforts  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  settlement  would  lead  to 
''the  greatest  catastrophe  which  could  befall  the  concert  of 
Europe,  and  its  consequences  would  be  incalculable." 
Europe  speedily  entered  into  a  state  of  tense  anxiety.  Dr. 
E.  J.  Dillon  ^^  had  written  from  Vienna  his  personal  belief 
that  a  general  war  would  be  averted,  but  after  traveling 
from  the  extreme  south  of  Austro-Hungary  to  Vienna,  and 
having  conversed  with  important  public  men,  he  found  that 
''almost  everybody  fervently  hoped  that  the  long-threaten- 
ing storm  will  burst,  not  because  the  national  sentiment  has 
suddenly  grown  bellicose,  but  because  the  people  are  sick 
to  death  of  the  periodic  crises  which  throw  public  and 
private  life  out  of  gear,  paralyze  trade  and  commerce,  in- 
flict enormous  losses  on  the  wealth-creating  classes,  and  are 

then   settled   for  a   couple   of    

months  or  years  only  to  break 
out  anew." 

On  July  30  Germany  sent 
a  note  to  Russia  asking  what 
her  intentions  were  in  mobiliz- 
ing troops  and  gave  her  only 
twenty-four  hours  in  which  to 
make  a  reply.  The  extreme 
gravity  of  the  situation  was 
then  recognized  in  all  Euro- 
pean capitals.  Russia  pro- 
ceeded with  her  mobilization, 
but  only  on  the  Austrian 
frontier.  The  French  took 
active  steps  for  defense.  The 
British  fleet  sailed  from  Port- 
land under  sealed  orders,  and 
the  German  battle-squadron 
was  concentrated  at  Kiel  and 
Wilhelmshaven.  Stock-mar- 
kets   everywhere    in    Europe 

virtually  ceased  to  do  business,  the  New  York  Stock  Ex- 
change, for  the  first  time  in  forty  years,  closing  its  doors. 
Leading  banking  institutions  in  all  countries  took  measures 

^^  Correspondent,  The  Daily  Telegraph,  London. 


Sir  Edward  (now  Viscount)  Grey 
British  Foreign  Minister  in  1914 
who  sought  in  vain  to  prevent  the 
war  through  a  conference  of  the 
Powers 


75 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

to  preserve  their  stocks  of  gold.  On  July  31  it  was  under- 
stood in  London  that  a  general  mobilization  of  the  German 
army  was  about  to  be  ordered,  altho  telegraph  communica- 
tion had  been  suspended.  Then  came  a  proclamation  from 
Emperor  William  of  a  ''state  of  war,''  and  next  day  Ger- 
many declared  war  on  Russia. 

The  event  at  Serajevo  can  never  be  well  understood  ex- 
cept in  the  light  of  the  wars  that  immediately  preceded  it 
in  the  Balkan  country.  Early  in  the  autumn  of  1912  the 
Western  world  was  startled  by  news  that  Bulgaria,  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  and  Greece  were  rapidly  mobilizing  troops  and 
unless  the  Great  Powers  took  measures  to  prevent  it,  war 
in  the  Balkans  was  seen  to  be  inevitable.  A  crisis  in  that 
region  had  been  predicted  for  some  time  as  a  consequence, 
not  only  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  but 
of  the  more  recent  Turko-Italian  War  over  Tripoli.  All 
through  the  summer  and  early  autumn  of  1912  were  seen 
unmistakable  signs  of  the  approach  of  war.  It  has  seemed 
inexplicable  since  that  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  did  not 
then,  by  some  united  effort,  take  steps  to  prevent  war,  which 
they  could  have  done,  once  they  had  made  it  evident  that 
they  were  ready  to  back  up  demands  with  force. 

The  four  Balkan  States,  before  entering  on  war  in  1912, 
had  determined  in  conference  to  act  together  in  securing 
autonomous  government  for  Macedonia,  pursuant  to  the 
Berlin  Treaty  of  1878.  Turkey  was  still  unalterably  op- 
posed to  the  wishes  of  these  States.  No  settlement  except 
through  war  was  possible.  Within  less  than  three  weeks 
after  Montenegro  declared  war — that  is,  by  the  end  of 
October,  1912 — the  armies  of  the  four  Balkan  allies  crossed 
the  frontier,  advanced  into  Macedonia,  and  drove  the  Turks 
before  them.  In  a  few  weeks  they  had  captured  Prishtina 
and  Kumanovo ;  routed  the  Turks  at  Kirk-Killisseh ;  in- 
vested Adrianople,  and  sent  the  main  body  of  the  Turkish 
army  back  upon  the  Tchatalja  forts,  which  formed  the  last 
main  line  of  defenses  toward  Constantinople.  By  the  end 
of  October  they  had  practically  possest  themselves  of  all 
Macedonia,  and  the  Bulgarians,  holding  the  main  Turkish 
army  behind  fortified  lines  only  fifty  miles  from  Constanti- 
nople, seemed  in  a  fair  way  to  enter  the  ancient  city  itself. 

76 


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77 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

This  extraordinary  success  caused  the  greatest  surprize  in 
Western  Europe.  ]\I.  Poincare,  for  France,  proposed  that 
in  any  action  they  might  take,  the  Powers  should  pledge 
themselves  to  ''territorial  disinterestedness."  This  did  not 
meet  with  favor  from  the  Triple  Alliance — that  is,  from 
Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy,  and  Austria  announced  her 
intention  of  taking  all  steps  necessary  to  protect  her  terri- 
torial interests.  She  was  known  to  be  hostile  to  any  move- 
ment that  would  extend  Serbian  territory  to  the  Adriatic, 
or  any  that,  by  imposing  a  barrier  of  Slavic  States,  would 
cut  Austria  off  from  the  road  to  Salonica.  Toward  the  end 
of  November,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  British  Foreign  Sec- 
retary, proposed  that  representatives  of  the  powers  be 
authorized  to  confer  on  the  settlement  at  some  European 
capital.  This  was  agreed  to  and  London  designated  as  the 
place  for  a  conference. 

During  the  London  Conference,  fighting  went  on  and  war 
continued  even  after  the  articles  of  peace  were  signed  by  all 
the  Balkan  contestants  except  Greece,  and  then  the  Balkan 
Allies  began  to  fight  one  another.  Roumania,  which  here- 
tofore had  been  a  non-combatant,  invaded  Bulgaria,  and 
almost  reached  her  capital.  Turkey,  seeing  her  opportunity, 
recaptured  Adrianople.  fit  was  not  until  October,  1913,  that 
something  definite  as  to  actual  peace  was  reached,  with  an 
arrangement  of  new  boundaries  by  which  Turkey  was  al- 
lowed to  keep  a  small  part  of  her  European  territory,  in- 
cluding Constantinople,  Adrianople,  and  outlying  lands  that 
reached  perhaps  a  hundred  miles  west  from  the  Bosporous. 
All  the  remainder  of  Turkey's  former  domain,  except 
Albania,  was  awarded  to  Bulgaria,  Serbia  and  Greece. 
Bulgaria's  new  lands  carried  her  down  to  the  ^gean  Sea, 
along  which  they  extended  from  the  Turkish  boundary  west- 
ward to  Kavala,  a  mountainous  region  having  no  harbor 
worthy  of  the  name.  From  Kavala  westward  Greece  ob- 
tained a  long-coveted  part  of  ancient  Macedonia,  including 
the  important  port  of  Salonica,  -and  the  province  of  Janina, 
her  northern  boundary  running  southwest  to  the  Adriatic 
at  a  point  opposite  Corfu.  Serbia  gained  to  the  south  a 
territory  nearly  as  large  as  her  ancient  domain,  including 
the  old  capital,  Uskup,  but  all  that  she  gained  was  inland 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

territory,  Albania,  which  separated  her  from  the  sea,  being 
set  up  as  an  independent  kingdom.  Thus  to  Serbia  was 
denied  a  realization  of  her  age-long  dream  of  a  port  on  the 
Adriatic,  or  on  the  ^^gean.  Her  bitterness  knew  no  bounds. 
Both  she  and  Greece  demanded  of  Bulgaria  that,  in  view 
of  changed  circumstances,  she  should  give  over  to  them  cer- 
tain portions  of  territory  as  originally  assigned  to  them  in 
the  agreement,  that  preceded  the  attack  on  Turkey  in  1912. 
But  Bulgaria  stood  out  on  her  technical  rights  and  so  had 
to  defend  herself  against  her  recent  Balkan  Allies,  and 
greatly  to  her  own  loss. 

This  second  Balkan  war  was  generally  attributed  to 
Austria's  attitude  toward  the  Balkan  States  in  the  London 
Conference.  Long  after  the  conference — as  a  matter  of 
date,  it  was  in  the  midst  of  the  great  war,  or  early  in 
December,  1914 — it  was  stated  by  Signor  Giolitti,  in  the 
Italian  Parliament,  that  in  August.  1913,  just  after  vic- 
tories had  been  won  by  Serbia  and  Greece  over  Bulgaria, 
Austria  informed  her  allies,  of  whom  Italy  was  then  one, 
that  she  intended  to  attack  Serbia.  Signor  Giolitti  re- 
ceived at  that  time  a  telegram  from  the  Marquis  di  San 
Giuliano,  the  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  informing 
him  that  Austria  had  just  notified  Italy  that,  in  accord  with 
Germany,  she  was  about  to  deliver  an  ultimatum  to  Serbia. 
This  ultimatum  was  substantially  the  same  as  the  one  which 
she  actually  did  send  to  Serbia  nearly  twelve  months  later, 
and  which  led  directly  to  the  world-conflTct  of  1914.  Austria 
in  1913  asked  Italy  to  consider  her  ultimatum  as  a  casus 
foederis,  that  is,  as  coming  under  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
Alliance,  and  thus  involving  Italy  in  military  participation 
in  the  affair,  along  with  her  imperial  Teutonic  allies.  The 
text  of  the  dispatch  was  as  follows: 

"Austria  has  communicated  to  us  and  Germany  her  intention  of 
proceeding  against  Serbia,  and  defines  such  action  as  defensive, 
hoping  thereby  to  apply  the  casus  foederis  provided  for  in  the  Triple 
Alliance,  which  I  hold  to  be  inapplicable.  I  am  seeking  concerted 
measures  with  Germany  to  impede  such  Austrian  action ;  but  it  may 
become  necessary  for  us  to  state  clearly  that  we  do  not  deem  such 
eventual  action  defensive — hence,  that  we  do  not  believe  that  a  case 

79 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

contemplated  by  the   Treaty   exists.     Kindly  telegraph  me   if  you 
iipi)rove.'^ 

Signer  Giolitti  replied  to  this  telegram  as  follows: 

"Should  Austria  intervene  against  Serbia  it  is  clear  that  no 
casus  foederis  is  involved.  It  is  an  action  which  Austria  accomplishes 
on  her  own  account.  Nor  is  there  any  case  of  defense,  seeing  that 
nobody  dreams  of  attacking  her.  It  is  necessary  that  Austria  should 
be  given  to  understand  this  in  the  most  formal  manner,  and  it  is  to 
be  hoped  that  Germany  will  exert  her  influence  to  dissuade  Austria 
from  so  perilous  an  adventure." 

The  year's  delay  on  the  part  of  Austria  (from  August, 
1913,  to  July,  1914)  in  declaring  war  against  Serbia  has 
been   ascribed,    in   part,   to   the    condition    of   the   Austrian 

army  in  1913,  and  in  part  to 
the  attitude  taken  by  Italy. 
Watever  it  was  that  prevented 
war  at  that  time,  the  assassin- 
ation of  the  Archduke  in  1911 
removed  all  further  restraint 
from  Austria  and  Germany. 
For  a  century  Austria  and 
Russia  had  been  rivals  in  the 
Halkans  and  for  twenty  years 
had  actively  intrigued  against 
one  another,  but  neither  had 
obtained  a  decisive  advantage. 
Down  to  1903  the  state  of  bal- 
ance at  no  time  was  seriously 
disturbed.  In  that  year  Alex- 
in der.  King  of  Serbia,  having 
become  a  tool  of  Austria,  was 
assassinated,  and  King  Peter 
was  made  his  successor.  Peter 
represented  the  Nationalist  ele- 
ment in  Serbia,  the  purpose  of 
which  was  to  create  a  stronger  Serbia,  its  inspiration  coming 
largely  from  Petrograd.  Serbia  under  Peter  went  over  to 
Austria's  enemy,  and  thus  Austria  had  to  consider  the  possi- 
bility of  losing  Croatia,  Dalmatia,  and  Slavonia  in  a   great 


CoTTNT   Leopold   Berchtold 

Minister     of     Foreign     Affairs     for 

Austria-Hungary    in    1914.    tlirougli 

whom  tlie  ultimatum  to  Serbia  was 

issued 


SO 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

Pan-Serb  movement  similar  to  the  Italian  risorgimeto  in 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Austria,  in  a  campaign  of  repression  against  Serbia,  had 
imposed  tariffs  which  deprived  her  of  a  market  for  her 
agricultural  products  and  temporarily  almost  ruined  her. 
Soon  afterward  the  Young  Turks,  having  obtained  control 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  threatened  to  reoccupy  Bosnia,  then 
held,  but  not  owned,  by  Austria,  and  Vienna  forestalled 
them  by  annexing  Bosnia.  Against  this  Russia  protested 
and  Serbia  appealed  but,  backed  by  Germany,  Austria's  will 
was  made  to  prevail  and  2,000,000  Slavs,  who  were  Serb  by 
race,  were  annexed  to  Austria.  To  this  stroke,  Russia  re- 
plied with  a  diplomatic  campaign  ending  in  the  Balkan 
Alliance,  out  of  which  came  the  war  of  1912-13.  Austria, 
at  the  settlement  in  London,  by  securing  independence  for 
Albania,  prevented  Serbia  from  gaining  her  long-coveted 
foothold  on  the  Adriatic,  and  encouraged  Bulgaria  to  attack 
Serbia,  and  thus  brought  about  the  second  Balkan  War. 
Greece  and  Serl^ia  in  this  war  crusht  Bulgaria,  depriving 
her  of  conquests  in  Macedonia  and  Thrace.  Austrian 
diplomacy  thus  found  itself  defeated,  and  saw  raised  up 
on  the  southern  frontier  an  enlarged  Serbian  State,  Russian 
in  sympathy,  and  determined  to  add  to  itself  Bosnia, 
Croatia,  and  Slavonia,  and  so  to  create  a  Greater  Serbia, 
parts  of  which  must  be  obtained  from  the  Austrian  Empire. 

There  was  left  to  Austria — as  Austria  saw  the  situation — 
little  choice  between  w^ar  and  disintegration  on  her  fron- 
tiers. Not  alone  the  Serbs  and  Croats,  but  the  Italians  of 
Trieste  and  the  Trentino,  the  Roumanians  of  the  Bukowina 
and  Transylvania,  the  Ruthenians  of  Galicia,  had  been  look- 
ing forward  to  the  day  when  the  overthrow  of  Austria 
would  permit  them  to  enter  the  ranks  of  their  brethren 
in  Italy,  Roumania,  and  Russia.  But  if  Austria  could  now 
crush  Serbia,  it  would  be  possible  for  her  to  eliminate  a 
valiant  soldier  of  Russia  from  the  Danube.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  Serbia  were  to  secure  increase  of  territory,  popula- 
tion, and  prestige,  Austria  could  not  in  the  end  escape  an 
attack  such  as  she  had  received  from  Italy,  half  a  century 
before.  The  Russian  Czar  seemed  likely  to  play  against 
Austria  the  role  that  Napoleon  III  had  played  against  her 

81 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

in  support  of  Italy.  However  great  the  peril,  it  is  plain 
now  that  Austria  was  determined  in  1914  to  risk  an  attack 
on  Serbia.  Giolitti's  statement  confirmed  all  previous 
evidence  on  this  point.  It  also  showed  that  the  war  of 
1914  was  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  First  and 
Second  Balkan  "Wars,  being  in  its  inception  a  struggle 
by  Austria  against  the  growing  power  of  Serbia.  Austria 
wavered  in  1913,  but  after  the  Serajevo  crime  did  not  hesitate 
longer. 

That  Germany  knew  of  Austria's  plans  and  intentions  as 
to  Serbia  in  July,  1914,  is  plain ;  that  she  fully  consented  to 
Austria's  action  long  before  the  war  ended  ceased  to  be 
doubtful.  In  the  German  * 'White  Papers,"  published  in 
the  second  month  of  the  war,  is  a  document  which  declares 
that  ''we  were  able  to  assure  our  ally  most  heartily  of  our 
agreement  with  her  view  of  the  situation."  In  another 
paper  Germany  said  any  action  Austria  might  consider  it 
necessary  to  take,  in  order  to  "put  an  end  to  the  movement 
in  Serbia  directed  against  the  existence  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  monarchy,  would  receive  our  approval."  After  the 
war  was  declared  by  Austria  against  Serbia,  Germany,  in 
a  "call  to  arms,"  addrest  to  all  the  States  of  the  German 
Empire,  said  that  "our  closest  interests  summon  us  to  the 
side  of  Austria,"  and  in  case  the  trouble  should  spread  to 
Russia,  Germany  would  support  Austria  "with  the  entire 
might  of  the  Empire."  From  this  and  other  incidents  Ger- 
many's prime  guilt  in  forcing  war  on  Serbia  had  long  been 
accepted  by  the  Entente  world  when  in  March,  1919,  two 
official  dispatches,  sent  in  cipher  from  Berlin  to  Vienna, 
were  made  public  in  Paris  by  the  Serbian  Minister  to 
France,  and  printed  in  the  Journal  des  Dehats.  One  mes- 
sage, dated  Berlin,  July  25,  1914,  said:  "It  is  generally 
supposed  here  that  a  negative  reply  from  Serbia  will  be 
followed  on  Austria's  part  by  an  immediate  declaration  of 
war  and  military  operations.  Any  adjournment  of  military 
operations  would  be  considered  here  as  very  dangerous  on 
account  of  intervention  by  other  powers."  Austria  in  this 
dispatch  was  "counseled  with  the  greatest  insistence  to  pass 
immediately  to  action  and  thus  put  the  world  in  face  of 
an    accomplished    fact."       The     second     dispatch,     marked 

82 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

''strictly  secret/'  and  dated  July  27,  1914,  said:  ''The 
Secretary  of  State  has  just  declared  to  me  [that  is,  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  to  Berlin]  positively,  but  under  the 
seal  of  most  strict  secrecy,  that  very  soon  eventual  proposi- 
tions of  mediation  from  England  will  be  brought  to  the 
knowledge  of  your  Excellency.  The  German  Government 
assures  me  in  the  most  convincing  manner,  that  it  in  no  way 
identifies  itself  with  these  propositions,  that  it  is  absolutely 
against  their  being  taken  into  consideration." 

Germany's  danger  at  that  time,  as  she  probably  saw  it, 


WAR  NEWS  IN  BERLIN 
A  crowd  cheering  after  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria  against  Serbia 

was  to  see  Russia  dominant  in  the  Bialkans  and  threatening 
her  Berlin-to-Bagdad  dreams,  with  Austria,  her  one  sure 
ally,  slowly  being  destroyed  by  internal  racial  rivalries 
encouraged,  if  not  backed  by,  Russia.  The  question  of 
world  peace  undoubtedly  turned  in  part  on  whether  Russia 
would  resign  her  role  as  protector — perhaps  as  an  aggressive 
protector — of  Serbia.  So  long  as  she  declined  to  do  that, 
war  between  Austria^  and  Russia,  sooner  or  later,  was 
probably  inevitable,  lit  was  strange  indeed  that  German 
diplomacy,  which  was  advised  as   early  as  April,   1913,   of 

83 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Austria's  purpose,  had  been  unable,  after  a  whole  year,  to 
prevent  a  coalition  of  all  the  other  Great  Powers  against 
her  and  her  ally,  so  that  after  the  inevitable  blow  against 
the  Great  Powers  was  struck,  she  and  Austria  found  them- 
selves alone. 

Three  years  after  the  world-conflict  began,  it  was  recalled 
that,  because  Austria  would  not  grant  Serbia's  one  request, 
after  Serbia  had  yielded  to  nine  of  her  requests,  towns  were 
still  being  razed  by  artillery  fire  in  northern  France,  the 
German  conquerors  of  Belgium  were  putting  down  food 
riots  in  their  own  country,  every  child  in  Poland  under  the 
age  of  seven  was  reported  dead  or  dying  of  starvation, 
villages  were  aflame  in  Persia,  Turks  were  massacring 
Armenians,  black  men  were  shooting  each  other  under  white 
commanders  in  Africa,  thousands  of  homes  were  in  mourn- 
ing in  lands  as  far  distant  as  Canada  and  New  Zealand, 
men  had  died  in  battle  in  China,  thatched  huts  had  been 
.•^helled  on  the  Pacific,  and  on  battlefields  extending  over 
thousands  of  miles  some  millions  of  men  had  been  killed  on 
battlefields  or  lay  at  rest  under  the  sea. 

A  larger  nation  than  Serbia  would  not  have  been  com- 
manded by  Austria  to  give  up  her  sovereignty  by  letting 
Austria  censor  her  press,  purge  her  schools,  emasculate  her 
army,  and  take  over  the  administration  of  her  courts. 
Serbia  was  a  small  nation  and  she  yielded  every  point  de- 
manded but  one,  and  Austria,  not  satisfied,  still  wanting 
that  point  yielded,  backed,  and  even  urged  on,  by  Germany, 
declared  war.  Three  years  afterward,  by  a  bloody  war,  in- 
volving the  lives  or  fortunes  of  hundreds  of  millions  of 
human  beings,  Austria  had  accomplished  many  of  the 
things  Serbia  had  consented  to  do  for  her  without  war  and 
in  addition,  anti-Austrian  newspapers  in  Serbia  had  been 
supprest;  the  society  called  the  "Narodna  Odbrana"  had 
probably  been  put  out  of  existence,  and  Austria  was  ''col- 
laborating" in  the  administration  of  justice  in  Serbia  and 
probably  directing  it  altogether.  Serbia  had  been  ready  to 
grant  nearly  all  these  things  without  war  and  yet  Austria 
preferred  war,  and  so  strangled  Serbia  to  the  point  of 
death.  In  the  fifth  year  of  the  war,  however,  Serbia  was 
released  from  that  strangle-hold,  Austria  no  longer  had  an 

84 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

Emperor   and   was    face    to    face    with    a    revolution    which 
ended  in  the  political  disintegration  of  her  empire.' 

■^  Principal  Sources :  The  Independent,  Gibbon's  "Map  of  New  Europe" 
(Century  Co.),  The  New  York  Evening  Sun,  the  New  Yorlv  Evening  Post,  the 
"International  Year  Book"  (Dodd,  Mead  &  Co.),  the  London  Times  "History 
of  the  War,"  "Bulletins"  of  the  National  Geographic  Society,  the  New 
York  Times,  the  London  Times,  the  New  Y'ork  Sun,  the  London  Morning 
Post,  "Nelson's  History  of  the  War,"  by  John  Buchan,  the  London  Dailt/ 
Telegraph,  the  New  York  Tribune. 


GERMAN  17-INCH  SIEGE  GUN 
Guns  of  this  type  were  used  in  destroying  the  defenses  of  Liege. 


85 


II 

AUSTRO-SERBO-MONTENEGRIN  FIGHTING 

July  28,  1914— December  30,  1914 

NEGOTIATIONS  among  the  Powers  aiming  at  peace  else- 
where in  Europe  were  still  under  way  in  the  last  days  of 
July,  1914,  when  the  world  was  startled  by  news  that  actual 
war  had  broken  out  between  Austria  and  Serbia.  Serbians  from 
their  own  side  of  the  Danube  had  fired  on  Austrian  troops 
assembled  on  the  river  in  transports,  and  the  fire  had  been 
returned.  Heavy  concentrations  by  Austria  of  troops  on 
the  Serbian  and  Montenegrin  frontiers,  and  the  mobilization 
of  other  Austrian  troops  had  taken  place,  while  in  the  in- 
terior of  Serbia  an  army  was  being  concentrated  and  in 
Montenegro  forces  had  been  called  out.  From  Belgrade  an 
exodus  set  in,  people  fearing  immediate  capture  by  the 
Austrians.  On  July  28  war  against  Serbia  was  actually  de- 
clared by  Austria  and  hostilities  began  in  earnest.  Two 
Serbian  steamers  on  the  Danube  were  seized  and  the 
Austrian  colors  run  up  in  place  of  the  Serbian.  Fighting 
was  reported  from  several  places  on  the  river.  Austrians, 
while  trying  to  cross  the  Danube,  were  repulsed,  but  suc- 
ceeded in  reducing  a  Serbian  fortress  near  Belgrade. 

Forgotten  tho  it  commonly  was  during  the  world-wide 
conflict  that  began  a  few  days  later,  the  actual  war  that 
for  months  went  on  between  Austria  and  Serbia  was  a  con- 
flict of  no  mean  proportion.  Serbia,  the  a  small  state,  had 
on  a  war  footing  an  army  of  250,000  men,  mostly  seasoned 
veterans,  and  a  territorial  reserve  of  50,000.  Her  ally, 
Montenegro,  could  place  in  the  field  about  50,000  hardy 
mountaineers,  renowned  for  valor.  Serbia  lacked  big  guns, 
aeroplanes,  and  sanitary  service,  and  there  was  a  shortage  in 
her  army  of  modern  rifles,  but  she  had  the  advantage  of 
recent  experience  in  war,  and  the  memory  of  great  vic- 
tories at  Kumanovo  in  1912,  and  at  Bregalnitza  in  1913. 
When    Austria-Hungary    declared    war    against    her,    about 

86 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

10,000  Serbian  soldiers  were  available  in  or  near  Belgrade. 
For  several  months  hostilities  continued  between  Austria  and 
Serbia  and  later  with  Montenegro,  simultaneously  with  events 
in  the  greater  war  on  the  Russian  and  French  front. 

From  July  29  to  August  12,  the  Austrians  bombarded 
Belgrade  and  made  attempts  at  various  points  to  cross  the 
frontier,  but  it  was  not  until  August  12  that  more  serious 
rnovements  began.  In  the  northwestern  corner  of  Serbia,  in 
the  angle .  formed  by  the  Drina  and  the  Save,  strong 
Austrian  columns  were  thrown  across  the  Drina  at  Liu- 
bovia,  Zornik,  and  Losnitza,  and  across  the  Save  at  Shabatz. 
In  the  mountainous  northwest,  from  August  16  to  23, 
was  fought  what  was  known  as  the  battle  of  the  Jadar,  in 
which   the   Austrians   were   compelled   to   retreat   into   their 


©   INTERNATIONAL   FILM   SERVICE.    N.    Y. 

BELGRADE,  THE  CAPITAL  OF  SERBIA 

own  country  under  cover  of  darkness.  In  repelling  200,000 
invaders,  the  Serbians  lost  3,000  in  killed  and  15,000  in 
wounded;  but  had  killed  some  6,000  of  the  enemy,  wounded 
perhaps  30,000,  captured  4,000,  and  taken  46  cannon,  30 
machine-guns,  and  stores  of  rifles  and  ammunition.  Bel- 
grade and  its  environs  were  devoid  of  permanent  defensive 
works.  Such  military  precautions  as  had  been  undertaken 
for  their  protection  were  directed  against  hostile  passages 
of  the  Save  and  Danube.  Infantry  played  a  small  part  in 
the  defensive  work. 

The  bombardment  of  Belgrade  served  no  military  end,  and 
could  have  had  for  its  objects  only  the  moral  effect  of  its 
capture  and  the  destruction  of  property.     Over  700  build- 

87 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

ings  were  struck  by  bombs,  shell  or  shrapnel,  and  of  these 
only  sixty  were  the  property  of  the  State.  The  old,  un- 
armed fortress,  with  its  memories  of  the  Turkish  occupa- 
tion ;  the  University,  where  centered  Serbian  culture ;  the 
riverside  factories ;  the  museum,  which  housed  relics  of  Rome 
and  Macedon;  even  the  foreign  legations,  hospitals,  and 
pharmacies — all  suffered.  The  cigaret  factory,  belonging 
to  the  State  as  a  monopoly,  was  wrecked  by  shell  and  fired 
by  grenades,  tobacco  and  machinery  to  the  value  of  $1,600,- 
000  being  destroyed  in  the  flames.  Foundries,  bakeries,  and 
factories  along  the  shore  of  the  river  were  razed  to  the 
ground.  The  King's  palace  bore  little  outward  evidence  of 
injury,  but  howitzers  had  dropt  shells  through  the  roof 
until  little  remained  of  the  interior.  The  University  was 
riddled,  the  building,  with  classrooms,  laboratories,  libraries, 
and  workshops  being  entirely  demolished.  Even  the  cellars 
were  destroyed  by  great  shells,  which  broke  down  the  walls 
and  pierced  their  way  into  the  earth  and  there  exploded. 
Nowhere  were  the  effects  of  modern  artillery  more  visible 
than  in  the  streets  of  Belgrade.  Missiles  pierced  the  wooden 
paving  and  its  concrete  foundations,  prest  their  way  under- 
ground for  distances  and  then  exploded,  throwing  particles 
of  the  roadway  far  and  wide,  and  exposing  immense  holes 
that  often  measured  fifteen  feet  in  diameter  by  twelve  in 
depth. 

Austria-Hungary  now  suffered  invasion  herself,  the 
Serbians  early  in  September  taking  Semlin,  opposite  Bel- 
grade, while  another  Serbian  army  struck  into  Southern 
Bosnia  toward  Serajevo.  Austria-Hungary,  massing  250,000 
men  against  the  northwest  corner  of  Serbia,  again  assumed 
the  offensive  in  the  second  week  of  September  and  advanced 
on  Valievo,  encountering  fierce  resistance,  and  suffering  a 
severe  check.  Another  Austrian  column,  six  battalions 
strong,  attempted  to  invade  Serbia  near  Semendria,  but  was 
cut  to  pieces  on  November  9.  On  November  15  an  Austrian 
offensive  approached  Valievo  in  such  force  that  the  Serbians 
fled  precipitately,  leaving  behind  6,000  men  and  large 
quantities  of  military  stores.  The  fifth  Austro-Hungarian 
corps  under  General  Frank,  which  had  been  besieging  Bel- 
grade  since  July  29,   succeeded  in  taking  that  city   at  the 

83 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

point  of  the  bayonet.  The  Serbian  army  was  then  said  to 
have  lost  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  some  100,000  men, 
and  Serbia's  complete  collapse  was  momentarily  expected. 

The  Austrian  invasion  was  made  with  five  army  corps. 
The  Serbians,  lacking  ammunition  for  big  guns  and  almost 
destitute  of  cartridges,  had  fallen  back,  but  late  in  No- 
vember supplies  of  ammunition  from  France  reached  them 
and,  thus  strengthened,  they  turned  upon  the  Austrians  in 
one  of  the  most  extraordinary  campaigns  in  the  whole  war. 
The  Austrians,  believing  the  resistance  of  Serbia  broken, 
had  allowed  their  front  to  become  unduly  extended,  so  that 
Serbia's  army,  tho  unable  to  break  through  the  center,  re- 
captured, in  December,  Ushitiza  and  Valievo,  and  inflicted 
a  crushing  defeat  on  two  Austrian  corps.  Some  20,000 
prisoners  were  taken,  besides  fifty  cannon,  and  quantities  of 
munitions.  The  Austrian  right  wing  was  thus  driven  back 
in  disorder  across  the  Drina,  where  it  was  still  further  over- 
come by  the  Montenegrins  at  Vishegrad.  At  first  the 
Austrians  offered  stubborn  resistance,  but  they  were  beaten 
at  every  point  and  soon  became  disorganized.  Their  diffi- 
culties of  transport  among  hills,  with  valleys  turned  into 
seas  of  mud  and  rivers  overflowing,  were  enormous  and  the 
Serbians  gave  them  no  rest.  Their  retreat  became  an  in- 
glorious flight,  until  they  had  no  thought  except  to  save 
their  lives.  The  end  of  the  year  saw  not  an  Austrian  soldier 
left  on  Serbian  soil.  "With  the  booty  left  behind  were  ap- 
proximately 60,000  prisoners. 

Something  of  the  Serbian  spirit  which  won  the  Bregal- 
mitza  battle  in  the  second  Balkan  War  had  here  been  dis- 
cernible. A  scene  had  attended  the  operation  that  belongs 
to  another  century  than  our  own.  This  was  the  white- 
haired  King  Peter  riding  before  his  troops,  welcomed  with 
cheers  from  broken  Serbian  regiments  who  were  about  to 
drive  the  Austrians  from  Belgrade.  It  was  in  mid-Novem- 
ber when  the  Russian  armies,  in  western  Galicia  and  across 
the  Carpathians  in  Hungary,  were  threatening  the  capture 
of  Cracow,  and  new  raids  toward  Budapest,  that  the  Serbian 
army  thus  came  out  of  its  resting-place  back  in  Serbian 
territory  and  drove  out  the  Austrians. 

The  Battle  of  the  Ridges,  as  this  fighting  was  called,  was 

V.  I— 0  89 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

of  a  type  not  unknown  to  history — a  well-equipped  army  in- 
veigled into  a  country  where  it  could  be  caught  at  a  disad- 
vantage by  a  weaker  force  operating  under  familiar  con- 
ditions. The  disaster  seemed  for  Austria  what  Tannenberg 
had  been  for  Russia ;  for  it  virtually  destroyed  a  field  army. 
General  Potiorek  was  removed  from  his  command,  and  all 
talk  of  the  conquest  of  Serbia,  for  the  time  being,  died 
away.  The  little  Balkan  state  had  put  four  corps  out  of 
action,  and  delayed  for  some  weeks  the  Austrian  main 
offensive  against  eastern  Galicia.  Thus  the  two  most  de- 
cisive battles  in  the  first  six  months  of  war  were  triumphs 
for  age  and  youth.  Tannenberg  was  won  by  a  veteran 
nearing  seventy,  and  the  Serbian  Ridges  by  a  young  man  of 
twenty-six. 

In  the  great  war  this  Serbian  incident  was  a  minor  detail, 
yet  a  wholly  significant  one.  More  and  more  the  inability 
of  the  Teutonic  allies  to  meet  their  enemies  and  really  crush 
them  was  becoming  clear,  here  in  Serbia  as  well  as  in  France 
and  Russia,  whera  two  tremendous  efforts  had  virtually 
failed.  Austria  was  visibly  going  from  one  defeat  to  another 
and  giving  signs  of  ultimate  exhaustion.  There  was  poetic 
justice  in  King  Peter's  victory.  All  this  conflict  had  been 
forced  by  Austria,  but  now,  after  five  months,  Serbia  was 
standing  erect,  with  new  victories  on  her  'banners,  her  store 
of  song  and  legend  enriched  by  new  pages.  Little  people 
once  more  had  fought  for  life  and  freedom  and  had  not 
failed ;  they  had  dared  everything  and  in  victory  seemed  to 
have  insured  the  future  of  a  race  which  was  greaj:  five  cen- 
turies ago,  and  which  all  through  the  night  of  Turkish 
dominion  had  kept  burning  the  light  of  liberty  on  the  sum- 
mits of  the  Black  Mountain  in  Montenegro.^ 

Of  300,000  Austrians  who  since  August  had  crossed  the 
Drina  and  the  Save,  not  more  than  200,000  returned.  In 
thirteen  days  the  Serbs  captured  perhaps  40,000  prisoners 
(including  300  officers),  besides  cannon,  machine-guns,  gun- 
carriages,  ammunition-wagons,  portable  ovens,  transport- 
wagons,  horses,  and  oxen.  The  Austrian  killed  and  wounded 
were  placed  at  60,000.  At  Koumanovo,  Monastir,  and  the 
Jadar  two  years  before   much  had  been   done   to   establish 

8  The  New  York  Evening  Sun. 

90 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

the  martial  prestige  of  Serbia;  but  the  victory  of  Suvobor 
stood  as  -an  example  of  the  manner  in  which  an  army,  ill- 
equipped  and  without  reserves,  and  notwithstanding  absence 
of  material  and  the  fatigue  of  unceasing  work,  with  almost 
certain  defeat  staring  it  in  the  face  might  secure  victory  out 
of  a  menacing  and  dangerous  situation.  The  presence  of  the 
King  in  the  firing  line,  the  strategy  of  the  staff,  the  arrival 
of  gun-ammunition,  and  the  leadership  of  General  Mishitch, 
all  contributed  to  the  result. 

In  normal  times  there  is  no  poverty  in  Serbia,  the  dis- 
tribution of  wealth  being  fairly  equal.     Most   people   have 


LADY    PAGET'S   HOSPITAL 
At  Uskub,  Serbia,  at  the  time  of  the  epidemic 


sufficient  for  all  their  meager  requirements.  But  more  than 
half  a  million  Serbians  were  now  reduced  to  beggary,  and 
towns  were  choked  with  applicants  seeking  food  and  lodging. 
Even  more  disastrous  was  a  devastating  fever  that  set  in. 
Medical  men  who  served  in  Serbia  during  that  reign  of 
typhus  described  the  country  as  for  weeks  a  land  of  death 
and  misery.  No  man  could  smile,  nor  could  a^ny  woman 
have  an  hour  of  happiness.  The  scourge  originated  in  camps 
and  probably  cost  more  Serbian  lives  than  all  the  fighting. 
Temporary  crowding  of  prisoners  had  much  restricted  their 
quarters  and  in  winter  they  herded  together  more  closely 
than  was  strictly  necessary.     Owing  to  a  multiplication  of 

91 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


vermin  communication  of  the  disease,  once  it  had  started, 
became  inevitable,  and  from  prisoners  it  spread  to  the 
army.  Serbian  soldiers,  after  the  hardships  they  had  gone 
through  and  the  scanty  diet  on  which  they  had  subsisted, 
were  in  no  condition  to  resist  the  disease,  and  the  mortality 
became  heavy.  As  soldiers  returned  home  on  leave,  typhus 
spread  throughout  the  country.  Nobody  knows  what  the 
actual  loss  of  life  was,  but  it  was  estimated  that  probably 
not  less  than  200,000  deaths  occurred.  Serbia  had  been 
almost  destitute  of  doctors.  There  were  only  350  in  the 
country  when   the  war   began,   and   of  these   over   100   had 

died  in  service.  Those  that  re- 
mained  were  not  enough  to  supply 
the  needs  of  the  army  alone.  The 
civil  population  found  themselves 
,^*  ^B^  *  ^^E^i^jil^l  practically  without  medical  help. 
W M* ^„.  '^^^i^'&yH        Serbia  appealed  to  her  Allies — 

to  France,  Russia,  and  Great 
Britain — for  100  doctors  from 
each  country  and  for  medical  sup- 
plies. They  responded  promptly, 
as  did  the  United  States.  An  In- 
ternational Sanitary  Commission, 
under  Sir  Ralph  Paget  as  chair- 
man, was  organized  with  head- 
quarters at  Nish.  Doctors  from 
Prance  were  scattered  through 
towns  and  villages  in  the  north. 
A  United  States  Commission,  with 
Dr.  Richard  P.  Strong  at  its  head, 
took  over  the  southern  part,  work- 
ing from  Uskub,  Veles,  and 
Monastir.  Nish  was  put  in  charge 
of  the'  Russians,  as  was  also 
Kraguievatz.  Great  Britain  sent 
hospital  units  and  supplies;  and 
Lieut.-Col.  Stammers  and  thirty 
days     all     railway     communication 


Nicholas,  Kinc  op 
Montenegro 


Colonel     Hunter    with 

doctors.       For     fifteen 

ceased,   and  when  it  was   resumed,   no   passenger-cars   were 

used  except  wooden-seated  third-class  vehicles,   from  which 


92 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 


every  shred  of  upholstery  had  been  stript.  Bare  wooden 
interiors  were  scrubbed  and  disinfected  every  day.  A 
cordon  of  disinfecting  stations  was  drawn  across  the  coun- 
try and  all  leaves  for  soldiers  stopt.  Colonel  Hunter's 
staff  practically  disinfected  and  in- 
oculated against  typhoid  and  cholera 
the  whole  Serbian  army.  In  towns 
and  villages,  every  restaurant,  hotel, 
and  place  of  public  entertainment  was 
compelled  to  close  its  doors  for  cer- 
tain hours  in  the  day,  when  floors, 
walls,  tables,  and  chairs  were 
scrubbed  and  disinfected.  By  these 
drastic  measures  the  epidemic  was 
successfully  checked  in  a  few  weeks. 
By  April  the  scourge  was  declining, 
and  by  June  typhus  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  had  become  extinct. 

No  one  who  witnessed  the  horrors 
of  that  winter  in  Serbia  could  ever 
forget  them,  nor  could  any  one  who 
did  not  witness  them  imagine  how 
terrible  they  were.  Until  early  spring 
there  had  been  no  hospital  accommo- 
dations for  treating  separately  various 
kinds  of  patients.  Men  wounded  in 
battle,  typhus  patients,  men  and 
women  suffering  from  small-pox,  scarlet  fever,  enteric  and 
other  diseases,  all  had  to  be  treated  together.  Nor  were  there 
any  hospital  staffs  or  medical  supplies.  Nurses,  single-handed, 
without  doctors  or  surgeons,  strove  each  to  care  for  perhaps 
a  couple  of  hundred  patients,  laid  close  together  on  floors,  it 
might  be  in  a  warehouse  or  a  school.  In  some  cases  it  was  not 
possible  to  carry  the  dead  out  daily ;  they  might  lie  for  hours 
beside  the  living.  When  a  place  became  vacant,  there  were 
dozens  waiting  to  fill  it.  Sanitary  conditions  in  some  of  these 
so-called  hospitals  were  appalling.  Each  country — England, 
France,  Russia,  and  the  United  States — gave  doctors,  nurses, 
and  hospital  assistants.  By  midsummer  the  combined  staffs 
numbered    some    500    persons,    under    the    direction    of    Sir 


A  MoxTEXEouiN   Soldier 
OF  Rank 


93 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Ralph  Paget  at  Nish.  Sir  Thomas  Lipton,  going  out  with 
his  yacht  Erin,  took  nurses  and  quantities  of  medical  stores 
on  successive  trips.  After  coming  home  to  America  from 
service  in  Serbia  one  of  the  physicians  said: 

"I  know  that  65  per  cent,  of  the  population  has  been  smitten  by 
typhus  and  that  75  per  cent,  of  the  65  per  cent,  so  afflicted  died. 
There  has  never  been  so  frightful  a  death-rate  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  The  reason  is  simple.  The  countiy  is  simply  rotting.  Thou- 
sands and  scores  of  thousands  of  dead  cover  the  wild  lands,  or  are 
insufficiently  interred.  Starvation  has  added  its  part  to  the  general 
misery.  Fifty  per  cent,  of  the  men  who  started  to  fight  with  the 
army  have  been  killed  and  there  are  60,000  Serbians  imprisoned  in 
Austria.  Raids  by  the  enemy  and  the  necessities  of  the  army  have 
simply  denuded  the  land  of  cattle,  sheep,  hogs — livestock  of  all  kinds. 
The  people  are  living  on  a  vegetable  diet,  mostly  consisting  of 
prunes  and  cabbage.  I  could  go  on  for  hours  expanding  this 
description  and  piling  horror  on  horror." 

"With  Serbia  and  Austria  at  war,  Montenegro,  faithful  to 
her  compact  with  Serbia,  who  was  really  her  sister,  was 
compelled  to  take  the  field  again,  and  for  the  third  time 
since  1912.  As  in  October,  1912,  it  was  Montenegro  who 
first  declared  war  on  Turkey,  so  now  Montenegro  was  early 
in  the  field.  On  August  11,  1914,  some  of  her  soldiers  oc- 
cupied Skutari,  a  town  across  their  southern  border  in 
Albania ;  others  entered  Herzegovina.  Skutari,  the  prin- 
cipal city  and  fortress  of  Albania,  had  fallen  before  the 
victorious  Montenegrins  in  the  first  Balkan  "War.  The 
Montenegrins  had  had  long  practise  in  attacking  Skutari 
through  500  years  of  intermittent  struggles  with  the  Turks. 

In  the  first  week  of  the  war  Austrian  cruisers  in  the 
Adriatic  bombarded  Antivari,  Montenegro's  seaport,  damag- 
ing the  wireless  station  and  the  electrical  works,  and  then 
directed  their  fire  on  the  adjacent  hills,  in  which  many 
Montenegrins  had  sought  refuge.  These  refugees  returned 
the  fire,  and  the  cruisers  redoubled  their  attack  on  the 
town  and  suburbs,  '  destroying  many  houses.  One  cruiser 
entered  the  port  and  destroyed  the  maritime  station  and 
store-houses.  Operations  against  the  fortifications  of  Cattaro 
were  taken  up  in  October  by  the  Montenegrins  in  earnest — 
a  siege  that  was  already  of  some  weeks  duration  and  now 

94 


AUSTRIA  AND  SERBIA 

undertaken  with  some  prospects  of  success,  Montenegro's 
shortage  of  artillery  having  been  remedied.  A  vigorous 
bombardment  was  begun  from  land  batteries  and  from 
Allied  ships — that  is,  French  and  English  ships.  The 
Allied  fleets  at  first  contented  themselves  with  scouring  the 
Adriatic  in  search  of  vessels  carrying  contraband,  but  now 
they  attacked  the  outer  ring  of  forts  at  Cattaro.  The  forts 
replied  vigorously,  while  new  guns  on  Mount  Lovtchen  in 
Montenegro  flung  a  hail  of  projectiles  down  on  Austrian 
positions.  Not  until  the  winter  of  1915-16  was  Montenegro 
again  active  in  the  war.  In  the  conflict  of  that  winter  she 
lost  all — at  least  temporarily.  That,  however,  is  a  story 
more  properly  told  in  its  relation  to  operations  by  all  the 
Powers  in  the  Balkans,  as  they  set  in  during  the  autumn  of 
1915.  Several  chapters  in  a  later  volume  of  this  work  are 
devoted  to  the  war  in  the  Balkans.^ 

8  Principal  Sources  :    "Nelson's  History  of  the  War"  by  John  Buchan,  The 
New  York  Evening  Sun,  The  Literary  Digest,  Associated  Press  dispatches. 


95 


►iJ    N    CS  T-l 


96 


THE  OUTBREAK  AND  THE 
CAUSES 

Part  II 

CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 
NEAR  AND  REMOTE 


97 


98 


I 

THE  FORCING  OF  A  LOCAL  INTO  A  WOELD  WAR 

The  Disclosures  of  Lichnowsky,  Muehlon,  and  Others 
— The  Potsdam  Conference 

1912—1914 

REMARKING  that  ''individuals  generally,  and  nations 
always,  act  from  mixed  motives,"  a  writer  in  The  Outlook 
undertook  to  set  forth  the  motive  that  lay  behind  the  Great 
Powers  in  the  conversation  of  a  local  into  a  World  War.  The 
motive  of  Austria,  he  said,  was  ''partly  an  indignant  re- 
solve to  punish  Serbia  for  a  supposed  conspiracy  leading 
to  the  assassination  of  the  Austrian  Crown  Prince;  partly 
an  ambition  to  annex  Serbia  to  the  Austrian  Empire,  as 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  had  been  previously  annexed; 
partly  a  desire  to  secure  a  port  on  the  ^gean  Sea  for  the 
development  of  Austrian  commerce/'  The  motive  of  Serbia 
was  "to  preserve  her  national  existence  and  perhaps  to  add 
to  her  national  power  and  prestige  by  annexing  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina."  The  motive  of  Russia  was  "partly  to  pro- 
tect her  kin  in  the  Balkan  States  from  the  Austrians ;  partly 
to  secure  for  herself,  if  any  partition  of  the  Balkan  States 
resulted  from  the  war,  a  share  in  that  partition  and  a  long- 
desired  access  to  the  Mediterranean."  The  motive  of  Ger- 
many was  "partly  to  aid  her  Teutonic  Ally  in  her  punitive 
expedition  against  Serbia;  partly  to  secure  through  Austria 
and  Serbia  access  to  the  ^gean  and  the  Mediterranean; 
partly  to  protect  herself  from  an  apprehended  invasion  by 
Russia  and  a  possible  attack  from  France."  The  motive  of 
Belgium  was  "to  preserve  her  neutrality  against  invasion 
by  Germany";  while  the  motive  of  France  was  "partly  to 
aid  Belgium  in  her  just  war  of  defense,  partly  to  defend 
herself  against  the  invasion  threatened  by  Germany,  partly 
to  recover  for  herself  the  province  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine 

99 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

taken  from  her  by  Germany  in  the  Franco-German  War." 
The  motive  of  England  was  "partly  to  protect  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  which  she  had  pledged  herself  to  protect; 
partly  to  protect  France  from  what  she  regarded  as  an 
unjustified  attack;  and  partly  to  curb  what  she  regarded  as 
the  ambitious  designs  of  Germany  and  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe."  The  motive  of  Japan  was 
''partly  to  fulfil  her  pledges  to  England;  partly  to  get  even 
with  Germany  for  Germany's  interference  with  Japan's  pos.- 
sessions  of  the  fruits  of  her  victory  in  her  war  with  China ; 
partly  to  establish  her  supremacy  in  the  East ;  partly  to 
bring  about  friendly  relations  with  Russia,  her  old-time 
enemy,  and  thus  secure  for  herself  peace  in  her  occupation 
of  Korea  and  Manchuria ;  partly  probably  to  make  a 
permanent  alliance  with  China  by  giving  that  country 
Kiauchau  after  having  won  it  from  Germany,  and  partly  to 
get  a  recognized  place  in  the  international  councils  of  the 
civilized  world."  Out  of  a  chaos  of  conflicting  motives  the 
writer  found  it  "impossible  to  construct  a  purpose  common 
to  the  Powers  on  either  side." 

As  leading  to  a  war  no  longer  local,  but  one  involving  all 
the  great  Powers,  a  new  factor  in  strained  relation  had 
risen  in  1912,  when  France,  in  a  spirit  of  greater  prepara- 
tion against  Germany's  growing  spirit  of  military  aggression, 
enacted  a  three-year  service  law  and  Germany,  in  the  same 
year,  made  another  supreme  effort  to  maintain,  if  not  to 
extend,  her  lead  in  martial  power,  through  what  was  called 
a  "contribution,"  followed  by  an  increase  in  her  army.  A 
general  change  of  attitude  from  peace  to  war  on  the  part 
of  the  Kaiser  was  commonly  dated  from  that  year.  M. 
Jules  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  described 
this  change  on  November  22,  1913,  in  a  remarkable  report 
to  his  Government : 

'^Berlin,  November  22,  1913. — I  have  received  from  an  ab- 
solutely sure  source  a  record  of  a  conversation  which  is  reported 
between  the  Emperor  and  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  in  the  presence 
of  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Gen.  von  Moltke,  a  fortnight 
ago — a  conversation  which  would  appear  greatly  to  have  struck 
King  Albert.  I  am  in  no  way  surprized  by  the  impression 
created,   which    corresponds    with    that   made    on    me    some   time 

100 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

ago.      Hostility   against    us    is    becoming   more    marked,    and   the 
Emperor  has  ceased  to  be  a  partizan  of  peace. 

''The  German  Emperor's  interlocutor  thought  up  to  the  pres- 
ent, as  did  everybody,  that  William  IL,  whose  personal  influence, 
has  been  exerted  in  many  critical  circumstances  in  favor  of  the 
maintenance  of  peace,  was  still  in  the  same  state  of  mind.  This 
time,  it  appears,  he  found  him  completely  changed.  The  German 
Emperor  is  no  longer  in  his  eyes  the  champion  of  peace,  against 
the  bellicose  tendencies  of  certain  German  parties.  William  II 
has  been  brought  to  think  that  war  Avith  France  is  inevitable, 
and  that  it  will  have  to  come  to  it  one  day  or  the  other.  The 
Emperor,  it  need  hardly  be  said,  believes  in  the  crushing  superior- 
ity of  the  German  Army  and  in  its  assured  success. 

''Gen.  von  Moltke  spoke  in  exactly  the  same  strain  as  his 
sovereign.  He  also  declared  that  war  was  necessary  and  inevi- 
table, but  he  showed  himself  still  more  certain  of  success,  for, 
said  he  to  the  King,  'this  time  w^e  must  an  end  to  it,  and  your 
Majesty  can  hardly  doubt  the  irresistible  enthusiasm  which  on 
that  day  will  carry  away  the  whole  German  people.' 

"The  King  of  the  Belgians  protested  that  to  interpret  the 
intentions  of  the  French  Government  in  this  manner  was  to 
travesty  them,  and  to  allow  one's  self  to  be  misled  as  to  the 
feelings  of  the  French  nation  by  the  manifestations  of  a  few 
hotheads  or  of  conscienceless  intriguers.  The  Emperor  and  his 
Chief  of  General  Staff  none  the  less  persisted  in  their  point  of 
view. 

"During  this  conversation  the  Emperor,  moreover,  appeared 
overwrought  and  irritable.  As  the  years  begin  to  weigh  upon 
William  II.  the  family  traditions,  the  retrogTade  feelings  of  the 
Court,  and,  above  all,  the  impatience  of  soldiers,  are  gaining  more 
ascendency  over  his  mind.  Perhaps  he  may  feel  I  know  not  what 
kind  of  jealousy  of  the  popularity  acquired  by  his  son,  who 
flatters  the  passions  of  the  Pan-Germans,  and  perhaps  he  may 
find  that  the  position  of  the  empire  in  the  world  is  not  com- 
mensurate with  its  power.  Perhaps,  also,  the  reply  of  France 
to  the  last  increase  in  the  German  Army,  the  object  of  which 
was  to  place  Germanic  superiority  beyond  question,  may  count 
for  something  in  these  bitternesses,  for  whatever  one  may  say  it 
is  felt  here  that  the  Germans  can  not  do  much  more. 

"One  may  ask  what. lay  behind  the  conversation.  The  Emperor 
and  his  Chief  of  General  Staff  may  have  intended  to  impress  the 
King  of  the  Belgians,  and  to  lead  him  not  to  resist  in  c-ase  a 
conflict  with  us  should  arise.  Perhaps,  also,  there  may  be  a 
desire  to  have  Belgium  less  hostile  toward  certain  ambitions  dis- 

101 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

played  here  with  regard  to  the  Belgian  Kongo.  But  this  latter 
hypothesis  does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  compatible  with  the  inter- 
vention of  Gen.  von  Moltke. 

''Further,  the  Emperor  William  is  less  master  of  his  im- 
patience than  is  generally  believed.  More  than  once  I  have 
seen  him  allow  his  innermost  thoughts  to  escape.  Whatever  may 
have  been  the  object  of  his  conversation,  which  has  been  reported 
to  me,  the  confidence  has  none  the  less  the  gravest  character.  It 
corresponds  with  the  precariousness  of  the  general  situation,  and 
with  the  state  of  a  certain  portion  of  opinion  in  France  and  in 
Germany.  If  I  were  allowed  to  draw  conclusions  I  w^ould  say 
that  it  would  be  wise  to  take  into  account  the  new  fact  that 
the  Emperor  is  growing  familiar  with  an  order  of  ideas  which 
formerly  was  repugnant  to  him,  and  that,  to  borrow  from  him 
a  jDhrase  he  likes  to  use,  *we  should  keep  our  powder  dry.' 

Meanwhile  were  taking  place  the  two  Balkan  wars,  the 
outcome  of  which  proved  more  satisfactory  to  the  Entente 
Powers  than  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  altho  Serbia's  aspira- 
tions for  an  outlet  on  the  Adriatic,  either  through  a  union 
with  Montenegro  or  by  the  acquisition  of  a  part  of  the 
Albanian  coast,  had  been  thwarted  by  Austria  in  the  final 
settlement.  Austria,  however,  had  been  unable  to  prevent 
an  extension  of  Serbia's  inland  territory  which  brought  to 
Serbia  greater  prestige,  and  as  the  champion  of  a  Pan-Serb 
propaganda,  having  for  its  avowed  purpose  the  incorporation 
into  a  united  Serbia  of  all  Serbs  living  under  the  Austrian 
Empire,  made  her  more  dangerous  to  Austria  than  ever. 
In  other  words,  Austria  could  no  longer  dictate  to  Serbia, 
but  had  to  be  content  with  a  neighbor  of  no  mean  strength 
who  was  backed  by  Russia.  Austria  was  also  bitterly  dis- 
appointed to  find  that  her  dream  of  an  outlet  on  the  ^Egean 
through  Salonica  had  been  thwarted,  while  this  stronger 
Serbia  had  been  thrown  across  the  path  that  led  to  it. 
When  in  July,  1914,  Russia,  in  response  to  Austria's 
aggressions  against  Serbia,  partially  mobilized  on  her  Aus- 
trian frontier,  as  she  had  previously  declared  she  would  do, 
Germany  took  urrfbrage.  At  first  Germany  had  said  she 
would  not  consider  partial  mobilization  against  Austria  as 
a  cause  for  war — Bismarck,  in  fact,  had  held  that  mobiliza- 
tion in  itself  did  not  mean  war,  that  the  proper  answer  to 

102 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

it  was  to  mobilize  yourself— but  now  she  declared  that 
mobilization,  even  against  Austria,  rendered  the  situation 
difficult.  This  action,  on  the  part  of  Germany,  combined 
with  Austria's  refusal  to  enter  into  direct  negotiations  with 
the  Powers,  and  her  bombardment  meanwhile  of  Belgrade, 
not  to  mention  her  threat  of  a  general  mobilization,  wore 
out  the  patience  of  the  Russian  Minister  and  aroused  in 
Russia  resentful  feelings  generally.  The  natural  conse- 
quences in  Great  Britain  were  to  awaken  indignation  against 
Austria  and  sympathy  for  Russia. 

It  was  unthinkable  that  Great  Britain  would  keep  out  of 
any  general  conflict,  no  matter  what  the  result.  But  had 
she  wished  to  keep  out,  a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  by 
Germany  was  certain  to  force  her  in.  ''Here  Germany  was 
rationally  to  blame,''  said  Prof.  Ellery  C.  Stowell.^  "If  she 
had  been  willing  to  agree  to  remain  out  of  Belgium  and 
prosecute  the  war  upon  that  condition,  it  is  possible  that 
Great  Britain  would  have  held  aloof,  except  as  regards  her 
conditional  intervention  for  the  protection  of  the  French 
coast  and  shipping." 

The  plan  of  German  strategists,  first  to  subdue  France 
and  then  to  make  her  a  hostage  for  Russia,  was  well  under- 
stood in  both  France  and  Great  Britain,  and  made  it  possible 
for  France  to  remain  on  the  defensive  until  attacked.  Ger- 
many felt  that  she  had  to  crush  France  without  delay,  and 
considered  the  route  to  France  through  Belgium  the  only 
feasible  one.  That  forced  her  to  take  upon  herself  the 
double  responsibility  of  aggression  against  France  and  a 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality.  Had  Germany  withdrawn 
twenty  kilometers  from  her  western  frontier,  says  Professor 
Stowell,  and  entrenched  herself  behind  her  defenses,  ''she 
could  have  employed  the  greater  part  of  her  troops  against 
Russia,"  and  in  such  conditions,  "it  is  most  likely  that  she 
could  have  relied  on  dividing  English  sympathy,  and  could, 
perhaps,  have  counted  with  reasonable  assurance  on  the 
neutrality  of  Great  Britain."  Moreover,  Great  Britain 
"might  then  have  exerted  some  influence,  not  to  say  pres- 
sure, upon  France  to  prevent  her  from  attacking  Germany." 
Had  France,  however,  in  spite  of  Great  Britain,  gone  to  the 

1  In  "The  Diplomacy  of  the  war.'"     (Houghton,  Mifflin  Co.) 
1  103 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

assistance  of  Russia,  "the  sympathy  of  the  world  would  have 
been  divided,"  and  Germany  could  then  have  stood  on  the 
defensive,  and  gradually  retreated,  if  necessary,  until  she 
had  dealt  successfully  with  Russia.  Professor  Stowell  con- 
cludes as  to  the  causes  of  the  world  war: 

"The  real  cause  of  the  action  of  the  German  Government  was 
a  result  of  the  state  of  mind  of  -the  nation.  As  a  whole,  the 
German  nation  thought  and  still  thinks  in  a  manner  distinct 
from  the  rest  of  Europe.  Because  of  Germany's  geographical 
position,  she  suffered  for  centuries  before  she  could  constitute 
a  German  state;  finally,  in  the  course  of  European  evolution,  a 
period  was  reached  when  it  was  almost  inevitable  that  a  strong 
German  state  should  be  constituted,  and  again  the  weakness  of 
Germany's  geographical  position  made  it  necessary  for  her  to 
have  a  strong  army  and  a  strong  bureaucracy,  both  of  which 
Prussia  gave  her.  After  Prussia  under  Bismarck  had  crusht 
Austria,  there  followed  several  years  during  which  he  guided 
the  affairs  of  the  Kingdom  and  the  German  Empire.  We  can 
Avell  understand  the  influence  of  his  example  on  every  German 
youth.  Instead  of  having  held  up  before  him  the  example  of  a 
Lincoln,  or  that  other  hero  who  could  not  tell  a  lie,  the  German 
youth  was  taught  to  admire  the  man  who  had  trampled  on  the 
express  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  stateman  who 
knew  how  to  suppress  a  part  of  the  truth  in  order  to  entrap 
an  unprincipled  sovereign  into  an  aggTessive  war.  Such  an 
example  must  have  exercised  a  potent  influence  in  building  up 
a  Realpolitik — that  is  to  say,  a;  policy  of  dealing  with  concrete 
conditions  as  they  are,  as  opposed  to  the  following  of  ideals. 
But  in  the  minds  of  many  it  meant  the  justification  of  what- 
ever succeeded.  Since  Bismarck  has  succeeded  in  trampling  the 
constitution  under  foot,  the  German  people  naturally  came  to 
feel  that  the  same  procedure  might  apply  to  the  law  binding 
nations  in  their  relations  to  one  another.  Any  statesman  might 
violate  any  provision,  however  sacred,  provided  he  could  carry 
it  through.  Refusal  to  cooperate  with  her  sister  States,  among 
whom  was  her  ally,  Italy,  must,  I  believe,  place  upon  Germany 
the  first,  and  by  far  the  heaviest,  responsibility  for  the  war." 

Elsewhere  in  his  book  Professor  Stowell  makes  a  distinc- 
tion as  to  Germany's  full  responsibility.  "I  do  not  wish  to 
be  misunderstood,"  he  says,  "as  thinking  that  Germany 
really  wished  for  war ;  but  by  her  conduct  she  gave  evidence 

104 


ii»iililliilliiliBi»^^ 


iiiiiiilBiii 

iiiiillM^^ 
iiiiliiiiiM^^^^^^^ 


*iiBill|l:i 


WILLIAM   II  OF  GERMANY. 
The  former  Emperor,  in  his  naval  uniform 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

that  she  intended  to  back  up  her  ally  to  secure  a  diplomatic 
triumph  and  the  subjugation  of  her  neighbor,  which  would 
greatly  have  strengthened  Teutonic  influence  in  the  Balkans. 
She  risked  the  peace  of  Europe  in  a  campaign  after  pres- 
tige.'' It  was  this  diplomacy  that  immediately  preceded  the 
war  that  convinced  Professor  Stowell  of  the  extent  to  which 
the  great  Central  Powers  became  the  immediate  aggressors. 
That  these  Powers  forced  the  war,  most  neutrals  came  to 
believe ;  that  Germany  might  have  prevented  it,  bj^  accepting 
Great  Britain's  proposal  for  a  conference  of  the  Powers, 
was  also  believed.  Germany  and  Austria  to  all  appearances 
had  determined  to  overthrow  the  settlement  of  the  Balkan 
wars  as  made  in  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  and  only  waited 
for  an  opportunity  to  do  so  with  the  sword.  When  Russia 
made  it  plain  that  she  would  go  to  war  in  Serbia's  behalf, 
Austria  showed  a  willingness  to  recede  from  the  position 
she  had  taken,  but  Germany  intervened  decisively  and  forced 
the  issue.  Germany's  advance  as  a  world  power  depended 
upon  the  maintenance  of  her  primacy  in  Europe,  and  this 
position  she  was  resolved  at  all  costs  to  uphold.^  Direct 
responsibility  for  beginning  the  great  catastrophe  was,  there- 
fore, commonly  ascribed  to  the  Teutonic  nations,  tho  one 
might  be  less  certain  that  they  deliberately  provoked  an 
armed  conflict  than  that  they  saw  in  the  circumstances  of 
1914  a  favorable  opportunity  to  obtain  without  fighting  that 
which  they  desired;  in  other  words,  to  succeed  with  Serbia 
as  they  had  succeeded  w^ith  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in  1908. 
Such,  in  fact,  was  the  view  of  RoUo  Ogden^  when  the  war 
began,  and  such  was  the  intimation  which  Count  Czernin 
gave  in  a  statement  made  a  few  weeks  after  the  war  closed. 
The  war  might  in  fact  have  been  averted  had  not  Germany 
rejected  all  the  efforts  made  for  a  peaceful  settlement. 

In  March,  1918,  for  telling  about  his  mission  as  German 
Ambassador  to  London,  of  the  efforts  made  by  British 
statesmen  to  prevent  war  between  Germania  and  Russia,  and 
of  the   rejection   by   his   own    Government   of   Sir    Edward 

2  Charles  Seymour  in  "The  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War."  (Yale 
University  Press.) 

"  Editor  of  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  in  an  article  printed  in  The 
World's  Work. 

105 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


Grey^s  overtures  for  peace,  Prince  Lichnowsky  became  in 
imminent  danger  of  being  put  on  trial  in  Germany  for  high 
treason.  Just  at  the  moment,  however,  when  the  German 
state's  attorneys  were  considering  the  evidence  against  him, 
Herr  von  Jagow,  German  Foreign  Secretary  from  1913  to 
1916,  while  ostensibly  attempting  to  controvert  the  evidence 

given  in  Lichnowsky 's  '^  Mem- 
orandum," and  pretending  to 
expose  its  ''inaccuracies  and 
perversions,"  actually  cor- 
roborated him  as  to  the  sole 
vital  point  in  the  controversy, 
and  fixt  the  responsibility  on 
Germany  for  beginning  the 
war  as  a  conflict  among  the 
Great  Powers.  [_Either  in  self- 
defense,  owing  to  severe  criti- 
cism of  his  conduct  while  in 
London,  or  for  some  other 
reason,  Lichnowsky  had  made 
it  plain  that,  if  his  own  rep- 
resentations and  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  appeals  for  a  confer- 
ence of  the  Powers  had  been 
heeded  in  Berlin,  there  would 
have  been  no  general  war?  He 
showed  that  Great  Britain  sin- 
cerely desired  p^aT^er-an^r^rtrat" 
she  strove  to  avert  the  strug- 
gle by  bringing  about  a  conference  of  the  Powers  to  in- 
fluence Austria  and  Russia  to  keep  the  peace.  Jagow  also 
bore  testimony  to  the  peaceful  disposition  of  Great  Britain. 
Moreover,  he  said  that  when  he  took  oflice  in  1913,  she 
was  ready  to  enter  into  friendly  agreements  with  Ger- 
many concerning  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  other  ques- 
tions; in  fact  "an  agreement  had  almost  been  reached 
just  previous  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,"  and  Great 
Britain,  after  the  dispatch  of  the  note  to  Serbia,  had 
''played  a  conciliatory  role  and  urged  moderation  upon 
Vienna."      In    fact    Jagow    put   himself    in    a    position    of 


Tkixce  Lichnowsky 
German  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain 
in  1914,  wlio  published  a  "memoran- 
dum" dealing  with  the  world  war. 
in  which  he  said  it  was  precipitated 
by  "the  perfidy  of  Berlin" 


106 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

squarely  dissenting  from  the  opinion,  laboriously  built  up  for 
nearly  four  years  in  Germany,  that  Great  Britain  was  the 
cause  of  the  war.     These  were  his  words: 

''I  do  not  intend  to  adopt  the  theory  now  widespread  among- 
lis  that  England  was  the  originator  of  all  the  intrigues  leading- 
to  the  war.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe  in  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
love  of  peace  and  his  genuine  desire  to  arrive  at  an  understand- 
ing with  us,  but  he  had  allowed  himself  to  become  too  hopelessly 
entangled  in  the  network  of  Franco-Russian  policy.  He  could 
find  no  way  out  and  therefore  failed  to  do  that  which  had  been 
in  his  power  to  prevent  the  world-war.  War  was  not  popular 
among-  the  English  people,  therefore  Belgium  had  to  serve  aj  a 
battle  cry." 


/^- 


ntended  as  a  defense  of  the  German  policy  preceding 
the  outbreak,  Jagow's  statement  showed  clearly  how  Ger- 
many had  definitely  decided 
to  "go  it  alone,"  war  or  no 
war.  He  maintained  that  she 
could  not  have  -agreed  to  the 
English  proposal  of  a  confer- 
ence of  ambassadors  (in  the 
Serbian  crisis)  because  "it 
doubtless  would  have  meant 
for  us  a  serious  defeat."  The 
best  and  only  possible  way 
out  was  to  "localize  the  war" 
and  secure  an  understanding 
between  Vienna  and  Petro- 
grad  and  "we  directed  all  our 
energies  to  the  attainment  of 
that  end."  Russia  at  that 
time  had  declared  that  she 
could  not  permit,  without 
resistance,  an  attack  upon 
Serbia,  and  Prince  Lichnowsky 
had  notified  his  government  that,  in  the  event  of  war.  Great 
Britain  would  stand  by  France,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  given 
his  famous  warning,  and  France  was  known  to  be  bound  by 
open  treaties  of  twenty  years'  standing  to  support  Russia  in 


(iOTTLIEB    VON    JaGOW 

(Teniian  Foreign  Minister  in  1914 


10/ 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

case  of  a  conflict.  It  was  in  the  face  of  all  this  that  "all 
our  energies  were  directed  to  the  localization  of  the  war," 
but  what  was  meant  by  this  attitude  was  that  Austria  was 
to  have  a  ''free  hand  in  Serbia,"  and,  in  the  event  of  any 
interference  from  Russia,  Germany  was  to  stand  by  Austria, 
Jagow's  reply  was  perhaps  the  most  conclusive  document 
that  had  yet  been  published.  It  gave  to  Lichnowsky's 
memorandum  a  force  and  veracity  which  it  could  scarcely 
have  otherwise  possest. 

It  was  idle  to  attempt  to  wave  aside  Lichnowsky's  expo- 
sure of  Germany's  methods  on  the  theory  that  he  was  a 
man  of  no  consequence.  A  man  who  had  been  in  turn 
German  Ambassador  in  Vienna  and  in  London  was  not  to  be 
dismissed  in  that  fashion.  Moreover,  his  ''Memorandum" 
had  not  been  written  for  argumentative  purposes;  nor  was 
publication  intended  by  its  author.  He  himself  stated  that 
it  got  into  circulation  "through  an  indiscretion"  more  than 
a  year  after  it  was  written,  and  exprest  his  extreme  regret 
for  it.  Lichnowsky  traced  the  development  in  Germany  for 
years  before  the  critical  situation  in  1914,  of  the  trend  of 
opinion  and  purpose.  Personally,  he  believed  jthat  interna- 
tional  difficulties  could  have  been  solved  without  war,  but 
the  controlling  powers  in  Berlin  were  determined  not  to 
allow  such  a  settlement.  With  the  despairing  pessimism  of 
a  man  who  had  seen  his  just  ambitions  to  secure  peace  for 
the  world  thwarted,  he  wrote  with  astonishing  frankne^^ 
One  passage  in  his  statement  was  so  complete  in  its  condem- 
nation of  Germany's  policy  and  action  that  it  promised  to 
become  historic: 

''As  appears  from  all  official  publications,  without  the  facts 
being  controverted  by  our  own  White  Book,  which,  owing  to  its 
poverty   and  gaps,   constitutes   a   grave   self-accusation: 

"1.  We  encouraged  Count  Berehtold  to  attack  Serbia,  altho 
no  German  interest  was  involved,  and  the  danger  of  a  world  war 
must  have  been  known  to  us — whether  we  knew  the  tex't  of  the 
ultimatum  is   a  question   of  complete  indifference. 

"2.  In  the  days  between  July  23  and  July  30,  1914,  when 
M.  Sazonoff  emphatically  declared  that  Russia  could  not  tolerate 
an  attack  upon  Serbia,  we  rejected  the  British  proposals  of 
mediation,  altho  Serbia,  under  Russian  and  British  pressure,  had 

108 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

accepted  almost  the  whole  ultimatum,  and  altho  an  agTeement 
about  the  two  points  in  question  could  easily  have  been  reached, 
and  Count  Berchtold  was  even  ready  to  satisfy  himself  with  the 
Serbian  reply. 

''3.  On  July  30,  when  Count  Berchtold  wanted  to  srive  way,  we, 
without  Austria  having*  been  attacked,  replied  to  Russia's  mere 
mobilization  by  sending  an  ultimatum  to  St.  Petersburg,  and  on 
July  31  we  declared  war  on  the  Russians,  altho  the  Czar  had 
pledged  his  word  that  as  long  as  negotiations  continued  not  a 
man  should  march — so  that  we  deliberately  destroyed  the  possi- 
bility of  a  peaceful  settlement. 

''In  view  of  these  indisputable  facts,  it  is  not  surprizing  that 
the  whole  civilized  world  outside  Germany  attributes  to  us  the 
sole  guilt  for  the  World  War." 

There  was  no  surprize  for  politicians  or  historians  in 
Lichnowsky's  disclosures;  the  document  became  one  of  the 
most  startling  of  the  war,  because  of  the  interpretation  put 
upon  facts  by  such  an  authority.  Lichnowsky  knew  the 
truth,  not  only  as  to  mere  occurrences,  but  as  to  their 
relations  to  each  other  and  as  to  their  bearing  on  the  ques- 
tion of  moral  responsibility  for  the  war.  He  has  pieced 
together,  with  the  skill  of  a  trained  diplomatist,  a  narrative 
which  placed  upon  the  German  Imperial  Government  blood- 
guilt  for  a  deliberately  plotted  assault  upon  humanity.  jJHe 
showed  that  the  war  had  been  in  contemplation  for  years, 
that,  through  the  crudity  and  clumsiness  of  Berlin,  the 
scheme  several  times  had  become  abortive  with  a  resultant 
impairment  of  German  prestige;  that  in  1914  an  artificial 
crisis  was  created  out  of  the  murder  of  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand  at  Serajevo;  that  this  crisis  was  created,  not  by 
Austria,  but  by  Germany;  that  every  Power  in  Europe, 
even  Austria,  and  especially  Great  Britain,  had  striven  at 
that  time  to  secure  peace  at  almost  any  sacrifice,  but  that 
Berlin  wantonly  forced  the  war,  because  her  dominating 
military  clique  desired  it.  The  war,  he  declared,  was  due, 
not  to  Russia,  France  or  Great  Britain,  but  to  "the  perfidy 
of  Berlin."  Had  there  been  any  doubt  as  to  the  accuracy  of 
his  statements  such  doubt,  after  the  publication  of  them, 
was  dispelled  by  the  course  of  the  German  Imperial  authori- 
ties   and    the    inspired    German    press    when    they    uttered 

109 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

shrieks  of  ''treason,"  but  never  accused  him  of  falsehood, 
and  when  they  made  enraged  declarations  that  diplomatic 
etiquette  had  been  violated,  and  placed  the  Prince  under 
arrest. 

Prince  Lichnowsky  had  placed  the  responsibility,  not  so 
much  on  Germany,  as  on  the  German  military  party.  Dr. 
Muehlon,  a  former  director  of  Krupps,  in  a  letter  published 
at  this  time,'*  went  further  in  indicating  the  responsibility 
of  the  Kaiser.  He  revealed  a  confidential  conversation  be- 
tween Dr.  Helfferich,  later  Yice-Chancellor,  and  the  Kaiser, 
in  which  the  Kaiser  said  that  ''he  would  declare  w^ar  imme- 
diately if  Russia  mobilized,"  and  insisted  that  this  time 
"nobody  would  be  able  to  accuse  him  of  indecision."  Dr. 
Muehlon  showed  that  a  decision  for  war  was  reached  "early 
in  July,  1914" — which  pointed  to  the  Potsdam  conference 
of  July  5th — and  that  it  was  communicated  to  a  select 
circle,  including  Herr  Krupp  von  Bohlen,  the  head  of  the 
great  armament  firm.  He  maintained  the  Kaiser's  personal 
responsibility  for  all  that  happened,  and,  incidentally,  con- 
firmed, on  the  authority  of  Krupp  von  Bohlen,  what  had 
often  before  been  conjectured,  but  never  put  on  a  basis  of 
evidence,  that  the  Kaiser's  absence  on  his  annual  cruise  to 
Norway,  at  the  critical  moment,  w^as  "a  mere  piece  of  false 
pretense." 

The  most  astonishing  thing  about  Muehlon 's  revelations 
was  that  they  should  have  come  from  a  twentieth  century 
German.  Their  tone  was  that  of  an  eighteenth  or  early 
nineteenth  century  German.  They  showed  the  detachment, 
the  cosmopolitanism,  the  critical  poise  of  the  German  mind 
of  the  days  of  Goethe.  He  had  not  become  a  victim  of  the 
new  German  chauvinism.  The  modern  furor  Teutonicus  did 
not  impress  him.  As  a  man  of  science  and  of  liberal  intel- 
lectual tendencies,  he  had  only  disdain  for  the  brutal  policies 
with  which  modern  German  militarism  and  industrialism  had 
set  out  to  conquer  the  world.  His  high  position  in  the 
Krupp  works  had  brought  him  into  close  contact  with  the 
influences  which  were  planning  to  set  up  a  German  Mittel- 

*  In  a  Swiss  newspaper  and  reprinted  widely  in  Entente  countries.  Dr. 
Muelilon  afterward  published  a  book  on  the  subject,  entitled  "The  Vampire  of 
Europe."     (G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons.) 

110 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

europa,  Mittelasien  and  Miitelafrika.  He  saw  that  the 
Serajevo  assassination  merely  offered  Imperialistic  Germany 
a  pretext  for  firing  a  powder  train  she  had  long  before  laid 
down.  The  Kaiser  had  given  Austria-Hungary  "a  free  hand 
in  dealing  with  Serbia,"  and  when  Vienna  hesitated  on  the 
brink  of  war  and  began  to  draw  back,  she  forestalled  a 
diplomatic  settlement  by  forcing  war  on  Russia.  Dr. 
Muehlon  added: 

^'Germany  started  the  war  because  she  not  only  answered  the 
mobilization  of  Russia  with  her  own  mobilization,  but  also  sent 
a  short-term  ultimatum  for  Russia's  demobilization  and  declared 
war  without  delay.  Had  Germany's  mobilization  not  meant 
immediate  war,  had  Germany  given  time  for  consideration,  with 
a  spark  of  good  will,  it  would  have  been  possible  to  arrange 
everything  by  peaceful  means.  It  was  not  the  tension  between 
Russia  and  Austria  that  could  not  be  bridged,  but  that  between 
Germany  and  Russia,  which  was  entirely  independent  of  the 
interests  of  Austria-Hungary.  It  was  this  that  brought  about 
war. ' ' 

Soon  after  the  appearance  of  the  Lichnowsky  and  Muehlon 
documents,  Henry  Morgenthau,  American  Ambassador  at 
Constantinople  during  the  early  years  of  the  war,  gave  an 
account  of  the  famous  conference  at  Potsdam  on  July  5th, 
as  he  had  received  it  from  Baron  Wangenheim,  the  German 
Ambassador  serving  at  Constantinople  at  the  time  he  served.^ 
This  account  agreed  with  the  Lichnowsky  story  and  others 
as  to  the  preparations  for  war  with  which  Germany  had 
been  busy  while  the  rest  of  the  world  was  ignorant  of  an 
impending  calamity.  It  laid  bare  the  hollowness  of  the 
German  plea  of  self-defense  and  the  duplicity  with  which 
the  Emperor,  after  preparing  the  mine  with  a  time  fuse, 
went  off  for  a  trip  to  Norway  on  his  yacht,  to  be  taken  by 
surprize  when  the  explosion  occurred.  Baron  Wangenheim 
disappeared  from  Constantinople  soon  after  the  assassination 
of  the  Grand  Duke  and  Duchess  at  Serajevo,  but  came  back 
later  and,  after  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria  on  Serbia, 
gave    Ambassador    Morgenthau    details    of    the    momentous 

5  Printed  in  Tlie  World's  Worlc  for  June,  1918,  and  afterward  included  in 
his  book,    "Ambassador  Morgentbau's    Story."      (Doubleday,   Page   &  Co.) 

Ill 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


Potsdam  conference  which,  during  his  absence,  he  had  at- 
tended ; 

''This  meeting  took  place  at  Potsdam  on  July  5th.  The 
Kaiser  presided;  nearly  all  the  ambassadors  attended;  Wangen- 
heim    came    to    tell    of    Turkey    and    enlighten   his    associates    on 

the  situation  in  Constantinople. 
IMoltke,  then  Chief  of  Staff,  was 
there,  representing  the  army,  and 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz  spoke  for  the 
navy.  The  great  bankers,  railroad 
directors,  and  the  captains  of  G'er- 
man  industry,  all  of  whom  were 
as  necessary  to  German  war  prepa- 
rations as  the  army  itself,  also 
attended. 

' '  Wangenheim  now  told  me  that 
the  Kaiser  solemnly  put  the  ques- 
tion to  each  man  in  turn.  Was 
lie  ready  for  war?  All  replied 
'Yes'  except  the  financiers.  They 
said  that  thej^  must  have  two 
weeks  to  sell  their  foreign  securi- 
ties and  to  make  loans.  At  that 
time  few  people  had  looked  upon 
the  Serajevo  tragedy  as  something 
that  was  likely  to  cause  war.  This 
conference  took  all  precautions  that  no  such  suspicion  should  be 
aroused.  It  decided  to  give  the  bankers  time  to  readjust  their 
finances  for  the  coming  war,  and  then  the  several  members  went 
quietly  back  to  their  work  or  started  on  vacations.  The  Kaiser 
went  to  Norway  on  his  yacht,  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  left  for  a 
rest,  and  Wangenheim  returned  to  Constantinople. 

''In  telling  me  about  this  conference,  Wangenheim,  of  course, 
admitted  that  Germany  had  precipitated  the  war.  I  think  that 
he  was  rather  proud  of  the  whole  performance;  proud  that 
Germany  had  gone  about  the  matter  in  so  methodical  and  far- 
seeing  a  way;  especially  proud  that  he  himself  had  been  invited 
to  participate  in  so  momentous  a  gathering.  The  several  blue, 
red,  and  yellow  books  which  flooded  Europe  the  few  months 
following  the  outbreak,  and  the  hundreds  of  documents  which 
were  issued  by  German  propaganda  attempting  to  establish 
Germany's  innocence,  never  made  any  impression  on  me.  For 
my   conclusions  as   to   the   responsibility   are   not   based   on   sus- 


ITENUY   MORGENTHAr 

American   Ambassador  to  Turkey 
(1913-1916) 


112 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 


picions  or  belief  or  the  study  of  circumstantial  data.  I  do  not 
have  to  reason  or  argue  about  the  matter.  I  know.  The  con- 
spiracy that  has  caused  this  greatest  of  human  tragedies  was 
hatched  by  the  Kaiser  and  his  imperial  crew  at  this  Potsdam 
conference  of  July  5,  1914.  One  of  the  chief  participants,  flushed 
with  his  triumph  at  the  apparent 
success  of  the  plot,  told  me  the 
details  with  his  own  mouth. 
Whenever  I  hear  people  arguing 
about  the  responsibility  for  this 
war  or  read  the  clumsy  and  lying 
excuses  put  forth  by  Germany,  I 
simply  recall  the  burly  figure  of 
Wangenheim  as  he  appeared  that 
August  afternoon,  puffing  away 
at  a  huge  black  cigar,  and  giving 
me  his  account  of  this  historic 
meeting.  "Wliy  waste  any  time 
discussing  the  matter  after  that? 
'■ '  This  Imperial  Conference 
took  place  July  5th;  the  Serbian 
ultimatum  was  sent  on  July  22d. 
This  is  just  about  the  two  weeks' 
interval  which  the  financiers  had 
demanded  to  complete  their  plans. 
All  the  great  stock  exchanges  of 
the  world  show  that  the  German 
bankers  profitably  used  this  interval.  Their  records  disclose 
that  stocks  were  being  sold  in  large  quantities  and  that  prices 
declined  rapidly.  At  that  time  the  markets  w^ere  somewhat 
puzzled  at  this  movement ;  AYangenheim  's  explanation  clears  up 
any  doubts  that  may  still  remain.  Germany  was  changing  her 
securities  into  cash,  for  war  purposes.  If  any  one  wishes  to 
verify  Wangenheim,  I  would  suggest  that  he  examine  the  quota- 
tions of  the  New  York  stock  market  for  these  two  historic  weeks. 
He  will  find  that  there  were  astonishing  slumps  in  quotations, 
especially  on  the  stocks  that  had  an  international  market.  Between 
July  5th  and  July  22d,  Union  Pacific  dropped  from  155^/2  to  127y2. 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  from  91^2  to  81,  United  States  Steel  from 
61  to  501/0,  Canadian  Pacific  from  194  to  1851/2  and  Northern 
Pacific  from  111%  to  108." 


Bauox  von  Wangenheim 

German    Ambassador   to   Turkey   in 

the  early  part  of  the  war 


After  the  publication  of  the  Lichnowsky  *' Memorandum,'' 
the    Kaiser,    Hindenburg,    and    Ludendorff    broke    out    with 


V.  1—8 


113 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

repetitions  of  a  stale  pretense  that  Germany  had  been  taken 
by  surprize  by  her  enemies  and  that  the  war  was  forced 
upon  her.  As  bearing  on  this  contention,  some  captured 
correspondence  of  Captain  von  Papen,  formerly  a  German 
Military  Attache  at  Washington,  was  brought  to  light  early 
in  1918.  One  letter  received  by  Papen  from  the  Ministry 
of  War  in  Berlin  called  upon  him  to  investigate  Mexican 
train-wrecking  methods  for  use  "in  the  event  of  a  European 
war."  This  request  was  made  on  March  12,  1914.  Papen 
replied  in  July,  and  war  broke  out  August  1.  And  yet  as 
late  as  July  31st,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  said,  in  a  speech  from 
the  balcony  of  the  palace  in  Berlin :  ' '  Envious  peoples 
everywhere  are  compelling  us  to  our  just  defense.  The 
sword  is  being  forced  into  our  hand,"  and  on  August  6th 
issued  a  proclamation  in  which  he  said:  "In  the  midst  of 
perfect  peace,  the  enemy  surprizes  us."  At  that  time  Papen 
had  been  at  work  for  four  months,  under  orders  from 
Berlin,  to  find  out  how  to  blow  up  railroad  trains  "in  the 
event  of  a  European  war,"  and  had  been  disgusted  to  find 
that  the  Mexican  methods  "were  not  up-to-date  enough  to 
be  of  much  use  in  Europe." 

An  open  confession  by  the  Milwaukee  Germania-Herold 
that  Germany  began  the  war  was  accepted  in  the  first  week 
of  May,  1918,  as  important  because  it  was  typical ;  for^  as 
this  editor's  mind  was  moved,  so  by  this  time  had  been  the 
minds  of  others  of  German  blood  in  America.  The  Germania- 
Herold  had  formerly  followed  Berlin  in  attributing  the 
world  conflict  to  Great  Britain.  "We,  too,"  it  now  said, 
"have  time  and  again  repeated  the  assertion  to  our  readers 
that  English  statesmen,  jealous  of  Germany's  success  in  the 
world  markets,  attempted  to  encircle  it,"  but  the  Lichnowsky 
"Memorandum"  and  the  Jagow  admission  "made  that  view 
ridiculous. ' ' 

After  the  armistice  was  signed  in  1918  and  a  revolution 
effected  in  Germany  with  the  Kaiser  and  Crown  Prince 
fugitives  in  Holland,  further  confirmation  of  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky and  Dr.  Muehlon  was  contained  in  a  diplomatic 
document  published  in  Munich,  as  a  report  made  by  the 
Bavarian  Minister  at  Berlin,  Count  von  Lerchenfeld,  to  his 

114 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

home  Government  on  July  18,  1914,  showing  how  Germany 
and  Austria  had  conspired  to  bring  on  the  war.  It  was  a 
part  of  that  conspiracy  to  make  the  terms  of  Austria's 
ultimatum  to  Serbia  so  drastic  that  hostilities  were  bound 
to  follow.  As  already  stated, 
the  delivery  of  the  ultimatum 
to  Serbia  was  originally  drawn 
up  soon  after  the  assassina- 
tion of  the  Austrian  Arch- 
duke on  June  23d;  it  was 
afterward  recalled  six  times 
and  the  sending  of  it  was 
delayed  until  after  Presi- 
dent Poincare  and  Premier 
Viviani  of  France  had 
sailed  for  St.  Petersburg,  for 
an  official  visit.  The  purpose 
of  the  delay  was  to  make  it 
difficult  for  the  Entente  na- 
tions, in  the  absence  of 
Poincare  and  Viviani,  to  arrive 
at  some  common  understand- 
ing as  to  counter  measures 
in  the  Teutonic  aggression 
toward  Serbia.  Serbia  "obvi- 
ously can  not  accept  such  conditions  as  will  be  laid  down,'' 
wrote  Count  von  Lerchenfeld,  "and  as  a  consequence  there 
must  be  war."  He  declared  that  the  time  limit  in  the  note  to 
Serbia  was  made  so  short,  in  order  to  prevent  Serbia  from 
having,  "under  pressure  from  France  and  Russia,  an  oppor- 
tunity to  offer  satisfaction."  In  a  telegram  to  Munich  from 
Berlin  on  July  31,  1914,  Lerchenfeld  had  said  that  all  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  efforts  to  preserve  peace  would  "certainly 
not  succeed  in  arresting  the  course  of  events."  On  the  same 
day,  he  wired  information  as  to  the  German  ultimatums  to 
Russia  and  France,  predicted  their  rejection  by  both  nations, 
and  told  of  Germany's  plans  to  hurl  her  armies  against 
France,  which,  he  said,  would  be  "overwhelmed  in  four 
weeks."  The  morale  of  the  French  army,  he  said,  was 
"poor,"  and  the  army  was  "poorly  armed."     He  outlined 


^'    M  JFFETT      CHICAGO 

Rene  Viviani 

Prime  Minister   of  France  in   1914, 

who.    with    Marshal    Joffre.    visited 

the  United  States  in  1917 


115 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Germany's  intention  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  and  said 
the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  had  declared  that  "even 
British  neutrality  will  be  paid  for  too  dearly,  if  the  price 
is  respect  for  Belgium/'  because  *'an  attack  on  France  was 
possible  only  through  Belgium." 

Commenting  on  these  disclosures  from  Munich,  the  Bed 
Flag  of  Berlin  in  December,  1918,  demanded  the  immediate 
convening  of  a  revolutionary  tribunal  for  the  purpose  of 
passing  sentence  on  the  Hohenzollerns,  father  and  son,  and 
on  Bethmann-Hollweg.  William  II,  said  Yorwarts,  ''must 
be  commanded  to  return  and  give  an  account  before  this 
tribunal.  "We  have  been  told  that  Germany  had  no  knowl- 
edge of  Austria's  ultimatum  to  Serbia;  it  was  a  lie.  Berlin 
was  said  to  have  admonished  Vienna  to  go  slow;  that  was  a 
lie."  Another  German  paper,  Die  Freiheit,  said  of  the 
Berlin  government:  "They  committed  high  treason.  W^ 
can  not  lay  hands  on  William  and  his  son,  but  it  is  to  be 
hoped  that  they  will  be  brought  to  justice.  Their  fortunes, 
however,  must  be  confiscated.  Bethmann-Hollweg,  Jagow, 
Zimmermann,  and  all  who  were  their  tools,  must  forthwith 
be  arrested  and  brought  into  court."  Count  zu  Eaventlow, 
the  Junker  journalist,  in  the  TageszeiUing,  said  that  neither 
Bethmann-Hollweg  nor  his  associates  desired  a  world-war  as 
they  "were  not  prepared  for  it,"  but  it  was  "not  to  be 
denied  that  their  jumbling  was  responsible  for  complications 
which  ultimately  involved  Germany." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Germany  declared  with 
insistence  that  Russia  was  the  culprit,  because  she  mobilized 
and  so  forced  the  hand  of  Germany;  but  afterward  the 
saying  "England  began  the  war"  was  the  text  of  almost 
every  German  utterance  on  the  subject,  and  the  battle  cry 
oi'^'Gott  strafe  England,"  started  in  Potsdam,  was  taken 
up  by  pulpit  and  press  until  it  resounded  throughout  the 
Empire.  Under  that  delusion  the  German  people  supported 
the  war,  millions  of  them  were  slain  or  maimed,  their  coun- 
try made  insolvent,  and  the  name  of  Imperial  Germany 
became  odious  to  mankind.  Germans  in  1914  had  ceased  to 
be  Europeans  in  the  old  cultural  sense.  They  had  become 
barbarians,  seeking  to  conquer  Europe  with  fire  and  sword, 

110 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

destroying   its   ancient   monuments,   pillaging   its   cities   and 
subverting  its  civilization.^ 

6  Principal  Sources  :  The  Outlook,  Ellery  C.  Stowell's  "The  Diplomacy  of  the 
War,"  Charles  Seymour's  "The  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War,"  Rollo 
Ogden  in  The  World's  Work,  The  New  York  Tribune,  Prince  Lichnowsky's 
"Memorandum,"  Dr.  Muehlon's  "'The  Vampire  of  Europe,"  The  New  York 
>Sm«,  'Ambassador  Morgenthau's  Story,"  by  Henry  Morgenthau,  The  New 
York  Evening  i<un.  The  New  York  Times. 


117 


II 

BOSNIA    AND    HERZEGOVINA    AND    AFFAIRS 
IN   MOROCCO 

1878—1911 

BACK  of  all  immediate  causes  were  causes  neither  mili- 
tary, diplomatic  nor  political.  These  were  racial  causes  as 
existing  among  the  conglomerate  people  of  the  Balkan  States, 
or  in  what  Lloyd  George  called  the  "ramshackle"  Empire 
of  Austria.  Balkan  people,  Italians  on  the  Adriatic,  Poles 
in  Central  Europe,  and  French  in  Alsace  Lorraine,  com- 
prised many  millions  of  men  and  women  who  for  generations 
had  grown  weary  in  long  and  unrealized  hopes  of  achieving 
each  a  nationality  for  themselves,  instead  of  being  in  sub- 
jection to,  or  otherwise  opprest  by,  Teutonic,  Magyar  and 
Turkish  autocrats,  their  overlords.  Among  these  racial  causes 
the  foremost  was  that  extraordinary  race  conceit,  as  devel- 
oped into  a  colossal  national  egomania,  among  Prussianized 
Germans,  leading  them  to  believe  their  mission  in  the  world 
was  to  put  the  other  European  States  into  virtual  subjection 
to  their  "Kultur. "  From  times  so  far  back  that  no  one 
had  computed  the  period,  Prussians  and  Prussianized  Ger- 
mans had  been  taught  from  childhood — taught  in  their  homes 
and  in  their  standardized  school  books — that  they  were  super- 
men who  had  been  chosen  by  a  supreme  being  whom  they 
called  ''Unser  Gott,"  a  purely  tribal  deity,  to  impose  their 
''Kultur"  on  races  alien  to  themselves  and  inimical  to  their 
''Kultur."  It  mattered  not  that  these  alien  people  preferred 
their  own  more  humane  culture  to  anything  that  Teutonism 
and  its  sword  could  impose;  the  Prussian  German  for 
generations  had  ruthlessly  pursued  his  self-imposed  mission, 
determined  to  carry  "Kultur"  by  force  to  the  ends  of  the 
earth. 

In  the  Balkans  for  centuries  had  lived  millions  of 
Christian  people — Roumanians,  Bulgarians,  Greeks,  Serbians, 
Montenegrins,  and  Slovenes.     Never  entirely  subjugated  by 

118 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

the  Turk,  they  had  again  and  again  agitated  for  freedom 
and  had  broken  out  in  rebellion  or  actual  war,  sometimes 
successfully,  as  in  1912,  sometimes  unsuccessfully.  Forty 
years  before  the  World  War,  when  Turkey  had  committed 
frightful  massacres  in  Bulgaria,  Russia  had  tried  to  per- 
suade other  Christian  powers  to  join  with  her  in  freeing 
the  Balkan  Christians  from  the  Turkish  yoke.  Failing  to 
obtain  their  aid,  Russia  notified  them  that  she  would  under- 
take the  work  alone  and  accordingly  fought  the  War  of 
1877,  against  Turkey,  of  which  the  great  events  were  the 
siege  of  Plevna  in  Bulgaria  and  of  Kars  in  Transcaucasia, 
and  the  defense  of  the  Shipka  Pass.  The  great  military 
figures  of  the  war  then  were  Skobeleif  and  Osman  Pasha.  A 
hard-fought  contest  ended  in  complete  victory  for  Russia, 
whose  armies  marched  almost  to  the  gates  of  Constantinople 
and  there  dictated  a  peace,  the  terms  of  which  were  exprest 
in  what  was  known  as  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  which  prac- 
tically provided  for  the  independence  of  Bulgaria,  Serbia, 
Montenegro  and  Roumania,  and  made  cessions  of  territory 
to  two  of  those  States,  leaving  to  Turkey  only  Roumelia  and 
Constantinople.  This  peace  freed  these  States  from  the 
Turks,  after  400  years  of  subjection  and  unmentionable 
outrages.  Bulgaria,  as  a  practically  independent  State,  was 
bounded  by  the  Danube,  the  Black  and  ^gean  seas  and  by 
Albania,  which  remained  under  a  merely  nominal  suzerainty 
of  the  Sultan.  Serbia  and  Montenegro  were  largely  increased 
in  size,  their  independence  definitely  recognized.  This 
seemed  to  make  Russia  permanently  the  arbiter  of  the  fate 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  the  more  so  as  the  war  indemnity 
agreed  upon  frojn  Turkey  to  Russia,  amounting  to  1,400,- 
000,000  roubles,  would  have  hopelessly  crippled  the  resources 
of  the  Ottoman  government. 

The  two  Powers  whose  interests  were  most  immediately 
threatened  by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  were  Austria  and 
Great  Britain.  The  former  saw  herself  cut  off  from  all 
chance  of  expansion  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  through  the 
establishment  in  that  region  of  Russia  as  the  paramount 
Power — a  peril  it  had  been  her  traditional  policy  for  genera- 
tions to  avert.  New  articles  of  agreement  were  in  conse- 
quence adopted  in  the  following  year  at  a  Congress  held  in 

119 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Berlin,  called  chiefly  at  the  instance  of  Great  Britain  and 
Austria-Hungary,  which  virtually  tore  up  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano,  and  rearranged  the  map  of  southeastern  Europe  as 
it  existed  thereafter  until  rearranged  at  the  end  of  the 
Balkan  wars  of  1912-1913.  The  Congress  met  under  the 
presidency  of  Bismarck  who,  in  a  phrase  now  historical, 
assured  his  diplomatic  associates  that  in  serving  them  he 
would  endeavor  to  be  ''an  honest  broker."  Partly  through 
the  prestige  Germany  had  acquired  in  1870  from  the  war 
with  France,  partly  through  his  own  masterful  personality 
and  his  commanding  mental  abilities,  Bismarck  dominated 
the  Congress.  But  it  was  at  this  Congress  that  he  is  said 
to  have  "played  politics  like  a  city  alderman."  The  new 
treaty  there  negotiated  decreed  that  Russia  should  receive 
from  Roumania  the  Province  of  Bessarabia,  that  Roumania 
should  receive  lands  from  Turkey  to  the  south,  that  the 
principality  of  Bulgaria  should  be  made  an  autonomous 
State,  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan,  that  Turkey 
should  still  keep  a  large  part  of  her  domain  in  Europe,  but 
that  Roumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should  be  free. 
Under  later  pressure  Turkey  ceded  to  Greece  Thessaly  and 
Epirus.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  which  had  been  freed 
from  Turkey  in  the  war  that  Russia  fought,  were  assigned, 
not  to  Serbia,  but  to  Austria  to  be  administered  by  her, 
tho  not  to  be  annexed.  In  this  readjustment  of  the  Balkan 
States,  according  to  political  and  diplomatic  wisdom,  rather 
than  according  to  racial  needs  and  ambitions,  we  must  find 
the  parent,  or  at  least  the  grandparent,  of  the  World  War. 
Austria  managed  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  well,  but  her 
position  under  the  treaty  was  that  of  trustee,  not  that  of 
owner.  The  people  of  the  two  provinces  were  closely  related 
by  blood,  language,  and  sympathy  to  those  of  Serbia,  and 
Bosnia  lay  between  Serbia  and  her  long-wished-for  outlet  on 
the  sea.  Serbians  for  generations  had  looked  forward  to 
some  future  union  with  Bosnia  in  order  to  acquire  an  outlet 
on  the  Adriatic,  But  after  Russia's  humiliation  and  defeat 
by  the  Japanese  in  1904,  which  lessened  her  prestige  in 
Europe,  and  after  the  success  of  the  Young  Turks  in  re- 
adjusting the  government  of  their  country  under  German 
influence,  Austria  believed  the  time  had  come  when,  undis- 

120 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

turbed,  she  could  announce  their  annexation.  Accordingly, 
in  October,  1908,  the  Powers  that  had  taken  part  in  the 
Berlin  Treaty  of  1878  were  informed  that  Austria  had 
decided  to  make  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  a  part  of  her 
Empire,  at  which  act  the  Serbians  were  intensely  embittered, 
since  Serbia  was  condemned  again  to  remain  land  locked. 
Rollo  Ogden^  pointed  out  the  grave  meanings  and  early 
consequences  of  the  annexation.  It  was  an  act  which  Austria 
never  would  have  dared  to  commit,  except  for  Russia's 
weakness  as  a  consequence  of  her  war  with  Japan,  and  the 
support  which  Austria's  al- 
liance with  Germany  and  Italy 
had  given  her: 

'^Russia  was  deeply  moved. 
Every  Slavic  fiber  in  her  heart 
thiilledwith  remonstrance  against 
this  subjection  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary of  Slav  populations.  Eng- 
land was  the  first  to  protest.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  urged  that  no  step 
in  disregard,  if  not  violation,  of 
a  public  treaty  of  Europe  could 
be  warranted  except  by  a  con- 
gress of  the  Powers,  of  which  he 
proposed  the  early  summoning. 
But  Germany,  who  had  been 
aware  in  advance  of  the  Austrian 
plans,  objected;* and  when  Russia 
began    to    hint    at    using    force  Ruli.o  oijoen 

against  Austria,  the  action  of  the 

Kaiser  was  swift  and  menacing.  He  threatened  an  instant  mobil- 
ization on  the  Russian  frontier;  and  the  Czar's  military  advisers 
warned  the  Czar  that  the  Russian  armj?-  was  in  no  condition  to 
resent  this.  On  the  24th  of  Julj^,  1914,  however,  the  Minister  of 
AVar  informed  the  Grand  Council  at  St.  Petersburg  that  1914  was 
very  different  from  1909,  and  that  Russia  was  now  in  position  to 
ignore  or  defy  the  military  threats  of  Germany.  This  shows  hoAv 
the  affront,  as  Russia  considered  it,  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia,  and 
Herzegovina  had  rankled  in  the  Czar's  mind  these  six  years, 
and    how    he    was    determined    not    to    be    caught    again    by    an 

^  His  article  appeared  in  The  World's  Work. 


121 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

anticipatory  German  mobilization.  The  Bosnian  incident  may 
also  have  had  its  effect  on  the  crisis  of  1914  in  another  way. 
It  may  have  made  Berlin  over-confident.  Having-  frightened 
Russia  from  interfering  with  Austria's  forward  policy  once,  why 
not  think  to  do  it  successfully  twice?  However  this  may  have 
been,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  events  of  1908-9  were  the 
sure  prelude  to  the  war  of  1914." 

Mr.  Ogden's  inference  that  Austria  and  Germany  in 
August,  1914,  were  confident  that  they  could  again  succeed 
with  a  bluffing  process,  as  they  had  done  in  1908,  was  more 
and  more  justified  as  the  war  went  on,  and  disclosures  from 
time  to  time  were  made.  Germany  in  1914  believed  Russia's 
military  force  unequal  to  carrying  on  war  with  her;  that 
France,  with  her  army  ill  equipped,  was  also  unprepared 
for  a  conflict  of  such  magnitude ;  and  that  Great  Britain 
was  too  fully  occupied  with  Irish  uprisings  and  with  dis- 
content in  India  to  engage  in  a  war  on  the  Continent. 
Hence  she  and  Austria  could  "bluff"  as  successfully  now 
as  they  had  done  in  1908  when  Russia  was  weak  and  France 
and  Great  Britain  indifferent.  That  extreme  reactionary  and 
Pan-German  journalist.  Count  zu  Raventlow,  who  throughout 
the  war  had  often  been  vociferous  with  fire-eating  pronounce- 
ments, and  was  still  defending  the  old  regime  in  1918  after 
the  German  revolution  had  been  effected,  stoutly  maintained 
as  late  as  the  end  of  November,  1918,  that  the  war  had  been 
brought  on  by  ''blundering."  Even  Bethmann-Hollweg 
"did  not  want  war,"  he  said,  but  "blundered  into  it"  by 
the  way  in  which  he  conducted  the  diplomatic  work.  He 
and  his  "paladins,"  said  Raventlow,  believed  that,  "by  a 
bluffing  policy  they  could  bring  about  a  solution  of  the 
Serbian  crisis  in  the  way  that  Prince  von  Bulow  had  brought 
one  about  in  the  Bosnian  crisis  of  1908."  Apparently 
Raventlow  thought  Bethmann-Hollweg  had  allowed  himself 
to  get  too  far  into  the  game,  and  that  the  Russians,  seeing 
this,  "called  his  bluff:'."  Accepting  this  presentation  of  the 
origin  of  the  war,  one  could  understand  how  it  was  possible 
for  the  Kaiser  and  the  great  mass  of  Germans  to  make  their 
constant  assertions  for  four  years  that  Germany  was  fighting 
a  defensive  war. 

From  other  causes  Europe,  for  half  a  generation,  had  been 

122 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

passing:  through  a  series  of  violent  crises  to  which  the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  affair  was  scarcely  superior  as  a  menace 
to  its  peace.  These  crises  concerned  the  partitioning  of 
Africa  by  European  Powers — Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Germany.  On  November  15,  1884, — that  is  in  Bismack's 
time — a  conference  had  met  in  Berlin  to  apportion  the  riches 
of  Africa  among  white  peoples.  Before  this  conference 
finished  its  deliberations,  the  Germans  had  annexed  an  area 
more  than  half  as  large  again  as  their  Empire  in  Europe, 
land  belonging  to  seven  millions  of  natives  being  seized  by 
methods  little  different  morally  from  those  by  which  Great 
Britain  and  France  each  had  obtained  four  million  square 
miles,  Portugal  three-quarters  of  a  million,  and  Italy,  Bel- 
gium, and  Spain  smaller  areas.  Stanley's  exploration  of 
the  Kongo  Valley  had  been  the  immediate  occasion  of  this 
scramble  among  European  Powers  for  Africa. 

As  to  France,  the  outcome  of  her  war  with  Germany  in 
1870  had  led  her  to  seek  in  other  lands  outside  of  Europe 
compensation  for  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Humiliated 
and  impoverished,  she  looked  for  a  new  imperial  domain  that 
might,  and  ultimately  almost  did,  reach  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Red  Sea.  Germany,  shut  out  as  she  was  from  America 
by  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  had  begun  more  slowly  to  see  in 
Africa  the  dawn  of  a  new  day  for  the  Fatherland,  and 
there,  as  well  as  in  Asia,  she  sought  colonies,  while  Portugal 
aimed  to  make  good  in  Africa  her  ancient  claim  to  an 
African  realm.  A  continent  where  in  1875  Europe  had 
claimed  only  a  tenth  of  the  land,  twenty-five  years  later  had 
been  practically  absorbed  by  European  Powers.  Desperate 
flames  of  war  shot  up  in  Africa  during  that  quarter  of  a 
century,  from  the  clash  between  France  and  Great  Britain 
at  Fashoda,  from  Italy's  acts  in  Adowa,  from  Italy  and 
Turkey  at  war  in  Tripoli,  from  Great  Britain  and  Portugal 
in  Delagoa  Bay,  from  Great  Britain,  Germany  and  the  Boers 
in  South  Africa,  from  France  and  Spain  in  Morocco,  from 
Germany  and  France  in  Agadir,  and  from  all  the  world, 
ourselves  included,  in  the  conference  at  Algeciras.  The  world 
had  long  been  conscious  of  the  potentialities  of  the  gold  and 
diamonds  of  South  Africa,  of  the  cocoa  of  Angola  and 
Nigeria,  of  the  rubber  and  ivory  of  the  Congo,  and  of  the 

123 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

palm-oil  of  the  West  Coast.  Exports  of  palm-oil  from  West 
Africa  had  grown  from  283  tons  in  1800  to  80,000  tons  in 
1913,  which,  with  exports  of  products,  were  worth  $60,000,000 
annually.  Here,  also  were  cocoa-producing  countries  with 
exports  of  89,000,000  pounds  annually,  while  the  cotton  crop 
of  Uganda  rose  from  3.000  bales  in  1909  to  50,000  bales  in 
1914.^ 

France  in  1898  had  wished  to  stake  out  a  claim  on  the 
Upper  Nile,  running  east  from  the  Congo  to  Abyssinia,  since 
by  so  doing  she  could  secure  a  land  route  across  Equatorial 
Africa  and  arrest  that  rival  expansion,  by  which  Great 
Britain  promised  soon  to  have  a  continuous  line  of  north 
and  south  possessions  for  her  Cape-to-Cairo  railroad.  Such 
a  route  would  have  given  to  France  a  shorter  land  and  sea 
route  to  India  and  once  having  it  she  would  have  been 
almost  free  from  British  control  in  Africa.  It  was  in  Septem- 
ber, 1898,  that  a  British  force  under  Kitchener,  when  push- 
ing its  way  southward  up  the  Nile,  suddenly  saw  a  French 
flag  waving  over  Anglo-Egyptian  territory  on  the  Nile  at 
Fashoda.  A  French  exploration  party  under  Captain  Mar- 
chand  had  established  itself  there,  so  that,  after  long  years 
of  colonial  rivalry  in  Asia  and  America  and,  in  an  older 
past,  after  longer  centuries  of  rivalry  in  Europe,  these  two 
great  States  found  themselves  in  direct  collision,  the  only 
possibility  of  avoiding  a  conflict  being  that  one  or  the  other 
should  recede. 

War  for  a  time  actually  hung  in  the  balance,  and  some 
actual  preparations  for  it  were  made  in  both  countries.  But 
France,  preferring  to  yield  rather  than  risk  annihilation  for 
her  colonial  empire  in  a  one-sided  conflict  with  Great 
Britain,  withdrew.  Great  Britain  meanwhile  having  been 
conciliatory.  Being  less  uneasy  than  she  formerly  w^as  about 
Russian  aggressions,  Great  Britain  met  half-way  the  advances 
of  Delcasse,  the  French  ^Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
the  incident,  through  diplomatic  negotiations  was  afterw^ard 
closed.  Delcasse  sought,  wherever  possible,  to  remove 
such  vestiges  of  bitterness  toward  Great  Britain  as  were  left 
in  France,  and  in  this  was  assisted  by  King  Edward  VII, 
whose  tact  and  liking  for  the  French  enabled  him  to  further 

8T.  W.  Burghardt  in  The  Atlantic  Monthly  for  June,  1916. 

124 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

the  ultimate  plans  of  both   countries   for   an   Anglo-French 
accord.     Certain  understandings  as  to  all  the   colonial  pos- 
sessions of  France  and  Great  Britain  in  Africa  were  reached 
in   due    course,    and   out   of   these   events    came    the    Triple 
Entente  of  Russia,  France,  and  Great  Britain,  as  a  combina- 
tion of  Powers  set  up  against  the  Triple  Alliance  of  Ger- 
many, Austria,  and  Italy.    Rollo  O'gden  remarked'^  that  there 
could  be   no   question   as   to   what    constituted   the   material 
from    which    came    the    great 
conflagration.      It    was    "the 
grouping  of  the  great  Powers, 
who    had    become    "a    series 
of  powder  magazines  so  con- 
nected that  when  one  was  ex- 
ploded the  others  blew  up." 
A    fire    that    started    in    the 
Triple     Alliance      ( Germany, 
Austria  and   Italy)    "set   the 
Dual    Alliance     (Russia    and 
France)  ablaze  ;  and  the  Triple 
Entente  (Russia,  France,  and 
Great      Britain)      speedily 
showed  that  it,  too,  was  highly 
inflammable."   Mr.  Ogden  be- 
lieved that  the  verdict  of  his- 
tory   would    agree    with    the 
calmest     contemporary    judg- 
ment in  holding  that,  but  for 
these    alliances,    these    balan- 
cings of  the  nations,   Europe 

' '  could  not  have  been  suddenly  turned  into  a  vast  shambles. 
Instead  of  the  old  doctrine  of  European  equilibrium,  com- 
monly known  as  the  Balance  of  Power,  Bismarck  as  Chan- 
cellor had  set  up  rigid  and  hard-and-fast  alliances.  For  years 
he  had  been  "busy  combining  and  shifting  and  re-combining 
the  Powers,  as  a  chessmaster  works  over  possible  moves." 
No  student  of  European  politics  could  have  predicted  any- 
where between  1899  and  1903  that  Europe  would,  in  a  few 
vears,  "see,  over  against  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  the  supple- 


1 

,  :,*«»-■',       'llPP*** 

HHI^fa 

iC;   LONDON    STEREOSCOPIC   COMPANY. 

Field  Marshal,  Viscount  Kitchener 
Who  encountered  the  French  at  Fa- 
shoda.  and  was  British  Secretary  of 
State  for  War  at  the  time  of  his 
death  in  June,  1916 


9  In  The  World's  Work. 


125 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

mentary  Dual  Alliance,  a  Triple  Entente  uniting  France, 
Russia,  and  Great  Britain  and  bidding  fair  to  refashion  the 
whole  political  system  of  Europe."  This  Entente,  given 
the  past  history  and  diverse  interests  of  the  countries  com- 
posing it,  ''was  an  even  stranger  mating  of  opposites  than 
the  Alliance  which  bound  Italy,  Germany,  and  Austria  up 
in  the  same  bundle."  That  Great  Britain  could  act  in 
hearty  unison  with  France  "seemed  only  less  unlikely  than 
that  she  could  so  act  with  Russia."  But  she  ''actually 
joined  both  in  the  Triple  Entente." 

Tho  the  Triple  Alliance  in  1914  had  been  in  effect  for  a 
generation,  it  had  long  been  "of  the  nature  of  a  dormant 
force."  Not  what  it  did,  but  what  it  might  do,  had  been 
the  chief  concern  of  the  other  European  Powers,  and  it 
was  "plainly  a  high  potential."  Its  purely  ornamental,  or 
at  least  exterior,  functions  had  been  for  many  years  "the 
only  public  proof  that  it  gave  of  its  existence" — such,  for 
example,  as  the  annual  exchange  of  royal  visits  between 
Vienna,  Berlin,  and  Rome,  military  reviews,  naval  displays, 
banquets,  toasts  and  embracings.  Similarly,  the  Dual  Alli- 
ance for  years  had  "seemed  content  to  take  it  out  in 
flourishes  about  the  undying  friendship  between  Russia  and 
France." 

The  rapid  development  by  the  French  of  Algeria  and 
their  later  acquisition  of  Tunisia,  in  the  course  of  many 
years  had  given  rise  in  France  to  a  dream  of  large  empire 
in  Africa.  Trade  routes  from  Algeria  into  Morocco  had 
made  clear  to  the  French  the  value  of  Morocco,  the  most 
western  of  the  North  African  lands  so  long  embraced  in 
Islam.  As  early  as  1903,  native  authority  in  Morocco  had 
been  so  weakened  by  French  and  other  European  influences 
that  the  Sultan,  in  an  effort  to  assert  himself,  dismissed  all 
foreign  advisers,  whereupon  a  situation  arose  that  was  more 
or  less  comparable  to  anarchy.  This  situation  in  April, 
1904,  gave  occasion  for  an  agreement  between  France  and 
Great  Britain,  whereby  Great  Britain,  in  exchange  for  a 
free  hand  in  Egypt,  granted  to  France  the  same  privileges 
in  Morocco,  the  French  Government  agreeing  not  to  change 
the  political  status  of  Morocco  and  to  recognize  British  com- 
merce as  on   a  footing  of   equality  with   its  own.     France 

12C 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

before  this,  through  treaty  rights,  had  for  many  years  acted 
as  something  of  a  check  on  British  control  in  Egypt.  She 
could,  for  example,  have  vetoed  any  action  which  affected 
the  security  of  French  investments  in  that  country. 

Germany  saw  in  these  events  dangers  to  her  colonial  in- 
terests in  Africa.  Having  outgrown  Bismarck's  distrust  of 
large  German  colonies  and  having  already  secured  for  her- 
self large  ones  in  Africa,  she  desired  an  interest  in  Morocco. 
Up  to  that  time  she  had  been  on  generally  good  terms  with 
Great  Britain,  altho  she  had  feared  that  France,  being 
already  allied  to  Russia,  might  ultimately  become  a  close 
friend  of  Great  Britain  and  that  German  prestige  and 
political  influence  might  in  consequence  be  diminished.  At 
an  earlier  period,  France  had  been  facing  the  dilemma  of 
an  alliance,  either  with  Germany  or  with  Great  Britain. 
An  alliance  with  Great  Britain  had  meant  French  accept- 
ance of  British  control  in  Egypt,  while  one  with  Germany 
meant  giving  up  all  thought  of  recovering  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine. It  was  not  until  after  Fashoda  that  France  turned 
definitely  to  Great  Britain  and  in  October,  1904,  secured  an 
agreement,  first  with  Great  Britain,  and  then  with  Spain, 
leaving  the  ground  sufficiently  clear  for  French  domination 
in  Morocco,  and  the  ultimate  establishment  of  a  French 
protectorate  over  that  country. 

All  this  time,  a  prevailing  opinion  in  Germany  was  that 
France  would  some  day  tear  up  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort — 
the  treaty  by  which  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870  came 
to  a  settlement— that  she  would  do  this  just  as  soon  as  she 
felt  strong  enough.  Germany  had  convinced  herself  that 
she  must  ''keep  bright  her  sword"  to  defend  her  possession 
of  Alsace-Lorraine,  altho  she  knew  that  possession  of  those 
provinces  had  been  for  fifty  years  a  constant  irritant  to  the 
body  politic  of  France.  France  had  looked  forward  prob- 
ably to  some  day  when  she  might  recover  her  ''lost  prov- 
inces,'' but  her  ambition  in  that  respect,  whatever  it  was  in 
earlier  years,  had  scarcely  survived  as  an  active  passion. 
Germany,  in  defense  of  her  aggressions  leading  to  the  war, 
still  contended  that  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  had  been 
arranged  with  the  fundamental  object  of  military  action 
against  Germany.    In  the  fifth  year  of  the  war,  in  order  to 

127 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

prove  beyond  question  the  falsity  of  German  assertions, 
France  published  from  her  archives  confidential  documents 
showing  the  origin  and  development  of  her  alliance  with 
Russia.  They  proved  beyond  question  that  the  alliance  had 
been  directly  inspired  by  German  pretensions  to  a  hegemony 
of  Europe,  which  left  France  and  Russia  no  alternative 
except  to  unite  in  a  defensive  alliance;  that  there  was  no 
ground  for  German  assertions  that  the  alliance  was  entered 
into  to  enable  France  to  reconquer  Alsace-Lorraine,  that  the 
alliance  at  first  was  not  specially  directed  against  Germany 
any  more  than  against  Austria  or  even  Great  Britain,  since 
it  was  directed  against  no  matter  what  combination  of 
Powers  might  desire  to  disturb  the  status  quo,  and  that  the 
French  General  Staff  in  1892  clearly  foresaw,  and  as  far  as 
possible  prepared  for,  such  steps  as  Germany  might  take 
and  did  take  in  the  onslaught  she  launched  in  1914.  The 
documents  as  published  in  support  of  this  statement  num- 
bered 107.  Germany  had  convinced  herself,  however,  that 
she  must  protect  her  prestige  by  keeping  France  too  weak 
to  make  an  attempt  to  recover  Alsace-Lorraine.  When  she 
learned  that  France'  had  not  only  extended  her  political 
influence  in  North  Africa,  but  was  reaching  a  better  under- 
standing with  Great  Britain,  she  considered  her  safety  seri- 
ously threatened.  She  did  not  at  that  time  enter  a  protest 
against  the  Morrocan  arrangement,  but  allowed  the  matter 
to  rest.  France  and  Great  Britain  concluded  from  this  that 
they  had  definitely  and  permanently  disposed  of  Morocco. 
The  fact  that  no  acute  crises  arose  indicated  either  that  the 
balance  of  power  was  secure,  or  that  Germany  regarded  the 
combination  against  her  as  too  powerful  to  be  resisted. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  which  broke 
out  in  February,  1904,  had  begun  to  reveal  Russia's  military 
weakness  and  this  offered  to  the  German  Government  a 
favorable  occasion  on  which  to  make  a  move  in  Morocco. 
Accordingly,  the  German  Emperor  in  1905,  on  his  way  to 
Constantinople,  suddenly  disembarked  at  Tangier,  where  he 
made  a  speech  declaring  that  Germany  would  protect  her 
interests  in  Morocco.  The  attention  of  the  world  thus  became 
focused  on  Morocco.  France  rushed  forward  military  prepa- 
rations to  defend  her  eastern  frontier  in  Europe  against  an 

128 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 


anticipated  attack,  while  Great  Britain  let  it  be  understood 
that  Germany's  action,  in  attempting  to  block  France  in 
Morocco,  would  be  looked  upon  by  her  unfavorably.  Ger- 
many became  so  greatly  incensed  by  this  declaration  that 
actual  war  was  believed  to  be  imminent.  A  French  program 
of  reform  about  this  time  was 
rejected  in  Morocco,  on  the 
ground  that  any  reforms 
should  emanate  from  a  con- 
ference of  Powers  signatories 
to  the  Treaty  of  Madrid,  and 
under  German  influence  the 
Sultan  announced  that  such 
a  conference  would  be  held  at 
Algeciras.  Delcasse,  owing  to 
the  suspension  of  his  Moroccan 
plans,  thereupon  resigned  and 
arrangements  were  pushed 
forward  for  the  Algeciras 
conference,  which  came  to- 
gether in  January,  1906. 
Through  the  support  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  defection  of 
Italy,  who  was  then  Ger- 
many's ally,  France  emerged 
from  the  conference  with  a 
diplomatic  victory.  Germany's 
aggressive  action  served  to  draw  France  and  Great  Britain 
still  closer  together  and  so  reacted  further  upon  Germany's 
prestige  in  Europe.  France  formed  at  that  time  an  entente 
cordiale  with  Great  Britain,  without  in  any  way  weakening 
her  alliance  with  Russia. 

In  these  events  was  seen  the  first  gathering  of  war  clouds 
which  broke  over  Europe  a  decade  later.  The  world  war 
had  a  multiple  of  causes,  but  Morocco  was  unhesitatingly 
a  principal  cause.  Algeciras  in  a  sense  was  a  defeat  for 
both  France  and  Germany,  since  every  compromise  is  a 
defeat  for  those  who  have  advocated  opposite  solutions. 
Germany  wanted  a  complete  independence  for  Morocco  and 
failed  to  get  it.  France  wanted  a  free  hand  in  Morocco 
V.  1-9  129 


Thkophile  Delcassi': 
The    French    Foreign    Minister   who 
negotiated     the     Entente     between 
France    and    Great    Britain    in    the 

reign  of  Edward  VII 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

and  this  she  did  not  get,  but  later  she  took  it  boldly.  For 
weeks  European  peace  had  seemed  about  to  be  shattered. 
For  France,  the  going  of  Delcasse  was  probably  the  greatest 
humiliation  she  had  known  since  Sedan,  but  Great  Britain 
stood  solidly  behind  the  French,  Russia  was  not  less  loyal 
to  her,  and  Italy  displayed  a  lack  of  sympathy  with  her 
German  ally  which  roused  bitter  recrimination  in  Berlin. 
In  Germany's  defeat  at  Algeciras  was  seen  the  first  sign 
visible  to  the  world  of  the  crumbling  of  the  edifice  of 
Bismarck.     Germany  and  Austria  now  stood  alone. 

Sultan  Abdul  Aziz  resented  keenly  the  action  of  the  con- 
ference, and  his  feelings  about  the  gratuitous  assumption  by 
the  Powders  of  a  right  to  decide  the  destinies  of  his  Empire 
were  shared  by  every  religious  and  political  chief  in  Morocco. 
Had  they  been  able  to  unite  in  action,  as  they  were  united 
in  spirit,  the  Moors  could  have  presented  so  formidable  a 
barrier  to  French  penetration  in  Morocco  that  France  would 
have  now  hesitated.  But  in  March,  1907,  after  a  French 
physician  was  assassinated  in  Morocco  and  a  British  consular 
agency  was  attacked,  France  definitely  crossed  the  Rubicon 
by  occupying  the  Ujda  district  on  the  Algerian  frontier  and 
establishing  European  control  over  customs  in  Morocco.  This 
led  to  an  anti-European  outbreak  at  Casablanca,  a  Moroccan 
port  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  whereupon  France  promptly  sent 
cruisers  to  bombard  Casablanca,  and  landed  three  thousand 
troops.  Moorish  attacks  against  this  expeditionary  force 
eventually  led  to  a  vigorous  French  campaign  in  the  hinter- 
land, which  meant  French  occupation  of  Morocco.  Franco- 
German  tension  over  Morocco  was  brought  to  fever  heat  by 
this  incident.  International  public  opinion  did  not  support 
the  French  side  of  the  case,  but,  at  this  moment.  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  was  betrayed  into  the  indiscretion  of  a  much- 
bruited  London  Daily  Telegraph  interview,  criticism  of  which 
convinced  the  German  Foreign  Office  that  Germany  was  not 
strong  enough  to  insist  upon  an  apology. 

After  the  Algeciras  Conference,  Great  Britain  entered  into 
a  convention  with  Russia,  which,  like  her  entente  with 
France,  eliminated  long-standing  differences  and  fears.  By 
this  convention  northern  Persia  was  allotted  to  Russia,  as 
being  within  her  sphere  of  influence,  while  the  southern  part 

130 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

fell  to  Great  Britain,  which  practically  amounted  to  a 
partition  of  Persia  on  the  ground  of  instituting  needed  re- 
forms. A  small  central  portion  was  left  to  Persia  herself 
as  a  buffer  State  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain.  The 
Triple  Alliance — Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy — thus  found 
itself  confronted  by  a  Triple  Entente,  in  which  France  was 
linked  by  alliance  with  Russia  and  by  a  friendly  under- 
standing with  Great  Britain.  Germany  felt  herself  hemmed 
in  on  every  side.  IMoreover,  she  saw  raised  up  a  new  menace 
to  her  long-exploited  advance  over  the  Bagdad  railway  to 
the  Persian  Gulf. 

Austria's  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  followed 
in  1908.  The  immediate  occasion  was  a  report  that  delegates 
from  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were  about  to  be  sent  to  the 
Turkish  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Austria  thereupon  affirmed 
her  sovereignty  over  the  two-  countries  by  proclaiming  their 
annexation  and  Germany  supported  her  as  an  ally.  Russia 
protested  against  the  act  as  a  violation  of  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin.  As  the  question  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  inter- 
ested all  Europe  it  could  not  be  settled,  Russia  said,  without 
the  assent  of  the  Powers  signatory  to  that  treaty.  Diplo- 
matic exchanges  ensued  until  March,  1909,  when  Germany 
announced  that,  unless  Russia  consented  to  the  annexation, 
Austria  would  invade  Serbia,  which  was  already  making 
preparations  for  an  attack  on  Austria.  Russia,  unprepared 
for  another  war,  had  to  submit,  especially  as  Great  Britain 
and  France  were  both  unwilling  to  be  dragged  into  a  conflict 
over  a  Balkan  question.  Had  Great  Britain  and  France 
wished  to  strike  Germany  and  Austria  at  that  time  they 
could  not  have  found  a  better  reason  than  the  annexation 
of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina;  but  both  wished  to  preserve 
peace.  Even  the  idea  of  a  conference  was  abandoned. 
Austria's  act  as  a  fait  accompli  was  accepted  and  Serbia 
was  compelled  to  make  a  formal  declaration  of  submission. 

After  this  there  was  diplomatic  peace  until  the  spring  of 
1911,  when  certain  tribes  in  Morocco  rebelled  against  Hefid 
the  Sultan,  who  found  himself  besieged  in  Fez.  Under  the 
obligation  which  her  position  as  ''predominant  power"  im- 
posed, the  army  of  France  at  Casablanca  was  now  reinforced, 
and  two  flying  columns  sent  to  relieve  P^ez,  followed  by  an 

131 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

army  of  eight  thousand,  which  occupied  Fez  on  May  21st. 
After  that  act  the  independence  of  Morocco  came  to  an  end. 
France  would  have  had  serious  trouble  over  the  matter  with 
Spain,  if  Spain  had  been  a  strong  power,  but  Spain  ])eing 
weak  had  to  make  the  best  terms  with  France  that  she 
could.  She  finally  signed  a  treaty  with  France  *by  which 
she  received  as  her  own  possession  the  northeastern  corner 
of  Morocco,  exclusive  of  Tangier. 

France  had  formerly  been,  able  to  restrict  the  development 
of  British  control  over  Egypt,  and  Germany  now  employed 
means  to  thwart  an  extension  of  French  influence  in  Morocco. 
Germany  complained  that  France  was  ignoring  the  principle 
of  the  open  door,  and  interfering  with  rights  that  had  been 
assured  to  German  citizens.  France  was  still  pushing  her 
campaign  into  the  interior  when  in  July,  1911,  the  German 
cruiser  Panther  appeared  off  Agadir,  a  port  of  Morocco  on 
the  Atlantic  coast.  Europe  saw  in  this  act  that  Germany 
was  putting  forth  her  claim  to  have  greater  interest  in 
]\Iorocco.  The  Pcinther  having  been  replaced  by  a  larger 
German  warship.  Great  Britain  and  France  then  sent  war- 
ships to  Agadir  and  Lloyd  George,  in  a  speech,  made  it 
clear  that  Great  Britain  would  support  France  against 
German  aggression.  For  some  weeks  the  situation  was 
tense,  but  a  compromise  was  reached  in  November,  1911, 
the  effect  of  which  was  to  settle  the  Moroccan  question  once 
for  all.  Germany  was  to  recognize  Morocco  as  a  French 
protectorate,  and  no  longer  oppose  French  designs,  while 
Germany  in  return  was  to  receive  a  part  of  the  French 
Kongo  bordering  on  her  own  possessions  in  the  Kameruns. 
The  people  of  both  countries  were  dissatisfied  with  this  out- 
come, and  especially  the  Germans  who  had  hoped  to  acquire  a 
port  on  the  Moroccan  Atlantic  coast  which  would  have 
been  valuable  to  them  as  a  way-station  on  the  route  to 
South  America  and  South  Africa,  while  in  France  there 
was  a  feeling  that  Germany,  by  threatening  force,  had 
obliged  France  to  give  up  part  of  her  African  possessions 
for  a  mere  recognition  by  Germany  of  the  title  of  France 
to  what  she  already  possest.  This  agreement  closed  a  new 
crisis  in  Morocco. 

Agadir  was,  however,   a  real  crisis,  if  indeed   it   did  not 

132 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

bring  Europe  to  the  verge  of  war.  A  Yellow  Book  issued 
by  the  French  Government  in  December,  1914,  indicated  how 
near  the  brink  the  great  nations  had  been.  In  Germany- 
people  at  large  had  practically  made  up  their  minds  for  the 
great  sacrifice.  "War  was  believed  to  have  been  averted  only 
because  the  Kaiser  and  the  Imperial  Government  had  main- 
tained a  reasonable  attitude,  steadily  insisting  on  a  desire 
for  peace,  if  peace  could  be  made  consistent  with  justice  for 
Germany.  Germany  had  accepted  a  clear  minimum  in  settle- 
ment of  her  claims.     She  chained  alono^  the  Kameruns  about 


THE   JULIUS   TUWER   AT    SPANDAl' 

Where  Germany  kept  her  war  chest  stored.     Spandau  is  nine  miles  west  of 

Berlin,  and  strongly  fortified 

230,000  square  kilometers  of  land  and  a  million  people.  She 
also  secured  in  Africa  access  to  the  sea  without  passing 
through  French  territory,  but  she  yielded  at  the  same 
time  practically  all  her  political  interests  in  Morocco,  and 
acknowledged  the  paramount  standing  of  France  therein. 
It  could  not  have  been  said  that  any  sort  of  victory  had 
been  won  for  Germany.  The  settlement  was  at  best  a  drawn 
battle,  with  perhaps  equal  honors  on  both  sides.  The  Ger- 
man people,  however,  placed  responsibility  for  the  outcome 
on   the   Kaiser   and   his   Ministers.     By   one   newspaper   the 

133 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Kaiser  was  called  "William  the  Poltroon."  The  nation 
was  obviously  for  the  moment  more  warlike  than  the  Govern- 
ment. It  was  afterward  generally  believed  that  the  Kaiser 
sincerely  did  not  want  war  at  that  time,  that  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  and  the  Eoreign  Minister  did  not  want  war,  but 
had  advisedly  kept  "conversations"  going  until  a  peaceful 
result  could  be  achieved.  Had  they  declared  war,  they 
probably  would  have  had  the  same  devoted  support  from 
the  German  people  that  they  had  in  August,  1914.  But 
they  resisted  temptation  and  Europe  was  saved — for  a  few 
years.  The  motives  for  this  were  no  doubt  complex.  Finan- 
cial and  military  reasons  had  come  in  to  reinforce  any 
peaceful  German  views  that  existed.  Great  Britain,  in  case 
of  war,  was  expected  to  stand  by  France  and  when  bankers 
were  approached  by  Germany  they  were  said  to  have  refused 
unanimously  to  provide  funds  for  a  war.  France  added 
further  to  the  financial  difficulty  by  calling  in  loans  and 
other  debts  due  her  in  Germany,  and  German  financiers 
took  additional  alarm. 

Another  fact  making  for  peace  afterward  came  to  light. 
At  the  French  military  maneuvers  in  the  autumn  of  1911 
aeroplanes  performed  such  amazing  feats  as  to  foreshadow 
some  drastic  revolution  in  warfare.  France  had  provided 
herself  with  so  large  an  equipment  of  them  that  other 
Powers,  and  especially  Germany,  were  struck  with  astonish- 
ment. German  representatives  who  saw  the  maneuvers 
pointed  out  that,  as  Germany's  equipment  at  that  time  was 
all  but  negligible,  it  would  be  utterly  hopeless  for  her  to 
engage  in  war  with  France  with  any  prospect  of  success. 
Instead  of  declaring  war,  therefore,  Germany  set  to  work  to 
develop  her  "fourth  army."  "When  she  finally  took  the  field 
against  France  in  1914,  she  had  a  colossal  array  of  aero- 
planes and  a  small  army  of  trained  pilots.  In  fact,  she 
was  far  ahead  of  any  other  country,  aeroplanes  numbering 
quite  1,500,  of  various  types.  Chief  among  them  was  the 
Taube,  in  several  varieties,  both  monoplane  and  biplane, 
together  with  the  Albatros,  also  made  in  both  forms,  and 
the  Aviatik  biplane.  Thus,  in  spite  of  a  pronounced  war 
sentiment  in  Germany,  1911  was  seen  to  be  no  time  for 
Germany  to  begin  war. 

134 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

That  peaceful  ending  of  a  great  crisis  has  been  regarded 
by  many  well-informed  students  of  international  affairs  as 
the  point  of  departure  from  which  the  great  catastrophe 
of  1914  became  inevitable.  The  German  people  felt  that  in 
the  Agadir  affair  they  had  been  wronged  and  humiliated. 
"With  exalted  conceptions  of  national  dignity  and  resources, 
they  contended  that,  having  taken  a  strong  position,  Ger- 
many should  never  have  receded  from  it,  that  the  maximum, 
not  the  minimum, ''compensation"  should  have  been  obtained 
from  France.  In  consequence  the  Kaiser's  popularity  was 
clouded,  ministers  involved  Avere  discredited,  and  fierce  irri- 
tation against  Britain  was  developed.  It  was  believed 
almost  universally  that  resolute  British  intervention  in  sup- 
port of  France  had  been  the  decisive  factor,  and  so  it 
became  a  German  aspiration  to  even  up  the  score  some  day 
with  her. 

Three  crises  had  threatened  the  peace  of  Europe  within 
fifteen  years.  But  Europe,  relieved  of  anxiety  in  one  quar- 
ter, soon  had  reason  to  turn  her  attention  to  another — the 
Near  East,  whence  had  emanated,  in  past  years,  many 
baleful  international  disagreements.  Italy  in  1911  went  to 
war  with  Turkey  for  Tripoli,  and,  after  a  difficult  campaign, 
occupied  that  country  and  Cyrenaeia.  Germany  did  not 
relish  this  onslaught  on  her  Turkish  protege,  but  was  power- 
less to  object,  because  she  feared  that  Italy's  flirtation  at 
Algeciras  w^ith  the  Triple  Entente  might  become  serious  and 
so  lead  to  a  desertion  by  Itah^  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 
Unofficial  criticism  of  what  w^as  called  Italy's  unprincipled 
and  greedy  action  in  Africa  was  not  lacking  in  the  Austrian 
and  German  press  at  that  time. 

Thus,  in  a  very  real  sense,  Africa  was  a  prime  cause  of 
the  world  conflict.  In  the  Dark  Continent  lie  hidden  many 
roots,  not  simply  of  this  war,  but  of  past  wars,  and  the 
menace  of  wars  that  were  to  come.  On  its  soil  rose  one  of 
the  earliest,  if  not  the  very  earliest,  of  human  civilizations. 
Nearly  every  human  empire  that  has  since  risen,  political 
as  well  as  spiritual,  has  encountered  great  crises  in  Africa, 
from  Greece  to  Carthage,  from  Carthage  to  Rome,  from  the 
long  dominion  of  Rome  to  the  rise  and  decay  of  the  Moham- 
medan power,  from  the  onslaught  of  the  Moors  on  Spain, 

135 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

to  their  expulsion ;  and  from  the  coming  of  Great  Britain, 
Belgium,  France,  Portugal,  and  Germany,  to  occupy  her  soil. 
It  was  in  Africa  that  the  last  wave  of  the  Germanic  inva- 
sions of  Rome  spent  itself,  and  it  was  chiefly  through  Africa 
that  Islam  acquired  its  great  role  of  conqueror  and  civilizer. 
Back-  to  Africa  again  one  had  to  go  for  the  remote  origins 
of  the  American  Civil  War. 

Other  causes  harked  further  back,  first  to  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War  of  1870,  then  to  the  question  of  the  Danish 
Duchies  and  the  war  with  Denmark,  in  1864,  and  to  nego- 
tiations which  led  to  the  war  between  Prussia  and  Austria, 
in  1866,  in  which  was  brought  into  full  prominence  the 
ambitious  schemes  of  Bismarck,  the  imbecility  of  Austria, 
the  adroitness  of  Italy,  the  improvidence  of  Louis  Napoleon, 
the  weakness  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  who 
showed  no  disposition,  in  spite  of  the  warnings  of  far-seeing 
diplomatists,  to  come  to  the  rescue  of  the  States  attacked 
and  to  call  on  Prussia  to  pause  in  her  career  of  conquest. 
The  great  crime  of  the  eighteenth  century  had  been  the 
partitioning  of  Poland,  which  neither  France  nor  Great 
Britain  knew  how  to  prevent.  The  great  blunder  of  the 
nineteenth  century  was  the  spoliation  of  the  Danish  Duchies, 
which  neither  France,  nor  Great  Britain,  nor  Russia  knew 
how  to  prevent.  That  crime  and  that  blunder,  beside  other 
blunders  whicJi  belonged  to  a  rather  distant  past,  lay  also 
at  the  roots  of  the  World  War,  Prussia  might  have  been 
curbed  at  the  outset — or  curbed  as  late  as  fifty  years  ago, 
but  she  was  not  curbed.  As  Frederick  II  first  devised  the 
partition  of  Poland,  so  it  was  Bismarck  who  involved  Aus- 
tria and  Prussia  in  war  against  the  Duchies,  to  be  followed 
by  the  wars  of  Prussia  against  Austria  in  1866  and  against 
France  in  1870,  with  the  unification  of  the  German  States 
under  the  Hohenzollern  family  followed  by  Pan-Germanics 
and  the  great  war. 

It  was  not  possible,  in  the  opinion  of  an  Outlook  writer, 
to  ''deduce  the  true  interpretation  and  meaning  of  this  war 
from  the  declarations  of  the  combatants,"  since  history 
shows  that  ''it  is  not  the  catch  words  of  international 
diplomacy,  but  the  fundamental  and  often  forgotten  currents 
of  history  that  determine  on  which  side  the  stars  are  fight- 

136 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

ing."  The  Napoleonic  war  began,  he  said,  in  an  attempt  to 
drive  the  Bourbons  out  of  France ;  they  ended  in  an  attempt 
to  establish  a  Napoleonic  Empire  over  Europe.  The  Allies 
combined  to  defeat  Napoleon  and  reestablish  Bourbonism, 
but  neither  Bourbonism  nor  Napoleonism  was  established. 
The  Bourbons  were  dethroned  and  the  leaven  of  liberty, 
equality,  and  fraternity  entered  every  European  kingdom 
west  of  Russia.  After  the  Napoleonic  Empire  was  destroyed 
Bourbonism  was  temporarily  restored,  but  by  1860  not  a 
Bourbon  was  left  on  a  European  throne.  Neither  the  pur- 
pose of  Napoleon  nor  the  purpose  of  the  Allies  was  accom- 
plished. Both  were  defeated,  and  constitutional  government, 
which  both  abhorred,  was  established.  The  object  of  Ger- 
many in  the  Franco-German  War  was  ''to  take  from  France 
the  provinces  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and  by  arousing  a 
German  national  sentiment  to  perfect  the  unification  of  the 
German  Empire."  But  the  overthrow  of  imperialism  in 
France  and  the  establishment  of  a  republic  in  France  on  a 
permanent  foundation  were  results  which  the  rulers  neither 
of  France  nor  of  Germany  had  anticipated  or  desired. 

In  our  own  Civil  "War,  the  purpose  of  the  South  was  ''to 
establish  the  supreme  sovereignty  of  the  States,  and  to  create 
a  nation  founded  on  slavery  as  its  corner-stone."  The  pur- 
pose of  the  North  was  to  "maintain  the  Union  as  it  had 
been  and  to  prevent  the  extension  of  slavery,  but  not  to 
interfere  with  it  where  it  existed."  The  real  issue  of  the 
conflict  was,  however,  "a  new  nationalism  which  neither 
South  nor  North  had  dreamed  of,  and  the  abolition  of 
slavery  absolutely  and  forever  in  every  part  of  the  nation's 
domain." 

The  victory  of  Germany,  continued  this  writer,  who  wrote 
in  August,  1914,  with  rare  prophetic  vision,  could  be  no 
other  than  "a  victory  for  militarism;  the  victory  of  the 
Allies  no  other  than  a  victory  for  permanent  peace." 
Should  Germany  win,  she  would  have  to  "maintain  her 
armaments  if  not  increase  them ;  for  power  obtained  by  force 
can  be  maintained  only  by  force."  Should  Germany  be 
defeated,  "a  diminution  of  her  armaments  as  a  condition 
of  peace  would  be  demanded  by  the  Allied  Powers."  The 
victory  of  free  peoples  in  western   Europe  would   "give   a 

137 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

new  impulse  to  the  cause  of  freedom  in  Russia  just  as  the 
Buma,  the  first  parliamentary  body  Russia  ever  knew,  had 
been  a  fruit  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War."  A  Duma,  with 
power  to  make  and  unmake  ministers  and  control  the  na- 
tional purse,  "might  well  be  one  fruit  of  this  European 
war."  German  victory  could  be  "nothing  else  than  a 
German  Empire  extending  from  the  North  Sea  to  the 
Mediterranean,  and  dominating  all  Europe,"  but  Germany's 
defeat  might  well  include  "an  emancipation  of  the  Slavs  in 
the  Austrian  Empire;  the  emancipation  of  the  Poles  in 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Germany ;  the  creation  of  a  self-govern- 
ing Balkan  confederacy;  a  political  revolution  in  Germany, 
giving  the  power  of  the  purse  and  of  the  sword  to  the 
people;  and  a  new  development  of  civil  and  religious  liberty 
in  the  slowly  awakening  Empire  of  ^Russia."  The  writer 
believed  that  "a  Power  greater  than  that  of  all  the  warring 
peoples  was  directing  the  purpose  of  the  war,"  which  was 
"the  end   of  military   autocracy   in   Europe. "^^ 

10  Principal  Sources  :  Gibbon's  "New  Map  of  Europe,"  The  London  Times, 
"History  of  the  War,"  The  Independent,  The  New  York  Times,  "The  Ency- 
clopedia Britannica,"  The  Literary  Diyest,  The  New  York  Sun,  The  Outlook, 
an  article  by  Joseph  Reinach  in  The  Quarterly  Review,  Ellery  C.  Stowell's 
"The  Diplomacy  of  the  War"  (Houghton,  Mifflin  Co.).' 


138 


Ill 

THE  RESOURCES  OF  THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND 
THE  TRANSFORMATION  OF  EUROPE 

ON  one  point  there  was  o:eneral  agreement,  when  the  war 
began — that  the  resources  of  the  world  were  not  sufficient 
to  maintain  for  a  long  period  a  conflict  of  such  dimensions  as 
the  declarations  of  war  portended.  Estimates  of  the  war's 
duration  by  several  military  experts  ranged  from  one  month 
to  eighteen.  Few  expected  to  see  the  decisive  blow  struck 
inside  of  six.  Lord  Kitchener,  however,  startled  the  world 
by  saying  the  war  would  last  "three  years  or  six."  While 
the  great  numbers  of  armed  men  involved,  the  tremendous 
modern  increase  in  rapidity  of  communication,  and  the  enor- 
mous cost  of  carrying  on  the  war,  all  made  for  quick  results, 
the  vast  area  of  the  probable  field  of  hostilities  was  a  factor 
offsetting  influences  which  otherwise  would  have  made  for  a 
short  struggle.  Instead  of  one  or  two  points  of  contact,  it 
was  seen  that  there  would  be  a  dozen  widely  separated  fields 
of  conflict,  each  on  a  scale  surpassing  all  other  wars  in 
modern  times. 

In  America  non-professional  observers  looked  on  Germany, 
hemmed  in  as  she  was  by  enemies,  as  doomed  to  almost 
certain  defeat.  Figures  placed  the  combined  forces  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary  at  6,400,000  men,  and  those  of 
France.  England,  and  Russia  at  10,600,000.  In  naval  units 
the  Triple  Entente  outnumbered  the  Dual  Alliance  by  1,039 
to-  401.  But  against  Germany's  numerical  inferiority,  au- 
thorities balanced  her  greater  preparedness  and  her  more 
efficient  organization.  Roland  G.  LTsher^^  argued  that,  while 
Germany's  central  position  would  be  weak  for  a  nation  on 
the  defensive,  it  possest  enormous  advantages  for  a  Power 
taking  the  aggressive: 

"She  holds  the  great  strategic  points  of  Northern  Europe — 
Alsace-Lorraine,  the  door  to  France;  the  Kiel   Canal,  giving  her 

11  "Pan-Germanism,"  published  a  few  years  before  the  war  began  (Hough- 
ton, Mifflin  Co.). 

139 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

access  to  the  Baltic  without  exposing  Jierself  to  the  necessity  of 
utilizing"  the  Sund.  Her  Allies  hold  the  Swiss  passes  and  the 
vital  points  affording  passage  into  Russia  and  the  Balkans. 
Everything  vital  to  Germany — indeed,  everything  she  owns — 
forms  a  compact  territorial  unit,  which  can  be  defended  with 
the  minimum  of  force  and  the  maximum  of  ease.  She  had  no 
long  chain  of  forts  or  islands  to  guard,  no  great  stretches  of 
land  in  Africa  or  Asia  to  protect,  no  subject  races  to  pacify 
like  the  Hindus  or  Moroccans." 

Rear-Admiral  Alfred  T.  Mahan  ^^^  predicted  that  "the  most 
decisive  strokes  in  the  general  European  warfare  would  be 
delivered  upon  the  sea  rather  than  upon  the  land."  Others 
regarded  Germany's  land  campaign  against  France  as  the 
real  crux  of  the  situation  and  still  others  maintained  that 
it  was  in  Russia,  rather  than  in  France,  that  the  principal 
act  of  the  war  would  take  place.  That  the  war  would  last 
"from  nine  to  eighteen  months" — none  named  a  longer 
period — and  that  Germany,  ".unless  she  is  superhuman," 
will  be  defeated,  was  the  consensus  of  opinion  of  more  than 
two-score  active  American  army  officers,  as  reported  in  the 
New  York  World  by  one  of  its  Washington  correspondents. 
These  men  were  all  of  or  above  the  rank  of  captain.  Their 
names  were  withheld,  because  of  the  President's  orders  that 
Government  officers  should  not  comment  on  the  war.  Their 
judgments  were  said  to  be  wholly  academic  and  were  made 
from  a  military  standpoint,  without  regard  to  personal 
sympathies.  The  officers  agreed  that  this  was  a  "war,  not 
only  of  ready  resources,  but  of  all  resources,  and  until  one 
side  had  about  exhausted  all  its  resources,  the  fighting  would 
go  on."  "Whichever  side  was  beaten,  it  would  be  so  crusht 
that  it  would  require  half  a  century  or  more  for  even  a 
waking  recovery." 

Austria's  army  was  credited  with  a  peace  strength  of 
415,000  men  and  1,880  guns,  which  the  first-line  reserves 
would  increase  to  820,000  men.  Behind  these  could  be 
mustered  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  of  varying  ages 
who  had  had  some  military  training,  and  would  fill  gaps  in 
the   field  army.     Little   Serbia   could  mobilize   all  her  male 

1'"  Author  of  famous  books,  dealing  with  the  influence  of  sea  power  in 
history. 

140 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

population  trained  to  bear  arms  to  the  number  of  324,000, 
in  a  fortnight's  time,  altho  she  maintained  only  36,000  men 
in  times  of  peace.  As  Austria  had  to  guard  her  Russian 
frontier  and  have  troops  in  her  own  Slav  areas,  in  order  to 
restrain  rebellious  outbursts,  it  could  be  seen  that  any  army 
she  might  attempt  to  throw  across  the  Danube  into  Serbia 
would  not  be  of  overwhelming  strength.  The  Serbian  army 
was  largely  composed  of  veterans,  with  a  splendid  morale, 
and  a  record  of  first-rate  achievements  in  the  Balkan  wars. 

Germany's  field  army,  in  time  of  war,  numbered  1,220,000 
men.  Her  entire  system  of  mobilization  and  strategy  was 
based  on  an  invasion  of  France  and  a  simultaneous  resistance 
to  a  Russian  attack  upon  her  back  door.  Behind  this  field 
army  stood  an  active  reserve  of  600,000  men  of  the  Land- 
wehr,  and  behind  them  1,500,000  men  who  had  had  military 
training  and  were  available  to  make  good  losses  in  battles. 
Germany's  strong  point,  as  opposed  to  Russia,  lay  in  her 
superior  facilities  for  mobilization.  The  vast  distance  which 
Russian  reservists  had  to  travel,  and  the  small  number  of 
railroads  in  the  Czar's  empire  all  tended  to  neutralize  the 
preponderance  of  Russian  troops.  On  a  peace  footing,  the 
Russian  army  numbered  1,384.000  men  of  all  corps,  dis- 
tributed over  her  European  and  Asiatic  possessions.  Many 
were  not  available  for  use  in  a  European  war,  but  military 
experts  conceded  that  Russia  could  hurl  an  army  of  1,500,000 
men  across  the  German  and  Austrian  frontier,  made  up  from 
regular  European  army  corps  and  first-line  reservists.  Be- 
hind them  were  several  million  trained  or  partly  trained 
men,  for  use  in  making  up  the  ravages  of  battle  and  disease. 

The  French  army  was  a  different  weapon  from  what  it 
was  in  1870.  Its  active  forces  within  continental  France 
were  thought  to  number  about  600,000  men,  and  tho  her 
smaller  population  did  not  allow  France  the  immense  amount 
of  reserve  strength  w^hich  Germany  possest,  an  outbreak  of 
war  meant  an  instant  increase  of  the  field  army  to  1,300.000, 
which  might  be  still  further  increased  by  the  recall  of 
troops  from  Algeria,  and  drafts  from  700,000  trained  re- 
servists of  the  second  line. 

Great  Britain  was  not  expected  to  count  for  much  in 
military  operations  on  land — at  least  not  for  many  months. 

141 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Her  Allies  expected  her  to  smash,  or  bottle  up,  at  once  the 
German  fleet,  and  then  assist  France  in  wiping  out  the 
Austrian  squadron  in  the  Mediterranean  and  Adriatic. 
Several  divisions  of  the  so-called  Expeditionary  Force  of  the 
English  home  army  could  be  sent  at  once  to  France.  But 
England's  most  efficient  help  would  be  given  against  the 
German  navy  and  mercantile  marine  and  in  blockading 
German  ports  in  the  North  and  Baltic  Seas.  With  an 
estimated  total  population  in  Europe  of  495,473,000,  seven 
nations  having  an  approximate  total  of  372,373,000  inhabit- 
ants at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  were  about  to  fight  with 
a  total  army  strength  in  time  of  war  of  about  15,480,000 
men.     Statistics  were  given  out  as  follows : 

Estimated  War  Strength 

Natioists  Population  of  Army 

Russia    160,100,000  5,400,000 

Germany     64,900,000  4,350,000 

Aiistria-Himgarv    51,340,000  1,820,000 

England    45,000,000  800,000 

France    39,601,000  2,500,000 

Belgium    7,432,000  340,000 

Servia    4,000,000  270,000 

Totals    372,373,000  15,480,000 

France  and  Germany  were  believed  able  to  call  up  equal 
numbers — four  million  each.  But  France,  if  she  relied  on 
her  own  population  solely,  could  not  add  materially  to  that 
number.  Considering  what  her  population  was,  four  mil- 
lions would  be  a  large  percentage  of  it,  roughly,  10  per  cent. 
But  France  had  a  great  colonial  empire,  and  she  could 
draw  to  a  considerable  extent  upon  that.  It  was  thought 
probable  that  France,  if  really  hard  pushed,  might  bring 
together  four  and  one-half  millions  of  men.  But  she  eventu- 
ally did  far  more  than  that. 

If  Germany  were  to  call  out  the  same  proportion  of  her 
population  she  could  make  use  of  about  six  and  one-half  mil- 
lions. In  Germany  liability  to  serve  with  the  colors  was  for 
only  two  years,  and  therefore  so  large  a  proportion  of  her 
male  population  had  not  been  actually  trained  as  was  the 

142 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

case  in  France.  For  all  that,  no  serious  doubt  existed  that, 
if  Germany  had  to  put  her  back  to  the  wall,  every  man 
capable  of  bearing  arms  would  turn  out  and  offer  a  des- 
perate resistance.  Germany  alone,  if  she  drew  to  the  same 
extent  upon  her  population,  could  put  in  the  field  larger 
forces  than  France.  On  the  other  hand,  France  had  more 
numerous  allies  and  a  larger  colonial  empire. 

The  Russian  war  strength  was  usually  said  to  be  four 
millions,  or  about  the  same  as  that  of  Germany  and  France. 
But  as  the  population  of  Russia  immensely  exceeded  that  of 
Germany,  it  was  clear  that  she  could  go  on  raising  and 
training  new  armies  long  after  Germany  was  exhausted.  If 
Russia  should  draw  on  her  male  population  of  fighting  age, 
in  the  same  proportion  as  France,  she  could  raise  an  almost 
fabulous  force.  "Whether  she  could  feed  such  a  force  or 
utilize  it  no  one  too  curiously  inquired.  Still  it  was  thought 
true  that  Russia  could  arm  at  least  six  million  men  and 
probably  eight  millions.-^^ 

It  was  seen,  therefore,  that  the  resources  of  Germany, 
France,  and  Russia  were  so  great  that  they  could  not  very 
soon  be  exhausted,  and  that  the  fighting  male  population  of 
France  would  probably  have  to  give  way  first,  then  that  of 
Germany,  and  last  that  of  Russia.  Provided  the  British 
fleet  maintained  command  of  the  sea,  the  British  Empire 
was  not  so  much  in  danger  as  the  other  nations  were.  Her 
Expeditionary  Force  could  be  mobilized  and  put  into  the 
field  in  a  short  time.  Lord  Kitchener  called  for  an  addi- 
tional army  of  a  million.  It  was  evident  early  in  the  war 
that,  in  the  course  of  six  months  or  a  year,  the  United 
Kingdom  would  have  a  large,  fully  organized  and  well- 
trained  army.  In  addition,  the  self-governing  Dominions 
and  Commonwealths  beyond  seas  would  send  large  contin- 
gents. So  long  as  England  kept  command  of  the  sea,  these 
forces  could  be  employed  wherever  required,  trade  could  go 
on  as  in  times  of  peace,  and  so  it  was  felt  that  there  was 
little  danger  of  British  exhaustion.  Data  as  to  the  navies 
of  the  belligerent  nations,  according  to  information  obtain- 
able in  1915,  were  as  follows  :^^ 

"  The  Wall  fitreet  Journal. 

^3  As  given  in   The  World  Almanac  for  1916. 

143 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


NATIONS 


Great  Britain.  .  .  . 

Germany 

United  States.  .  .  , 

France 

Japan 

Russia 

Italy 

Austria-Hung-ary . 

Portug-al 

Greece 

Turkey 


a. 


10 


s  e 
s  cc  a 

^1 


*150,609 

179.197 

t55,389 

63,846 

§48.000 

60.000 

30.298 

20.000 

6.000 

4.000 

6.000 


*  Naval  Reserve  seamen,  26,200.  t  Reserve  of  110,000  men.  %  Naval  militia, 
8,068  men.      §  Reserve  of  115,000  men. 

Fate  or  fortune  seemed  in  several  ways  to  favor  the 
Allies.  Not  only  were  they  richer  in  financial  and  food 
resources,  but  they  were  the  possessors  of  superior  naval 
strength,  of  a  larger  number  of  troops,  and  of  an  over- 
whelming majority  of  horses.  The  horse  had  always  been 
one  of  the  greatest  instruments  of  war.  Cavalry  had  often 
served,  not  only  to  clear  the  way  for  an  advancing  army, 
but  to  cover  retreats  which  might  otherwise  have  become 
disastrous  routs.  Besides  this,  the  horse  had  been  needed 
for  handling  field  artillery.  Modern  European  battles  had 
become  artillery  duels  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  them 
more  like  sieges  than  ordinary  battles.  Thus  a  nation's 
horse  resources  became  important  in  determining  the  result 
of  the  war — at  least  the  early  events.  On  the  opposite  page 
is  an  estimate  of  the  available  horses  made  soon  after  the 
war  began. 

In  great  wars  cavalry  had  played  a  far  more  important 
part  than  was  generally  realized.  A  quarter  of  a  century 
before  cavalry  constituted  15  per  cent,  of  the  total  German 
regular  army,  14  per  cent,  of  the  French  army,  18.6  per 
cent,  of  the  Austrian,  9.5  per  cent,  of  the  British  and  about 
12  per  cent,  of  the  aggregate  armies  of  Europe.  A  nation 
weak  in  cavalry  suffered  from  a  defect  which  could  not  be 
overcome.  Horses  had  not  increased  as  fast  as  population 
among  either  the  Allied  nations  or  their  enemies.  In  Ger- 
many the  growth  had  been  somewhat  proportionate  to  popu- 


144 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 


CUMMANDEEliING  WAR  HORSES 

The  horses  on   their  waj'  to  a   central  depot.     A  common   scene   in   large 

English  and  French  towns  in  191-i 


Total  number 

Nation  Present 

Austria-Hungary       ..      ..  1,700,000 

Germany      4,494,725 

Total        6,194,725 

France 3,236,110 

Great    Britain 2,147,683 

Russia         21,006,140 

Belgium       266,331 

Total  allied  nations     ..  26,716,264 

Canada         2,355,750 

Australia 2,341,175 

Argentina 8,479,376 

United   States 20,962,000 

Last  four  nations..      ..  34,138,291 

World's  total 80,459,136 


of  horsei. 
1895 

1,632,342 
3,933,901 

5,566,243 

3,172,688 

1,944,665 

19,663,336 

271,527 

25,052,216 

882,723 

1,926,787 

4,446,859 

15,893,318 

23,149,687 

64,521,744 


-10 


345 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

lation,  but  in  Austria  it  had  fallen  far  behind.  However, 
the  Allies  had  a  great  advantage  in  that  they  possest  about 
26,700,000  horses  as  compared  with  only  6,200,000  for  Aus- 
tria and  Germany.  Even  if  one  assumed  that  Germany 
could  draw  freely  upon  the  horses  of  Norway,  Sweden, 
Denmark,  Netherlands,  and  Switzerland,  this  situation  would 
not  be  much  changed,  for  all  these  nations  combined  possest 
only  about  1,825,000  horses. 

Figuring  in  that  Avay,  the  Austro-German  horse  resources 
could  have  been  placed  at  8,020,000  and  in  like  manner  the 
resources  of  the  Allied  nations  in  horses  at  60,800,000. 
Moreover  the  latter  could  draw,  by  purchase  and  otherwise, 
on  Canada,  Australia,  Argentina,  and  the  United  States. 
Horses  had  multiplied  more  rapidly  in  Canada  and  Argen- 
tina than  in  other  large  countries.  Indeed  the  Allies  could 
draw  upon  the  whole  world;  and  the  world's  horses  in  1914 
were  estimated,  at  80,400,000  as  compared  with  64,500,000  in 
1895,  and  52,000,000  in  1885.^^  Among  the  factors  fighting 
on  the  side  of  the  Allies  one  could  have  enumerated:  Num- 
bers of  men,  national  wealth,  gold  output,  battleships,  time, 
the  grain  and  meat  supply,  the  gasoline  supply  and  last, 
but  not  least,  horses. 

Germany  had  a  splendid  system  of  railroads  by  which 
vast  transfers  of  troops  could  be  made  from  one  field  to 
another  in  defiance  of  distances  and  the  delays  incident  to 
winter  travel.  When  the  Russians  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  appeared  to  have  gained  a  firm  foothold  in  East  Prus- 
sia, German  regiments,  brigades  and  even  divisions  suddenly 
made  their  appearance  in  that  region,  having  come  by  rail, 
so  that  the  Russians  soon  found  themselves  face  to  face  with 
an  enormous  concentration  of  men.  Germany  often  gave 
proof  of  her  ability  to  collect  men  at  any  single  point  on 
either  war  front  more  rapidly  than  could  her  opponents. 
Her  railway  system  struck  a  hard  blow  at  the  Allies. 
Owing  to  her  supremacy  in  railways,  Germany  was  able  to 
accomplish  such  wonders  as  her  advance  through  Belgium 
to  the  gates  of  Paris  in  five  weeks,  her  defeat  of  the  Russians 
at  Tannenburg,  her  holding  of  Western  Poland  against 
Russia  and,  finally,  her  conquest  of  Poland,     Frederick   II 

^*  The  Wall  Street  Journal. 

146 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

was  skilled  in  shifting  forces  from  one  theater  of  war  to 
another.  He  made  the  most  of  "interior  lines,"  and  of  his 
ability  of  travel  about  a  shorter  circumference.  William  II 
could  carry  this  system  to  a  point  of  which  his  predecessor 
never  dreamed,  because  Germany  was  not  only  inside  of  the 
ring-,  but  had,  in  her  railways,  the  most  rapid  and  effectual 
means  of  transporting  troops  and  munitions. 

The  French  general,  Pan,  when  despatched  during  the 
war  on  a  mission  from  France  to  Russia,  had  to  travel 
along  exterior  lines.  Leaving  Paris,  he  went  by  express  to 
a  southern  French  port — probably  Marseilles — there  boarded 
a  swift  warship  for  Salonica,  and  from  that  point  travel  by 
rail  took  him  slowly  north  to  the  Russian  capital.  In  all 
more  than  a  week's  travel  was  necessary.  Meanwhile,  a 
German  official  could  have  traveled  from  Brussels  to 
Konigsburg,  without  using  other  than  way  trains,  in  less 
than  two  days,  or  in  one-fifth  the  time  with  one-fifteenth  the 
effort.  In  a  few  days  the  Germans  could  transport  whole 
armies  from  Flanders  to  Lithuania,  while  to  the  Allies  the 
sending  of  large  forces  from  one  war  front  to  another 
seemed  almost  out  of  the  question. 

From  Berlin  westward  ran  several  nearly  parallel  lines, 
passing  through  the  great  industrial  district  of  Westphalia, 
crossing  the  borders  and  terminating  at  Amsterdam,  Ant- 
werp, Brussels,  and  Liege,  there  merging  into  the  Belgian 
network  of  rails.  From  Antwerp,  Brussels,  Lille,  and 
Calais,  another  set  converged  as  they  ran  south  on  Paris. 
The  area  thus  covered  included  a  slice  of  Northern  France, 
the  greater  part  of  Belgium,  all  of  Westphalia,  and  terri- 
tory eastward  to  Berlin.  It  was  the  most  important  rail- 
road area  in  Europe.  More  than  half  of  it  before  the  out- 
break of  the  war  lay  within  German  bounds.  To  seize  most 
of  the  remainder,  which  was  in  Belgium  and  Northern 
France,  was  the  first  German  purpose  after  war  began. 
Germany  had  a  mile  of  railway  to  every  5.4  square  miles  of 
territory,  as  against  only  a  mile  of  railway  to  every  6.6 
square  miles  in  France,  and  a  far  lower  proportion  in 
Russia.  German  railways  were  fewer  to  the  east  of  Berlin, 
but  that  territory  none  the  less  was  far  better  supplied  than 
Russia. 

147 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Apart  from  superior  density  of  mileage,  Germany  could 
also  show  a  superior  disposition  of  lines  for  military  pur- 
poses. These  lines  were  direct,  and  ran  to  points  where 
troops  had  to  be  sent  and  maintained.  The  Vistula  thus 
became  only  a  three  days'  march  from  the  Aisne.  The 
greater  part  of  the  German  railways  are  owned  and  oper- 
ated by  the  State.  Every  bridge  crossing  and  terminus  and 
every  turn  w^as  planned  to  meet  possible  military  con- 
tingencies. As  the  employees  were  in  State  service,  the 
railways,  when  war  came,  were  prepared  at  once  to  do  their 
part  in  waging  it.  The  German  generals,  by  using  their 
railway  system,  could  give  their  Allied  opponents  a  start 
of  several  days  in  reaching  any  given  point  and  so  could 
establish  numerical  superiority.  There  were  only  three 
things  that  these  superb  railways  could  not  do:  They 
could  not  help  an  army  that  was  pressing  forward  to 
points  beyond  their  reach ;  they  could  not  bring  Germany 
more  reinforcements  than  she  had;  they  could  not  create 
food,  ammunition,  and  supplies. 

The  world  learned  how  important  motor-cars  and  trucks 
would  be  in  making  war  operations  possible.  Just  as  never 
before  had  such  large  armies  been  maintained  on  battle- 
fronts,  so  never  before  had  the  rapidity  of  movements  been 
made  so  certain.  Railroads  might  be  efficient,  but  motor- 
trucks were  in  some  ways  more  important  still,  being  in- 
dependent of  rails  and  free  to  go  over  all  parts  of  the 
country  with  an  elasticity  that  was  to  become  the  marvel 
of  military  experts.  Subsidies  in  France,  England,  and 
Germany  had  assured  the  governments  of  those  countries 
great  quantities  of  such  vehicles.  Plans  for  their  use  had 
been  made  so  long  in  advance  that  supplies  of  them  could 
be  put  into  operation  at  a  minute's  notice,  once  they  were 
commandeered.  When  Germany  declared  war,  the  motor 
operations  of  France  went  into  activity  in  less  than  an  hour 
and  with  a  smoothness  that  was  surprizing  in  its  perfection. 
Men  and  trucks  jumped  to  duty  both  together  and  at  the 
shortest  warning. 

At  one  of  the  largest  French  factories  about  four  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  August  1,  several  trucks  suddenly  ar- 
rived at  the  gate,  driven  by  soldiers  in  uniform.     Signs  on 

148 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

these  trucks  proclaimed  them  department  store  delivery 
wagons,  but  every  one  in  the  factory  knew  that  a  mobiliza- 
tion was  in  operation.  The  soldiers  proceeded  to  post 
notices  in  various  rooms  of  the  factory  and  a  whistle  was 
blown  for  shutting  down.  Men  at  once  filed  in  military 
order  out  of  the  factory,  bade  each  other  good-by,  went  to 
the  office  and  drew  their  wages,  and  next  day  only  about 
1,500  hands  out  of  nearly  6,000  were  left  on  duty ;  those 
remaining  were  mostly  girls  and  men  over  forty.  This  fac- 
tory, as  well  as  many  others,  had  at  once  ceased  to  be 
private  and  become  Government  property,  an  outpost  of  a 
French  military  camp.  A  lieutenant  of  artillery  was  in 
command  and  the  Republic  was  proprietor  of  the  factory, 
which  had  become  an  army  post.  Work  on  all  civilian 
orders  ceased ;  mechanics  donned,  instead  of  overalls,  army 
uniforms,  and  instead  of  the  former  wage  received  the  pay 
of  enlisted  men,  with  regular  rations,  and  entered  upon  a 
regular  army  life. 

Probably  half  the  Paris  automobile  factories  were  taken 
over  in  this  way  and  made  into  Government  stations,  with 
employees  serving  as  soldiers.  At  the  same  time,  army 
officers  seized  all  the  motor-busses  then  in  use,  and  prac- 
tically every  automobile  in  France.  All  this  took  place 
automatically,  in  accordance  with  army  plans  made  long 
before  for  just  such  an  emergency.  Observers  marveled  to 
see  with  what  smoothness  the  mobilization  of  men  and 
motor-vehicles  took  place,  and  how  expeditiously  it  enabled 
the  French  army  to  reach  the  frontier.  The  minute  the 
mobilization  order  was  posted  every  motor-bus  in  Paris, 
probably  1.000  in  all,  each  with  its  driver,  reported  at  an 
armory.  Soldiers  then  filed  out  of  the  armory  by  com- 
panies on  either  side  of  the  busses  and  piled  in,  forty  to 
each  vehicle,  and  were  whirled  away  a  hundred  miles  or 
more  to  the  front.  Once  camp  was  reached,  seats  were 
ripped  out  and  the  busses  made  into  transport  wagons. 
Forty  thousand  soldiers  who  had  reported  at  armories  in 
Paris  on  Sunday  morning,  August  2,  were  in  camp  on  the 
frontier  by  mid-afternoon  of  that  day  because  of  the  work- 
ing of  the  bus  mobilization.  Similar  use  was  made  of 
trucks    and    cars.      These    also    were    taken    automatically. 

149 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Every  owner  of  a  car  received  a  voucher  for  his  ear,  pay- 
able at  stated  places  by  the  Government,  in  accordance  with 
definite  schedules  of  appraisal.  Practically  all  the  motor- 
busses  which  had  become  such  familiar  sights  in  both 
Paris  and  London  were  taken  by  the  governments  for  the 
transportation  of  troops  and  supplies. 

In  taking  soldiers  to  ports  of  embarkation,  Great  Britain 
employed  about  20,000  vehicles,  while  others  were  used  to 
transport  supplies.  The  conditions  of  war  soon  made  it 
possible  for  trucks  to  be  loaded  on  the  going  trip  with  men 
and  food  and  on  the  return  with  wounded  soldiers.  "Within 
twenty-four  hours  after  war  was  declared  against  Germany 
by  Great  Britain,  one  of  the  largest  motor-car  camps  on 
record  was  concentrated  at  a  British  port  of  embarkation, 
where  all  types  of  motor-vehicles,  including  trucks  sub- 
sidized by  the  Government,  omnibuses  from  London,  and 
passenger-vehicles  were  to  be  seen.  Busses  taken  from  the 
streets  of  London  were  fitted  with  bodies  suitable  for  both 
ambulance  and  transport  work. 

Most  drivers  of  Paris  motor-busses  were  liable  for  military 
service.  Every  Frenchman  able  to  serve  carried  a  passbook 
in  which  were  instructions  as  to  where  he  should  be  on  the 
first,  second,  third,  fourth,  or  fifth  day  of  mobilization.  To 
get  the  full  fighting  force  together  required  twenty  days, 
the  most  valuable  units  going  first  and  the  older  men,  up  to 
forty-eight  years  of  age,  on  later  days.  A  motor-bus  driver 
liable  to  serve  with  his  bus  first  finished  the  journey  he 
was  making  in  town,  then  drove  straight  to  his  depot,  and 
from  that  moment  was  a  soldier.  Paris  omnibuses  had  been 
so  built  as  to  be  transformable  into  meat-wagons,  windows 
being  taken  out  and  replaced  by  wire-gauze  screens,  a  door 
of  similar  material  being  fitted  in,  seats  removed,  existing 
hand-rails  fitted  with  hooks  to  receive  quarters  of  beef,  and 
a  special  floor  laid  with  linoleum  to  permit  the  interior  to 
be  washed  out  with  a  hose  or  buckets  of  water.  Another  use 
to  which  busses  were  put  was  in  the  transportation  of  troops 
to  points  at  which  it  was  desired  to  make  a  quick  attack. 
These  busses  could  average  fifteen  miles  an  hour  over  ordinary 
roads  and  each  could  carry  forty  men.  With  fifty  busses  it 
was  possible,  within  sixty  minutes,  to  take  2,000  men  with 

150 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

quick-firing  guns   to   any  point   within   a   radius   of   fifteen 
miles. 

The  belligerent  States  all  had  in  use  more  than  250,000 
motor-vehicles,  of  which  more  than  100,000  were  trucks, 
some  having  trailers.  The  German  army  alone  had  nearly 
75.000.  The  Allies  at  one  time  were  in  receipt  of  trucks  at 
the  rate  of  250  a  week.  The  British  first  used  military 
motor-trucks  during  the  Boer  War;  they  were  propelled  by 
steam.  Italy  afterward  used  them  in  the  Tripolitan  War, 
and  then  Bulgaria  in  the  Balkan  War  when  her  advance 
toward  Constantinople  was  in  a  large  measure  facilitated 
by  them.  Greeks  and  Serbians  in  the  second  Balkan  War 
used  motor-trucks  for  transportation  purposes.^^ 

In  July,  1914,  the  whole  world  had  been  settling  down  to 
its  mid-summer  siesta,  unconscious  of  impending  ill.  Kings, 
princes,  and  presidents  were  yachting  or  paying  party  calls. 
Diplomats  after  the  winter's  gastronomic  campaign  were 
''taking  the  waters.''  People  at  large  were  beginning  their 
summer  outings  on  seashore  and  mountain,  while  the  annual 
stream  of  Americans  to  Europe  had  in  the  main  disem- 
barked from  ships.  Suddenly  in  southeastern  Europe  a 
cloud  appeared  on  the  horizon,  at  first  *'no  bigger  than  a 
man's  hand,"  but  it  swiftly  covered  the  heavens  and  wrapt 
the  earth  in  darkness.  Then  a  change  came  over  the  face 
of  ail  Europe.  Its  several  peoples,  steeled  from  their 
cradles  to  this  eventuality,  sprang  to  arms,  each  man  taking 
tlie  place  marked  out  for  him  in  his  young  jnanhood,  when 
by  years  of  training  he  was  made  ready  for  the  grim  work 
of  war.  Smoothly  and  silently  the  well-oiled  machinery  of 
mobilization  set  the  stage  for  a  myriad  of  players  to  act 
their  respective  parts  in  "Europe  in  Arms" — the  greatest 
tragedy  in  recorded  history. 

Gone  in  a  single  day  were  multitudes  of  pleasure-seekers 
from  their  summer  haunts.  Sea-beaches  were  deserted, 
while  their  shuttered  villas  and  empty  hotels  awaited 
possible  destruction  from  war-craft  whose  black  smoke  trails 
could  be  seen  along  the  horizon.  Gone  were  tourists  from 
the  Swiss  mountains,  their  picturesque  slopes  now  scaled  by 

12  The  Commercial  Vehicle. 

151 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

a  sterner  breed  of  climbers,  blue-clad  Swiss  riflemen  in 
mountain  barriers,  ready  to  defend  the  neutrality  of  their 
country.  In  the  gorgeous  casinos  of  a  hundred  resorts  card- 
room  and  concert-hall  alike  stood  empty.  Valetudinarians 
had  fled  from  favorite  ''spas"  and  "kurorts,"  forgetting 
physical  ailments  in  the  overpowering  grip  of  the  universal 
transformation.^^ 

With  pleasure's  realm  thus  paralyzed,  the  work-a-day 
world  was  equally  in  sore  straits.  Fields  were  yellowing 
with  the  harvest,  but  the  sturdy  reapers  were  gone  leaving 
the  year's  grain  to  be  garnered  by  weeping  women,  wide- 
eyed  children,  and  men  already  bowed  beneath  the  weight  of 
years.  Steel-works  and  arsenals  were  busy  enough — busier 
than  they  had  ever  been,  pulsating  with  feverish  energy  day 
and  night.  Elsewhere  the  wheels  of  industry  had  almost 
ceased  to  turn,  the  best  workers  gone,  with  no  work  for  those 
left  behind,  the  nation's  coal-supply  hoarded  for  arsenals, 
gun-foundries,  and  fleets.  In  great  cities  stores  were  clos- 
ing, business  offices  deserted,  bourses  and  exchanges  all  were 
silent.  Idle  crowds  cheered  regiments  marching  to  railway 
stations,  or  hung  feverishly  about  bulletin-boards,  hungry 
for  tidings  of  victory.  Real  domestic  peril  threatened  many 
cities  for  the  lack  of  coal  which  closed  factories  and  would 
presently  shut  down  municipal  lighting-plants.  Cities  would 
soon  be  dark  at  night,  and  with  a  police  force  depleted  of 
its  best  men,  the  "apache"  and  the  hooligan,  insensible  to 
patriotism,  would  swarm  forth  in  the  darkness  to  their 
work. 

Other  branches  of  human  activity  were  pulsating  with 
hectic  life.  Every  railroad  line  was  working  to  its  full 
capacity.  The  first  wave  of  young  reservists  had  already 
passed,  but  long  troop-trains  still  coiled  along  valley^,,  or 
ground  across  plains,  for  barracks  were  beginning  to  fill 
with  "Landwehr" — second  reservists  brushing  up  their  half- 
forgotten  military  duties  and  making  ready  to  support  field 
armies  that  would  melt  away  beneath  the  wastage  of  war. 
Before  long,  should  the  tide  set  strongly  against  one  or 
other  combatant,  still  other  troop-trains  would  traverse  the 

i«  Adapted  from  parts  of  an  article  by  Col.  George  Harvey  in  The  North 
American  Review  for  October,   1914  ;   several  paragraphs  being  used. 

152 


CAMPBELL   GRAY. 


GEORGE  V, 
King  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  Emperor  of  India 


CAUSES  OF  THE  GREATER  CONFLICT 

endangered  lands — trains  filled  with  grizzled  "Landsturm" 
answering  tlieir  country's  call  last. 

Troop-trains  were  only  one  of  the  components  of  the  vast 
masses  of  rolling-stock  which  overflowed  every  railway  yard 
and  siding.  The  fighting  millions  at  the  front  had  not 
only  to  be  reinforced,  but  to  be  fed,  supplied,  and  muni- 
tioned. Countless  freight-trains  of  box-cars  were  filled  with 
foodstuffs  and  equipment,  cattle-cars  with  cavalry  remounts, 
flat-cars  piled  high  with  bulky  tarpaulined  artillery.  As 
one  neared  hostile  frontiers,  wagon  roads  vied  with  railways 
in  feverish  life.  Broad,  beautiful  European  highways  were 
jammed  with  a  swift-flowing  human  tide — endless  infantry 
marching  to  right  and  left,  cavalry,  gun-batteries,  and 
traction-engine  trains  clattering  and  grumbling  along  the 
middle  of  the  road,  bywa3^s  choked  with  grain-carts  and  with 
herds  of  cattle  for  feeding  armies.  Thousands  of  miles  of 
road  and  railway  presented  such  scenes,  in  the  smiling 
border  country  of  Germany  and  France,  amid  the  wooded 
Ardennes,  on  the  flatlands  of  Austrian  Galicia  and  Eastern 
Germany,  through  the  rugged  defiles  of  the  Carpathians, 
along  the  middle  Danube,  and  far  out  on  the  vast  Russian 
plain. 

At  the  uttermost  ends  of  the  earth  men  prepared  for 
battle.  On  the  plains  of  western  Canada,  on  the  South 
African  veldt,  in  towns  and  villages  of  the  Australian 
antipodes,  volunteers  were  mustering  for  European  battle- 
fields. On  the  bastions  of  Tsing-Tau  Chinese  coolies  were 
strengthening  that  German  outpost  in  the  East.  Amid  the 
swamps  and  jungles  of  Africa  savage  negroes  who  had  never 
heard  of  Serbia  or  Alsace-Lorraine,  made  ready  to  fight  in 
the  white  man^s  war.  The  pathways  of  the  ocean  likewise 
presented  a  strange  and  ominous  spectacle.  Crowded  be- 
fore with  shipping,  they  were  now  soon  deserted.  A  few 
neutrals  kept  to  the  accustomed  tracks,  but  all  belligerent 
ships  not  safely  tied  up  in  port  steamed  for  the  lonelier 
reaches  of  the  ocean  under  forced  draft,  with  hooded 
lights  at  night,  fearful  of  swift  commerce-destroyers.  No 
friendly  calls  went  from  ship  to  ship  as  before;  only  rare 
code-messages,  mysterious  and  menacing,  broke  upon  the 
silence  of  the  wireless  operator's  room. 

153 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

One  part  of  ocean's  domain  was  the  reverse  of  lonely — 
the  North  Sea,  now  very  much  alive,  but  with  a  life 
monstrous  and  terrible  almost  beyond  the  stretch  of  imagina- 
tive powers.  On  this  restricted  area  of  boisterous  waters 
floated  hundreds  of  complex  fighting-machines  ranging  in 
size  from  super-dreadnought  down  to  waspish  torpedo-boats 
and  venomous  submarines.  Angry  gray-green  waters  were 
sown  thick  with  mines,  ready  at  the  slightest  touch  to  burst 
into  frightful  explosion.  Low  coasts  were  studded  with 
German  batteries  from  Borkum,  near  the  Dutch  frontier,  to 
the  Danish  border  beyond  the  mouth  of  the  Kiel  Canal, 
while  far  out  stood  Helgoland,  the  German  Gibraltar,  ready 
to  smite  with  long-range  batteries,  or  sting  with  submarines 
shot  out  from  hidden  caves.  Strange  sounds  reached  the 
straining  ears  of  landsmen  on  these  North  Sea  shores — dull 
boomings  of  heavy  guns,  muffled  concussions  of  torpedos,  or 
contact-mines.  At  night  came  the  flickering  play  of  search- 
lights along  the  horizon.     All  else  was  silence  and  mystery. 

From  land-areas  there  was  great  lack  of  news.  Behind 
an  impenetrable  veil  of  censorship  millions  of  men  were 
wrestling  in  death-grapples,  but  only  curt  official  announce- 
ments, ambiguous  when  not  intentionally  deceiving,  came  to 
whet  the  appetites  of  a  breathless  world  tormented  by  the 
wild  lucubrations  of  "war  correspondents''  who  themselves 
were  far  from  the  outermost  fringe  of  hostilities.  Only 
trains  laden  with  wounded  and  convoys  of  prisoners  bore 
testimony  to  the  titanic  struggle  going  on  behind  the  veil: 
crashing  duels  of  fortress  and  siege  artillery,  desperate  in- 
fantry assaults  strewing  glacis  and  counterscarp  with  dead 
and  dying,  captured  forts  blown  bodily  into  the  air,  fierce 
cavalry  charges,  hand-to-hand  combats  in  forest  and  on 
mountain  side,  crouching  battle-lines  torn  and  harried  by 
raining  shrapnel,  while  high  over  all  was  the  silver  glint 
of  a  war  Zeppelin,  or  the  swift  dart  of  a  monoplane,  show- 
ing like  some  black  vampire  amid  evening  mists  against  the 
sky.  Men  read  with  easy  credulity  the  prophecy  of  a  lead- 
ing army  surgeon  in  the  Balkan  wars  of  one  and  two  years 
before — that  a  month  after  the  outbreak  of  the  new  and 
greater  conflagration  a  million  and  a  half  men  would  be 
d?ad. 

154 


THE  OUTBREAK  AND  THE 
CAUSES 

Part  III 

DECLARATIONS  OF  WAE  AMONG 
THE  POWEES 


155 


15G 


I 

DECLARATIONS  IN  THE  FIRST  MONTHS  OF 
THE  WAR 

Germany  Against  Russia — August  1,  1914 

AS  soon  as  an  Anstrian  army  began  to  operate  against  the 
Serbian  capital  in  the  last  days  of  July,  the  center  of 
European  anxiety  moved  from  the  Danube  to  the  Neva — that 
is,  from  Vienna  to  Petrograd,  or  as  the  latter  was  then  still 
called,  St.  Petersburg.  Would  Russia  support  the  Serbs 
against  Austria?  If  so,  a  general  European  war  was  im- 
minent. Telegrams  to  and  from  Vienna,  Berlin,  Paris, 
London,  and  the  capitals  of  smaller  nations — some  of  them 
personal  messages  from  sovereigns — passed  and  repassed. 
While  some  were  intended  merely  to  ''feel  out''*  Russia's 
attitude,  others  earnestly  put  forth  efforts  to  prevent  a  clash 
between  great  powers.  The  German  Kaiser,  suddenly  re- 
turning to  Berlin  from  a  vacation  in  Norwegian  waters,  late 
in  July  assumed  leadership  in  a  great  diplomatic  game  that 
was  to  send  Europe  rapidly  to  war.  On  July  24  he  was 
cruising  near  Balholm  in  his  yacht,  the  Hohenzollern.  A 
pilot  whom  he  employed  related  two  weeks  afterward,  in 
Christiania,^  the  dramatic  circumstances  in  which  he  re- 
ceived at  Balholm  word  of  the  crisis  in  southeastern  Europe, 
which  four  days  later  (July  28)  ended  in  Austria's  declara- 
tion of  war  against  Serbia : 

''On  the  previous  day  (July  23)  the  Kaiser  had  been  trout 
fishing  and  had  had  a  splendid  catch.  The  trout  were  cooked  as 
part  of  a  banquet  for  which  200  covers  had  been  laid  as  a  com- 
pliment to  his  Norwegian  friends.  The  departure  of  the  yacht 
and  the  accompanying  squadron  of  about  forty  war-vessels  had 
been  fixt  for  Sunday,  July  25,  at  sunrise.  When  the  pilots  came 
aboard  at  midday  Saturday  (July  24)  the  Kaiser  was  on  the 
bridge  and  in  the  highest  of  spirits.  He  shook  hands  with 
them  and  said:  'We  who  pretend  to  know  our  way  about  would 
be  helpless  without  you.'     Just   then   an  officer  approached  and 

^  To  a  New  York   World  correspondent. 

157 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

handed  the  Emperor  a  transcript  of  a  wireless  message,  with  a 
deep  bow.  Upon  seeing*  the  contents  the  expression  of  the 
Kaiser's  face  instantly  changed  and  he  became  very  g-rave.  He 
handed  the  telegram  to  a  principal  naval  officer  who  was  stand- 
ing" beside  him,  who,  when  he  read  it,  looked  like  one  petrified. 
The  officer  handed  back  the  message  to  the  Kaiser,  who  penciled 
a  reply  npon  the  back  of  the  sheet,  and  as  it  was  taken  away, 
said  to  the  officer  in  a  loud  voice  twice:  'Panta  rej,'  which 
means,  'Everything  is  moving.'  The  Kaiser  hurried  to  his 
saloon,  followed  by  his  suite.  Orders  were  given  for  an  instant 
departure.  The  Kaiser  during  the  voyage  to  Germany  was  con- 
stantly occupied  with  his  officers." 

Late  in  the  night  of  July  26  the  Kaiser  reached  Berlin. 
The  day  before  the  British  Ambassador  at  Petrograd  had 
informed  the  British  Foreign  Office  that  "if  Serbia  should 
appeal  to  the  Powers,  Russia  would  be  quite  ready  to  stand 
aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the  hands  of  England, 
France,  Germany,  and  Italy."  Germany's  contention  then 
had  been  that  the  quarrel  "was  a  purely  Austrian  concern, 
with  which  Russia  had  nothing  to  do."  Immediately  after 
the  Kaiser  reached  Berlin,  the  British  Charge  d' Affaires 
telegraphed  to  London  that  the  German  Foreign  Office  "re- 
gretted that  the  Kaiser  had  taken  the  step" — that  is,  that 
he  had  returned  to  Berlin.  He  had  done  so  "on  his  own 
initiative,"  and  it  was  feared  the  event  would  "cause  specu- 
lation and  excitement."  Two  days  later  Austria  declared 
war  on  Serbia.  Next  day  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  in- 
formed Count  Pourtales,  the  German  Ambassador  to  Russia, 
that  Russia  "would  not  be  able  to  remain  indifferent  if 
Serbia  was  invaded." 

Austria  and  Russia,  through  their  ambassadors,  endeavored 
to  "localize  the  war."  Great  Britain  proposed  to  Germany 
that  they,  with  France  and  Italy,  summon  a  general  council 
of  States,  for  "a  private  and  informal  discussion,  to  ascer- 
tain what  suggestion  could  be  made  for  a  settlement."  Sir 
Edward  Grey  declared  that  "no  suggestion  would  be  put 
forward  that  had  not  previously  been  ascertained  to  be  ac- 
ceptable to  Austria  and  Russia,  with  whom  the  mediating 
powers  could  easily  keep  in  touch  through  their  respective 
allies."      The    German    Chancellor    declined    this    proposal, 

158 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 


because  he  did  not  think  it  would  be  ''effective,"  and  as 
V^ienna  and  St.  Petersburg  were  already  in  direct  com- 
munication, Berlin  ''could  not  interfere."  Moreover,  it 
was  "impossible  for  us  to  bring  our  ally  before  a  European 
court  to  discuss  a  difference  with  Serbia."  Austria, 
to  whom  the  German  Chan- 
cellor forwarded  the  proposal 
of  Great  Britain,  replied  that 
^'events  had  marched  too 
rapidly,"  and  it  was  "too 
late  to  act  upon  the  sugges- 
tion that  the  Serbian  reply 
might  form  the  basis  of  dis- 
cussion." Austria's  real  con- 
tention was  that  her  quarrel 
with  Serbia  "was  a  purely 
Austrian  concern,  with  which 
Russia  had  nothing  to  do." 

On  July  27,  the  Russian 
Minister  of  War,  Sazonof. 
"gave  his  word  of  honor"  to 
the  German  Ambassador  that 
"as  yet  no  mobilization  order 
had  gone  forth";  that  for  the 
time  being,  "merely  precau- 
tionary measures  were  being 
taken,"  and  that  "not  one  re- 
servist had  been  summoned,  nor  a  single  horse  requisitioned." 
In  case  Austria  should  cross  the  Serbian  frontier,  military 
districts  in  the  direction  of  Austria  "would  be  mobilized," 
but  those  on  the  German  frontier  "would  not  be  under  any 
circumstances."  After  the  war  had  been  long  in  progress 
Stephen  Lauzanne  declared  in  his  newspaper,  the  Paris 
Matin,  that  before  mobilizing  his  army  the  Czar  had  sent  to 
the  Kaiser  four  telegrams  of  which  one  was  the  following: 


©    INTERNATIONAL    FILM    SERVICE.    N.    Y. 

M.  Sazonof 

The    Russian    Minister    of    Foreign 

Affairs  in  1914.  wlio  souglit  in  vain 

to  restrain  Germany  from  declaring 

war 


"TsARSKOE  Selo,  July  29,  1914. 
^^To  His   Majesty,   The  German   Emperor. — Thanks   for  your 
telegram,  which   is  conciliatory  and   friendly   whereas  the   official 
message   presented   to-day   by   your   Ambassador   to   my    Minister 

159 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

was  conveyed  in  a  different  tone.  I  be^  you  to  explain  this 
divergency.  It  would  be  right  to  give  over  the  Austro-Serbian 
problem  to  The  Hague  Tribunal.  I  trust  in  your  wisdom  and 
friendship. — Nicholas." 

M.  Lauzanne  declared  that  the  Kaiser  not  only  did  not 
answer  this  telegram,  but  "supprest  it."  In  the  official 
German  "White  Papers,"  giving  documents  about  the  war, 
this  telegram  from  the  Czar  did  not  appear.  A  reason 
given  by  German  officials  for  suppressing  it  was  that  it 
"was  not  interesting."  What  rendered  war  inevitable,  ac- 
cording to  the  Kaiser,  said  David  J.  Hill,  our  former  Am- 
bassador to  Berlin,^  "was  that  on  July  31  a  general  order 
of  mobilization  was  issued  by  the  Czar."  It  mattered  noth- 
ing, said  Dr.  Hill,  that  it  would  require  weeks  to  render  the 
order  really  effective  as  against  Germany,  and  that  the 
Czar  had  assured  the  Kaiser,  in  a  telegram  dated  2  p.  m.  of 
the  day  war  was  declared : 

"I  comprehend  that  you  are  forced  to  mobilize,  but  I  should 
like  to  have  from  you  assurance  that  these  measures  do  not  mean 
war,  and  that  we  shall  continue  to  negotiate  for  the  welfare  of 
our  two  countries  and  the  universal  peace  which  is  so  dear  to 
our  hearts.  With  the  aid  of  God  it  must  be  possible  to  our  long- 
tried  friendship  to  prevent  the  shedding  of  blood.  I  expect,  with 
full  confidence,  your  urgent  reply." 

Not  content  to  meet  Russian  mobilization,  which  the 
Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  assured  by  the 
German  Ambassador  even  on  August  1  "did  not  mean 
war,"  and  wholly  ignoring  the  Czar^s  exprest  belief  that 
"these  measures  do  not  mean  war,"  and  his  disposition  "to 
negotiate  for  the  welfare  of  our  two  countries  and  the  uni- 
versal peace,"  the  German  declaration  of  war,  added  Dr. 
Hill,  "was  without  delay  presented  at  St.  Petersburg." 

James  M.  Beck,  in  his  book  entitled  "The  Evidence  in 
the  Case,"  says  of  mobilization  that  it  "does  not  necessarily 
mean  aggression,  but  simply  preparation,  as  the  Czar  had 
clearly  pointed  out  to  the  Kaiser."  ^Mobilization  Mr.  Beck 
defined  as  "the  right  of  a  sovereign  State,  and  by  no  code 

2  In  the  New  York  Times  of  October  21,  1917. 

160 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

of  ethics  a  casus  belli.''  Mr.  Beck  added  that  Germany,  in 
her  demand  that  Russia  should  not  arm  to  defend  herself 
when  Austria  was  pushing  her  aggressive  preparations, 
*' treated  her  as  an  inferior,  almost  as  a  vassal  state."  Bis- 
marck had  laid  down  as  a  proposition  of  war  that  the 
answer  to  mobilization  was  to  mobilize  yourself ;  that  mobiliza- 
tion in  itself  did  not  mean  war.  It  was  on  July  31  that  the 
German  Chancellor  sent  to  St.  Petersburg  Germany's  ulti- 
matum and  on  the  following  day  issued  Germany's  declara- 
tion of  war  against  Russia.  After  the  declaration  the 
Russian  Foreign  Office,  on  August  2,  issued  to  Russian  rep- 
resentatives in  foreign  countries  the  following  statement, 
which  several  weeks  later  was  made  public  in  the  Russian 
*' Orange  Papers,"  and  in  December  was  included  in  the 
French  "Yellow  Papers": 

"St.  Petersburg,  July  20,  (Aug.  2),^  1914.— It  is  absolutely 
clear  that  Geiinany  is  now  endeavoring  to  throw  upon  us  the 
responsibility  for  the  rupture.  Our  mobiUzation  was  caused  by 
the  enormous  responsibility  which  we  would  have  incurred  if 
we  had  failed  to  take  every  measure  of  precaution  at  a  moment 
when  Austria,  confining  herself  to  pourparlers  of  a  dilatory 
character,  was  bombarding  Belgrada  and  proceeding  to  a  general 
mobilization. 

''His  Majesty  the  Emperor  had  pledged  himself,  by  his  word 
of  honor,  to  the  GeiTnan  Emperor,  not  to  take  any  aggressive 
steps  so  long  as  the  pourparlers  with  Austria  continued.  After 
offering  such  a  guaranty,  and  after  giving  every  proof  of  Rus- 
sia's love  of  peace,  Germany  could  not  question,  and  had  not 
the  right  to  question,  our  declaration  that  we  would  be  glad  to 
accept  any  peaceful  solution  which  was  compatible  with  the 
dignity  and  independence  of  Serbia.  Any  other  solution  would 
have  been  completely  incompatible  with  our  own  dignity,  and 
would  indubitably  have  upset  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe 
by  insuring  the  hegemony  of  Germany.  This  European,  not  to  say 
worldwide,  character  of  the  conflict  is  infinitely  more  important 
than  the  pretext  which  brought  it  to  pass.  Germany,  by  her 
decision  to  declare  war  upon  us  at  a  moment  when  the  negotia- 
tions among  the  powers  were  still  in  progress,  has  assumed  a 
heavy  responsibility. — Sazonof.^' 

3  The  two  dates  here  given.  July  20  and  August  2,  are  in  accord,  the  first 
with  the  Russian,  the  second  with  the  reformed,  or  Gregorian,  calendar. 

V.  I— 11  161 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

The  Paris  Matin,  on  Feb.  5,  1919,  printed  a  dramatic 
revelation  made  by  the  former  Italian  Premier  Salandra  of 
events  during  the  last  days  of  July,  1914.  There  actually 
was  a  moment,  he  said,  when  Austria  hesitated.  It  was  after 
hostilities  had  begun  against  Serbia  and  when  Austria 
learned  that  Russia  in  consequence  was  mobilizing,  but  Ger- 
many "intervened  and  obliged  her  ally  to  continue  the 
war. ' ' 

At  noon  on  August  1  the  Kaiser  signed  the  order  for 
mobilization,  and  on  the  same  day  the  German  Ambassador 
left  St.  Petersburg.  Both  armies  now  crossed  the  eastern 
border,  rival  ships  met  in  the  Baltic,  airmen  scouts  went 
aloft,  and  the  war  as  between  Great  Powers  began.  Pub- 
licity in  separate  issues  was  afterward  given  by  Germany 
and  Russia  to  their  diplomatic  correspondence  leading  up 
to  this  rupture.  Germany  called  her  publication  ''Memo- 
randum and  Documents  regarding  the  Outbreak  of  the 
War";  it  is  knowTi  also  as  the  German  "White  Papers." 
In  the  "Memorandum"  was  a  statement  of  Germany's  re- 
lations with  Austria,  and  in  it  occurred  a  statement,  of 
which  critics  made  much,  "We  therefore  gave  Austria  an 
entirely  free  hand  in  her  action  against  Serbia."  So  long 
ago  as  1879 — in  Bismarck's  time  as  Chancellor — an  alliance 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  had  been  formed. 
This  Alliance  was  still  in  force  in  1914,  but  had  been 
widened  by  the  inclusion  of  Italy  into  it,  and  is  what  was 
thereafter  known  as  the  Triple  Alliance.  The  terms  of  its 
two  operative  clauses,  as  published  in  1888,  were  as  follows: 

^Tlause  I. — Should,  contrary  to  the  hope  and  against  the  sin- 
cere Avish  of  the  two  high  contracting  parties,  one  of  the  two 
Empires  be  attacked  by  Russia,  the  high  contracting  parties, 
are  bound  to  stand  by  each  other  with  the  whole  of  the  armed 
forces  of  their  Empire,  and  in  consequence  thereof,  only  to  con- 
clude peace  jointly  and  in  agTeement. 

'^  Clause  II. — Should  one  of  the  high  contracting  parties  be 
attacked  by  another  Power,  the  other  high  contracting  party 
hereby  binds  itself,  not  only  to  stand  by  its  high  ally,  but  to 
observe  at  least  an  attitude  of  benevolent  neutrality  toward  its 
high  co-contractor." 

162 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

The  part  taken  by  Great  Britain  in  negotiations  looking 
for  the  preservation  of  peace  between  Germany  and  Russia 
was  afterward  disclosed  in  the  British  "White  Papers." 
Much  importance  was  attached  to  the  following  dispatch 
from  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  British  Foreign  Minister,  to 
Sir  Edward  Goschen,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin, 
dated  July  30,  two  days  before  war  against  Russia  was  de- 
clared. It  relates  to  the  attitude  of  France  toward  Ger- 
many and  toward  Belgian  neutrality,  and  proposed  an 
arrangement  to  secure  Germany  from  any  "aggressive  or 
hostile  policy  from  France,  Russia,  and  England": 

"His  Majesty's  Government  can  not  for  a  moment  entertain 
the  Chancellor's  [that  is,  the  German  Chancellor's]  proposal 
that  they  should  bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 
What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by  while  French 
colonies  are  taken  and  France  is  beaten,  so  long  as  Germany  does 
not  take  French  territory  as  distinct  from  the  colonies. 

^''From  the  material  point  of  view,  such  a  proposal  is  unaccept- 
able, for  France,  without  further  territory  in  Europe  being 
taken  from  her,  could  be  so  crusht  as  to  lose  her  position  as  a 
great  Power,  and  become  subordinate  to  German  policy.  Alto- 
gether apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgTace  for  us  to  make  this 
bargain  with  Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from 
which  the  good  name  of  this  country  would  never  recover.  The 
Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain  away  whatever  obliga- 
tion or  interest  we  have  as  regards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 
We  could  not  entertain  that  bargain  either. 

"You  should  speak  to  the  Chancellor  in  the  above  sense,  and 
add  most  earnestly  that  the  one  way  of  maintaining  the  good 
relations  between  England  and  Germany  is  that  they  should 
continue  to  work  together  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe:  if  we 
succeed  in  this  object,  the  mutual  relations  of  Germany  and  Eng- 
land will,  I  believe,  be  ipso  facto  improved  and  strengthened. 
For  that  object  His  Majesty's  Government  will  work  in  that 
way  with  all  sincerity  and  good  will. 

''And  I  will  say  this:  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  pre- 
served, and  the  present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavors 
will  be  to  promote  some  arrangement  to  which  Germany  could  be 
a  party,  by  which  ehe  could  be  assured  that  no  aggi'essive  or 
hostile  policy  would  be  pursued  against  her  or  her  allies  by 
France,  Russia,  and  ourselves,  jointly  or  separately.  I  have 
desired   this   and   worked   for  it,  sd  far  as  I  could,  through   the 

163 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

last  Balkan  crisis,  and,  Germany  having  a  corresponding-  object, 
our  relations  sensibly  improved.  The  idea  has  hitherto  been 
too  Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of  definite  proposals,  but  if  this 
present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any  that  Europe  has 
gone  through  for  generations,  be  safely  passed,  I  am  hopeful  that 
the  relief  and  reaction  Avhich  Avill  follow  may  make  possible  some 
more  definite  rapprochement  betwen  the  Powers  than  has  been 
possible  hitherto." 

This  dispatch  was  read  to  the  German  Chancellor  on  the 
following  day  by  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  who  wrote  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  that  the  Chancellor  "was  so  taken  up  with  the 
news  of  Russian  measures  along  the  frontier  that  he  re- 
ceived it  without  comment."  He  wanted  to  "reflect  on  it 
before    giving    an    answer."      No    answer    was    ever    made. 

Just  as  Austria  had  agreed  to  accept  the  Serbian  answer 
to  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  but  Germany  had  stept  in  and 
rejected  the  British  proposals  of  mediation  to  settle  the 
Austro-Serbian  dispute,  so  now  once  more,  when  Austria  was 
ready  to  give  way  to  Russia  for  a  conference,  Germany  re- 
plied to  Russia's  partial  mobilization  by  sending  a  stiff 
ultimatum  to  St.  Petersburg  and,  in  face  of  the  Czar's 
promise  not  to  move  his  troops,  declared  war  on  Russia. 
Americans,  returning  from  Germany  in  September,  gave 
accounts  of  the  circumstances  in  which  the  Kaiser  signed 
the  declaration  of  war  against  Russia.  One  of  these,  Liston 
Lewis,  gave,  as  coming  from  "a  German  officer  very  close 
to  the  Emperor, ' '  the  following  details  of  a  striking  scene : 

"The  Emperor  could  not  believe  a  general  European  war 
was  possible.  He  had  been  told  by  the  German  Ambassador  in 
St.  Petersburg  that  the  Russian  Government  had  assured  him  that 
the  Russian  army  was  not  mobilizing  and  had  no  intentions  of 
doing  so.  Therefore  the  Emperor  refused  to  believe  reports  of 
aggressive  movements  until  the  members  of  the  General  Staff  put 
proof  before  him  and  insisted  that  the  Kaiser  declare  war  at 
once.  'Leave  me  for  an  hour,'  the  Emperor  requested.  When 
the  members  of  the  General  Staff  returned  they  found  the  Kaiser 
weeping.  The  declaration  of  war  lay  before  him.  He  signed  it, 
saying:  'I  can  not  do  otherwise.'  After  signing  the  declaration 
the  Kaiser,  with  the  Kaiserin  and  Princes  Adelbert  and  Oscar, 
appeared  on  the  raised  terrace  of  the  palace  and  made  a  speech 

164 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

ill  which  he  used  the  words:  'They  have  thrust  the  sword  into 
my  hand!'  He  then  bade  the  multitude  disperse  to  the  churches 
and  pray.  Again  the  Kaiser  appeared  before  the  Schloss  and 
proclaimed  that  Germany  was  as  one  man,  that  he  forgave  his 
enemies  and  all  who  had  spoken  ill  of  him.  He  was  drest  in  the 
dull  gray-gTeen  field  uniform  of  the  Feldjaeger  Corps.  While 
he  spoke,  mobilization  posters 
began  to  appear  in  the  streets. 
Next  day  he  spoke  from  a  win- 
dow to  a  crowd,  estimated  at 
50,000,  saying,  'Let  all  party 
strife  cease.  We  are  German 
brothers  and  nothing  else.'  The 
Imperial  Chancellor,  Dr.  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  then  ap- 
peared. 'Let  all  stand  as  one 
man  for  our  Emperor,'  said  he, 
'whatever  our  opinion  or  our 
creeds.  All  young  German  men 
are  ready  to  shed  their  blood  for 
the  fame  and  greatness  of  Ger- 
many. We  can  only  trust  in  God. 
who  hitherto  has  always  given  us 
victory.'  On  August  3  the 
Reichstag  was  formally  opened 
in  the  White  Room  of  the  Palace, 
the  Kaiser  entering  with  the 
Kaiserin,  clad  in  his  gray  battle- 
field uniform.  Besides  the  Im- 
perial    Chancellor,     there     were 

present  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  von  Moltke,  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz,  other  generals  and  admirals,  cabinet  ministers,  and  the 
diplomatic  corps,  except  the  Ambassadors  of  Russia  and  France. 
The  American  Ambassador,  Mr.  Gerard,  was  present  in  evening 
clothes.  The  Kaiser  read  his  war  speech  from  sheets  held  in  his 
right  hand.'* 

Observers  found  it  difficult  to  describe,  in  terms  easily 
intelligible  to  an  English  reader,  the  facility  with  which 
Germany  now  threw  off  her  whole  civilian  trappings  and 
reverted  to  the  pure  type  of  a  military  State.  Within  a 
few  hours  of  the  issue  of  mobilization  orders  the  whole 
country  was  under   military   control.      Government   depart- 


Theodoue  von  Bethmaxx-Hollweo 
German  Chancellor  in  1914.  author 
of  the  "Scrap  of  Paper"  remark  to 
the  British  Ambassador,  Sir  Edward 
Goschen 


165 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

raeiits,  provincial  administrations,  municipal  administrations, 
"all  lost  th'^  very  show  of  independence,  and  became  hand- 
maids of  the  military  rulers  of  the  country."  In  Berlin, 
for  instance,  all  power  passed  at  once  into  the  hands  of  the 
Military  Governor.  Throughout  the  Empire  the  real  con- 
trol of  administration  was  vested  in  generals  in  command  of 
army-corps  districts — that  is  to  say,  in  generals  who  were 
kept  behind  as  deputies  for  generals  who  had  taken  the 
field.  It  was  they  who  guided  the  public  by  constant  procla- 
mations, they  and  their  subordinates  who  managed  every- 
thing, and  saw  to  it  that  the  needs  of  the  army  and  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  were  held  superior  to  other  con- 
siderations. The  military  authorities  generally  directed  the 
whole  course  of  civil  life.  The  whole  machinery  of  the 
State  was  at  their  disposal. 

This  military  regime  was  not  felt  to  be  irksome,  nor  was 
it  accepted  w^ith  reluctance,  but  was  regarded  as  perfectly 
natural.  Germany  at  war  had  no  thought  or  care  for  any- 
thing but  a  successful  prosecution  of  the  war.  The  people 
generally  had  no  desire  more  eager  than  to  play  their  part 
as  members  of  the  great  machine.  The  more  perfect  the 
war  organization  proved  to  be,  the  more  enthusiastic  was 
the  country.  The  people  were  willing  to  make  every  sac- 
rifice. They  felt  themselves  integral  parts  of  a  complex 
scheme  containing  all  the  forces  and  resources  of  the 
Empire.  One  must  not  forget  here  the  force  of  tradition. 
It  was  less  than  fifty  years  since  the  German  Empire  had 
been  united  by  the  sword.  Many  of  the  most  prominent 
men  in  Germany  had  themselves  taken  part  in  the  war 
against  France.  Every  family  had  personal  ties  with  the 
great  epoch  of  Bismarck.  The  whole  country  knew  how 
German  victories  in  1870  had  brought  unimagined  wealth, 
prosperity  and  prestige.  It  was  easy  to  persuade  such  a 
people  that  it  was  fighting  to  hold  and  defend  what  its 
fathers  had  won,  to  complete  their  work,  and  that  defeat 
meant  relapse  to  old  conditions  and  possibly  a  breaking  up 
of  the  Empire  into  small  and  impotent  States.* 

*  The  London  Times  "History  of  The  War." 


166 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 
France  and  Germany — August  4,  1914 

When  Germany  was  about  to  declare  war  against  Russia, 
her  Government  knew  this  made  necessary  an  immediate  un- 
derstanding with  France.  On  the  evening  of  July  31,  there- 
fore, after  Count  von  Pourtales  had  delivered  Germany's 
ultimatum  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Office,  Baron  von  Schoen, 
the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris,  was  directed  to  inquire 
of  Premier  Viviani  what  would  be  the  attitude  of  the  French 
Republic,  in  case  of  war  between  Russia  and  Germany,  and 
requested  a  reply  at  an  hour  earlier  than  the  one  set  for 
Russia's  answer  to  Germany's  ultimatum.  The  French 
Premier  said  he  desired  first  to  be  informed  if  Germany 
could  not  still  prevent  war.  Baron  von  Schoen  promised  to 
communicate  this  inquiry  to  Berlin  and  said  he  would  return 
to  the  French  Foreign  Office  again  that  afternoon  (August 
1).  On  his  return.  Von  Schoen  repeated  his  questions  as  to 
the  position  of  France  in  case  Germany  and  Russia  should 
fight,  to  which  M.  Viviani  replied  that  the  French  Republic 
would  be  '^ forced  to  consult  her  own  interests."  The  in- 
terview being  thus  terminated,  the  mobilization  of  the  entire 
French  aimy  was  ordered.  Accompanying  the  order  was  a 
statement  from  President  Poincare  and  the  cabinet  explain- 
ing to  the  rest  of  Europe  that  this  action  by  France  was 
only  ''a  precautionary  measure."  On  August  2  martial  law 
was  declared  throughout  France  and  Algeria,  and  Parlia- 
ment was  summoned  to  meet  on  the  fifth. 

Baron  von  Schoen  then  announced  to  Premier  Viviani 
that  "a  state  of  war"  existed  between  Germany  and  France, 
and  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  M.  Cambon,  was 
called  home,  but  he  had  been  instructed  before  leaving  to 
protest  vigorously  against  German  violation  of  Luxemburg 
and  against  the  German  ultimatum  that  had  already  been 
sent  to  Belgium.  So  swiftly  had  the  German  blow  been 
struck,  that,  before  a  "state  of  war"  with  France  was 
acknowledged,  the  German  invasion  of  France  had  virtually 
begun — that  is,  through  the  neutral  countries,  Luxemburg 
and  Belgium.  On  August  4,  the  French  Minister  of  War 
formally  announced  that  war  had  been  declared.  His  words 
were : 

167 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

^'The  German  Ambassador  has  demanded  his  passports  and 
diplomatic  relations  between  France  and  Germany  have  been 
broken  oft.  War  is  declared.  The  first  act  of  the  Germans,  ac- 
cording to  information  from  a  positive  source  to  the  Minister 
of  AVar,  was  to  execute  M.  Samian,  former  president  of  the 
French  War  Society,  who  lived  in  Metz,  and  to  imprison  all  the 
members  of  that  society.'' 

Before  diplomatic  relations  were  formally  severed,  Baron 
von  Schoen,  in  an  official  letter  to  the  French  Government, 
declared  that  French  aviators  had  flown  over  German  and 
Belgian  territory,  and  that  it  was  in  consequence  of  these 
acts  that  the  German  Government  considered  itself  in  a 
state  of  war  with  France.  Premier  Viviani  in  reply  pro- 
tested against  the  allegations  regarding  French  aviators,  and 
reminded  the  German  Ambassador  that  France  had  already 
presented  a  note  on  August  1  in  reference  to  the  violation 
of  French  territory  by  Germany.  M.  Viviani  declared  in 
the  French  Chamber  on  Feb.  1,  1919,  that  the  French  Gov- 
ernment on  July  30,  1914,  had  ordered  its  forces  on  the 
frontier  to  retire  eight  or  ten  kilometers,  after  it  heard  that 
the  German  troops  were  moving  toward  the  frontier.  On  the 
same  day  M.  Viviani  requested  M.  Paul  Cambon,  the  French 
Ambassador  in  London,  by  wire  to  inform  Sir  Edward  Grey 
of  the  measures  then  taken  by  France.  On  August  4  the 
Germans  were  near  Longwy,  in  Old  Lorraine,  and  soon  in- 
vaded Cirey-sur-Vezouze.  Other  violations  of  French  terri- 
tory were  reported.  German  detachments  visited  outlying 
farms  at  Lepuix,  near  Belfort,  and  requisitioned  cattle. 
German  troops  crossed  into  French  territory  near  Mars-la- 
Tour,  scene  of  one  of  the  most  important  battles  of  the 
Franco-Prussian  War.  Through  the  night,  German  troops 
continued  to  harry  French  outposts  along  the  frontier.  The 
French,  however,  refused  to  be  drawn  beyond  the  zone  which 
they  had  left  unoccupied  on  the  frontier. 

Wild  enthusiasm  prevailed  on  the  Paris  boulevards  when 
the  order  for  mobilization  became  known.  Crowds  fell  into 
military  formation  and  marched  through  the  streets,  waving 
the  flag  of  the  Republic  and  singing  the  ''Marseillaise." 
There  was  continuous  cheering  and  throwing  of  hats  into 
the   air.     Women   and   children   gathered   on   the   sidewalks 

168 


RAYMOND  POINCARe, 

President  of  the  French  Republic 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

weeping.  Stores  and  cafes  became  deserted.  A  procession 
headed  by  men  bearing  the  French,  Russian,  and  British 
flags  and  numbering  3,000,  passed  along  the  boulevards. 
Paraders  when  passing  groups  of  Germans  sang  the 
''Marseillaise"  and  shouted  ''Conspuez  I'Empereur  Guil- 
laume ! "  ^  Autobusses  disappeared,  requisitioned  for  the 
army.  Most  motor  taxicabs  were  also  taken.  Horse  cabs 
became  rare  because  horses  were  generally  commandeered 
by  the  military  authorities.  The  telephone  service  was  com- 
pletely suspended. 

Germany  Against  Belgium — August  4,  1914 
The  declaration  of  Germany  against  Belgium  followed 
speedily  after  the  announcement  of  war  with  France.  Some 
days  earlier,  however  (on  July  31),  Germany  had  been 
asked  by  Great  Britain  if  she  would  respect  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium.  Great  Britain  had  asked  France  and  Germany 
simultaneously  whether  they  would  respect  that  neutrality, 
as  it  had  been  guaranteed  by  Prussia,  France,  and  Great 
Britain  in  1831.  The  French  Foreign  Office  promptly  re- 
plied that  it  would.  The  German  Foreign  Minister,  Herr 
von  Jagow,  declined  at  first  to  make  a  reply,  but  later  said 
Germany  ''could  not  thus  reveal  her  military  plans."  In 
a  statement  given  out  a  few  hours  later,  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor, Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  said  German  troops  were 
already  "going  through  Belgium."  The  reply  received 
from  France  was  as  follows: 

^'French  Government  are  resolved  to  respect  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  and  it  would  only  be  in  the  event  of  some  other 
Power  violating  that  neutrality  that  France  might  find  herself 
under  the  necessity,  in  order  to  assure  defense  of  her  own  secur- 
ity, to  act  otherwise.  This  assurance  has  been  given  several  times. 
The  President  of  the  Republic  spoke  of  it  to  the  King  of  the 
Belgians,  and  the  French  Minister  at  Brussels  has  spontaneously 
•renewed  the  assurance  to  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  to-day." 

The  French  Premier  on  the  same  day  telegraphed  to  the 
French   Ambassador   in   Berlin,   Jules   Cambon,   and   to   the 

^  An  opprobrious  epithet  indicating  public  scorn. 
V.  T— 1  169 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

French  Minister  in  Brussels,  that  he  had  notified  the  British 
Government  that  France  had  "on  several  occasions  informed 
the  Belgian  Government  that  we  intend  to  respect  this 
neutrality."  He  added  that  it  'Svould  only  be  in  the  event 
of  this  neutrality  being  violated  by  another  power,  that 
France,  in  order  to  fulfil  her  duties  as  a  guaranteeing 
power,  could  be  led  to  enter  Belgian  territory."  On  August 
2  the  Germans  occupied  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  a 
small  independent  territory  fronting  on  France,  Germany, 
and  Belgium,  the  neutrality  of  which  had  been  guaranteed 
by  the  Powers  in  1867.  At  7  p.  m.  on  the  same  day  the 
German  Government,  through  its  minister  in  Brussels,  ad- 
drest  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  follow- 
ing note  declaring  its  intention  to  invade  that  country: 

*'The  Imperial  Government  has  received  reliable  information  of 
a  prospeclive  march  of  the  Frencli  forces  by  way  of  Maas, 
Strecks,  Givet,  and  Namiir.  They  have  no  doubt  that  the  inten- 
tion of  France  is  to  march  against  Germany  by  Avay  of  Belgian 
territory.  The  Imperial  Government  can  not  avoid  the  fear 
that  Belgium,  in  spite  of  the  best  intentions,  will  not  be  in  a 
position  without  assistance  to  defend  itself  against  the  French 
march,  which  alone  can  give  complete  security  against  the 
danger  threatening  Germany.  It  is  a  necessity  of  self-preserva- 
tion for  Germany  to  parry  this  hostile  attack.  The  German 
Government  would  regret  if  Belgium  should  regard  as  an  act 
of  hostility  the  fact  that  Geraiany  is  obliged  to  violate  Belgian 
territory  on  account  of  the  measures  of  her  enemy.  If  Belgium 
behaves  in  a  friendly  manner  Germany  is  prepared  to  pay  for  all 
the  needs  of  her  troops  and  to  make  good  any  damage  which 
may  be  caused  by  these  troops.  Should  Belgium  be  hostile  to 
Germany  and  particularly  seek  to  hinder  her  advance  by  a 
defense  of  Maas  fortifications  or  by  destruction  of  railways, 
streets,  tunnels,  or  other  artificial  erections,  Germany  will  with 
regret  be  forced  to  regard  Belgium  as  an  enemy." 

On  the  following  day  the  Belgian  Government  rejected 
this  proposal  and  declared  its  intention  to  "oppose  to  the 
uttermost"  a  German  invasion.  Following  is  Belgium's 
official  declaration : 

'* According  to  the  Note  of  August  3  the  German  Government 

170 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

has  been  informed  that,  according-  to  reliable  information,  French 
forces  intend  to  march  across  the  Meuse  by  way  of  Maas, 
Strecks,  Givet  and  Namur,  and  that  Belgium,  in  spite  of  its 
desire,  vvill  not  be  able  to  repulse  without  help  the  French 
troops.  The  German  Government  considers  itself  under  the  obli- 
gation to  prevent  this  attack  and  the  violation  of  Belgian  terri- 
tory. Under  these  conditions  Germany  proposes  to  the  Belgian 
Government  to  take  steps  in  order  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of 
Belgium  and  its  possessions  fully.  The  Note  adds  that,  if  Bel- 
gium makes  difficulties  in  a  march  of  Belgian  troops,  Germany 
will  feel  herself  obliged  to  look  upon  her  as  an  enemy,  and  the 
solution  in  future  between  the  two  States  will  have  to  be  set- 
tled by  force  of  arms. 

''This  Note  has  given  the  Government  of  the  King  a  profound 
and  painful  impression.  The  intentions  which  it  attributes  to 
France  are  contrary  to  the  declaration  by  France  which  has  been 
given  to  us  in  the  name  of  the  Republic.  If,  contrary  to  our 
hope,  a  violation  of  Belgium  neutrality  is  committed  by  France, 
Belgium  will  fulfil  all  her  international  obligations  and  her  army 
will  oppose  the  invader  to  the  uttermost.  The  treaties  of  1839, 
confirmed  by  the  treaties  of  1870,  assured  the  independence  and 
neutrality  of  Belgium  under  the  guaranty  of  the  Powers,  and 
particularly  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia. 

'^ Belgium  has  always  been  true  to  her  international  obliga- 
tions. She  has  fulfilled  them  in  a  spirit  of  impartiality  and  has 
not  neglected  any  effort  to  obtain  or  cause  respect  for  her  neu- 
trality. The  attempt  on  her  independence,  the  menace  of  the 
German  Government,  forms  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  nations. 
The  strategical  interests  do  not  justify  a  violation  of  this  right. 
The  Belgian  Government  by  accepting  the  propositions  which 
were  notified  to  them,  would  sacrifice  the  honor  of  the  nation  and 
would  betray  its  cause  before  Europe.  Conscious  of  the  role  that 
Belgium  has  played  for  eighty  years  in  the  civilization  of  the 
world,  she  refuses  to  believe  that  the  independence  of  Belgium 
could  not  otherwise  be  maintained  than  at  the  expense  of  the 
neutrality  of  the  nation.  If  this  step  is  decided  upon,  the  Bel- 
gian Government  is  determined  to  repel  it  by  all  the  means  in  its 
power  in  order  to  maintain  her  rights." 

The  next  day  the  British  Foreign  Office,  through  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  addrest  to  the  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin 
the  following  note  of  protest  against  a  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  for  eommunication  to  the  German  Government. 
It  was  this  note  that  led  to  the  famous  "scrap  of  paper" 

171 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

incident  in  Berlin,  as  described  in  the  next  chapter,  ''Great 
Britain  Against  Germany": 

''The  King'  of  the  Belgrians  has  made  an  appeal  to  His  Majesty 
for  diplomatic  intervention  on  behalf  of  Belgium  in  the  follow- 
ing terms: 

"  'Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your  Majesty's 
friendship  and  that  of  your  predecessor,  and  the  friendly  atti- 
tude of  England  in  1870  and  the  proof  of  friendship  you  have  just 
given  us  again,  I  make  a  supreme  appeal  to  the  diplomatic  inter- 
vention of  your  Majesty's  Government  to  safeguard  the  integ- 
rity of  Belgium/ 

"His  Majesty's  Government  are  also  informed  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  has  delivered  to  the  Belgian  Government  a 
note  proposing  friendly  neutrality  entailing  free  passage  through 
Belgian  territory,  and  promising  to  maintain  the  independence 
and  integrity  of  the  kingdom  and  its  possessions  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace,  threatening  in  case  of  refusal  to  treat  Belgium  as 
an  enemy.     An  answer  was  requested  within  twelve  hours. 

"We  also  understand  that  Belgium  has  categorically  refused 
this  as  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  law  of  nations.  His  Majesty's 
Government  are  bound  to  protest  against  this  violation  of  a 
treaty  to  which  Germany  is  a  party  in  common  with  them- 
selves, and  must  request  an  assurance  that  the  demand  made 
upon  Belgium  will  not  be  proceeded  with  and  that  her  neutrality 
will  be  respected  by  Germany.  You  should  ask  for  an  immediate 
reply. ' ' 

At  the  same  time,  Sir  Edward  Grey  instructed  the 
British  Minister  in  Brussels  to  inform  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment that  "if  pressure  is  applied  to  it  by  Germany  to  in- 
duce it  to  depart  from  neutrality,"  Great  Britain  would 
expect  Belgium  to  resist  it  by  any  means  in  her  power; 
that  Great  Britain  would  "support  her  in  offering  such 
resistance,"  and  would  be  prepared  to  join  Russia  and 
France  in  offering  to  Belgium  at  once  common  action  "for 
the  purpose  of  resisting  the  use  of  force  by  Germany  against 
her,  and  of  securing  a  guaranty  to  maintain  her  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  in  future  years."  Later  on  the 
same  day,  the  British  Foreign  Office  heard  that  Germany 
had  addrest  a  note  to  Belgium  stating  that  she  would  be 
"compelled  to   carry   out,   if  necessary,   by   force   of   arms, 

172 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

measures  considered  indispensable,"  and  that  Belgian  terri- 
tory had  already  been  violated  on  the  frontier  at  Gem- 
minich. 

Under  these  circumstances,  and  "in  view  of  the  fact  that 
Germany  declined  to  give  the  same  assurance  respecting 
Belgium  as  France  gave  in  reply  to  the  request  made  in 
the  previous  week  simultaneously  at  Berlin  and  Paris,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  said  Great  Britain  "must  ask  that  a  satisfac- 
tory reply  be  received"  by  twelve  o'clock  that  night.  In 
case  such  reply  was  not  received,  Sir  Edward  Goschen  was 
to  ask  for  his  passports,  and  to  say  that  Great  Britain  felt 
bound  "to  take  all  steps  in  her  power  to  uphold  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  and  the  observance  of  a  treaty  to  which 
Germany  is  as  much  a  party  as  ourselves."  Such  were  the 
immediate  circumstances  in  which  Germany  invaded  Bel- 
gium and  which,  nearly  three  weeks  later,  brought  to  the 
Franco-Belgian  frontier  an  English  army  as  an  ally  of 
France  and  Belgium. 

Great  Britain  Against  Germany — The  "Scrap  of  Paper'' 
Episode — August  4,  1914 

Would  Great  Britain  actually  go  to  war?  Since  war  had 
been  declared  by  Germany  against  Russia,  since  war  existed 
between  France  and  Germany,  and  since  Germany  had  de- 
clared war  on  Belgium  and  invaded  her  territory,  that 
question  was  now  paramount.  Great  Britain  hesitated  long. 
There  appears  to  have  been  at  the  time  a  division  in  her 
Cabinet.  Sir  Edward  Grey  led  the  party  which  believed 
Great  Britain's  duty  and  interest  were  to  throw  the  weight 
of  her  navy  at  once  into  the  scales  on  behalf  of  France  and 
Russia.  Lloyd  George  led  the  faction  which  believed  the 
country  could  with  honor  and  advantage  refrain  from  en- 
gaging in  a  European  conflict.  It  was  suggested  that  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  together  might  intervene  at 
a  propitious  moment  to  reduce  to  some  extent  the  horrors 
of  a  Continental  Armageddon.  Rear-Admiral  Mahan,  the 
American  writer  on  naval  history,  at  his  summer  home  on 
Long  Island,  declared  that  Great  Britain  ought  at  once  to 
throw  her  preponderating  fleet  against  Germany,  if  for  no 

173 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

other  purpose  than  to  maintain  her  own  position  as  a  world- 
power.  To  keep  out  of  the  war  meant,  he  said,  to  sacrifice 
her  empire  in  the  next  generation  to  the  interests  of  the 
present.  These  views  from  the  author  of  what  have  been 
called  epoch-making  books  on  the  influence  of  sea-power  in 
history,  attracted  wide  attention. 

On  August  3,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  it  was  officially 
stated  that  the  British  navy  w^ould  mobilize  on  the  follow- 
ing day.  Sir  Edward  Grey  reminded  the  House  that  it  was 
free  to  decide  what  the  British  attitude  should  be,  inasmuch 
as  Great  Britain  thus  far  had  not  committed  herself  to  any- 
thing but  diplomatic  support.  He  requested  the  House  to 
approach  consideration  of  the  crisis  from  the  point  of  view 
of  British  interests,  British  honor,  and  British  obligations. 
When  the  official  documents  were  made  public,  he  said,  it 
would  be  seen  ''how  genuinely  and  whole-heartedly  we  have 
made  efforts  to  preserve  the  peace."  He  had  told  the 
French  and  German  Ambassadors  that,  if  a  war  should  be 
forced  on  France,  public  opinion  in  the  British  Isles  "would 
rally  to  France."  This  part  of  Sir  Edward's  speech  was 
"received  with  loud  cheering."  Sir  Edward  announced 
that  by  telegram  the  King  of  the  Belgians  had  made  a 
supreme  appeal  to  Great  Britain  to  safeguard  the  integrity 
of  Belgium.  Unexpected  cancellation  of  Field-Marshal  Earl 
Kitchener's  expected  return  to  Egypt,  now  announced,  was 
understood  to  be  a  prelude  to  his  appointment  as  Minister 
of  War,  and  this  soon  followed. 

Due  warning,  therefore,  had  been  given  to  Germany  of 
the  intention  of  the  British  navy  to  take  instant  action,  in 
case  a  German  soldier  kept  foot  on  Belgian  soil.  In  spite  of 
this,  and  of  the  prompt  refusal  of  the  Belgian  Government 
to  accept  the  terms  ofifered  by  Germany  as  the  price  of  a 
violation  of  her  neutrality,  German  forces  had  already  pene- 
trated that  buffer  State  at  two  points  in  order  to  reach  the 
French  frontier.  The  British  fleet  had  been  mobilized,  and 
the  mobilization  of  the  British  army  was  taking  place,  but 
no  arrangements  had  yet  been  made  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  send  an  expedition  to  the  Continent.  Sir  Edward 
continued : 


174 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

''The  French  fleet  is  in  the  Mediterranean  and  the  northern 
coasts  of  France  are  defenseless.  If  a  foreign  fleet,  engaged  in 
war  against  France,  shoukl  come  down  and  battle  against  those 
defenseless  coasts,  we  could  not  stand  aside.  We  felt  strongly 
that  France  was  entitled  to  know  at  once  whether,  in  the  event 
of  an  attack  on  her  unprotected  coasts,  she  could  rely  on  our 
support.  I  gave  an  understanding-  to  the  French  Ambassador  last 
night  that,  if  the  German  fleet  goes  into  the  English  Channel,  or 
into  the  North  Sea,  to  attack  French  shipping  or  the  French 
coast,  the  British  fleet  will  give  all  the  protection  in  its  power. 
That  answer  is  subject  to  the  approval  of  Parliament.  It  is  not 
a  deslaration  of  war.  I  understand  that  the  German  Government 
would  be  prepared,  if  we  would  pledge  ourselves  to  neutrality, 
to  agTee  that  its  fleet  would  not  attack  the  northern  coast  of 
France.     That  is  far  too  narrow  an  engagement." 

After  the  House  had  broken  out  into  cheers  at  this  state- 
ment, Sir  Edward  recited  the  history  of  the  negotiations 
concerning  Belgian  neutrality: 

''When  mobilization  began,  I  telegTaphed  to  both  the  French 
and  the  German  Governments,  asking  whether  they  would  respect 
Belgian  neutrality.  France  replied  that  she  was  prepared  to 
do  so  unless  another  Power  violated  that  neutrality.  The  Ger- 
man Foreign  Secretary  replied  that  he  could  not  possibly  give 
a  response  before  consulting  the  Imperial  Chancellor  and  the 
German  Emperor.  He  intimated  that  he  doubted  whether  it  was 
possible  to  give  an  answer,  because  that  answer  would  disclose 
the  German  plans.  We  were  sounded  last  Aveek  as  to  whether, 
if  Belgian  neutrality  were  restored  after  the  war,  it  would  pacify 
us,  and  we  replied  that  we  could  not  barter  our  interests  or  our 
obligations." 

Another  burst  of  cheering  greeted  this  declaration.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  then  read  a  telegram  from  the  King  of  the 
Belgians  to  King  George,  making  a  supreme  appeal  for  dip- 
lomatic intervention  from  England  to  safeguard  the  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium.  Toward  the  close  of  his  speech  he 
said:  "AVe  must  be  prepared  and  we  are  prepared,  to  face 
the  consequences  of  using  all  our  strength  at  any  moment, 
we  know  not  how  soon,  in  order  to  defend  ourselves." 

Andrew  Bonar  Law,  leader  of  the  Opposition,  warmly 
supported  the  Government,  and  referred,  amid  cheers,  to  the 

175 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

pledges  of  support  received  from  British  dominions  beyond 
the  seas.  Loud  cheering  from  all  parts  of  the  House  greeted 
John  E.  Redmond,  the  Irish  Nationalist  leader,  when  he 
assured  the  Government  that  ''every  British  soldier  in 
Ireland  might  be  withdrawn  to-morrow  and  the  coast  of 
Ireland  would  be  defended  against  invasion  by  her  armed 
sons,  the  Catholics  of  the  south  and  the  Protestants  of 
Ulster."  Meanwhile,  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  the  British  Am- 
bassador in  Berlin,  was  making  inquiries  of  the  German 
Government  as  to  its  intentions  toward  Belgium,  the  result 
of  which  finally  led  to  the  formal  rupture  of  diplomatic 
relations  between  the  two  countries.  Sir  Edward  afterward 
wrote  out  his  own  account  of  the  dramatic  "scrap  of  paper" 
scene  in  which  this  rupture  occurred.  It  is  dated  August  8, 
and  begins: 

*'In  accordance  with  the  instructions  contained  in  your  tele- 
gram of  the  4th  inst,  I  called  upon  the  Secretary  of  State  that 
afternoon  and  inquired  in  the  name  of  H.M.  Government  whether 
the  Imperial  Government  would  refrain  from  violating  Belgian 
neutrality.  Herr  von  Jagow  at  once  replied  that  he  was  sorry  to 
say  that  his  answer  must  be  ^^No,"  as  in  consequence  of  German 
troops  having  crossed  the  frontier  that  morning  Belgian  neutral- 
ity had  already  been  violated.  Herr  von  Jagow  again  went  into 
the  reasons  why  the  Imperial  Government  had  been  obliged  to 
take  this  step — namely,  that  they  had  to  advance  into  France  by 
the  quickest  and  easiest  way,  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  well  ahead 
with  their  operations  and  endeavour  to  strike  some  decisive  blow 
as  early  as  possible. 

*'It  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for  them,  as  if  they  had 
gone  by  the  more  southern  route^  they  could  not  have  hoped,  in 
view  of  the  paucity  of  roads  and  the  strength  of  the  fortresses, 
to  have  got  through  without  formidable  opposition,  entailing 
great  loss  of  time.  This  loss  of  time  would  have  meant  time 
gained  for  the  Russians  for  bringing  up  their  troops  to  the  Ger- 
man frontier.  Rapidity  of  action  was  the  great  German  asset, 
while  that  of  Russia  was  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  troops.  I 
pointed  out  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  this  fait  accompli  of  the 
violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier  rendered,  as  he  would  readily 
understand,  the  situation  ex-ceedingly  grave,  and  I  asked  him 
whether  there  was  not  still  time  to  draw  back  and  avoid  possible 

«That  is,  by  Alsace-Lorraine. 

176 


ALBERT,  KING  OF  THE  BELGIANS 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

consequences  which  both  he  and  I  would  deplore.  He  replied 
that  for  the  reasons  he  had  given  me  it  was  now  impossible  for 
them  to  draw  back.'* 

Sir  Edward  Goschen  next  related  how  he  presented  the 
British  ultimatum,  to  which.  Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that 
he  could  give  no  other  answer  than  that  which  he  had 
given  earlier  in  the  day — namely,  that  the  safety  of  the 
German  Empire  rendered  it  absolutely  necessary  that  the 
Imperial  troops  should  advance  through  Belgium.  Sir 
Edward's  report  continues: 

*'In  a  short  conversation  which  ensued  Herr  von  Jagow  ex- 
pressed his  poignant  regret  at  the  crumbling  of  his  entire  policy 
and  that  of  the  Chancellor,  which  had  been  to  make  friends  with 
Great  Britain,  and  then  through  Great  Britain  to  get  closer  to 
France.  I  said  that  this  sudden  end  to  my  work  in  Berlin  was 
to  me  also  a  matter  of  deep  regret  and  disappointment,  but  that 
he  muct  understand  that  under  the  circumstances  and  in  view  of 
our  engagements  his  Majesty's  Government  could  not  possibly 
have  acted  otherwise  than  they  had  done." 

Sir  Edward  Goschen  soon  afterward  saw  the  Chancellor 
and  thus  describes  the  historic  ''scrap  of  paper"  interview 
with  Bethmann-Hollweg : 

''I  founl  the  Chancellor  very  agitated.  His  Excellency  at  once 
began  a  harangue  which  lasted  for  about  twenty  minutes.  He 
said  that  the  step  taken  by  his  Majesty's  Government  was  temble 
to  a  degree.  Just  for  a  word — '^  neutrality " — a  word  which  in 
war  time  had  been  so  often  disregarded — just  for  a  scrap  of  paper 
Great  Britain  was  going  to  make  war  on  a  kindred  nation  who 
desired  nothing  better  than  to  be  friends  with  her.  All  his 
efforts  in  that  direction  had  been  rendered  useless  by  this  last 
terrible  step  and  the  policy  to  which  as  I  knew  he  had  devoted 
himself  since  his  accession  to  office  had  tumbled  down  like  a 
house  of  cards.  What  we  had  done  was  unthinkable.  It  was 
like  striking  a  man  from  behind  while  he  was  fighting  for  his 
life  against  two  assailants.  He  held  Great  Britain  responsible 
for  all  the  terrible  events  that  might  happen. 

''I  protested  strongly  against  that  statement  and  said  that  in 
the  same  way  as  he  and  Herr  von  Jagow  wished  me  to  understand 
that  for  strategical  reasons  it  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to 

177 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Germany  to  advance  through  Belgium  and  violate  the  latter 's 
neutrality,  so  I  would  wish  him  to  understand  that  it  was,  so  to 
speak,  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for  the  honor  of  Great  Britain 
that  she  should  keep  her  solemn  engagement  to  do  her  utmost 
to  defend  Belgium's  neutrality  if  attacked.  That  solemn  com- 
pact simply  had  to  be  kept,  or  what  confidence  could  any  one 
have  in  engagements  given  by  Great  Britain  in  the  future?  The 
Chancellor  said:  ^But  at  what  price  will  that  compact  have  been 
kept?  Has  the  British  Government  thought  of  that?'  I  hinted 
to  his  Excellency  as  plainly  as  I  could  that  fear  of  consequences 
could  hardly  be  regarded  as  an  excuse  for  breaking  solemn  en- 
gagements, but  his  Excellency  was  so  excited,  so  overcome  by  the 
news  of  our  action  and  so  little  disposed  to  hear  reason,  that  I 
refrained  from  adding  fuel  to  the  flame  by  further  argument. 

^'As  I  was  leaving  he  said  that  the  blow  of  Great  Britain  join- 
ing Germany's  enemies  was  all  the  greater  in  that  almost  up  to 
the  last  moment  he  and  his  Government  had  been  working  with 
us  and  supporting  our  efforts  to  maintain  peace  between  Austria 
and  Russia.  I  said  that  this  was  part  of  the  tragedy  which  saw 
the  two  nations  fall  apart  just  at  the  moment  w^hen  the  relations 
between  them  had  been  more  friendly  and  cordial  than  they  had 
been  for  years.  Unfortunately,  notwithstanding  our  efforts  to 
maintain  peace  between  Russia  and  Austria,  the  war  had  spread 
and  had  brought  us  face  to  face  with  a  situation,  if  we  held  to 
our  engagements,  we  could  not  possibly  avoid  and  which,  un- 
fortunately, entailed  our  separation  from  our  late  fellow-workers. 
He  would  readily  understand  that  no  one  regretted  this  more 
than  I. 

''After  this  somewhat  painful  interview  I  returned  to  the 
Embassy  and  drew  up  a  telegraphic  report  of  what  had  passed. 
This  telegram  was  handed  in  at  the  Central  Telegraph  Office  a 
little  before  9  p.m.  It  was  accepted  by  that  office,  but  apparently 
never  despatched. ' ' 

Sir  Edward  Goschen  related  how,  on  the  same  day  as  that 
on  which  the  interview  occurred,  a  Berlin  newspaper  issued 
an  ''extra"  announcing  that  Great  Britain  had  declared 
war  against  Germany,  the  immediate  result  being  "the 
assemblage  of  an  excited  and  unruly  mob  before  the  British 
Embassy."  A  small  force  of  police  sent  to  guard  the 
Embassy  was  soon  overpowered,  and  "the  attitude  of  the 
mob  became  more  threatening."  No  notice  was  taken  by 
the    Embassy    of    this    demonstration    until    there    came    a 

178 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 


crash  of  glass  and  the  landing  of  cobble-stones  in  the  draw- 
ing-room where  all  were  sitting.  Sir  Edward  then  tele- 
phoned to  the  German  Foreign  Office  an  account  of  what 
was  happening.  Herr  von  Jagow  at  once  informed  the 
Chief  of  Police,  and  an  adequate  force  of  mounted  men  was 

sent  with  great  promptness 
and  soon  cleared  the  street  of 
the  disturbance. 

Herr  von  Jagow  afterward 
called  on  Sir  Edward  and 
exprest  regret  at  what  had 
occurred.  The  behavior  of  his 
countrymen  "made  him  feel 
more  ashamed  than  he  had 
words  to  express."  It  was 
"an  indelible  stain  on  the 
reputation  of  Berlin."  Sir 
Edward  declared  that  "no 
apology  could  have  been  more 
full  and  complete."  Next 
morning  the  Emperor  sent 
one  of  his  aides-de-camp  to 
Sir  Edward  with  the  follow- 
ing message: 


Siu  Edward  Goschen 

British  Ambassador  to  Germany  in 
1914,  to  whom  Bethmann-Hollweg 
made  the  "Scrap  of  Paper"  remark 


''The  Emperor  has  charged  me 
to  express  to  your  ExTeellency 
his  regret  for  the  occurrences  of  last  night,  but  to  tell  you  at  the 
same  time  that  you  will  gather  from  these  occurrences  an  idea  of 
the  feelings  of  his  people  respecting  the  action  of  Great  Britain 
in  joining  with  other  nations  against  her  old  allies  of  Waterloo. 
His  Majesty  also  hopes  that  you  will  tell  the  King  that  he  has 
been  proud  of  the  titles  of  British  Field-Marshal  and  British 
Admiral,  but  that  in  consequence  of  what  has  occurred  he  must 
now  at  once  divest  himself  of  those  titles. ' ' 


The  message,  said  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  "lost  none  of 
its  acerbity  by  the  manner  of  its  delivery."  About  eleven 
o'clock  on  the  same  morning  an  official  handed  Sir 
Edward  his  passports,  which  he  had  earlier  in  the  day  de- 
manded in  writing,  and  said  he  had  been  instructed  to  con- 


179 


OUTBREAK  AND  .CAUSES 

fer  with  Sir  Edward  as  to  the  route  he  should  follow  in  his 
return  to  England: 

''He  said  that  he  had  understood  that  I  preferred  the  route 
via  the  Hook  of  Holland  to  that  via  Copenhagen.  Tney  had 
therefore  arranged  that  I  should  go  by  the  former  route,  only  I 
should  have  to  wait  till  the  following  morning.  I  agreed  to  this, 
and  he  said  that  I  might  be  quite  assured  that  there  would  be  no 
repetition  of  the  disgraceful  scenes  of  the  preceding  night,  as 
full  precautions  would  be  taken.  He  added  that  they  were  doing 
all  in  their  power  to  have  a  restaurant-car  attached  to  the  train, 
but  it  was  rather  a  difficult  matter.  He  also  brought  me  a 
charming  letter  from  Herr  von  Jagow,  couched  in  the  most 
friendly   terms." 

Sir  Edward  added  to  his  report  an  account  of  his  de- 
parture from  Berlin  on  the  following  morning.  Beyond 
patriotic  songs  and  a  ''few  jeers  and  insulting  gestures  at 
the  stations,"  he  and  his  staff  had  nothing  to  complain  of 
on  their  long  and  tedious  journey.  He  closed  his  report 
with  praise  of  the  American  Ambassador: 

''I  should  also  like  to  mention  the  gTeat  assistance  rendered  to 
us  all  by  my  American  colleague,  Mr.  Gerard,  and  his  staff.  Un- 
deterred by  the  hooting  and  hisses  with  which  he  was  often 
greeted  by  the  mob  on  entering  and  leaving  the  Embassy,  his 
Excellency  came  repeatedly  to  see  me  to  ask  how  he  could  help  us 
and  to  make  arrangements  for  the  safety  of  stranded  British  sub- 
jects. He  extricated  many  of  these  from  extremely  difficult  situa- 
tions at  some  personal  risk  to  himself,  and  his  calmness  and 
savoir-faire  and  his  firmness  in  dealing  with  the  Imperial  authori- 
ties gave  full  assurance  that  the  protection  of  British  subjects  and 
interests  could  not  have  been  left  in  more  efficient  and  able 
hands." 

Dudley  "Ward,  a  passenger  on  Sir  Edward *s  train,  wrote 
of  ''the  amazing  changes"  which  a  declaration  of  war  by 
Great  Britain  produced  in  Berlin.  Throughout  the  crisis 
the  English  "had  been  exceedingly  popular  in  Berlin,  but 
when  news  spread  that  England  was  to  wage  war  on  Ger- 
many, it  seemed  as  if  the  nerves  of  the  populace  collapsed 
completely   under   the   awful   strain."     It   was  more   than 

180 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

panic  that  ensued;  it  was  'Vild,  rampant  hatred  against 
what  they  thought  the  treachery  of  England."  What  had 
been  a  silent  crowd  in  Unter  den  Linden  "changed  in  a 
moment  into  a  howling,  shrieking  mob  which  swept  around 
the  corner  of  Wilhelmstrasse  to  the  English  Embassy." 
Serious  damage  was  prevented  only  by  the  arrival  of 
mounted  police,  but  the  British  Embassy  "was  practically 
beleaguered  till  far  into  the  night."  Englishmen  were 
roughly  handled.  Many  were  brought  up  on  specific  charges 
of  espionage.  The  American  Ambassador,  Mr.  Gerard,  had 
taken  charge  of  English  subjects  and  "let  it  be  clearly  seen 
what  would  be  the  effect  of  such  medieval  practises  upon 
American  opinion."^ 

Neutrality  Declared  By  Italy 

^  Germany  and  Austria  now  asked  Italy  to  fulfil  her  obliga- 
tions to  them  as  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  but  the 
Italian  Foreign  Office  maintained  that,  as  Germany  and 
Austria  were  not  engaged  in  a  defensive,  but  in  an  offensive, 
war,  having  each  and  separately  declared  war,  Italy,  under 
the  terms  of  the  treaty,  was  not  bound  to  support  them  and 
therefore  she  would  remain  neutral.  Pressure  on  Italy  to 
adhere  to  the  alliance  was  applied  by  the  German  and 
Austrian  Governments,  and  amounted  in  the  end,  it  was  said, 
to  something  like  an  ultimatum,  and  included  an  offer  of 
French  territory  in  North  Africa  in  case  they  succeeded  in 
the  war.  Italy,  however,  reaffirmed  her  neutrality  and 
called  to  their  colors  the  first  and  second  lines  of  her  troops. 
In  the  Giornale  delV  Italia,  an  Italian  paper  published  in 
New  York,  appeared  in  August  a  spirited  article  in  which 
Italy  was  declared  to  have  a  full  right  to  remain  neutral: 

"Italy  has  to-day  refused  the  offers  of  territory  made  her  by 
Germany,  on  condition  that  she  would  take  the  field  against 
France  and  England,  just  as  in  1870  she  refused  the  much  more 
tempting  offers  made  to  induce  her  to  join  arms  with  Germany 
against  the  French.     Italy  has  never  gained  any  advantage  from 

^Principal  sources:  Associated  Press  Dispatches,  The  Manchester  Exam- 
iner, The  New  York  Times,  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  and  official  docu- 
ments. 

181 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

the  Triple  Alliance.  The  conquest  of  Libya  was  accomplished  in 
spite  of  the  ill-concealed  hostility  of  Austria  and  Germany. 
Many  may  not  be  aware,  or  have  forgotten,  that,  while  Italy  was 
at  war  with  Turkey,  having  England  on  one  side  and  France  on 
the  other  she  was  subjected  to  many  impositions.  Austria 
assumed  an  attitude  of  hostility,  in  order  to  prevent  Italy  from 
striking  a  blow  as  she  was  justified  in  doing,  at  her  enemy  in  the 
latter 's  European  possessions,  a  course  of  action  which  prolonged 
the  war  to  our  serious  inconvenience  and  loss.  Whoever  may 
forget  these  circumstances,  w^e  shall  never." 

Such  were  conditions  early  in  August.  A  month  later 
there  was  clamor  in  Italy  for  war  with  Austria.  "Day  by 
day,  almost  hour  by  hour,"  wrote  John  Priolean  to  the 
London  Daily  Mail  from  Bari,  Italy,  "the  situation  grows 
more  critical."  While  the  country  clung  tenaciously  to  her 
declared  neutrality,  he  believed,  "The  hour  when  the  best 
laid  plans  of  her  statesmen"  would  be  swept  away  on  the 
tide  of  war  was  "drawing  perilously  near."  Mr.  Priolean 
said  further: 

^^One  of  the  most  potent  factors  in  the  whole  position  is  the 
question  of  the  unemployed.  Every  Aveek  hundreds  of  workers 
are  turned  out  from  the  closing  factories  into  the  streets  of 
the  great  cities  to  swell  the  army  of  malcontents  whose  unceas- 
ing cry  is  'War.'  When  I  first  reached  Italy,  on  the  outbreak 
of  war,  less  than  a  month  ago,  the  specter  of  unemployment  had 
scarcely  more  than  begun  to  show,  except  in  a  few  scattered 
places,  but  now  it  stalks  through  every  town.  The  streets  of 
Milan,  Rome,  Venice,  and  Turin,  grow  weekly  more  and  more 
crowded  with  the  hungry,  sullen-eyed,  desperate  army  of  the 
destitute.  Those  who  know  Venice  in  times  of  peace  would 
hardly  recognize  her  now.  The  narrow,  winding  streets,  the 
quays,  and  squares  are  filled  with  the  out-of-work,  and  at  night 
the  plinths  of  the  Campanile  and  the  column  of  the  Lion  of  St. 
Mark,  every  pillar  of  the  colonnades  round  the  Plaza,  even  the 
chairs  outside  the  cafes,  give  rest  to  these  miserable  waifs,  these 
withered  leaves  blown  before  the  gale  of  war.  It  is  these  and 
the  terrible  power  which  lies  behind  them  that  account  for  Italy 's 
deepest  anxiety  to-day.  It  may  fall  to  them  to  take  the  decision, 
and  not  to  the  statesmen  of  the  Quirinal. 

''Down  here,  opposite  that  dismembered  land  of  Albania,  the 
kingdom   of   many   rulers   and    of   no   King,   one   hears   little   war 

182 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

talk  ex'eept  about  Valona,^  the  prize  which  Italy  desires  even  more 
than  Trieste  and  Trent.  For  weeks  past  the  popular  cry  has 
been,  'We  must  have  Valona.'  Trieste,  Trent,  and  the  big 
palaces  of  Istria,  all  that  they  once  held,  the  Italians  naturally 
regard  as  a  kind  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  but  from  what  I  have  been 
able  to  learn  in  talking  with  men  of  every  position  in  the  coun- 
try, they  place  Valona  far  higher  in  the  scale  of  commercial 
and  political  value. 

''Valona  is  the  best  port  on  the  Adriatic  and  the  key  to  the 
markets  of  the  Balkans.  Italy,  in  her  neAv  and  solid  prosperity, 
must  find  fresh  and  unencumbered  outlets  for  her  manufactures. 
Tripoli  is  not  yet  fit  to  offer  help,  but  loAver  Albania  is  the  door 
to  the  Near  East,  and  in  the  possession  of  Valona  lies  the  possi- 
bility of  a  Greater  Italy  undreamt  of  a  score  of  years  ago. 

"War  is  not  yet  declared — perhaps  will  never  be  declared. 
But  as  the  days  pass  and  the  hideous  tragedy  of  Europe  goes 
upon  its  course  in  eastern  France,  as  the  German  power  slowly 
crumbles  before  the  armies  of  the  Allies,  as  Russia  drives  her 
way  deep  into  Austria  and  Prussia,  the  possibility  of  Italy's 
isolation  steadily  receded  in  the  eyes  of  the  people." 

As  weeks  passed,  this  war  spirit  in  Italy  gradually  sub- 
sided, but  late  in  September  word  came  that  "the  pot  was 
boiling  over  once  more  in  Albania."  The  situation  became 
so  serious  that  intervention  by  Italy  at  one  time  seemed  not 
unlikely.  Intervention  in  Albania  would  have  meant  a 
declaration  of  war  by  Austria.  A  necessity  for  "protecting 
Italian  interests  in  Albania"  could  then  probably  have 
furnished  a  sufficient  pretext  to  Italy  for  taking  a  definite 
side  in  the  war. 

It  appeared  that  in  Durazzo  the  Senate  of  Albania,  de- 
fying the  Powers,  had  elected  Prince  Burhan-Eddin,  a  son 
of  Abdul  Hamid,  the  deposed  Sultan  of  Turkey,  Prince  of 
Albania  in  place  of  the  unlucky  William  of  Weid.  Simul- 
taneously Essad  Pasha,  the  popular  leader  in  Albania,  pre- 
pared to  march  on  Durazzo  and  there  was  more  than  a  hint 
that  Essad  was  playing  Italy's  game.  His  revolt  was 
thought  to  be,  not  only  a  development  of  Italy's  policy  of 
obstructing  Albanian  nationality,  but  was  intended  to  offer 
Italy    an    acceptable    pretext    for    definitely    intervening    in 

8  Valona  (also  written  Avlona)  is  opposite  Otranto.  Here  the  Adriatic 
becomes  narrowed  and  is  known  as  the  Strait  of  Otranto. 

183 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


Albanian  affairs.  Meanwhile,  the  pressure  of  public  opinion 
in  Italy  increased.  Each  day  found  the  Government's  posi- 
tion more  delicate  and  the  comments  of  influential  citizens 
became  bolder,  and  more  aggressive.  Italy's  army  and  navy 
were  ready.  All  that  was  needed  was  a  respectable  pre- 
text. 

A  few  days  later  other  incidents  threatened  to  precipitate 
a  conflict.  One  was  the  destruction  of  an  Italian  fishing 
boat  with  its  crew  of  nine,  and  another  the  reported  sinking 

in  the  Adriatic  of  an  Italian 
torpedo  boat  by  Austrian 
mines.  The  Italian  Ambassa- 
dor at  Vienna  was  instructed 
to  draw  the  serious  attention 
of  Austria  to  these  occur- 
rences and  to  ask  that  ade- 
quate measures  be  taken  to 
prevent  their  recurrence. 
]\Ieanwhile,  confirmation  was 
given  to  earlier  statements  as 
to  the  calling  to  the  colors  of 
certain  classes  of  Italian  re- 
serves which  would  have  given 
Italy  1,390,000  men  in  arms. 

Austria's  reply  to  the  pro- 
test was  a  note,  in  which  it 
deplored  the  sinking  of  Italian 
ships  by  Austrian  mines  and 
agreed  to  an  immediate  pay- 
ment of  an  indemnity  of 
$1,000,000  to  the  families  of 
the  seventeen  victims  of  the 
disasters.  Austria's  action  removed  what  had  seemed  to  be  a 
casus  belli.  Navigation  of  the  Adriatic  and  Ionian  seas  was 
then  forbidden  by  the  Italian  Government,  until  the 
numerous  derelict  Austrian  mines  had  been  picked  up  or 
destroyed.  Italian  torpedo-boats  were  sent  out  for  that 
purpose.  Thus,  for  the  time  being,  was  war,  between  Italy 
and  the  Teutonic  Powers  avoided.  It  was  not  until  May 
of  the  following  year  that  Italy  definitely  cast  her  lot  with 


Prince  von  Buelow 

A  former  Chancellor  of  the  German 
Empire  who,  late  in  1914,  was  sent 
to  Italy,  where  he  failed  to  effect  a 
settlement  between  that  country  and 
Austria 


184 


LONDON  CROWDS  AWAITING  W^AR  NEWS 

Part  of  the  vast  crowd  which  gathered  about  Buckingham  Palace  in  London, 
on  the  night  of  August  4,  1914,  awaiting  news  that  Great  Britain  had 
declared  war  on  Germany.  The  crowd  was  described  at  the  time  as  "one 
seething  mass  of  humanity,  surging  down  Constitution  Hill  and  around 
the  palace  gates  cheering  with  all  its  might" 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

the  Allies,  as  detailed  on  later  pages.^  Meanwhile,  Germany 
had  sent  to  Italy  Prince  von  Buelow,  a  former  Chancellor  of 
the  empire,  married  to  an  Italian  wife,  believing  he  would 
be  able  to  restrain  Italy  from  going  over  to  the  Entente 
Allies. 

Japan  Against  Germany — August  23,  1914 — Other 
Declarations 

Japan  *s  declaration  against  Germany  was  not  made  until 
August  23.  Several  days  before  she  had  sent  to  Germany 
an  ultimatum,  demanding  delivery  to  her  of  the  entire 
Chinese  territory  of  Kaiochow,  then  held  by  Germany  under 
a  long  lease,  Japan  having  in  view  its  eventual  restoration 
to  China.  Japan  took  this  bold  step  after  consultation  w4tli 
Great  Britain.  Under  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1892  (renewed  in  August,  1905,  and  again  in  July, 
1911),  the  British  and  Japanese  Governments  had  agreed 
that  ''whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  either  Great  Britain  or 
Japan,  any  of  the  rights  and  interests  referred  to  in  the 
preamble  of  this  agreement  are  in  jeopardy,  the  two  Gov- 
ernments will  communicate  with  one  another  fully  and 
frankly,  and  will  consider  in  common  the  measures  which 
should  be  taken  to  safeguard  those  menaced  rights  or  in- 
terests. ' ' 

The  interest  of  Japan  in  Kiaochow  dated  from  the  Chino- 
Japanese  War  of  1894-5,  which  was  concluded  by  a  treaty 
that  gave  to  Japan  the  Liaotung  peninsula.  This  treaty 
was  upset  later  by  the  action  of  Russia,  France,  and  Ger- 
many, in  forming  what  was  known  as  the  Triple  Alliance  in 
the  Far  East,  which  deprived  Japan  of  the  fruits  of  her 
victory.  Great  Britain  is  understood  to  have  refused  to 
take  part  in  this  spoliation,  but  Japan  was  forced  to  yield, 
and  the  nation  burned  with  indignation.  Her  resentment 
grew  stronger  when,  within  three  years,  she  saw  Germany 
installed  in  Kiaochow,  in  virtue  of  a  ninety-nine  years  ^  lease 
extorted  from  China,  and  Russia  established  on  the  Liaotung 
peninsula  in  a  fortified  position  at  Port  Arthur. 

9 Principal  sources;  The  Literary  Digest,  The  New  York  World,  Tiie  New 
York  Sun. 


V  T— 12 


185 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Before  the  war  of  1914  began,  the  press  of  Japan  had 
exprest  a  wish  that  the  great  conflict  would  not  drag  Japan 
into  it.  Papers  were  cautious  in  commenting  on  the  re- 
lations between  Japan  and  England,  but  intimated  that,  if 
England  entered  the  conflict,  Japan  could  not  shirk  the  re- 
sponsibility which  her  Treaty  of  Alliance  with  England 
placed  upon  her.  Leading  Japanese  journals,  in  emphasiz- 
ing Japan's  obligations  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  re- 
called the  moral  support  which  England  extended  to  Japan 
during  her  war  against  Russia.  Some  were  frank  enough  to 
admit  that  Japan  had  seized  on  the  present  opportunity  in 
order  to  ''get  even  with  Germany."  The  German  inter- 
ference of  1895  had  been  the  first  in  a  long  string  of  events 
calculated  to  alienate  Japanese  sympathy  from  Germany. 
They  led  the  Japanese  to  conclude  that  Germany  was  dan- 
gerous to  them,  and  co  they  took  the  first  opportunity  to 
destroy  the  German  base  in  China. 

Immediately  after  England  entered  into  war,  a  number 
of  British  merchant-vessels  in  the  Far  East  were  either 
chased  or  captured  by  German  cruisers,  while  a  vessel  of  the 
Russian  Volunteer  Fleet  was  captured  by  a  German  warship 
in  waters  within  Japanese  jurisdiction.  These  incidents  were 
interpreted  by  Japan  and  England  as  a  menace  to  the  ''gen- 
eral peace"  of  the  Far  East,  and  to  the  "special  interests" 
of  England  and  Japan  in  that  region.  Thus,  they  afforded 
to  Japan  an  immediate  occasion  for  sending  an  ultimatum 
to  Germany.  Nor  had  the  Japanese  forgotten  the  Kaiser's 
historic  picture  of  the  "Yellow  Peril"  in  which  an  Oriental 
people,  presumably  the  Japanese,  were  painted  as  tramping 
across  the  Asian  continent  and  invading  Europe.-^*^ 

Other  declarations  of  war  occurred  in  those  days  of  swift- 
moving  events — Austria  against  Russia  on  August  6, 
Montenegro  against  Austria  on  August  8;  France  against 
Austria  on  August  1  ^ ;  INTontenegro  against  Germany  on 
August  12 ;  Great  Britain  against  Austria  on  August  13 ; 
Austria  against  Japan  on  August  25 ;  Portugal,  on  August  8, 
announced  her  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  which  was  in- 
evitable, since  her  commercial  relations  to  Great  Britain 
almost  make  her  a  part  of  the  British  Empire.     More  than 

i**  Principal  Sources  :  The  London  Times,  and  The  Literary  Digest. 

180 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

a  year  later  she  seized  German  ships  in  her  harbor  and  then 
Germany  formally  declared  war  on  her.  So  also  of  Monaco, 
the  small  independent  principality  in  the  south  of  France, 
in  which  Monte  Carlo  is  situated — her  declaration  naturally 
followed  that  of  France.  The  same  was  true  in  May,  1915, 
of  San  Marino,  that  tiny  ancient  republic  in  Italy;  she 
naturally  followed  Italy  into  the  strife. 

President  Wilson's  Appeal  to  His  ''Fellow 
Countrymen'* — August  18,  1914 

As  soon  as  Germany  had  declared  war  on  Russia,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  issued  a  proclamation  of  neutrality  for  the 
United  States.  During  the  first  fortnight  of  the  war  dis- 
cussion of  its  causes  and  of  those  who  were  thought  to  be 
responsible  for  it,  was  prevalent  among  all  classes  in 
America.  Citizens  born  in  the  countries  engaged  in  war, 
and  other  citizens  born  here  but  whose  parents  were  born 
abroad,  not  infrequently  made  public  demonstrations  of 
their  sympathies,  some  going  so  far  as  to  parade  in  public 
with  the  flags  of  their  ancestral  nations.  Then  came  news 
of  the  warlike  attitude  of  Japan  toward  Germany,  which 
led  to  much  anxiety  as  to  what  effect  this  would  have  on 
the  position  of  the  United  States. 

On  August  18  President  Wilson,  following  a  long  session 
of  the  Cabinet,  issued  a  solemn  appeal  to  all  citizens,  calling 
upon  them  to  use  their  utmost  endeavors  to  refrain  from 
any  act  or  expression  that  might  be  construed  into  offensive 
partizanship  by  any  nation  engaged  in  the  conflict.  The 
extreme  probability  of  war  between  Germany  and  Japan 
was  shown  in  official  information  from  Ambassador  Gerard 
that  the  Japanese  Ambassador  in  Berlin  had  asked  him  to 
be  prepared  to  take  charge  of  Japanese  interests  in  Ger- 
many.   Following  is  President  Wilson 's  appeal  of  August  18 : 

My  Fellow  Countrymen. — I  suppose  that  every  thoughtful 
man  in  America  has  asked  himself  during  the  last  troubled  weeks 
what  influence  the  European  war  may  ex'ert  upon  the  United 
States,  and  I  take  the  liberty  of  addressing  a  few  words  to  you 
in  order  to  point  out  that  it  is  entirely  within  our  own  choice 
what  its  effects  upon  us  will  be  and  to  urge  very  earnestly  upon 

187 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

you  the  sort  of  speech,  and  conduct  which  will  best  safeguard  the 
nation   against  distress   and   disaster. 

The  effect  of  the  war  upon  the  United  States  will  depend  upon 
Avhat  American  citizens  say  and  do.  Every  man  who  really  loves 
America  will  act  and  speak  in  the  true  spirit  of  neutrality,  which 
is  the  spirit  of  impartiality  and  fairness  and  friendliness  to  all 
concerned. 

The  spirit  of  the  nation  in  this  critical  matter  will  be  deter- 
mined largely  by  what  individuals  and  society  and  those  gathered 
in  public  meetings  do  and  say,  upon  what  newspapers  and  maga- 
zines contain,  upon  what  our  ministers  utter  in  their  pulpits  and 
men  proclaim  as  their  opinions  on  the  streets. 

^'The  people  of  the  United  States  are  drawn  from  many  nations, 
and  chiefly  from  the  nations  now  at  war.  It  is  natural  and  inevi- 
t..ble  that  there  should  be  the  utmost  variety  of  sympathy  and 
desire  among  them  with  regard  to  the  issues  and  circumstances  of 
the  conflict.  Some  will  wish  one  nation,  others  another,  to  suc- 
ceed in  the  momentous  struggle. 

'^It  will  be  easy  to  excite  passion  and  difficult  to  allay  it.  Those 
responsible  for  exciting  it  will  assume  a  heavy  responsibility; 
responsibility  for  no  less  a  thing  than  that  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  whose  love  of  their  country  and  whose  loyalty  to 
its  government  should  unite  them  as  Americans  all,  bound  in 
honor  and  affection  to  think  first  of  her  and  her  interests,  may 
be  divided  in  camps  of  hostile  opinions,  hot  against  each  other, 
involved  in  the  war  itself  in  impulse  and  opinion,  if  not  in  action. 

^'Such  diversions  among  us  would  be  fatal  to  our  peace  of 
mind  and  might  seriously  stand  in  the  way  of  the  proper  perform- 
ance of  our  duty  as  the  one  great  nation  at  peace,  the  one  people 
holding  itself  ready  to  play  a  part  of  impartial  mediation  and 
speak  the  counsels  of  peace  and  accommodation,  not  as  a  partizan, 
but  as  a  friend. 

''I  venture,  therefore,  my  fellow  countrymen,  to  speak  a  solemn 
word  of  warning  to  you  against  that  deepest,  most  subtle,  most 
essential  breach  of  neutrality  which  may  spring  out  of  partizan- 
ship,  out  of  passionately  taking  sides. 

^'The  United  States  must  be  neutral  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name 
during  these  days  that  are  to  try  men's  souls.  We  must  be 
impartial  in  thought  as  well  as  action,  must  put  a  curb  upon  our 
sentiments  as  Avell  as  upon  every  transaction  that  might  be  con- 
strued as  a  preference  of  one  party  to  the  struggle  before  an- 
other. 

''My  thought  is,  of  America.  I  am  speaking,  I  feel  sure,  the 
earnest  wish  and  purpose  of  every  thoughtful  American  that  this 

188 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

great  country  of  ours,  which  is,  of  course,  the  first  in  our  thoughts 
and  in  our  hearts,  should  show  herself  in  this  time  of  peculiar 
trial  a  nation  fit  beyond  others  to  exhibit  the  fine  poise  of  undis- 
turbed judgment,  the  dignity  of  self-control,  the  efficiency  of  dis- 
passionate action,  a  nation  that  neither  sits  in  judgment  upon 
others  nor  is  disturbed  in  her  own  counsels  and  w^hich  keeps  her- 
self fit  and  free  to  do  what  is  honest  and  disinterested  and  truly 
serviceable  for  the  peace  of  the  world. 

^' Shall  we  not  resolve  to  put  upon  ourselves  the  restraint  which 
will  bring  to  our  people  the  happiness  and  the  great  and  lasting 
influence  for  peace  we  covet  for  "^hem?" 

The  Allies  Form  a  New  Bond  op  Union — 
September  5,  1914 

On  September  5  an  announcement  v^as  made  that,  on  the 
day  before,  Russia,  France,  and  Great  Britain  had  entered 
into  an  agreement  by  which  no  one  of  them  would  sign  a 
treaty  of  peace  until  each  of  the  others  had  agreed  to  it. 
Following  are  the  terms  of  this  agreement,  or  protocol,  as 
signed  in  London  by  the  representatives  of  the  Triple 
Entente : 

^*The  undersigned,  duly  authorized  thereto  by  their  respective 
Governments,  hereby  declare  as  follows:  The  British,  French 
and  Russian  Governments  mutually  agree  not  to  conclude  peace 
separately  during  the  present  war.  The  three  Governments  agTee 
that  when  the  terms  of  peace  come  to  be  discust,  no  one  of  the 
Allies  will  demand  conditions  of  peace  without  the  previous  agree- 
ment of  each  of  the  Allies. 
**  Signed: 

E.  Grey, 

{British  Secretary/  for  Foreign  Affairs), 
Paul  Cambox, 

(French  Ambassador  to   Great  Britain), 
Benckendorff, 

{Russian  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain)  J* 

A  significani  "scrap  of  paper''  was  this  protocol.  At 
least  it  was  so  regarded  by  the  press  of  this  country  and 
England  and  in  official  circles  in  Washington  and  London. 
It  virtually  meant  that  the  Triple  Entente  had  become  a 
Triple  Alliance,  and  that  the  Allies  had  committed  them- 

189 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

selves  to  a  ''war  to  the  finish/*  It  was  on  this  phase  that 
comment  mainly  dealt.  A  British  Foreign  Office  authority 
said  to  the  London  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Times: 

"The  Allies  are  absolutely  determined  to  stand  together  in 
this  war  for  freedom,  fighting  together  for  the  right  and  to  van- 
quish an  enemy  who  threatens  the  whole  world.  Until  thrown 
together  by  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  the  Entente  had  been  a 
rather  loosely  constructed  organization,  with  no  definite  under- 
taking, as  far  as  England  was  concerned,  to  join  with  the  others  in 
military  operations  against  any  enemy.  The  French  and  Russians 
were  pledged  to  assist  each  other  but  England  was  not.  Now  the 
more  or  less  informal  Entente  of  the  three  countries  becomes  an 
absolute  alliance,  with  each  pledged  to  cooperation  in  war  as  well 
as  politics." 

''Neutral  countries,"  said  the  London  Daily  Chronicle, 
"now  know  definitely  where  things  are!"  They  could  be 
assured  that  "whatever  allowance  must  be  left  for  the  un- 
foreseen, London,  Paris  and  Petrograd  had  reached  a  general 
agreement  as  to  the  lines  upon  which  Europe  should  be 
reconstructed."  The  five  weeks  which  had  intervened  be- 
tween the  outbreak  of  war  and  the  signing  of  this  treaty 
had  not  been  spent  by  the  diplomatists  "in  merely  drafting 
the  two  short  clauses  of  which  its  text  consists."  The  Lon- 
don Times  wished  it  understood  that  there  was  nothing  new 
in  this  officially  exprest  determination  of  the  Allies  to  perse- 
vere together: 

"We  have  all  entered  into  this  war  for  the  sake  of  the  peace 
that  we  mean  to  make  after  it,  so  that,  in  the  words  used  in  the 
memorable  declaration  by  Dr.  Eliot,  ex-President  of  Harvard 
University,  4t  may  mean  the  end  of  militarism.'  But  while  we 
know  this  well  enough,  Germany  did  not  know  it.  She  believed 
that  when  France  suffered  a  certain  amount  from  her  brutal- 
ity, she  would  forget  evervthing  but  that  suffering  and  would  make 
peace  on  what  the  Germans  are  pkased  to  call  easy  terms,  and 
even,  perhaps,  be  grateful  to  Germany  because  these  terms  were  no 
worse. ' ' 

In  the  eyes  of  most  newspaper  editors  in  this  country,  the 
new   agreement   meant  merely   "the   inevitable   prolongation 

190 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

of  the  war  to  the  bitter  end,'*  and  for  the  time  being,  meant 
the  slaughter  of  so  many  more  thousands  of  German  work- 
ing men,  French  shopkeepers  and  Russian  peasants.  The 
New  York  Press  and  the  Tribune  thought  it  well  for  the 
world  that  the  war  should  be  fought  out  to  the  defeat  of 
Germany,  for  if  *' militaristic"  Germany  succeeded  they 
could  not  conceive  how  ''anything  more  than  an  armed 
truce"  was  possible.  Calm  observers  outside  of  New  York 
preferred  to  accept  the  new  agreement  as  an  indication  that 
the  war  might  last  three  years,  rather  than  six  months. 


John  E.  Redmond  A.  Boxar  Law 

When  Great  Britain  declared  war  on  Germany,  Bonar  Law,  tlien  Con- 
servative Leader  in  the  House  of  Commons,  warmly  supported  the  Gov- 
ernment, composed  as  it  was  of  Liberals  under  Mr.  Asquith  as  Prime 
Minister.  Mr.  Redmond,  the  Irish  leader,  at  the  same  time  declared  that 
"every  British  soldier  in  Ireland  might  now  be  withdrawn,"  such  was  the 
loyalty  Great  Britain  could  expect  from  Ireland 


191 


II 

OTHER  STATES  EVENTUALLY  DRAWN  INTO 
THE   CONFLICT 

Russia  Against   Bulgaria — Bulgaria  Against   Serbia — 
Affairs  in  Greece 

October  4,  1915 — October  8,  1915 

THE  participation  of  the  Balkan  States  in  the  war  seemed 
imminent  as  far  back  as  May,  1915,  when  Italy  joined  the 
Triple  Entente,  making  it  thereafter  the  Quadruple  Entente. 
But  the  summer  came  and  passed,  with  no  step  actually 
taken  for  war.  The  common  opinion  was  that  Roumania 
and  Bulgaria,  being  almost  wholly  agricultural  countries, 
were  waiting  to  gather  their  harvests  and  that,  later  in  the 
year,  they  would  engage  in  the  conflict  followed  perhaps  by 
Greece.  Bulgaria  became  the  first  to  move,  when  late  in 
September  she  issued  a  decree  of  mobilization.  Three  days 
later  the  Greek  Government  issued  a  similar  decree.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  at  this  time  made  a  memorable  statement  in 
the  British  House  of  Commons.  As  long  as  the  Bulgarian 
attitude  was  unaggressive,  he  said,  there  would  be  no  dis- 
turbance of  her  friendly  relations  with  Great  Britain;  but 
"if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Bulgarian  mobilization  were  to 
result  in  Bulgaria  assuming  an  aggressive  attitude  on  the 
side  of  our  enemies,  we  are  prepared  to  give  to  our  friends 
in  the  Balkans  all  the  support  in  our  power  in  the  manner 
that  would  be  most  welcome  to  them,  in  concert  with  our 
Allies,  without  reserve  and  without  qualification." 

The  Bulgarian  army,  including  all  men  under  fifty  years 
of  age,  comprised  a  total  of  perhaps  750,000  men,  but  not 
more  than  a  third  of  that  number  were  expected  to  be  put 
into  the  field,  and  even  that  number  would  be  more  than  she 
had  used  in  1912  in  the  war  against  Turkey.     In  addition, 

192 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 


there  were  sixty  thousand  Bulgars  from  Macedonia  and 
from  regions  that  were  annexed  by  Serbia  and  Greece  in 
1913,  who  responded  to  the  order  and  so  left  their  homes 
in  order  to  join  an  army  that  was  designed  to  invade  the 
country  in  which  they  had  lived.  Bulgarian  troops  were 
at  once  massed  on  the  Serbian 
frontier,  whence  they  were  ex- 
pected eventually  to  strike  at 
Nish,  the  war  capital,  or  cut 
the  railroad  leading  to  Salon- 
ica,  which  would  isolate  Serbia 
from  Greece  and  from  the 
Allies. 

Before  mobilization  was 
ordered.  King  Ferdinand,  al- 
ready believed  to  be  pro-Ger- 
man and  perhaps  committed 
to  the  German  cause,  had  met 
in  conference  leading  men  of 
all  Bulgarian  parties.  By  the 
opposition  he  was  warned  that 
he  would  make  a  mistake  in 
taking  the  side  of  the  Central 
Powers,  and  was  asked  to  form 
a  coalition  cabinet.  Address- 
ing M.  Stambolinski,  the 
Agrarian  leader,  King  Ferdi- 
nand asked  about  the  harvest,  to  which  M.  Stambolinski  re- 
plied, and  then  added :  ' '  This  is  not  the  moment  for  talking 
of  such  things  with  a  view  to  war.  I  repeat  once  more  to  your 
Majesty,"  said  he,  *'that  Bulgaria  does  not  want  a  repetition 
of  the  policy  of  adventure  which  cost  us  so  much  in  1913. 
That  policy  of  adventure  was  your  Majesty's  personal  policy. 
You  took  advantage  of  the  defects  in  the  Constitution  to 
impose  your  policy  on  the  country;  your  Ministers  are 
ciphers;  you  alone  rule  Bulgaria.  Before  1913  we  thought 
you  were  a  great  diplomatist,  but  then  we  saw  what  your 
diplomacy  was  worth."  To  this  rebuke  King  Ferdinand 
responded  coldly,  saying,  ''The  policy  which  I  have  decided 
to  pursue  is  the  one  which  I  regard  as  the  best  and  most 


Ferdixaxd  of  Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha 
Who  was  King  (or  Czar)  of  Bul- 
garia until  the  end  of  the  war, 
when  he  abdicated  and  returned 
to  Germany  to  devote  himself  to 
botany 


193 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

profitable  for  Bulgaria."  ''It  is  a  policy,"  said  M.  Stam- 
bolinski  in  reply,  ''which  can  only  lead  to  disaster.  It  will 
lead  to  fresh  catastrophes.  It  will  compromise  the  future 
of  the  nation  and  of  your  dynasty.  Perhaps  it  will  cost  you 
your  own  head" — a  bit  of  prophecy  which  the  King  may 
have  recalled  in  September,  1918.  "Do  not  concern  your- 
self with  my  head,"  replied  the  King,  "which  is  already 
gray.  Think,  rather,  of  your  own."  With  what  was 
described  as  "a  slight  smile  of  disdain,"  the  King  turned 
his  back  on  M.  Stambolinski  and  conversed  for  a  few  min- 
utes with  M.  Guchoff  and  M.  Daneff,  who  explained  to  him 
that  "many  felt  as  strongly  as  the  Agrarian  leader,  even 
if  they  did  not  employ  such  language. '  '^^ 

The  "wheat  harvest  calendar"  all  through  the  summer  of 
1915  had  a  direct  bearing  on  the  diplomatic  situation  in 
southeastern  Europe.  For  at  least  three  months  all  the 
world  had  been  wondering  why  Roumania  and  Bulgaria  did 
not  make  up  their  minds  which  side  to  take.  Definite  action 
was  repeatedly  rumored,  but  nobody  knew  what  the  decision 
would  be.  Meantime  the  people  of  both  nations  were  har- 
vesting their  crops.  Seventy  per  cent,  of  Bulgaria's  inhab- 
itants make  their  living  from  agriculture.  Wheat  alone 
makes  up  20  per  cent,  of  the  country's  exports.  Roumania's 
annual  export  of  cereal  products  was  four  times  as  great  as 
its  export  of  all  other  goods  combined.  The  harvest  was 
for  these  two  States  the  national  wealth.  It  was  not  only 
the  basis  of  foreign  credit,  but  the  sole  assurance  that  the 
army  and  people  could  be  fed  in  a  time  of  European  food 
scarcity. 

After  the  decree  of  mobilization  was  issued,  leaders  of  the 
opposition  declared  their  acquiescence  in  it.  But  it  was 
declared  by  the  Government  that  mobilization  did  not  neces- 
sarily mean  war.  It  was  merely  putting  the  country  into 
"a  state  of  armed  neutrality,"  made  necessary  by  the  situa- 
tion existing  elsewhere  in  Europe.  That  Bulgaria's  action 
was  really  one  of  cooperation  with  the  Teutonic  Allies  was, 
however,  generally  believed,  and  Russia,  on  October  3,  sent 
to  Bulgaria  an  ultimatum. 

^^  As  reported  in   the  Journal  de  Geneve. 

194 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 


No  reply  being  received  to  this  ultimatum,  Russia  declared 
war.  All  eyes  then  turned  to  Greece.  Would  she,  as  an 
ally  of  Serbia,  enter  the  war?  On  October  5  came  an 
altogether  unexpected  event — Premier  Venizelos  resigned. 
King  Constantine,  whose  wife  was  a  sister  of  the  German 
Kaiser,  had  come  suddenly  to 
Athens  from  his  summer  resi- 
dence and  summoned  the 
Premier  to  the  Palace,  from 
which,  after  a  tense  interview, 
in  which  there  was  said  to 
have  been  ''the  plainest  speak- 
ing, * '  the  Premier  proceeded  to 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  and 
announced  that  he  had  disa- 
greed once  more  with  the  King 
on  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
country,  and  had  presented  his 
resignation  and  that  of  his 
Cabinet,  which  led  to  a 
"scene  of  wild  disorder"  in 
the  Chambers,  after  which  a 
great  crowd,  singing  the 
*' Marseillaise,"  marched  to 
the  home  of  Venizelos,  who  by 
this  time  was  in  consultation  with  diplomatic  representatives 
of  the  Entente  Powers.  With  the  crowd  so  great  that  it 
*' jammed  the  narrow  street  separating  the  American  Lega- 
tion from  the  residence  of  Venizelos,"  cries  were  heard  of 
*'Long  live  Venizelos!"  "Long  live  France!"  the  cheers  for 
France  being,  it  was  said,  prompted  by  news  of  the  occupa- 
tion of  Salonica  by  French  troops.  By  October  6  British 
troops  also  were  landing  at  Salonica,  while  French  troops 
were  being  concentrated  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  town, 
on  ground  that  had  been  conceded  by  Greece  to  Serbia  after 
the  war  of  1913,  as  a  site  for  warehouses.  From  Salonica, 
Allied  troops  were  to  be  sent  as  quickly  as  possible  to  the 
Serbian  frontier. 

While    these    movements    were    going    forward,    Bulgaria 
declared  war  on  Serbia  and  crossed  the  frontier,  and  then 


Venizelos 
Premier  of  Greece 


195 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


Great  Britain  declared  war  on  Bulgaria.  Teutonic  forces 
at  once  crossed  the  Danube  and  recaptured  Belgrade,  which 
the  Serbians  had  recovered  from  Austria  several  months 
before,  and  started  southward,  expecting  to  force  their  way- 
through  the  mountains  to  Nish. 

It  was  necessary  now  to  recognize  that  the  Quadruple 
Alliance  had  not  only  failed  thus  far  to  force  the  Dar- 
danelles, but  had  failed  to  enlist  the  Balkan  States  on  their 

side.  The  enlistment  of  Italy 
in  May  and  the  great  Russian 
retreat  of  the  summer  had 
changed  the  whole  Balkan 
situation.  Greek  sympathies 
were  no  doubt  with  the  Allies, 
but  Bulgaria's  attitude  toward 
Greece  demanded  careful  at- 
tention, for  Greece  had  taken 
Kavala  and  Drama  from  Bul- 
garia in  the  Second  Balkan 
War,  and  these  cities  Bulgaria 
intended  some  day  to  retake. 
Should  the  Allies  guarantee 
to  Greece  the  integrity  for 
her  of  these  cities,  the  hopes 
of  Bulgaria  would  be  im- 
periled, and  so  Bulgaria  pro- 
tested, whereupon  the  Allies 
suggested  to  Greece  that  she 
give  up  Kavala  and  Drama,  in  return  for  prospective  gains 
in  Asia  and  notably  Smyrna.  Greece  balked  at  this.  Venizelos 
had  been  willing,  but  King  Constantine  was  not,  and  then 
Venizelos  fell  from  power.  Italy  had  raised  a  question  in 
this  negotiation.  Italy  held  Rhodes  and  the  Dodecanesian 
group  of  ^gean  Islands,  whose  population  was  Greek,  and 
Italy  had  forbidden  Greek  expansion  in  Northern  Epirus, 
altho  the  population  was  Hellenic.  Italian  ambition,  there- 
fore, ran  counter  to  Greek  all  the  way  from  Smyrna  to 
Adalia.  The  Allies  redoubled  their  efforts  to  pacify  Bul- 
garia, that  insisted  on  Kavala  and  Drama,  demanded  Serbian 
Macedonia  and  the  Bulgar  lands  taken  by  Roumania  at  the 


SorHIA    OF     HOHENZOLLERN 

The  former  Queen  of  Greece,  sister 
of  the  former  German  Kaiser 


196 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

Treaty  of  Bucharest.  Greece  would  not  yield  Kavala  and 
Serbia  would  consent  to  give  up  only  half  of  Macedonia, 
insisting  on  keeping  the  west  bank  of  the  Vardar.  Serbia's 
Allies  could  not  coerce  her  further,  so  that  from  May 
to  October  the  Balkan  game  had  remained  what  was 
described  as  "a  perfect  reproduction  of  the  once  familiar 
'Pigs  in  Clover'  puzzle."  Either  Greece,  Bulgaria,  or  Rou- 
mania  might  be  had,  but  it  was  only  at  the  risk  of  driving 
the  two  others  into  an  oppo- 
site camp.  Further  complica- 
tions came  from  the  fact  that 
the  kings  of  the  thre6  States 
were  Teutonic  or  Teutonic  in 
sympathies. 

Germany  at  this  time  had 
offered  to  Bulgaria  all  of 
Serbian  Macedonia,  had  prom- 
ised to  use  her  influence  at 
Athens  to  get  for  Bulgaria, 
Kavala  and  Drama,  had  prom- 
ised to  Greece  Albania  and  the 
^gean  Islands,  and  to  Rou- 
mania  Bessarabia  in  exchange 
for  the  Bulgar  Dobrudja. 
Thus  Bulgaria  was  promised 
by  ^Germany  all  that  she  had 
asked  of  the  Allies  and  they 
had  been  unable  to  give. 

Venizelos  had  been  willing  to  take  the  risk  of  joining  the 
Allies,  for  he  believed  the  Allies  would  win,  and  that,  if 
they  won,  Greece  would  get  her  share  of  the  spoils  from 
Turkey,  and  that  the  supremacy  of  Hellenism  in  the  Near 
East  would  be  assured.  But  King  Constantine  preferred 
the  promise  of  his  brother-in-law,  the  Kaiser,  who  had  saved 
Kavala  for  Greece  during  the  peace  negotiation  after  the 
Second  Balkan  War.  The  Allies  failed  in  the  Balkan 
negotiations  for  these  reasons  because  they  could  not  meet 
the  German  offer  to  Bulgaria,  because  Russian  disasters  had 
shaken  their  prestige  and  because  the  Gallipoli  deadlock  had 
weakened  their  hold  on  Balkan  confidence.     It  was  easy  to 


Constantine 
Former  King  of  Greece 


197 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

magnify  the  Allied  defeat  into  a  disaster  and  this  was  com- 
monly done,  but  it  was  something  less  than  that,  because 
this  war  was  ultimately  to  be  won  on  the  eastern  and 
western  fronts — not  in  the  Balkans.  A  conquest  of  Serbia 
and  an  opening  of  the  Berlin-Vienna-Constantinople  rail- 
road might  temporarily  reward  Teutonic  enterprises,  but 
would  not  materially  affect  the  ultimate  situation.  The 
defeat  was  a  dramatic  occurrence,  but  in  the  lon^  view  it 
was  no  more  than  that.  Altho  a  storm  of  criticism  was 
evoked  by  it  in  Allied  capitals,  the  war  was  still  in  its  early 
stages  and  was  proceeding  about  as  might  have  been  ex- 
pected, given  German  superiority  in  ultimate  resources.  The 
Balkan  episode  from  a  military  point  of  view  might  post- 
pone, but  it  could  not  precipitate  the  end.-^^ 

The  Allies  Against  Turkey — November  5,  1914 

Without  any  previous  declaration  of  war,  or  even  notifica- 
tion to  her  own  representatives  abroad,  Turkey  began  active 
hostilities  against  Russia  on  October  29,  when  two  of  her 
destroyers  entered  the  harbor  of  Odessa  on  the  Black  Sea 
and,  without  warning,  torpedoed  the  old  Russian  gunboat 
Kuhanets  and  fired  on  the  city.  Three  Russian  and  one 
French  merchant  steamers  were  hit.  The  same  day  two 
Russian  steamers  were  torpedoed  by  the  dreadnought  GoheUy 
which  on  August  11,  to  escape  capture  in  the  Mediterranean, 
had  been  transferred  from  the  German  to  the  Ottoman  navy. 
The  Goehen  was  in  charge  of  the  German  Admiral  Souchon, 
who  now  became  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Turkish  navy. 
The  Goehen  and  the  Breslaii  were  two  German  warships 
which  were  off  the  Algerian  coast  when  the  war  began.  The 
Goehen  was  the  fastest  armored  vessel  in  the  German  fleet. 
She  displaced  22,640  tons,  had  a  speed  of  28  knots,  and 
carried  as  armament  ten  11-inch,  twelve  5.9-inch,  and  twelve 
21-pounder  guns.  The  Breslmi  was  a  fast  light  cruiser,  with 
about  the  same  rate  of  speed,  and  a  displacement  of  4,478 
tons.  After  war  began  they  had  fired  a  few  shots  into  the 
unprotected  Algerian  coast  towns  of  Bona  and  Philippeville, 

"Principal  Sources:  The  Independent,  The  New  York  Times,  The  New 
York  Tribune. 

198 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

but  did  little  harm,  and  then  turned  northwest,  with  the 
object,  apparently,  of  going  to  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,  but 
were  headed  off  by  the  British  fleet.  Escaping  injury,  and 
going  at  full  speed  eastward,  they  encountered,  off  Cape 
Matapan,  a  British  cruiser,  the  Gloucester,  a  ship  slightly 
larger  than  the  Breslau,  which,  with  gallantry,  attempted  to 
engage,  and  damaged  the  plates  of  the  Goehen  and  the 
smokestack  of  the  Breslau,  but  the  superior  speed  of  the 
Germans  carried  them  through  their  danger.  They  were 
next  heard  of  in  the  Dardanelles  at  the  end  of  the  week. 
Presently  they  reached  Constantinople,  where  they  passed 
into  the  hands  of  the  Turkish  Government,  and  began  that 
disturbance  in  the  diplomatic 
relations  of  the  Porte  which 
ended  in  war. 

The  reason  Turkey  gave  for 
her  attack  at  Odessa  was  that 
the  Russians  had  been  laying 
mines  in  the  Bosporus.^^  In 
the  attack  the  Russian  mine- 
layer Pri^f,  carrying  700  mines, 
was  sunk  by  a  Turkish  cruiser. 
Sebastopol,  the  stronghold 
which  in  the  Crimean  War 
more  than  a  half  century  ago, 
had  held  out  for  nearly  a  year 
against  French,  Turkish,  and 
English  forces,  was  then 
shelled  by  one  of  the  Turkish 
vessels,  and  the  Breslau  ap- 
peared before  Theodosie,  a 
Crimean  seaport,  and  threw 
shells  into  the  town,  damaging 
ihe  cathedral,  bank,  and  railroad  station.  On  the  same  day 
the  Turkish  cruiser  Hamidie  appeared  before  the  port  of 
Novorossisk,  on  the  northeast  coast  of  the  Black  Sea,  and 
bombarded  it  for  three  hours. 

It  was  thought  that  a  land  campaign  by  the  Turks  would 

1^  Frequently  misspelled  Bosphorus.     The  word  is  from  the  Greek  ious,  ox, 
and  poros,  ford. 


Enveu  Pasha 

The  Turkish  Minister  of  War,  who 

has  been  held  chiefly  responsible  for 

the  Armenian  massacres 


199 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

now  be  directed  toward  Egypt,  which  was  still  nominally 
under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Sultan,  altho  actually  a  part 
of  the  British  Empire.  Turkish  cavalry  were  said  to  be 
concentrated  at  the  head  of  the  Gulf  of  Akabah,  which  is 
separated  from  the  Gulf  of  Suez  by  the  Sinai  Peninsula. 
Three  thousand  Bedouins  were  said  to  have  crossed  the 
Egyptian  boundary.  Turkey  was  known  to  be  able  to  put 
into  the  field  from  500,000  to  800,000  troops,  but  they  were 
indifferently  trained  and  imperfectly  equipped.  Great 
Britain  and  France  several  weeks  afterward,  on  November 
5,  declared  war  on  Turkey.  The  British  proclamation  was 
as  follows: 

^^  Owing'  to  hostile  acts  committed  by  Turkish  forces  under 
German  officers  a  state  of  war  exists  between  Great  Britain  and 
Turkey  from  to-day,  and  all  proclamations  and  orders  in  council 
issued  with  reference  to  the  state  of  war  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  and  Austria  shall  apply  to  the  state  of  war  between 
Great  Britain  and  Turkey." 

Great  Britain  on  the  same  day  formally  annexed  the 
island  of  Cyprus,  in  the  Mediterranean,  which  nominally 
formed  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire.  As  the  defensive 
alliance  between  Great  Britain  and  Turkey  had  now  become 
annulled  by  an  outbreak  of  war,  the  British  Government 
decided  that  it  was  necessary  to  take  over  Cyprus,  in  order 
that  proper  provision  might  be  made  for  its  government  and 
protection.  The  island,  since  the  Anglo-Turkish  Convention 
of  1878,  had  been  occupied  and  administered  by  Great 
Britain,  tho  it  remained  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Sultan. 
France  issued  the  following  declaration: 

' '  The  hostile  acts  of  the  Turkish  fleet  against  a  French  steamer, 
causing  the  death  of  two  Frenchmen  and  serious  damage  to  the 
ship,  not  having  been  followed  by  the  dismissal  of  the  German 
naval  military  missions,  the  measure  whereby  Turkey  could  dis- 
claim responsibility,  the  Government  of  this  Republic  is  obliged 
to  state  that,  as  a  result  of  the  action  of  the  Ottoman  Government, 
a  state  of  war  exists  between  France  and  Turkey. ' ' 

Turkey's  plunge  into  the  conflict,   after  blowing  hot  and 

200 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

cold  for  three  months,  conjured  up  in  the  minds  of  some 
editorial  observers  the  specter  of  a  *' general  war'' — ''a  pos- 
sibility," remarked  the  Springfield  Republican,  ''the  terrible 
significance  of  which  only  far-sighted  thinkers  have  till  now 
comprehended."  The  participation  of  "The  Sick  Man," 
said  the  New  York  Sun,  ''threatens  to  involve  all  the  other 
nations  of  Europe  except  Spain,  Switzerland,  the  Scandina- 
vian countries,  and  Holland."  That  it  might  lead  to  a 
"Holy    War"    involving    200,000,000    Moslems    in    Europe, 


©   INTERNATIONAL   FILM   SERVICE.    N.    Y. 

SCENE  IN  CONSTANTINOPLE  DURING  THE  TURKISH  MOBILIZATION 


Asia,  and  Africa  was  an  eventuality  discust  in  many  quar- 
ters. The  St.  Louis  Globe-Democrat  even  suggested  that  in 
view  of  the  possibility  of  fanatical  attacks  upon  thousands 
of  Americans  engaged  in  missionary  work  in  Turkey,  the 
question  of  American  neutrality  might  for  the  first  time 
become  a  difficult  one.  The  American  armored  cruisers 
Tennessee  and  North  Carolina  were  reported  as  then  in 
Turkish  waters,  "ready  to  protect  American  lives  and  prop- 
erty." In  any  case,  remarked  the  Syracuse  Post-Standard, 
the  advent  of  Turkey  as  an  ally  of  the  Kaiser  "extends  the 
war  area,  adds  to  the  daily  cost  in  blood  and  treasure  of 


T.  I- 


201 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

the  murderous  business  in  which  Europe  is  engaged,  and 
introduces  into  it  new  barbarism." 

When  it  came  to  estimating  the  value  of  this  new  ally  ta 
the  Austro-German  cause,  opinions  differed.  Many  papers 
felt  with  the  New  York  Evening  Post  that  Germany  would 
ultimately  find  Turkey's  cooperation  more  of  a  liability  than 
an  asset,  on  the  ground  that  other  countries  were  almost 
certain  to  be  drawn  in  after  Turkey's  wake,  and  would 
create  a  balance  of  new  forces  in  favor  of  the  Allies.  Others 
shared  the  view  of  the  Springfield  Repuhlica7i,  that  Turkey's 
course  represented  "the  first  diplomatic  triumph  scored  by 
Germany."  As  the  situation  stood,  remarked  the  Chicago 
Tribune,  "from  the  military  and  naval  point  of  view,  the 
accession  of  Turkey  is  a  substantial,  if  not  formidable,  addi- 
tion to  the  strength  of  the  German  side."  The  Turkish 
navy  had  become  a  formidable  factor  by  the  acquisition  of 
the  Goehe)i  and  the  Breslau.  Including  these,  Turkey's 
naval  strength,  according  to  a  writer  in  the  New  York 
Even:ng  Fast,  consisted  of  3  battleships,  4  cruisers,  3  tor- 
pedo-gunboats, 10  destroyers,  7  torpedo-boats,  28  small  gun- 
boats, a  coast-defense  ship,  and  some  auxiliary  craft.  This 
fleet  was  said  to  excel  Russia's  Black  Sea  fleet  in  weight 
and  power. 

The  entrance  of  Turkey  into  the  conflict  was  received 
with  popular  jubilation  in  Petrograd.  This  was  not  hard 
to  understand,  because  since  the  time  of  Peter  the  Great, 
Russia  had  striven  to  acquire  Constantinople.  Before  that 
time,  Austria-Hungary  was  persistent  in  her  desire  to 
become  Turkey's  heir.  Up  to  1699  the  Turkish  Empire 
had  extended  in  Europe  almost  as  far  west  as  Vienna,  and 
included  Budapest.  When  the  Turks  threatened  to  over- 
whelm Europe  still  further  by  besieging  Vienna  in  1529 
and  again  in  1863,  it  was  to  Austria  that  they  owed  their 
defeat.  Hence  it  became  Austria's  aim  to  defend  European 
civilization  and  gradually  to  conquer  the  Turkish  Empire. 
While  expanding  eastward  at  Turkey's  expense,  Austria 
seemed  at  one  time  in  a  fair  way  of  reaching  the  Bosporus, 
but  the  development  of  Russia's  power  under  Peter  the 
Great,  and  Peter's  victorious  wars  with  the  Turks,  suddenly 
raised  another  claimant  to  the  Turkish  heritage. 

202 


203 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Russia's  desire  to  possess  Constantinople  sprang  not  only 
from  historical,  but  from  weighty  strategical  and  economic 
reasons.  The  Dardanelles  are  the  door  to  Russia's  house. 
The  Crimean  War  showed  that  any  hostile  Power  controlling 
the  Dardanelles  and  Bosporus  could  attack  Russia  in  a 
vulnerable  part.  The  most  fruitful  and  most  densely  popu- 
lated provinces  ot  Russia  are  those  in  the  south,  which 
depend  on  the  Dardanelles  for  an  outlet.  In  other  words, 
two-thirds  of  Russia's  water-borne  foreign  trade  depends  on 
the  free  use  of  the  Black  Sea,  so  that  the  closing  of  the 
Dardanelles  would  prove  ruinous  to  her.  Whether  or  not 
Russia  had  an  aggressive  ambition  to  possess  Constantinople, 
it  was  clear  that  for  political  and  economical  reasons  she 
could  not  allow  the  Turkish  capital  to  fall  into  the  hands 
of  any  other  strong  European  Power. 

The  Turkish  Empire  was  an  unwieldy  aggregate  and  not 
easily  capable  of  defense.  It  was  a  thinly  inhabited  region, 
broken  up  by  deserts,  and  extending  from  the  Adriatic  Sea 
to  the  Indian  Ocean.  Before  the  curtailment  of  its  boun- 
daries in  the  Balkan  War  of  1912-1913,  its  population  was 
estimated  at  26,000,000.  But  these  comprised  nearly  a  dozen 
different  nationalities,  speaking  as  many  distinct  languages, 
and  further  divided  by  the  mutual  hatreds  engendered  by 
hostile  faiths.  The  Government  has  been  little  more  than 
an  anarchy  kept  in  repression  by  military  despotism,  in 
spite  of  the  apparent  triumph  of  constitutionalism  and 
progress  under  the  Young  Turks.  The  intelligence  and 
industry  of  the  population  have  been  chiefly  found  among 
races  most  hostile  to  the  continuance  of  the  Empire.  The 
ruling  race  possest  the  supreme  virtue  of  courage,  but  it 
was  utterly  lacking  in  enterprise,  foresight,  perseverance, 
and  administrative  capacity.  Asiatic  Turkey  is  probably 
the  least  progressive  part  of  the  earth's  surface.  All  trav- 
elers have  agreed  in  characterizing  its  abject  penury  as 
without  example  elsewhere.  The  Turks,  with  apparent  heed- 
lessness, staked  the  existence  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  on  the 
issue  of  this  war,  and  they  made  it  all  but  certain  that 
Italy,  Roumania,  and  Greece  would  be  drawn  into  the  con- 
flict.    The  Treaty  of  Paris  which  bound  the  great  Powers  to 

204 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

respect  the  territorial  integrity  of  Turkey,  had  now  become 
so  much  waste  paper." 

Italy  Against  Austria — May  23,  1915 


It  was  not  until  May  23,  1915 — ten  months  after  the  war 
began — that  Italy  came  in  with  a  declaration  against  Aus- 
tria. A  fresh  army  of  a  million  or  more,  and  a  new  navy, 
were  thus  added  to  the  Allied  forces.  The  two  Teutonic 
Powers  were  now  almost  completely  surrounded  by  bellig- 
erents or  antagonistic  nations,  and  it  was  believed  that 
when  their  harvests  were  gathered  (about  August)  the 
remaining  Balkan  States  would  join  the  Allies. 

The  Germans  had  expected  that  Italy,  as  a  former  ally, 
would  at  least  remain  neutral.  Italy  had  been  persuaded 
originally  by  Bismarck  to 
enter  the  Triple  Alliance  for 
protection  against  France.  For 
many  years,  however,  she  had 
acquired  a  growing  dislike  of 
her  old  enemy,  Austria.  In 
the  Balkans  her  interests  had 
conflicted  with  Austria's,  and 
Italians,  living  under  the 
Austrian  flag  along  the  east- 
ern Adriatic  and  in  Trentino, 
had  never  ceased  to  call  on 
Italy  to  rescue  them  from  for- 
eign domination. 

"Whether  it  would  have  been 
better  for  Italy  to  accept  the 
territory  Austria  offered  her 
as  the  price  of  her  neutrality  in 
the  spring  of  1915  rather  than 
to  risk  almost  her  existence  in 
an  attempt  to  grasp  by  joining  the  Allies  something  more,  re- 
mained for  the  future  to  determine.  Wise  or  unwise,  war 
with  Austria  w^as  the  people's  undoubted  will.     Here  was 

"  Principal  sources :  The  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce,  The  Literary 
Digest,  The  Independent,  "Nelson's  History  of  the  War,"  by  John  Buchan. 

205 


AxTuxio  Salandra 

Italian   Premier  when   war   was 

declared 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

no  case  of  forced  and  hasty  action.  There  was  no  com- 
pulsion. Indeed,  there  had  been  ample  time  for  deliberation 
and  discussion.  Parliament  by  an  overwhelming  majority 
had  supported  the  Italian  Government.  On  that  eventful 
day  in  May  when  Premier  Salandra  presented  a  bill  for 
meeting  "the  eventual  expenses  of  a  national  war/'  and 
granting  full  powers  to  the  Government  to  deal  with  all 
public  matters  after  war  was  declared,  practically  no  oppo- 
sition was  shown,  the  bill  being  passed  by  a  vote  of  407  to 
74,  while  in  the  Senate,  on  the  following  day,  262  votes 
were  cast  in  favor  of  it  and  only  two  against  it.  Such 
opposition  as  there  was  included  Intransigent  Socialists  and 
followers  of  ex-Premier  Giolitti,  who  had  been  using  his 
utmost  endeavors  to  maintain  Italian  neutrality.  On  May 
23  the  Duke  of  Avarna,  Italian  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  pre- 
sented to  the  Austrian  Foreign  Office  the  formal  declaration 
of  war,  as  follows : 

''Declaration  has  been  made,  as  from  the  fourth  day  of  this 
month,  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  of  the  grave  mo- 
tives for  which  Italy,  confident  in  her  good  right,  proclaimed, 
annulled  and  henceforth  without  effect  her  treaty  of  alliance  with 
Austria-Hungary,  which  was  violated  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government,  and  resumed  her  liberty  of  action  in  this  respect. 

''The  Government  of  the  King,  firmly  resolved  to  provide  by  all 
means  at  its  disposal  for  safeguarding  Italian  rights  and  interests, 
can  not  fail  in  its  duty  to  take  against  every  existing  and  future 
menace,  measures  which  events  impose  upon  it  for  the  fulfilment 
of  national  aspirations.  His  Majesty  the  King  declares  that  he 
considers  himself  from  to-morrow  in  a  state  of  war  with  Austria- 
Hungary.  ' ' 

Italy  *s  decision  was  at  once  regarded  as  a  decisive  event 
and  was  welcomed  by  the  Allies  as  likely  to  shorten  the 
conflict.  The  total  possible  war  strength  of  Italy  was  esti- 
mated at  3,330,202  men  of  all  ranks,  of  whom  1,700,000 
were  reported  mobilized.  This  impressive  total  was  made  up 
as  follows:  Standing  ^rmy,  248,111  men;  mobile  militia, 
320,170 ;  territorial  militia,  2,275,631 ;  reserves  on  unlimited 
leave,  486,290.  There  were  32  artillery  regiments  and  an 
aviation  corps  of  60  companies,  with  more  than  400  aero- 

206 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

planes  ready  for  immediate  use.  The  naval  fleet  consisted 
of  15  battleships,  of  which  7  were  of  the  dreadnought  type; 
24  cruisers,  of  the  first,  second,  and  third  class ;  5  gunboats ; 
46  destroyers;  75  torpedo-boats;   and  20   submarines. 

To  the  outside  world's  surprize  no  declaration  of  war 
came  from  Germany  as  the  ally  of  Austria.  Month  after 
month  passed  and  still  there  was  none.  Finally,  on  Febru- 
ary 29,  1916,  it  was  announced  that  the  Italian  Government 
had  requisitioned  34  of  the  37  German  steamers  then  in- 
terned in  Italian  ports.  There  had  been  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  a  total  of  57  German  and  Austrian  vessels  in 
Italian  ports.  The  Austrian  ships  only  had  been  seized  by 
Italy  when  she  declared  war  on  Austria.  Germany  still 
refrained  from  declaring  war  on  Italy.  As  the  Allied 
nations  were  then  short  of  ships  this  transfer  of  many 
German  vessels  to  the  flag  of  Italy  and  their  use  by  the 
Allies  promised  to  do  much  toward  relieving  the  congestion 
of  goods  that  existed  in  neutral  countries.  One  of  the  ex- 
planations advanced  for  Italy's  action  was  that  she  and  her 
Allies  hoped  thus  to  check  the  Germanic  submarine  cam- 
paign by  sending  to  sea  German  ships  bearing  the  Italian 
flag  and  thus  liable  to  be  sunk  by  German  submarines. 

There  had  been  provocation  enough  for  a  declaration  by 
Germany.  But  Germany  brooked  this  hostile  act  on  the 
part  of  Italy,  altho  on  a  like  provocation  she  had  promptly 
declared  war  on  Portugal.  Italy  must  also  have  committed 
against  Germany  a  mortal  sin  when  she  signed  with  Great 
Britain  a  treaty  whereby  British  capital  and  enterprise  were 
allowed  to  displace  German  in  the  commercial  life  of  Italy. 
That  there  was  still  peace  with  Germany  seemed  more  and 
more  strange.  In  fact,  from  the  moment  when  Italy  entered 
the  conflict,  Berlin  made  every  effort  to  avert  a  clash  with 
Italy. 

Italy's  decision  to  flght  Austria  created  a  third  battle- 
front,  to  which  new  military  attention  had  to  be  given  by 
the  Germans  and  Austrians.  A  study  of  the  Italian  press 
indicated  that,  ever  since  the  World  War  began,  the  majority 
of  the  people  had  urgently  demanded  that  Italy's  oppor- 
tunity thus  created  of  bringing  under  the  Italian  flag  ''un- 
redeemed Italians"  living  under  the  sway  of  Austria  should 

207 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

not  be  lost.  "With  the  passing  of  six  months  this  demand  had 
become  more  insistent  until  the  Government  complied  by 
declaring  war.  In  the  Teutonic  countries  Italy's  act  was 
denounced  as  ''indescribable  treachery.*'  Francis  Joseph 
called  it  "an  act  of  unparalleled  perfidy.'*  In  the  opinion 
of  neutrals  such  an  outcome  of  months  of  diplomatic  dicker- 
ing showed,  either  motives  of  greed,  or  a  policy  of  oppor- 
tunism. Italy,  however,  had  solid  reasons  for  taking  a  posi- 
tion where  she  would  have  a  voice  in  any  settlement  that 
followed  the  termination  of  the  war,  especially  if,  as  seemed 
likely,  the  settlement  should  involve  a  dismemberment  of 
Austria-Hungary.  Her  interests  might  well  have  been  held 
sufficient  for  mobilizing  her  army  and  navy,  and  for  holding 
both  in  readiness  to  strike  when  her  interests  could  be  most 
effectively  served.  Whether  these  interests  fully  justified  a 
declaration  of  war  was  another  question. 

"When  in  1813  Napoleon  was  fighting  his  last  campaign  in 
Germany,  he  had  against  him  Germany,  Russia,  Prussia, 
Sweden  and  Spain.  Despite  such  tremendous  odds  he 
fought  battles  at  Lutzen,  Bautzen,  and  Dresden.  At  that 
moment  Austria  served  on  Napoleon  a  demand  for  the 
Illyrian  provinces,  Istria,  Dalmatia,  and  Trieste,  or  just 
what  Italy  in  1915  asked  Austria  to  give  back  to  her  under 
conditions  almost  identical.  Like  Austria  now,  so  Napoleon 
then  refused.  Francis  Joseph's  answer  to  Italy  was  the 
answer  of  Napoleon  to  Austria.  Napoleon's  refusal  became 
the  decisive  factor  in  his  ensuing  overthrow,  since  Austria 
brought  into  the  field  300,000  troops,  some  of  whom  shared 
in  the  great  Allied  triumph  at  Leipzig  a  few  weeks  later, 
when  Bavaria  and  Saxony — Napoleon's  former  allies — joined 
with  Austria  in  fighting  with  the  Allies.  Italy  had  now 
come  in  as  Austria  then  came  in — at  a  moment  when  a 
great  coalition  was  making  headway  against  an  extremely 
powerful  nation  that  was  regarded  as  its  common  enemy. 
Moreover,  Roumania,  Bulgaria,  and  Greece  seemed  likely  to 
follow  Italy,  just  as  the  smaller  German  States  followed 
Austria  in  1813,  since  profit  for  them  now  seemed  to  lie  in 
one  direction  only. 

This  coalition  of  1915  against  Germany  and  her  two 
allies  was  a  more  colossal  thing  than   the   coalition   which 

208 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

overthrew  Napoleon.  Far  superior  sea-power,  greater  ammu- 
nition factories  and  supplies  from  neutral  nations  and  from 
colonies,  the  resources  of 
Africa,  Asia,  Australia,  and 
Canada,  the  wealth  in  money 
and  men  of  Paris,  Petro- 
grad,  and  London — all  these 
gave  to  Germany's  foes 
an  advantage  which  Na- 
poleon's enemies  lacked. 
But  against  this  advantage 
was  the  intrepid  German 
spirit,  a  far  more  formidable 
factor  in  the  war  of  1914- 
1915  than  was  the  spirit  of 
France  in  1813,  because  Ger- 
many now  was  united,  de- 
termined and  confident,  while 
France  then  was  not.  France 
in  1813  was  near  exhaustion, 
while  Germany  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war  in  1914  was 

at   the   summit   of  her   resources,   military,   economic,   and 
pecuniary.^^ 


Victor  Emanuel 
King  of  Italy 


Germany  Against  Portugal — ^March  9,  1916 

Germany  did  not  declare  war  on  Portugal  until  March  9, 
1916.  The  step  was  then  taken  in  consequence  of  the  seizure 
of  German  ships  in  Portuguese  ports  a  few  weeks  before. 
The  declaration  enumerated  a  long  series  of  breaches  of 
neutrality  by  the  Portuguese,  such  as  granting  free  passage 
to  British  troops  through  the  colony  of  Mozambique,  per- 
mission given  to  British  men-of-war  to  use  Portuguese  ports 
for  a  time  exceeding  that  given  to  neutrals;  permission  to 
the  British  navy  to  use  Madeira  as  a  naval  base;  actual 
engagements  between  Portuguese  and  German  troops  on  the 

IS  Principal  sources:  The  Independent,  The  Literary  Digest,  The  New 
York  Times,  The  New  York  Trihime,  "Nelson's  History  of  the  War,"  by 
John  Buchan. 


209 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

frontier  of  German  Southwest  Africa  and  Angola;  and 
frequent  insults  to  the  German  nation  by  members  of  the 
Portuguese   Parliament,   who   never   were   reprimanded. 

Portugal  was  the  thirteenth  nation  to  enter  the  war.  In 
February,  1915,  she  had  taken  over  38  German  and  Austrian 
merchant  vessels  that  had  been  lying  in  her  ports  ever  since 
the  war  began.  An  ultimatum  was  sent  by  the  Berlin 
Government  demanding  the  release  of  these  ships,  but  the 
Lisbon  Government  paid  no  attention  to  it.  Owing  to 
Germany's  submarine  campaign,  to  the  taking  over  of  mer- 
chant steamers  by  the  British  Government,  and  to  the  rise 
in  marine  insurance,  freight  rates  to  Portugal  had  risen 
so  that  not  only  was  the  republic  deprived  of  luxuries,  but 
of  raw  materials  for  her  factories,  while  food  products  had 
grown  so  scarce  and  high  that  the  people  found  themselves 
in  actual  want.  This  situation  was  believed  to  be  the  main 
reason  for  Portugal's  seizure  of  the  German  and  Austrian 
vessels,  which  added  132,000  tons  to  her  flag.  As  far  back 
as  October,  1914,  Germany,  however,  had  begun  actual  war 
on  Portugal  by  invading  Angola  in  Portuguese  West  Africa. 
jMinor  engagements  took  place  between  German  and  Portu- 
guese troops,  after  which  the  Germans  withdrew  to  their 
own  territory.  Successive  Portuguese  governments  had  been 
outspoken  in  adhesion  to  an  Anglo-Portuguese  Treaty,  to  the 
effect  that,  if  the  colonies  of  either  nation  were  threatened 
by  a  third,  the  other  should  come  to  the  aid  of  the  one 
attacked,  and  the  latter  should  give  free  access  to  its  terri- 
tory for  such  purposes. 

Portugal 's  army  consisted  of  30,000  regular  troops  and 
230.O00  reserves.  She  was  credited  with  a  maximum  force 
of  870,000  fighting  men.  Her  navy  was  negligible,  consist- 
ing of  only  5  second-class  cruisers  and  some  smaller  craft, 
but  her  ports,  from  now  on  open  to  the  British  navy,  might 
be  of  great  benefit  to  the  fleets  of  the  Allies.  The  impor- 
tance of  Portugal's  action  lay  in  the  effect  it  would  produce 
on  the  war  in  Africa.  Mozambique,  or  Portuguese  East 
Africa,  had  a  long  frontier  conterminous  with  German  East 
Africa.  The  Portuguese  had  no  reason  Avhatever  to  fear  any 
German  interruption  into  their  territory,  because  the  Ger- 
mans had  enough  to  do  in  the  north,  where  a  serious  menace 

210 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

then    confronted    them    in    the    steady    advance    of    British 
Afrikander  forces. 

From  the  Portuguese  point  of  view,  the  declaration  of 
war  probably  could  not  have  come  at  a  more  opportune 
time.  German  East  Africa  was  already  completely  cut  off 
from  the  outside  world.  Her  access  to  the  Port  of  Dar-es- 
Salaam  was  worthless  to  her,  because  England  had  com- 
mand of  the  sea.  On  land,  this,  the  only  remaining  German 
colony,  was  ringed  round  by  enemies — Portugal  on  the  south. 
Great  Britain  on  the  north,  and  the  Belgian  Kongo  on  the 
west.  In  this  situation  German  forces  in  East  Africa,  tho 
stiffened  by  German  reservists  who  had  settled  in  the  colony, 
were  not  expected  to  hold  out  long,  but  they  put  up  a 
plucky  fight. 

Anglo-Portuguese  friendship  was  a  matter  of  more  than  two 
hundred  years.  It  dates  from  the  conclusion  of  the  Methuen 
commercial  treaty  in  1703,  by  which  Portugal  became  eco- 
nomically dependent  on  Great  Britain.  The  record  of  friend-* 
ship  suffered  a  brief  interruption  in  1889,  when  colonial 
troops  under  Serpa  Pinto  made  an  attempt  to  bridge  the 
gap  between  Portuguese  East  Africa  and  Angola  on  the 
west  coast,  and  so  interpose  a  barrier  to  British  expansion 
into  what  is  now  Rhodesia ;  but  after  a  severe  crisis  the 
dispute  was  adjusted.  Portugal  may  have  welcomed  war  as 
one  way  out  of  troubles  that  had  prevailed  at  home  since 
the  establishment  of  the  republic  in  1910.  Partizan  differ- 
ences might  be  expected  to  disappear  before  a  common 
enemy.  At  the  same  time,  the  risk  was  not  heavy.  There 
was  no  way  in  which  Germany  could  strike  at  Portugal 
except  by  an  isolated  submarine  attack  on  Portuguese  ships. 

For  Great  Britain's  chief  aim  in  the  matter  we  must  look 
to  the  South  Atlantic  and  to  Africa.  With  Portugal  for- 
mally in  the  war,  Portugal's  island  possessions  became 
available  to  her  as  operating  centers  for  British  crusiers. 
Madeira  lies  some  seven  hundred  miles  southwest  of  Gibraltar. 
Eight  hundred  miles  further  south  lie  the  Cape  Verde 
Islands.  Both  are  on  the  great  trade  routes  between  South 
Africa  and  Great  Britain.  It  was  along  these  routes  that 
German  raiders  did  their  heaviest  work  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  and  again  during  the  later  exploits  of  the  Moewe. 

211 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

Madeira  and  the  Cape  Verde  Islands  offered  to  Great  Britain 
facilities  for  a  closer  safeguarding  of  ocean  routes  to  Africa.^^ 

Portugal  was  once  a  part  of  the  ancient  Roman  province 
of  Lusitania,  from  which  the  giant  Cunard  Line  steamer 
sunk  by  a  German  torpedo  received  its  name.  With  a  popu- 
lation scarcely  exceeding  the  combined  population  of  New 
York  City,  Jersey  City,  and  Newark,  and  an  area  in  Europe 
less  than  the  State  of  Indiana,  Portugal  has  not  played  a 
major  role  in  the  politics  of  Continental  Europe  for  many 
years,  not,  in  fact  since  Wellesley,  afterward  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  banded  his  British  forces  and,  with  the  aid 
of  native  troops,  defeated  Soult  and  Massena,  Napoleon's 
marshals  in  the  two  peninsular  campaigns. 

The  colonial  empire  of  Portugal  is  out  of  all  proportion 
to  the  importance  of  the  home  country.  In  fact,  there  were, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  only  three  other  countries  in 
Europe — Great  Britain,  France,  and  Germany — whose  flags 
floated  over  more  territory  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the 
home  country.  The  combined  area  of  the  New  England  and 
North  Atlantic  States  would  equal  less  than  one-fourth  of 
the  territory  under  the  dominion  of  the  tiny  republic 
occupying  the  western  edge  of  the  Iberian  Peninsula,  whose 
navigators  in  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  performed 
feats  that  were  the  wonders  of  the  world.  All  this  vast 
territory  is  held  by  8,000  colonial  troops,  supplemented  by 
native  armies. 

The  harbor  of  Lisbon,  where  the  seizure  of  the  German 
merchant  ships  precipitated  Portugal  into  the  war,  is  one 
of  the  most  beautiful  in  all  Europe,  ranking  scarcely  second 
to  Naples  and  Constantinople.  The  city  is  about  the  size 
of  Pittsburgh,  and  has  been  the  political  center  of  the  nation 
since  it  was  wrested  from  the  Moors  by  Atfonso  Henriques, 
the  founder  of  the  kingdom,  in  the  middle  of  the  twelfth 
century.  The  English  aided  Affonso  in  his  war  against  the 
Moors,  and  in  the  following  century  the  two  countries  effected 
an  alliance  which  has  existed  unbroken  during  the  succeed- 
ing seven  hundred  years,  save  for  such  sporadic  interrup- 
tions, as  when  Napoleon  forced  the  little  kingdom  to  declare 
war  against  the  island  empire. 

16  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  "Bulletins"  of  the  National  Geographic 
Society. 

212 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

Portugal's  contribution  to  world  history  was  the  coloniza- 
tion of  Brazil,  the  largest  nation  in  South  America  and  the 
third  largest  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  While  Brazil  was 
discovered  by  Columbus's  companion  Pinzon,  and  formal 
possession  taken  by  him  in  the  name  of  Spain,  Cabral  landed 
there  in  1500  and  proclaimed  it  Portuguese  territory. 
Portugal  settled  the  country  and  ruled  it  until  1822  when, 
under  the  leadership  of  the  Portuguese  Prince,  Dom  Pedro, 
independence  from  the  mother  country  was  declared. 

RouMANiA  Against  Austria — August  27,  1916 

That  Roumania  would  eventually  enter  the  war  few 
observers  doubted.  During  the  first  two  years,  it  was  again 
and  again  believed  she  was  on  the  verge  of  a  declaration, 
now  on  the  one  side,  now  on  the  other.  She  finally  went 
into  the  conflict  on  August  27,  1916,  with  a  declaration 
against  Austria.  Her  action  sent  a  thrill  through  Great 
Britain  which  was  felt  in  the  highest  official  circles.  Such 
enthusiasm  as  was  aroused  by  the  news  had  not  been  seen 
in  London  since  early  in  the  war.  It  was  the  universal 
belief  that  Roumania 's  action,  following  Italy's  declaration 
of  war  on  Germany,  had  made  it  clear  that  the  Allies  would 
win.  It  was  important  to  recall  the  relations  of  Roumania 
to  Italy.  The  most  deeply  rooted  sentiment  in  the  Rou- 
manian mind  was  that  their  race  was  Latin,  or  Roman,  as 
their  name  signified.  Paris  and  Rome  had  been  cultural 
sources  for  Bucharest.  Indeed,  it  was  to  Napoleon  III  that 
Roumania,  like  Italy,  had  owed  her  liberation  and  unity  in 
no  small  degree.  The  declaration  of  Roumania  brought  the 
total  number  of  belligerents  up  to  fifteen.  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Turkey,  and  Bulgaria  were  facing  Belgium,  France, 
Great  Britain,  Russia,  Italy,  Roumania,  Japan,  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  Portugal,  and  San  Marino.  Roumanian  troops 
already  were  in  action  in  the  Carpathian  passes  leading  to 
Transylvania.  Germany  in  secret  councils  had  for  days,  if 
not  weeks,  expected  such  action,  and  on  the  next  day  she 
herself  declared  war  on  Roumania.  Roumania 's  declaration 
was  a  long  document,  accusing  Austro-Hungarian  officials  of 
persecuting    Roumanians,    and    charging    both    Austria    and 

213 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


Germany  with  violations  of  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the 
agreements  between  those  countries  and  Roumania,  all  dating 
from  the  commencement  of  the  European  war.  In  conclu- 
sion, it  set  forth  that  Roumania  felt  impelled  to  come  to 
the  rescue  of  the  Roumanian  population  of  Austrian  terri- 
tory exposed  to  the  dangers  of  war  and  invasion ;  that  she 
believed  by  intervening  she  could  shorten  the  war,  and  that 
placing  herself  on  the  side  of  the  Entente  Powers  she  was 
allying  herself  with  those  Powers  which  could  assist  her 
most  efficaciously  in  realizing  her  national  ideal. 

One  estimate  put  the  total  effective  strength  of  the  Rou- 
manian army,  completely  mobilized,  at  900,000  men,  includ- 
ing 20  regiments  of  hussars,  480  field-guns  (75s),  with  160 
older  field-pieces  belonging  to  the  reserve,  and  an  unknown 
number  of  heavy  guns.  Other  authorities  placed  Roumania 's 
strength  at  700,000  men.  Service  in  Roumania  was  universal 
{^i)d  compulsory,  and  the  first-line  army  on   a  war  footing 

was  estimated  at  290,000  men. 
By  a  stroke  of  the  pen  King 
Ferdinand  of  Roumania  added 
nearly  900  miles  of  front  in 
Europe  now  to  be  defended  by 
the  Central  Empires — 500  in 
the  west,  785  in  the  east,  315 
facing  the  Italians,  and  160 
miles  at  Salonica — making  in 
all  1,750  miles.  The  new 
miles  included  520  miles  of  the 
Transylvanian  Alps,  75  miles 
bordering  on  Serbia,  and  300 
miles  on  Bulgaria.  Roumania 
added  to  the  Allied  forces 
650.000  men,  capable  of  being 
raised  to  800,000.  The  south- 
ern portion  of  what  is  now 
Roumania  emerged  toward  the 
close  of  the  thirteenth  century 
as  the  Principality  of  Wallachia ;  the  northern  a  century 
later,  as  the  Principality  of  ^Moldavia.  Both  were  founded 
by  immigrant  Roumanian  nobles  from  Transylvania.     From 


Feudinand 
King  of  Roumania 


214 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

that  day  to  this  Roumania  has  been  distinguished  from  the 
other  Balkan  provinces  by  the  survival  of  a  powerful  native 
aristocracy.  In  Serbia  the  nobles  were  exterminated ;  in 
Bosnia  they  saved  their  property  by  the  surrender  of  their 
faith ;  in  Roumania  alone  did  they  retain  both.  The  social 
and  material  progress  made  by  Roumania  during  the  reign 
of  the  late  King  Carol  was  remarkable.  Out  of  a  popula- 
tion of  seven  and  a  half  millions  over  one  million  Rou- 
manians are  proprietors.  Most  peasants  own  the  land  they 
cultivate.  Agriculture  is  still  the  main  occupation.  Only 
20  per  cent,  of  the  people  dwell  in  towns.  The  birth-rate 
is  said  to  be,  next  to  that  of  Russia,  the  highest  in  Europe. 
The  population  has  an  increment  of  about  one  hundred  thou- 
sand per  annum,  and  it  is  estimated  that  in  twenty  years  it 
will  reach  twenty-five  millions.  Oil  and  cereals  furnish,  the 
bulk  of  the  exports.  The  external  trade  of  the  country — 
about  fifty  millions  sterling — exceeds  that  of  all  the  other 
Balkan  States  together.  Much  of  it  is  done  with  the  Central 
Empires.  The  imports  from  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
before  the  war  were  over  thirteen  millions;  those  from  the 
United  Kingdom  less  than  two.  Of  all  Balkan  peoples  the 
Roumanians  are  not  only  the  most  numerous,  but  by  far 
the  most  homogeneous  alike  as  regards  race,  language,  creed, 
and  geographical  distribution.  The  fourteen  millions  speak 
one  language,  virtually  without  dialects ;  they  profess  one 
faith,  that  of  the  Orthodox  Church,  and  all  but  a  remnant 
are  found  between  the  Theiss,  the  Danube,  and  the  Pruth.^" 

Italy  Against  Germany — August  27,  1916 

On  August  27  came  word  that  Italy  had  finally  declared 
war  on  Germany.  Virtually  at  war  with  Germany  for  more 
than  a  year,  Italy  had  never  been  technically  at  war  with 
her  until  now — for  what  exact  reason  no  one  knew.  The 
same  day,  as  by  a  concerted  arrangement,  Roumania  threw 
herself  into  the  strife  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  Italy's 
military  successes  in  1916  had  brought  into  sharper  defini- 
tioii  her  relations  with  Germany,  which  had  been  anomalous 
and    mysterious    for    more    than    a    year.      That    a    state 


"J.  A.  R.  Marriott  in  The  Edinburgh  Review  of  July,   1916. 

215 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

of  war  must  result  had  been  confidently  predicted  and,  in 
fact,  expected  from  month  to  month,  but  it  did  not  come. 
A  special  convention,  agreed  upon  by  Italy  and  Germany, 
on  May  21,  1915,  to  cover  the  period  of  suspended  diplo- 
matic relations,  had  provided  in  general  that  the  private 
rights  of  Germans  in  Italy,  and  of  Italians  in  Germany, 
should  be  fully  respected.  Complaints  that  this  agreement 
had  been  violated  came  thick  and  fast  from  both  sides.  Each 
asserted  that  the  other  began  the  violations.  An  Italian 
note  published  on  July  18  arraigned  the  German  Foreign 
Office  for  acts  in  violation  of  the  convention,  and  for  attempt- 
ing to  conceal  the  facts.  It  asserted  that,  while  Italy  had 
loyally  lived  up  to  the  agreement  between  the  two  countries, 
Germany  had  "violated  it  systematically."  The  conclusion 
reached  was  that  certain  measures  adopted  by  the  German 
Government  constituted  a  plain  and  clear  act  of  hostility, 
and  these  were  words  which  usually  mean  war. 

The  situation  involving  Italy,  Austria,  and  the  Triple 
Alliance  was  complex.  If  Germany  had  really  sought  a 
cause  of  war  with  Italy,  she  could  have  easily  found  it. 
Under  apparently  great  provocation  she  had  refrained  from 
hostilities.  One  motive  was  undoubtedly  her  desire  to  con- 
serve, if  possible,  large  German  interests  in  Italy,  economic 
penetration  of  that  country  by  the  Germans  having  been 
one  of  the  remarkable  developments  of  the  period  before  the 
war.  Should  actual  hostilities  now  break  out,  there  would 
be  a  large  amount  of  German  property  upon  which  Italy 
could  lay  hands  temporarily;  while,  after  peace  came,  Ger- 
man prestige  and  German  enterprise  would  suffer  a  great 
blow,  with  progress  blocked  for  many  years.  Here  was, 
perhaps,  inducement  enough  to  prevent  Germany  from  de- 
parting from  her  awkward  attitude  toward  Italy,  while 
Austria  and  Italy  were  actually  at  war.  The  situation  had 
become  such  that  a  push  from  one  side  or  the  other  might 
mean  a  declaration  of  war  and  Italy,  now  flushed  with 
success,  might  any  day  give  that  push.^^ 

Reasons  for  Italy's  previous  failure  to  declare  war  upon 
Germany  had  been  much  debated.     What  was  more  signifi- 

»The  New  York  Evening  Post. 

216 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

cant  was  the  fact  that  the  step  now  taken  marked  the  final 
collapse  of  the  whole  edifice  which  Bismarck  had  erected  in 
the  years  when  he  guided  German  Foreign  policy.  Thirty- 
five  years  had  passed  since  he  pushed  France  into  Tunis  and 
thus  provoked  a  bitter  quarrel  between  the  two  great  Latin 
nations.  It  was  a  full  generation  since  Crispi  and  then 
Crispins  sovereign  went  to  Berlin  and  a  celebrated  bargain 
was  made  by  which  Italy  turned  her  back  upon  her  ally  of 
Magenta  and  Solferino  and  became  after  a  fashion  one  of 
the  guarantors  of  German  possession  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  It 
was  not  until  the  Kaiser  made  his  first  memorable  venture 
in  world  affairs  (that  of  Tangier)  that  the  change  began. 
If  one  were  to  fix  a  date  it  would  be  fair  to  say  that  the 
German  attitude  at  Tangier,  the  eruption  of  the  Kaiser  into 
the  Mediterranean  and  the  subsequent  conference^  at  Alge- 
ciras,  marked  the  coming  of  Italy's  break  with  'Germany. 
In  that  conference  Italy  sided  not  with  Germany  but  with 
France  and  Britain.  Germany  emerged  from  it  actually 
defeated,  having  suffered  a  loss  of  prestige,  the  first  evidence 
to  the  world  that  German  statesmanship  had  fallen  into 
weaker  hands  than  those  of  the  Iron  Chancellor.^^ 

A   State  of  War  With  Germany   Declared  by   the 
United  States — April  6,  1917 

Two  years  and  eight  months  after  the  war  began,  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  declared  that  ''a  state  of 
war"  existed  between  this  country  and  Germany.  Two 
months  before  this  Count  von  Bernstorff,  the  German  Am- 
bassador, had  received  his  passports  in  consequence  of  the 
resumption  by  Germany  of  unrestricted  and  intensified  sub- 
marine warfare  regardless  of  neutral  rights.  For  two  years 
the  President  had  warned  Germany  of  the  consequences  of 
her  submarine  war  on  neutrals.  Step  by  step  these  warnings 
had  been  repeated  as  Germany's  conduct  grew  in  indiscrimi- 
nate savagery.  On  February  10,  1915,  in  answer  to  Ger- 
many's creation  of  a  war  zone,  the  President  had  told  her 
this  action  might  lead  to  the  destruction  of  American  lives 
and  property,  and  that  such  an  act  would  be  ''an  indefensi- 

19  The  New  York  Tribune. 

v.  1—14  217 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

ble  violation  of  neutral  rights  which  it  would  be  very  hard 
indeed  to  reconcile  with  the  friendly  relations  now  so 
happily  subsisting  between  the  two  Governments/'  This 
Government,  he  said,  would  "hold  the  Imperial  German 
Government  to  a  strict  accountability  for  such  acts  of  their 
raval  authorities  and  take  any  steps  it  might  be  necessary 
to  take  to  safeguard  American  lives  and  property  and  to 
recure  to  American  citizens  the  full  enjoyment  of  their 
acknowledged  rights  on  the  high  seas."  Nevertheless,  the 
Germans  in  May  sank  the  Lus'tania,  with  which  many 
American  lives  were  lost.  On  ]\Iay  13,  the  President  in- 
formed Germany  that  the  United  States  insisted  on  the 
rights  of  its  citizens  as  already  defined,  and  added:  "The 
Imperial  German  Government  will  not  expect  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  to  omit  any  word  or  any  act 
necessary  to  the  performance  of  its  sacred  duty  of  maintain- 
ing the  rights  of  the  United  States  and  its  citizens  and  of 
safeguarding  their  free  exercise  and  enjoyment."  On  June 
9,  after  receipt  of  an  unsatisfactory  note  from  Germany, 
he  informed  her  that  this  country  "can  not  admit  that  the 
proclamation  of  a  war  zone,  from  which  neutral  ships  have 
been  warned  to  keep  away  can  be  made  to  operate  in  any 
degree  as  an  abbreviation  of  the  rights  either  of  American 
shipmasters  or  of  American  citizens  bound  on  lawful  errands 
as  passengers  on  merchants  of  belligerent  nationality." 
Later  he  told  her  that  repetition  by  the  commanders  of 
German  naval  vessels  of  acts  in  contravention  of  those  rights 
must  be  regarded  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
when  they  affect  American  citizens,  as  deliberately  un- 
friendly. Then  came  the  sinking  of  the  White  Star  steam- 
ship Arahic,  followed  by  Germany's  disavowal  of  the  act 
and  by  a  definite  promise  on  September  1,  as  follows; 

^'Liners  will  not  be  sunk  by  our  submarines  without  warning 
and  without  safety  of  the  lives  of  non-combatants,  provided  that 
liners  do  not  try  to  escape  or  offer  resistance." 

Notwithstanding  this  assurance,  the  British  channel  boat 
Sussex,  with  Americans  on  board,  was  sunk  early  in  the 
next  year.     On  April  18,  the  President  said  with  reference 

218 


<&  G.   G.   BAIN 


Elbert  Hubbard 
Author  and  publisher 


©  underwood  &  underwood.  n.  y. 
Charles  Frohman 
Theatrical  manager 


Justus  Miles  Formax  Charles   Klein 

The  novelist  The  playwright 

LOST  ON  THE  "LUSITANIA" 


219 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

to  this  act  that  ''again  and  again"  Germany  had  *' given 
its  solemn  assurances"  that  passenger  ships  would  not  be 
sunk  without  warning,  and  yet  it  has  "repeatedly  permitted 
its  undersea  commanders  to  disregard  those  assurances  with 
entire  impunity."  The  United  States  had  accepted  her 
assurances  as  given  in  good  faith,  had  ''hoped,  even  against 
hope,"  that  she  would  keep  her  word,  and  the  United  States 
had  "been  willing  to  wait  until  facts  became  unmistakable, 
and  were  susceptible  of  cnly  one  interpretation."  But  this 

country  "now  owed  it  to  a 
just  regard  for  its  own  rights 
to  say  to  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment that  that  time  had 
come."  He  told  Germany, 
therefore,  that,  if  she  con- 
tinued this  kind  of  warfare, 
there  was  "but  one  course" 
for  the  United  States  to  pur- 
sue, and  he  defined  it  thus : 

"Unless  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment should  now  immediately 
declare  and  effect  an  abandon- 
ment of  its  present  methods  of 
submarine  warfare  against  pas- 
senger- and  freight-carrying  ves- 
sels, the  Government  of  the 
United  States  can  have  no  choice 
but  to  sever  diplomatic  relations 
with  the  German  Empire  alto- 
o-ether. ' ' 


(S)   HARRIS    a    EWING. 
COITNT    JOHANN    VON    BERNSTORFF 

Former  German  Ambassador  to  the 
United  States 


Germany  gave  the  pledge  required,  coupling  it,  however, 
with  a  condition  relating  to  what  Great  Britain  might  do,  which 
our  Government  informed  her  could  not  for  one  moment  be 
entertained.  Then,  on  January  31,  1917,  Germany,  in  disre- 
gard of  this  pledge,  announced  that  on  February  1  she 
would  enter  upon  a  systematic  policy  of  unrestricted  and  in- 
tensified submarine  warfare,  in  which  neutral  ships  would  be 
involved  unless  they  followed  two  specified  narrow  lanes, 
and  limited  their  sailings  to  once  a  week.  In  accordance 
with  his  notice  of  April  18  President  "Wilson  recalled  our 


220 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

Ambassador,  Mr.  Gerard,  from  Berlin,  and  gave  passports 
to  Count  von  Bernstorff,  the  German  Ambassador,  on  Feb- 
ruary 3,  but  even  this  act  failed  to  restrain  Germany's  hand. 
"Within  a  month  another  ship,  sailing  under  the  American 
flag,  was  torpedoed  and  American  lives  were  lost,  while  in 
March  four  American  ships  were  sunk  and  American  lives 
lost.  President  Wilson  then  summoned  Congress  in  special 
session  to  meet  on  April  2  and  act  on  the  war  conditions 
which  had  thus  been  created  by  Germany.  Both  Houses, 
the  Senate  on  April  4  by  82  to  6  votes,  the  House  on  April 
6  by  373  to  50,  passed  the  following  resolution: 

Whereas,  The  Imperial  German  Government  has  committed  re- 
peated acts  of  war  against  the  Government  and  the  people  of  the 
United  States  of  America;  therefore,  be  it 

JResolved,  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  state 
of  war  between  the  United  States  and  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment, which  has  thus  been  thrust  upon  the  United  States,  is 
hereby  formally  declared;  and 

That  the  President  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  and  directed 
to  employ  the  entire  naval  and  military  forces  of  the  United 
States  and  the  resources  of  the  Government  to  carry  on  war 
against  the  Imperial  German  Government;  and  to  bring  the  con- 
flict to  a  successful  termination  all  the  resources  of  the  country 
are  hereby  pledged  by  the  CongTess  of  the  United  States. 


Cltba  and  Panama  Against  Germany — April  7,  1917 

Cuba  and  Panama  were  the  first  American  States  to  follow 
the  example  of  the  United  States  in  entering  the  war. 
President  Menocal,  of  Cuba,  on  April  7  signed  a  bill 
declaring  that  a  state  of  war  existed  between  Cuba  and 
Germany.  The  Senate  unanimously  passed  the  bill  and 
immediately  forwarded  it  to  the  Lower  House,  where  it  was 
again  passed  unanimously  amid  scenes  of  wild  enthusiasm. 
In  the  Senate  the  utmost  gravity  prevailed,  as  if  the  mem- 
bers realized  to  the  fullest  extent  the  importance  of  the 
step  taken.  The  Conservative  leader  spoke  in  favor  of  it, 
without  attempt  at  eloquence,  declaring  that  it  was  Cuba's 

221 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

duty  to  declare  herself  on  the  side  of  the  United  States 
which  had  been  Cuba's  friend.  While  these  obligations  alone 
required  Cuba  to  enter  the  war,  there  were  other  reasons 
cited  in  President  Menocal's  message.  In  the  House,  where 
the  galleries  were  jammed,  and  the  diplomatic  box  was  filled, 
Leader  IManduley  spoke  of  the  ties  that  bound  Cuba  and  the 
United  States  as  closely  as  if  they  were  one  nation.  He 
spoke  of  the  support  of  the  American  people  during  the 
dark  days  of  Cuba's  fight  for  independence  and  the  final 
action  of  the  United  States  Government  which  resulted  in 
Cuban  independence. 

While  Menocal  recognized  a  moral  obligation  to  support 
the  United  States,  it  was  an  obligation  that  this  country 
would  never  have  thought  of  urging  upon  the  Cuban  people. 
Their  entrance  in  the  war  would  undoubtedly  be  advanta- 
geous, as  the  United  States  could  now  use  all  Cuban  ports 
for  its  warships,  when  need  arose,  instead  of  confining  itself 
to  the  harbor  of  Guantanamo.  The  advantages  Cuba  derived 
from  the  alliance  were  obvious,  and  more  than  offset  any 
she  might  have  gained  by  remaining  neutral.  By  the  terms 
of  her  treaty  with  the  United  States,  Cuba  was  restrained 
from  granting  to  any  foreign  power  the  right  to  establish 
a  naval  base  on  her  shores.  If  such  a  base  should  have  been 
established  by  force  while  she  remained  neutral,  it  would 
inevitably  have  carried  the  war  to  her  territory  under  con- 
ditions unpleasant  for  Cuba.  In  abstaining  from  entrance 
into  the  confiict,  Cuba  might  thus  have  been  a  shining  mark 
for  a  foreign  aggressor.  If  a  German  fieet  had  come  to 
her  waters,  her  case  would  have  been  hard.  Before  the 
United  States  actually  entered  the  war  Cuba  had  officially 
announced  that  she  would  stand  by  the  United  States.  The 
resolution  of  April  7,  declaring  war,  therefore  was  a  formal 
and  altogether  expected  act. 

Panama  entered  the  great  conflict  at  the  same  time.  Her 
action,  however,  was  somewhat  different.  By  proclamation 
signed  by  President  Valdez  on  April  7,  she  committed  her- 
self to  specific  assistance  of  the  United  States  in  defense 
of  the  Panama  Canal. 


222 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

Brazil  Against   Germany — The  Status  of  Other  Latin- 
American  Countries — The  Luxburg  Disclosures — 
May  28,  1917-October  26,  1917 

The  Brazilian  Chamber  on  May  28  passed  to  first  reading 
a  Government  measure  revoking  Brazil's  decree  of  neutrality 
in  the  war  between  Germany  and  the  United  States,  the  vote 
being  136  to  3,  and  on  June  28  Brazil  formally  revoked  the 
decree.  As  early  as  April,  trouble  between  Brazil  and  Ger- 
many had  reached  a  climax  when  the  Brazilian  steamer 
Parana  was  torpedoed.  Forty-six  German  ships,  aggregating 
400,000  tons,  were  now  seized  in  Brazilian  ports.  But  it  wa3 
not  until  four  months  later  (October  26)  that  war  wa5 
actually  declared  on  Germany  by  Brazil.  President  Braz 
on  that  day  sanctioned  a  proclamation  of  a  state  of  w^aj 
with  Germany  following  an  almost  unanimous  vote  *'of 
Congress  in  favor  of  a  declaration  that  actual  war  existedl 
The  vote  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on  the  declaration  w^ 
149    to    1.      In    the    Senate   there    was    no    dissenting    vot^ 

Territorially  Brazil  was  the  fifth  largest  country  in  till 
world,  with  a  population  of  25,000,000,  and  could  put 
500,000  soldiers  in  the  field.  Her  navy  possest  two  modern 
superdreadnoughts  and  was  manned  by  15,000  men.  Brazil 
ranked  as  the  eighteenth  nation  in  the  war.  Greece,  that 
abandoned  her  neutrality  about  the  same  time,  was  the 
nineteenth.  Greece,  however,  had  taken  no  positive  warlike 
action,  while  Brazil,  having  begun  by  seizing  the  Germaii 
ships,  became  actively  at  work  through  her  navy,  which,  in 
cooperation  with  an  American  squadron,  engaged  in  hunting 
German  raiders  in  the  South  Atlantic.  Brazil  had  the  honor 
of  being  the  first  South  American  nation  to  recognize  the 
duty  of  democracies  in  that  continent  to  strike  a  blow  for 
the  cause  of  American  solidarity.  Her  action  had  signifi- 
cance beyond  any  immediate  results  that  could  possibly 
attend  it.  Its  bearing  on  future  relations  between  the 
Latin-American  republics  and  the  United  States  invested  it 
wdth  an  importance  that  could  not  otherwise  have  been 
claimed.  Brazil  had  discerned  that  the  path  of  independ- 
ence and  safety  led  to  a  concert  of  American  States,  which 
should  put  them  all  behind  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  its  discre- 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


tion  being  to  decide  when,  in  the  common  interest,  it  was 
necessary  and  proper  so  far  to  invade  the  independence  of 
any  particular  State  as  to  compel  it  to  recognize  and  per- 
form its  international  duties.  To  the  attainment  of  the 
goal  of  a  ''United  America"  the  action  of  Brazil  marked 
an  important  advance. 

While  BraziUs  reserve  army  was  in  excess  of  half  a  mil- 
lion men,  the  total  available  unorganized  strength  of  the 
nation  was  4,300,000   from   a  population   slightly  less  than 

one-fourth  as  large  as  that  of 
the  United  States.  For  nine 
years  Brazil  had  had  in  force 
a  universal  military  service 
law,  every  Brazilian  between 
the  age  of  twenty-one  and 
forty-five  being  affected.  The 
terms  of  service  under  this  law 
required  two  years  in  the 
ranks,  followed  by  seven  years 
in  the  national  guard.  Re- 
servists were  called  up  for  four 
weeks'  training  annually  and 
were  given  rifle  practise  once 
a  month.  Training  varied 
from  two  to  four  weeks  a  year. 
The  total  available  unorgan- 
ized military  strength  exceeded 
by  half  a  million  men  the  total 
organized  military  strength  of  Italy  at  the  time  the  latter 
country  entered  the  World  War.  Here  was  strength  twice 
as  great  as  that  of  Portugal,  five  times  greater  than  that  of 
Norway,  and  it  exceeded  that  of  Greece,  Serbia,  or  Bul- 
garia. Her  reserves  and  regular  army  constituted  a  fight- 
ing force  half  as  large  as  the  total  war-strength  of  all  the 
other  countries  of  South  America  combined. 

Brazil,  in  September,  1918,  severed  diplomatic  relations 
with  Austria-Hungary  and  sent  a  message  to  Vienna  which 
amounted  to  a  declaration  of  war.  The  Government  declared 
that  in  order  to  render  effective  the  protests  made  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1917,  against  the  submarine  blockade  proclaimed  by 

224 


rUESIDENT    BrAZ    OF    BRAZIL 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

Germany  and  affirmed  by  Austria,  a  division  of  the  Brazilian 
navy  was  to  be  dispatched  to  European  seas  to  cooperate 
with  Allied  navies.^" 

Latin-America  for  the  most  part  had  responded  naturally 
to  the  ideals  of  the  Republic  of  the  north.  Of  the  A.  B.  C. 
nations,  that  is,  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile,  that  had  been 
in  conference  with  the  United  States  over  the  Mexican  situa- 
tion, only  Chile  remained  neutral  altho  she  declared  herself 
in  a  state  of  ** benevolent  neutrality'*  toward  the  United 
States.  Argentina  dismissed  the  German  Minister  and,  like 
Chile,  officially  announced  her  sympathies  with  the  United 
States.  Mexico  alone  of  the  greater  Latin  States  still 
assumed  a  questionable  attitude.  The  Latins  had  their 
domestic  problems  as  well  as  we — their  pacifists,  their  pro- 
Germans,  their  hatreds  of  Great  Britain  or  France,  their 
demagogs  and  self-seekers.  Time  had  been  needed  to  bring 
the  United  States  to  a  realization  of  the  issues  involved  in 
this  war.  All  Latin-America  would  learn  to  know  them.  A 
world  was  in  arms  against  Germany,  or  against  the  brutal 
militarism  of  Germany.  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile  had 
always  had  certain  intimate  relations.  Cooperation  between 
them  and  the  United  States  had  been  steadily  fostered  by 
President  Wilson.  Brazil  was  as  near  kin  to  the  Entente's 
ally  Portugal  as  the  United  States  was  to  Great  Britain. 
She  was  colonized  by  Portuguese,  actually  belonged  to  Portu- 
gal until  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  sent 
cordial  and  fraternal  greetings  when  Portugal  became  a 
republic.  In  Argentina  the  demand  for  war  was  not  so 
strong  as  in  Brazil,  tho  at  one  time  it  was  considerable.  In 
the  neighboring  republic  of  Uruguay  anti-German  feeling 
was  strong.  In  Chile,  there  had  always  been  a  considerable 
pro-German  sentiment,  due  to  large  German  settlements 
there.  The  general  tone  of  the  press,  while  supporting  the 
Government's  policy  of  neutrality  unless  directly  attacked, 
inclined  to  a  belief  that  sooner  or  later  Chile  would  have 
to  enter  the  struggle  against  Germany.  Bolivia  had  early 
followed  the  example  of  Brazil  in  severing  diplomatic  rela- 
tions. In  Central  America,  Guatemala  had  led  the  way  by 
a   breach    of   relations   with    Germany    and   had    sought   to 

2«  The  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce. 

225 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

cooperate  with  the  United  States.-^  Relations  had  also  been 
severed  by  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Dominican 
Republic,  and  Haiti.  In  October,  1917,  Peru  and  Uruguay- 
severed  relations. 

The  attitude  of  Argentina,  Salvador,  and  Chile  toward 
the  end  of  the  summer  in  1917  remained  what  was  called 
an  attitude  of  "benevolent  neutrality  toward  the  United 
States."  Then,  in  the  first  week  of  September,  the  whole 
diplomatic  world  was  astonished  when  Secretary  Lansing 
made  public  the  fact  that  the  Swedish  Legation  in  Argen- 
tina had  been  forwarding  among  its  own  official  messages 
to  Sweden,  certain  telegrams  from  the  German  Charge 
cV Affaires  in  Argentina  to  the  German  Foreign  Office  at 
Berlin.  This  was  an  obvious  breach  of  neutrality,  but  what 
was  curious  was  the  fact  that  the  dispatches  were  offensive 
and  hostile  to  Argentina  itself,  since  they  related  to  the 
seizure  or  sinking  of  Argentina  ships  by  German  submarines. 
Twice  these  dispatches  contained  a  brutal  and  inhuman 
recommendation  that  hereafter  Argentina  ships,  if  not 
spared,  should  be  ''sunk  without  leaving  any  trace" — that 
is,  in  plain  words,  that  the  German  submarines  should 
murder  the  crews  of  the  ships  in  order  to  prevent  diplomatic 
discussion.  Argentina  for  this  act  had  cause  to  demand  the 
recall  of  the  Swedish  Minister  and  Charge  cV Affaires,  as 
well  as  the  German  Minister,  Count  Luxburg.  Luxburg  soon 
received  his  passports  and  then  in  Buenos  Aires  a  mob 
stormed  the  German  Embassy  and  set  fire  to  other  buildings 
belonging  to  Germans. 

The  Argentina  Senate,  on  September  19,  by  a  vote  of 
23  to  1,  declared  for  the  breaking  off  of  relations  with 
Germany.  The  resolution  went  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
where  the  vote  was  53  to  18.  The  President,  however,  re- 
fused to  sign  the  declaration.  Both  votes  had  occurred  after 
the  German  Foreign  Office  ate  humble  pie  by  virtually 
apologizing  to  the  Argentina  Government,  disclaiming  Count 
Luxburg,  and  making  specific  promises  to  the  Argentina 
Minister  in  Berlin  to  respect  Argentina  rights  at  sea  in 
the  future.  Six  Latin-American  republics  besides  Chile  and 
Argentina,    altho    understood    to    be    overwhelmingly    pro- 

"  The  Literary  Digest. 

226 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 


Ally  in  their  attitude  toward  the  war,  maintained  an  offi- 
cially neutral  attitude.  These  were  Paraguay,  Ecuador, 
Colombia,  A^enezuela,  Salvador,  and  Mexico. 

New  disclosures  as  to  Count  Luxburg's  secret  plottings  in 
South  America  w^ere  made  late  in  December  in  dispatches 
from  him  to  the  German  Gov- 
ernment as  published  by  our 
Government.  Such  was  their 
audacity  and  criminality,  not 
to  mention  their  folly,  that 
German  diplomacy  appeared 
once  more  as  a  thing  all  Ly 
itself.  A  German  diplomat 
differed  from  other  diplomats, 
not  merely  in  the  fact  that 
his  most  important  work  was 
not  diplomatic,  but  felonious 
work.  The  difference  was 
shown,  not  alone  in  such  activi- 
ties as  the  sowing  of  disease 
germs  in  Roumania,the  poison- 
ing of  cattle  in  Russia  and  of 
wtIIs  in  France,  the  carrying 
infernal  machines  in  diplo- 
matic luggage,  the  organizing 
of  wholesale  arson  and  incidental  murder  in  the  United  States. 
Xor  was  it  shown  most  clearly  in  the  activities  of  German 
gentlemen  representing  their  sovereign  abroad,  who  had  pur- 
sued methods  closely  resembling  those  of  a  New  York  gun- 
man. In  our  contact  with  the  Dumbas,  Bernstorffs,  and 
Papens  this  difference  had  not  become  quite  so  clear  as  in 
the  correspondence  of  Luxburg,  Zimmermann,  and  Kuehl- 
mann.  The  main  duties,  the  chief  activities  of  a  German 
diplomat  had  been  to  discover  the  sore  spots  in  the  country 
whose  hospitality  he  was  receiving  and  to  labor  with 
Machiavellian  ingenuity  to  embroil  that  country  with  its 
neighbors.  Arson,  poisoning,  and  murder  were  merely  inci- 
dental and  subsidiary  matters.  His  business  was  on  a 
greater  scale.  It  was  to  set  one  country  against  another 
country,   as  well   in   peace   as   in   war;    to    foment   national 


Di:. 


iA.XTIX     T.     DlMBA 


Former    Ambassador    from    Austria 
to  the  United   States 


.OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

misunderstandings;  to  create  them  if  they  did  not  exist; 
to  breed  suspicion  and  hatred  between  the  nation  he  was 
supposed  to  honor  with  his  presence  and  other  nations.  This 
might  be  attempted  by  bribery,  as  when  Zimmermann  sought 
to  bribe  Mexico  to  attack  the  United  States  in  time  of  peace 
by  an  offered  bribe  of  Texas,  Arizona  and  New  Mexico.  It 
might  be  done  by  long  and  artful  manipulation  of  slight 
points  of  difference,  as  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  and 
Japan  in  1905 — a  method  continued  with  a  certain  measure 
of  success  for  a  dozen  years. 

We  had  in  the  Luxburg-Zimmermann-Kuehlmann  corre- 
spondence the  perfect  culmination  of  the  German  diplomat. 
Luxburg  had  so  concentrated  in  his  own  person  every 
feature  of  German  diplomacy,  save  only  the  coarse  one  of 
mere  clumsy  arson,  that  he  painted  in  this  correspondence 
a  picture  of  it  for  the  whole  world  to  see.  He  sought  to 
bribe  Argentina,  to  negotiate  with  her  a  secret  agreement 
by  which  her  ships  would  be  spared  by  German  submarines. 
He  sought  to  irritate  her  against  other  South  American 
nations.  He  sought  to  use  her  to  mislead  Chile  and  Bolivia 
into  a  hostile  attitude  toward  the  United  States.  Mean- 
while, he  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  Bernstorff  (who  had 
manipulated  an  Irish  revolution  from  New  York)  by  plot- 
ting a  German  revolution  in  southern  Brazil.  He  was  not 
above  homicide  measures,  as  he  had  shown  in  his  ''spurlos 
versenkt"^^  message.  In  the  main  his  activities  were  in 
larger  matters,  as  shown  in  his  attempts  to  play  off  Chile 
against  Argentina.^^ 

Curious  and  startling,  however,  was  the  news  from  Buenos 
Aires  on  January  3  that  Count  Luxburg  had  been  pro- 
nounced insane  in  a  report  made  by  medical  authorities 
who  had  had  him  under  observation.  The  finding  was  an- 
nounced ''after  prolonged  and  careful  study."  Luxburg  at 
that  time  was  held  in  an  internment  camp.  A  ''number  of 
reliable  medical  authorities"  pronounced  the  verdict,  after 
having  been  informed  that  Luxburg  ' '  had  been  acting  queerly 
for  a  number  of  years."  The  verdict  afforded  Germany  an 
excuse  for  the  astounding  revelations  of  duplicity  on  Lux- 


22  Literally,  "Sunk  without  trace.' 

23  The  New  York  Times. 


228 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

burghs  part.  But  it  did  not  explain  the  messages  that  had 
been  sent  by  Berlin  to  Luxburg,  and  which  indicated  an 
equal  facility  of  duplicity  on  the  part  of  the  German 
Foreign  Office. 

At  the  end  of  January,  1918,  the  Argentine  Minister  of 
War  recalled  Argentina's  military  attaches  from  Berlin  and 
Vienna.  In  political  circles  this  action  was  regarded  as 
connected  with  the  sinking  of  the  Argentine  steamship 
Ministro  Irriendo,  January  26,  when  she  was  flying  the 
Argentina  flag. 


Greece  Against  Germany — July  2,  1917 

The  entry  of  Greece  on  July  2,  1917,  had  two  aspects. 
In  its  effect  on  the  Allies  it  not  only  freed  Sarrail's  army, 
but  gave  him  all  Greek  territory  as  a  base.  It  also  prom- 
ised him  men  as  fast  as  Greece  could  repair  the  havoc  that 
was  wrought  in  her  army  when  Constantine  dismantled  it. 
Or  one  could  look  at  it  as  the  redemption  of  the  Greek  soul, 
the  wiping  out  of  dishonor  that  had  been  put  on  the  Greek 
name.  Venizelos  was  keeping  at  last  the  pledge  that  Con- 
stantine broke  in  Serbia's  hour  of  agony;  he  was  bringing 
Greece,  two  years  late,  to  the  altar  where  she  had  made  her 
vow.  She  had  pledged  herself,  if  Serbia  were  in  peril,  to 
come  to  the  rescue.  If  she  had  done  so,  Serbia  might 
have  been  saved;  but  when  the  expected  moment  came,  and 
Serbia  cried  for  help,  Constantine  deprived  Greece  of  her 
sword  and  sided  with  the  Teutonic  aggressor.  Not  satisfied 
with  the  blood  of  Serbia,  Constantine  soiled  his  hands  also 
with  that  of  Roumania,  for  the  fact  clearly  emerged  from 
the  mysteries  of  1915  that  what  kept  Sarrail  from  moving 
to  Roumania 's  aid,  when  she  fought  alone  against  Germany, 
Austria,  Turkey,  and  Bulgaria,  was  the  fear  of  Constantine 
and  his  ability  to  work  on  the  fears  of  the  Czar.^^ 


^  The  New  York  Times. 

229 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

SiAM  AND  China  Against  Germany — July  21,  1917 
August  14,  1917 

Official  notification  that  Siam  had  declared  war  against  Ger- 
many and  Austria  reached  Washington  on  July  22,  1917 ; 
German  and  Austrian  subjects  were  then  being  interned  and 
German  ships  had  already  been  interned.  The  announcement 
carried  greater  significance  than  might  at  first  have  been 
supposed.  While  Siam  was  a  country  comparatively  little 
known  in  the  United  States,  it  ranked  in  Asia  with  Belgium 
as  an  important  and  strategic  land.  Next  to  Japan,  it  was 
the  most  progressive  country  in  Asia ;  had  a  King  and 
statesmen  of  unusual  ability ;  a  prosperous  population  of 
over  ten  millions;  an  area  equal  to  that  of  France,  and  an 
agricultural  belt  unsurpassed  in  the  world.  Its  chief  impor- 
tance in  the  war  was  that  it  was  practically  the  rice  granary, 
and  so  the  resources  of  a  food  supply,  for  China.  It  gave 
the  Allies  now,  for  the  first  time,  an  unbroken  coastline  all 
the  way  from  China  to  the  Mediterranean.  It  had  been 
the  only  neutral  territory  in  that  entire  distance  of  many 
thousand  miles.  Siam  possest  an  excellent  little  navy,  ade- 
quate to  patrol  her  coastline  of  nearly  2,000  miles. 

On  March  14  China  had  severed  relations  with  Germany 
in  a  note  explaining  that  the  German  reply  to  China's  sub- 
marine warfare  protest  had  been  unsatisfactory.  At  the 
same  time,  the  seizure  of  half  a  dozen  small  German  mer- 
chantmen which  had  been  interned  for  many  months  at 
Shanghai  was  announced.  This  incident  recalled  the  German 
Emperor's  famous  injunction  at  the  time  of  the  Waldersee 
expedition  in  1900  to  his  troops  in  China  to  ''act  like 
Huns,"  to  pattern  their  conduct  on  that  of  Attila — direc- 
tions which  his  soldiers  obeyed  with  a  fidelity  that,  at  the 
moment,  shocked  the  world.  In  China  a  bitter  memory 
remained  of  that  warfare.  Only  a  few  years  before  the 
horrors  of  that  expedition,  Germany  had  seized  the  whole 
Province  of  Shantung  as  punishment  for  the  murder  of  two 
missionaries — an  act  which  ever  since  had  made  the  name 
of  Germany  odious  in  Chinese  minds.  On  August  14,  China 
finally  declared  war  upon   Germany   and  Austria-Hungary. 

230 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

The  decision  of  the  Chinese  Cabinet  to  declare  war  had  been 
reached  on  August  2. 

Liberia  Against  Germany — August  4,  1917 

Liberia,  the  negro  republic  on  the  west  coast  of  Africa, 
declared  war  on  Germany  on  August  7,  1917.  Some  time 
before  this,  Liberia  had  broken  off  diplomatic  relations. 
The  declaration  of  war  gave  her  an  opportunity  to  intern 
German  merchants  and  others  who  had  been  accused  of  un- 
neutral activities  in  Liberia.  The  active  military  forces  of 
the  country  consisted  of  only  about  400  men,  including 
militia,  volunteers,  and  police.  Liberia  was  organized  in 
1816,  by  the  National  Colonization  Society  of  America  as  a 
refuge  for  emancipated  slaves.  Its  population  was  in  the 
neighborhood  of  2,000,000,  only  about  50,000  of  whom  are 
civilized. 

The  L^xited  States  Against  Austria — December   7,   1917 

On  December  4,  1917,  President  Wilson  went  to  Congress 
with  a  notable  war  message  the  significance  of  which  was 
such  as  to  command  world-wide  attention.  The  message  was 
otherwise  notable  because  the  President  urged  an  immediate 
declaration  of  a  state  of  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Austria-Hungary — Germany's  vassal  and  tool.  As  to  Turkey 
and  Bulgaria — also  tools  of  Germany — he  counseled  delay, 
because  *'they  do  not  yet  stand  in  the  direct  path  of  our 
necessary  action."  Appearing  before  Congress  in  joint 
session  for  the  first  time  since  he  asked  for  the  war  declara- 
tion against  Germany  in  April,  he  was  greeted  warmly. 
His  recommendation  of  war  with  Austria  was  largely  based 
on  its  necessity  in  case  we  were  to  aid  Italy,  and  it  might 
now  be  necessary  at  any  time  to  send  American  soldiers  to 
Italy.  War  against  Austria-Hungary  was  formally  declared 
on  December  7.  The  vote  in  the  Senate  was  unanimous. 
In  the  House  there  was  only  one  dissenting  vote,  that  of  a 
Socialist. 

The  declaration  merely  recognized  a  fact  as  now  of  record. 
Germany  had  been   making  war   on   the   United   States   for 

231 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

many  months  before  our  Government  took  formal  notice  of 
the  situation.  Again  after  many  months,  Congress  had 
served  public  notice  of  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  with 
Austria-Hungary.  On  both  sides  it  had  been  conceded  that 
genuinely  peaceful  relations  long  since  had  terminated.  In 
fact  we  have  been  at  war  with  Austria-Hungary  ever  since 
we  declared  war  on  Germany,  her  protector  and  patron. 
The  Dual  Monarchy  had  become  a  mere  appanage  of  the 
German  Empire.  All  the  military  resources  of  Austria- 
Hungary  had  been  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  German  High 
Command.  That  High  Command  had  three  times  come  to 
the  Dual  IMonarchy's  rescue  and  driven  armies  from  its  soil. 
When  we  declared  war  on  the  senior  partner  in  that  sinister 
scheme  of  imperialism,  we,  in  effect,  had  declared  war  on 
the  junior  partner.  Austria-Hungary  had  committed  acts  of 
war  against  the  United  States,  and  the  United  States  had 
committed  acts  of  war  against  Austria-Hungary,  notably  in 
making  Treasury  loans  to  the  Italian  Government.  Austria- 
Hungary  in  1914  precipitated  the  World  War.  The  Dual 
Monarchy  had  now  suffered  losses  greater  relatively  than 
any  other  of  the  chief  belligerents  and  was  near  the  point 
of  exhaustion.  Its  Emperor-King  had  constantly  given  ex- 
pression to  the  war-weariness  of  his  disillusionized  subjects. 

Peru  With  the  Allies 

Nine  months  before  the  submarine  raid  on  the  Atlantic 
Coast  in  June,  1918,  Peru  had  broken  off  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Germany,  but  had  done  nothing  further  until 
now,  when  she  seized  six  German  vessels  in  Callao.  Among 
them  were  three  passenger  ships  that  would  make  excellent 
transports.  The  tonnage  she  had  seized  was  about  equal  to 
the  total  tonnage  that  had  been  destroyed  by  submarines 
off  our  coast  down  to  June  15.  The  character  of  the  seized 
ships  was,  however,  of  immensely  greater  value  to  the 
Allies  than  that  of  those  constituting  the  mixed  spoils  of 
the  U-boats.  Peru's  action  at  once  directed  attention  to 
Chile,  which  had  75  German  ships  rusting  in  her  ports. 
Sooner  or  later  Chile  was  expected  to  follow  Peru's  action. 
On  November  5,  1918,  Chile  took  possession  of  84  German 

232 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

ships  then  interned  in  Chilean  ports.  The  action  was  taken 
to  prevent  German  crews  from  sinking  the  vessels  after  they 
had  destroyed  vital  parts  of  their  machinery.  At  the  same 
time  the  Argentine  Government  placed  a  military  guard  on, 
three    German   merchant    ships    interned    at   Bahia    Blanca. 

Haiti  Against   Germany 

On  July  14,  1918,  the  Council  of  State  of  Haiti,  acting 
in  accordance  with  the  legislative  powers  given  it  under  the 
new  Haitian  Constitution,  unanimously  voted  a  declaration 
of  war  against  Germany  as  demanded  by  the  President  of 
the  Republic.  Germany  had  severed  diplomatic  relations 
with  Haiti  in  June,  1917,  after  the  "West  Indian  republic 
had  protested  against  Germany's  unrestricted  submarine  war- 
fare and  had  demanded  compensation  for  losses  to  Haitian 
commerce  and  life.  President  d'Artiguenave,  in  a  message 
to  the  Haitian  Congress  had  recommended  a  declaration  of 
Avar  against  Germany,  in  consequence  of  the  deaths  of  eight 
Haitians  on  the  French  steamship  Montreal,  when  that 
vessel  was  torpedoed  by  a  German  submarine.  The  declara- 
tion was  not  passed  at  that  time,  however,  the  commission 
appointed  to  study  the  question  having  reported  that  there 
was  not  sufficient  reason  for  passing  it. 

The  Onondaga  and  Oneida  Indians  Against  Germany 

In  July,  1918,  the  Onondaga  Indians,  one  of  the  Five 
Nations  that  composed  the  famous  Iroquois  League  in 
Colonial  New  York,  once  the  most  powerful  of  American 
Indians,  but  now  little  more  than  a  memory,  declared  war 
on  Germany  because  of  indignities  inflicted  upon  members 
of  the  Onondaga  Nation  who  were  attached  to  "Wild  West" 
shows  in  Germany  in  1914  when  the  war  broke  out.  Interned 
in  Berlin,  these  Indians  were  beaten  and  insulted  and  then 
told  that  they  had  been  put  in  prison  "for  their  own  pro- 
tection." They  were  finally  released  through  efforts  made 
by  our  Government.  In  1918,  Edward  Gohl,  one  of  their 
adopted  members,  whose  Indian  name  was  Tya  Gohwens, 
as  their  legal  adviser,  was  instructed  to  draft  a  declaration 

V.I— 15  233 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

of  war,  basing  their  right  to  make  such  a  declaration  on 
the  recognition  given  them  as  an  independent  people  in  the 
treaty  made  with  George  Washington  for  the  United  States 
in  1783.  All  the  young  Onondaga  braves  were  urged  to 
enlist  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  Numbering  540,  these 
people  lived  on  a  reservation  near  Syracuse  in  Central 
New  York. 

The  example  of  the  Onondagas  was  followed  some  weeks 
later  by  the  Oneidas.  During  the  Revolution,  the  Oneidas 
were  the  only  members  of  the  Iroquois  Confederacy  who 
sided  with  the  Americans,  all  the  others,  and  notably  the 
Mohawks,  taking  up  arms  for  Great  Britain.  The  Oneidas 
fought  again  with  the  United  States  in  the  War  of  1812.  The 
ancient  hunting-ground  of  the  Oneidas  stretched  southward 
from  the  Oneida  Lake  country  to  the  upper  Susquehanna 
at  and  west  of  Unadilla,  which  was  the  western  limit  of 
Mohawk  lands.  Their  alliance  with  the  Americans  in  the  Rev- 
olution brought  down  on  them  the  other  Iroquois — Mohawks, 
Onondagas,  Senecas  and  Cajnigas — who  burned  their  villages 
and  forced  them  to  take  refuge  with  Americans.  The  hos- 
tility of  the  other  Iroquois,  however,  was  overcome  by  an 
American  expedition  led  against  them  in  1779  by  Generals 
John  Sullivan  and  James  Clinton,  who  destroyed  more  than 
forty  of  their  villages  in  western  New  York.  The  Oneida 
tribe  now  numbers  about  3,000.  Of  these  two-thirds  are  in 
Wisconsin,  about  800  in  Ontario  and  200  in  New  York 
State.  The  word  Oneida  refers  to  a  huge  bolder  on  the 
shore  of  Oneida  Lake  against  which  the  council  fires  of  this 
^* nation"  were  built. 

As  TO  Spain 

Spanish  ships  were  sunk  by  German  submarines  at  various 
times  during  the  war.  Formal  protests,  and  even  demands 
for  indemnities,  were  made,  but  no  severing  of  relations 
occurred.  Spain,  Holland,  Switzerland,  and  Scandinavia 
now  remained  the  only  countries  in  Europe  who  were  not 
actually  belligerents.  Matters  had  several  times  been  critical 
between  Spain  and  Germany,  as  when,  in  September,  1918, 
thS  Spanish  Government  seized  a  German  steamship  interned 

234 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

in  a  Spanish  port.  Spain's  action  threatened  a  German  loss 
of  90  vessels,  but  it  ended  in  a  diplomatic  adjustment. 
Cable  dispatches  had  showTi  that  the  Dato  Ministry,  after 
displaying  great  reluctance,  had  been  compelled  to  take 
action  by  the  anti-German  sentiment  which  was  steadily 
growing  in  Spain.  Spain  had  full  confidence  by  this  time 
in  an  Allied  victory  because  of  the  July-August,  1918, 
offensive,  but  it  was  not  expected  by  the  Allies  that  Spain 
would  actually  enter  the  war.  She  had  been  on  the  verge 
of  it  several  times  before,  and  then  reached  a  settlement 
with  Germany.  Nor  did  the  Entente  really  desire  her  to 
do  so,  because  she  was  doing  the  cause  more  good  by  an 
aggressive  attitude  toward  Germany,  than  she  could  by 
actually  joining  the  Entente.  At  best  Spain  could  send 
only  a  few  indifferently  equipped  divisions  to  France — not 
greater  in  numerical  strength  than  America  was  sending 
every  month — and  embarrassing  complications  would  prob- 
ably come  afterward  because  of  the  reward  Spain  would 
seek.  Spain  might  feel  that  she  had  earned  Gibraltar,  or 
a  piece  of  French  colonial  territory  in  North  Africa.  She' 
had  already  been  rendering  service  in  a  mx)ral  way  by 
setting  a  good  example  to  other  neutrals,  and  might  yet  take 
steps  in  seizing  German  ships  that  would  assure  tonnage  for 
neutrals  and  the  Allies.  She  had  nothing  to  fear  from 
Germany  even  if  the  Kaiser  should  maker  an  empty  declara- 
tion of  war.  There  were  practically  no  Spaniards  in  Ger- 
many, but  there  were  100,000  Germans  in  Spain  who  might 
be  interned  or  sent  out  of  Spain,  and  Germany  could  not 
attack  Spain  anywhere."^ 

The  Scandinavian  States  and  Holland 

Each  of  the  three  Scandinavian  States  preserved  neutrality 
throughout  the  war,  .but  each,  having  had  many  of  their 
ships  torpedoed,  had  had  ample  justification  for  declaring 
war.  Their  nearness  to  Germany  and  their  weakness  in 
war  resources  alone  would  have  kept  them  from  hazarding 
a  conflict  with  the  big  military  aggressor  who  was  their 
neighbor.     Norway  suffered  most   from   Germany's   ruthless 

25  Paris  dispatch  to  The  New  York   Times. 

235 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

warfare  on  the  sea.  From  a  third  to  a  half  of  her  shipping- 
went  down,  and  shipping  combined  with  fishing  were  the 
chief  means  of  Norwegian  livelihood.  In  the  summer  of 
1918,  therefore,  the  Norwegian  public  followed  with  out- 
spoken delight  the  victorious  advance  of  Foch's  armies  and 
[he  press  no  longer  pretended  to  be  neutral.  Long  since 
lad  Germany  violated  Norwegian  neutrality,  not  only  by 
murdering  her  sailors  and  sinking  her  ships,  but  by  bomb 
explosions  and  fires.  In  the  first  days  of  the  war  the 
'Marseillaise"  had  been  sung  in  Norwegian  music  halls, 
md  had  been  cheered  loudly  by  the  public  but,  under 
orerman  pressure,  it  was  afterward  forbidden.  Most  Ger- 
mans by  1916  had  left  the  country,  finding  the  ground  in 
that  northern  region  too  hot  for  them. 

It  was  proof  of  solid  sympathy  for  the  Allies  that  Nor- 
ivegians  for  four  years  had  been  able  to  withstand  as  well 
IS  they  did  an  overwhelming  German  propaganda  which  by 
1916  actually  succeeded  in  making  the  people  believe  that 
American  soldiers  could  not  arrive  in  France  in  time  to 
prevent  an  Allied  defeat.  Norwegians  in  general  suffered 
much  during  the  war,  but  some  few  gained  millions,  and  for 
all  classes  wages  were  raised,  but  the  price  of  living  rose 
correspondingly.  Bulgaria's  withdrawal  from  the  war  in 
September,  1918,  and  the  subsequent  proposals  from  Ger- 
many and  Austria  for  an  armistice  played  havoc  with  Scan- 
dinavian shipping  stocks.  Norwegian  papers  estimated  that 
100  war  millionaires  had  been  wiped  out  by  the  break  that 
followed.  In  a  single  day  it  was  estimated  that  the  value 
of  such  stocks  declined  100,000,000  kroner,  or  about  $33,000,- 
000.  The  losses  occurred  chiefly  in  securities  of  small  com- 
panies operating  one  or  two  ships,  whose  stocks  had  been 
selling  as  high  as  400  because  of  stiff  freight  rates.  Many 
stocks  of  this  character  dropt  in  value  50  per  cent. 

Norway  had  done  two  great  things  for  the  Allies.  She 
was  at  first  of  help  in  keeping  Sweden  from  joining  Ger- 
many, and  at  the  most  critical  time  of  the  U-boat  war  she 
placed  about  2,000,000  tons  of  shipping  at  the  service  of  the 
Allies.  Her  products  of  fish,  minerals,  and  nitrates  were 
all  exported  to  Allied  countries  in  exchange  for  coal  and 
food.     Sweden  and  Denmark  remained  neutral  in  form,  but 

236 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

under  great  pressure,  seemed  at  times  quite  pro-German. 
Both  countries  carried  on  a  large  trade  with  Germany,  and 
fortunes  were  made  from  it.^'^ 

Holland,  also  a  neutral  power,  for  four  years  had  been  in 
a  position  where  it  hardly  dared  to  resist  any  demand  that 
had  the  might  of  Germany  back  of  it.  Whatever  the  in- 
telligence or  heroic  spirit  of  the  Dutch  people  might  be — 
and  history  had  shown  what  those  qualities  were  in  the 
Dutch — their  original  little  home-land,  on  the  very  borders 
of  the  German  Empire,  was  utterly  helpless  for  attack  upon 
a  gigantic  enemy  or  for  giving  resistance  to  its  aggression. 
Holland  had  distant  and  valuable  colonies  which  it  feared 
to  lose.  It  also  had  strong  industrial,  mercantile,  and 
financial  interests  which  had  been  by  no  means  blind  to 
their  opportunities  for  gain,  or  at  all  eager  to  make  sac- 
rifices for  freedom,  and  their  influence  was  powerful.  Under 
these  compelling  forces  the  sentiment  of  the  people  in  the 
mass  remained  quiescent,  hoping  to  escape  hunger  and 
forcible  pressure  from  without. 

As  TO  Luxemburg 

Luxemburg  did  not  declare  war  against  Germany,  and  yet 
by  Germany's  act  she  was  in  a  state  of  war  from  the  be- 
ginning. That  tiny  State,  a  Grand  Duchy  lying  in  the  path 
of  the  German  invaders  of  France,  in  August,  191-i,  yielded 
under  great  necessity  to  a  demand  from  Germany  for  a 
passage  of  their  armies  across  her  territory.  She  was  assured 
by  the  German  Government  at  that  time  that  her  acquies- 
cence would  be  rewarded.  The  little  State  was  afterward 
held  up  by  Germany  as  an  example  and  a  warning  to  the 
"obstinate"  and  severely  punished  Belgians.  Luxemburg 
soon  discovered  that  her  surrender  had  availed  her  little. 
From  the  first  day  that  German  soldiers  set  foot  upon  her 
soil,  the  Grand  Duchy  was  held  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
as  a  conquered  province.  Nor  was  her  state  of  slavery  a 
mild  one.  Prussian  troops,  stationed  in  her  towns,  com- 
mitted crimes  comparable  only  to  the  dragonades  of  Louis 
XIV.     M.   Marcel   Noppency,   a   Luxemburg   editor,   for   ex- 

26  Cable  dispatch  from  Christiania  to  The  New  York  Times,  Associated 
Press  reports,  The  New  York  Evening  Post. 

237 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

ample,  was  condemned  to  death  for  publishing  proofs  of 
German  atrocities.  After  Foch's  victorious  drive  began,  in 
1918,  nearly  all  civil  liberties  in  the  country  were  sus- 
pended. No  newspapers  from  AUies  or  neutral  countries 
were  allowed  to  circulate  there.  Luxemburg  editors  could 
print  on  war  subjects  only  such  articles  as  they  copied  from 
German  journals  or  as  were  dictated  to  them  by  German 
censors.      Luxemburg,    however,    constantly    sighed    for    the 

day  of  her  deliverance ;  she  boldly 
sang  the  ''Marseillaise"  in  the 
presence  of  German  leaders,  in- 
cluding the  Crown  Prince,  and 
her  people  refused  to  doff  their 
hats  when  His  Imperial  i\Iajesty 
the  Kaiser  passed.  In  their  souls 
her  people  came  to  loathe  the 
power  which  had  not  hesitated  to 
betray  and  enslave  them  at  a  time 
when  they  were  helpless  to  make 
any  defense  or  get  any  help  from 
other  nations.  Submission  to 
Germany's  violation  of  her  neu- 
trality had  not  saved  Luxemburg 
Marie  Adelaide  ^^^"^    ^    ^^^^  .^^^O^t   as    terrible    aS 

The  former  Grand  Duchess  of     ^^^^^    of    Belgium,    a    fate    that    waS 

Luxemburg,     who     abdicated    not  made   easier   for  her   to  bear 

after  the  armistice  was  signed        .  -r»   n    •  -■  ^-^     ^^    ^^a^ 

snice  Belgium,  havnig  secured  by 
her  heroic  resistance  the  admiration  of  the  world,  was 
conscious  of  a  noble  duty  unflinchingly  performed.-'' 

Iceland's  Own  Flag  First  in  a  Foreign  Port 

It  was  not  another  declaration  of  war,  but  it  was  a  dec- 
laration of  independence  that,  during  a  night  in  July,  1918, 
startled  the  skippers  in  the  Norwegian  harbor  of  Chris- 
tiania,  when  a  trim  new  freighter,  flying  a  strange  ensign  at 
the  masthead,  made  her  way  up  to  anchorage.  This  ensign, 
a  red  cross  edged  with  white  on  a  field  of  blue,  was  the  flag 
of  Iceland  which,  so  far  as  known,  never  before  had  been 
displayed  in   a  foreign  port.     The  surprize   of  sea-captains 

^  The  New  York  Evening  Sun. 

238 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

was  no  greater  than  that  of  representatives  of  British, 
American,  French,  and  Italian  Governments  who,  at  that 
time,  were  in  council  in  London  drawing  up  a  new  trade 
arrangement  with  Iceland,  the  compact  of  1916  having 
expired.  Iceland  had  outstript  the  leisurely  progress  of  the 
law.  She  had  been  contending  for  absolute  independence 
for  more  than  400  years  and  now  she  had  gone  ahead  and 
taken  it.  There  was  stubborn  stuff  in  these  descendants  of 
exiled  Norse  noblemen.  Norsemen  founded  Iceland  1,050 
years  ago,  after  Irishmen  had  already  been  there.  Denmark 
got  Iceland  from  Norway  in  1380,  but  the  Icelandic  claim 
had  always  been  that  the  treaty  with  Denmark  contained  no 
provision  that  destroyed  Iceland's  national  identity.  Restive 
always,  Iceland  secured  the  segregation  of  her  finances 
from  those  of  Denmark  in  1871,  and  the  payment  of  a  sum 
of  money  in  compensation  for  certain  church  properties 
seized  and  sold  to  the  Danish  crown  at  the  time  of  the 
Reformation. 

Home  rule  at  last  came  to  the  island  in  1903  and 
an  amplification  of  Icelandic  rights  in  1913.  By  these  Ice- 
land won  the  privilege  of  flying  her  own  flag  on  her  own 
soil  and  in  her  own  ports.  From  that  time  the  Althing  at 
Reykjavik  had  made  Iceland's  laws  and  administered  them 
through  its  own  cabinet.  A  stipulation  remained  that  Copen- 
hagen should  be  consulted  upon  affairs  of  state,  and  spe- 
cifically upon  matters  concerning  foreign  relations.  These 
forbidden  things,  however,  became  just  those  which  Iceland 
felt  an  irresistible  desire  to  have,  which  explained  the  ap- 
pearance of  her  flag  in  a  foreign  port  in  July,  1918,  and 
the  conclusion  of  w^hat  amounted  to  a  treaty,  without  so 
much  as  "by  your  leave"  to  King  Christian  X.  It  was  a 
minor  sensation  but  it  provoked  a  Cabinet  crisis  in  Copen- 
hagen, while  the  European  press  passed  it  with  a  few  lines, 
and  American  correspondents  did  not  think  it  was  worth 
cabling  about.  Iceland  has  an  area  about  the  same  as  New 
York  State,  or  a  little  less,  and  the  population  of  Yonkers, 
or  a  little  more,  which  gives  her  people  elbow-room.  After 
a  hard  winter  a  generation  ago  20,000  Icelanders  migrated 
to  Manitoba. ^^ 

28  The  New  York  Sun. 

239 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 

A  Summary  of  States  Involved  in  the  War  w^ith  Their 
Populations 

By  May  8,  1918,  thirty-one  States,  large  and  small,  were 
at  war  with  one  or  both  of  the  Teutonic  powers,  or  with 
Turkey.  Six  others  (if  Argentina  could  be  included)  had 
severed  relations  with  the  German  Government.  Since  April, 
1917,  when  the  United  States  entered  the  war,  seventeen 
States  had  either  declared  war  against  the  Imperial  German 
Government  or  had  broken  diplomatic  relations  with  it.  Of 
twenty-one  other  American  republics,  ten  were  at  war  with 
Germany,  four  had  severed  relations  with  her,  another  had 
announced  that  it  would  not  officially  receive  a  German 
^Minister,  and  still  another  had  dismissed  a  German  Minister, 
placed  him  under  arrest,  and  voted  for  a  break,  tho  the 
last-named  action  was  not  ratified  by  its  executive.  Strong 
anti-German  feeling  at  the  same  time  existed  in  some  of  the 
other  Latin-American  countries.  Following  are  lists  showing 
the  different  Allied  States  engaged  in  the  conflict,  and  the 
States  which  severed  relations  with  Germany 

While  thirty-one  sovereign  States  could  be  classed  as  hav- 
ing entered  the  war  against  Germany  or  her  Allies,  several 
were  not  important  factors  against  her.  For  example,  the  tiny 
Republic  of  San  Marino  and  the  Principality  of  Monaco, 
while  sovereign  States,  could  hardly  be  considered  seriously. 
Japan's  active  participation  had  been  limited  to  one  short 
campaign,  altho  this  campaign  had  important  results,  since 
it  eliminated  Germany  from  eastern  Asia.  Portugal  in  the 
first  years  of  the  war  had  no  soldiers  on  the  battle  line  in 
Europe,  but  from  the  beginning  she  could  not  be  treated 
lightly.  Portugal  was  playing  a  not  important  part  in  the 
war.  Men's  eyes,  when  fixt  on  the  drama  in  Europe,  seldom 
saw  a  struggle  that  might  bulk  large  on  another  continent 
when  histories  were  written  centuries  afterward.  This  was 
the  struggle  for  the  continent  of  Africa.  In  the  Seven 
Years'  War  European  eyes  had  been  flxt  almost  exclusively 
on  European  battlefields.  Men  thought  little  of  a  simul- 
taneous struggle  going  on  for  possession  of  North  America. 

240 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR 

STATES    AT    WAR    WITH    GEP.MAXY 

Nation                                                                 War  Declared 

Serbia July  28,  1914 

Russia Aug-.  1,  1914 

France Aug.  3,  1914 

Monaco Aug.  3,  1914 

Belgium        Aug.  4,  1914 

British  Empire Aug.  4,  1914 

Montenegro Aug.  9,1914 

Japan    .\      Aug.  23,  1914 

Portugal       .  .  Nov.  23,  1914 

Italy May  24,  1915 

San  Marino f.      May  24,1915 

Arabia  (Hejas)   (about) June  10,  1916 

Roumania     .  .      .  .      Aug.  27,  1916 

Greece  ^9       Nov.  28,  1916 

United  States Auril  6,  1917 

Cuba April  7,  1917 

Panama April  7,  1917 

Greece  ^^       July  2,  1917 

Siam July  22,  1917 

Liberia Aug.  4,  1917 

China Aug.  14,  1917 

Brazil Oct.  26,  1917 

Guatemala April  21,  1918 

Nicaragua May  7,  1918 

Honduras 

Bolivia  

Haiti 

Ecuador        

Costa  Rica 

Czecho-Slavs        

Jugo-Slavs 

states    that    severed    relations    with    GERMANY  OR    WERE 

benevolently  neutral  toward  the  united  states 
Nation 

Egypt Aug.  13,  1914 

Dominican  Republic 

Peru      Oct.  6,  1917 

Uruguay       Oct.  7,  1917 

Chile 

29  Provisional  Government. 
^'  Government  of  Alexandria. 

241 


OUTBREAK  AND  CAUSES 


To  them  that  conflict  was  simply  a  gmall  affair  on  negligible 
side-lines,  and  yet  it  was  a  struggle  which  determined  the 
destiny  of  the  American  continent,  and  the  United  States  of 
America  was  a  result  of  it.  So  now,  with  Africa,  a  neglected 
continent  for  centuries,  the  world  was  not  thinking  of  great 
nations  rising  there  as  one  had  risen  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. Not  from  sentimental  reasons  had  Portugal  entered  the 
war,  but  to  protect  her  African  territories.    As  the  ally  of 

England,  France,  and  Bel- 
gium she  was  playing  her  part 
in  wiping  out  German  African 
claims.  Portugal  also  in  the 
last  years  of  the  war  had  men 
at  the  front  in  western 
Europe.  In  a  sense  there  was 
still  another  belligerent  nation 
in  this  war — Persia.  Persia 
had  not  declared  war,  and  war 
had  not  been  declared  against 
her,  but  she  was  actively  en- 
gaged from  the  first.  Altho 
only  nominally  a  belligerent, 
Persia  had  really  done  more 
fighting  than  Japan. 

]\Iore  than  three-fourths  of 
the  workUs  population  lived 
in  countries  at  war  with  Ger- 
many or  her  allies.  Of  the 
world's  total  area  of  57,000,- 
000  square  miles,  27,000,000  were  under  anti-German  dom- 
ination, while  the  Germanic  Allies  controlhjd  only  5,000,000. 
But  against  all  these  advantages  were  Germany's  years  of 
careful  preparation,  the  long-fostered  belief  of  her  people 
that  she  was  some  day  to  fight  a  defensive  war  against  a 
world  of  enemies,  and  her  advantageous  frontiers  in  Central 
Europe  as  a  beleaguered  fortress,  with  a  superb  railway 
system  enabling  her  to  transport  troops  from  one  front  to 
another  with  ease  and  rapidity.  Had  the  Entente  Allies 
been  prepared  for  war  to  anything  like  the  same  extent, 
Germany's  cause  would  have  been  lost  in  the  first  year  of 
the  war. 

242 


El  Hussain 
King  of  the  new  Hejaz  State  which 
rebelled    from    Turkey    and    became 

independent 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

Part  I 

THE  INVASION  OF  BELGIUM, 
LUXEMBURG,  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 


243 


244 


I 

ROADS  FROM  THE  RHINE  VALLEY  INTO  FRANX^E 
— ^'THE   COCKPIT   OF   EUROPE" 

THERE  are  fonr  mucli-traveled  rail-routes  from  the  Rhir.e 
Valley  into  France,  three  of  them  ancient  and  well-worn 
military  routes.  Only  one  of  them  runs  directly  across  the 
Franco-German  frontier,  the  others  reaching  France  across 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg,  countries  declared  neutral  under 
guaranties  from  the  Great  Powers,  including  Germany.  An 
effective  and  sudden  German  blow  at  France  was  possible 
only  by  taking  the  prohibited  routes  through  Belgium  and 
Luxemburg,  because  a  frontal  attack  from  Germany's  south- 
ern border  with  the  barrier  from  Verdun  to  Belfort  to 
overcome,  would  at  best  have  taken  months  to  force  a  pas- 
sage and  might  have  failed  in  the  end  disastrously,  as  did 
the  attack  on  Verdun  in  1916.  Such  an  invasion  made 
through  the  Gap  of  IMetz  would  not  only  have  exposed  the 
German  armies  to  a  flank  attack  from  behind  Verdun,  but 
would  have  compelled  them  to  pour  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  men  through  a  bottle-neck  of  territory  not  more  than 
thirty  miles  wide.  This  would  have  meant  that  army  corps 
in  some  numbers  would  all  have  been  packed  on  the  same 
road  with  their  lines  of  supply  overburdened  and  their  com- 
munications limited  to  the  middle  Rhine,  leavinor  bridges 
and  railways  on  the  lower  Rhine  half  idle.  Such  a  step 
would  have  courted  almost  certain  disaster.  "What  Germany 
needed  was  a  wide  "out-march"  and  this  could  only  be  got 
by  begging,  or  by  unlawfully  forcing  a  passage  through 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg. 

The  road  through  Luxemburg  passed  into  the  southern 
Ardennes  and  thence  to  the  valley  of  the  Meuse,  from  the 
German  camp  at  IMalmedy,  just  north  of  which  was  a  road 
to  Stabelot,  running  thence  to  the  northern  Ardennes  and 
the  Meuse  at  Dinant.  From  Aix-la-Chapelle  ran  a  road  by 
way  of  Verviers,  and  another  by  way  of  Vise,   both  near 

245 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

tire  Dutch  frontier.  Germany  poured  her  armies  into  France 
by  these  northern  routes  and  so  violated  the  territory  of 
Luxemburg  and  Belgium.  In  all  she  had  six  armies,  com- 
manded, respectively,  by  General  von  Kluck  (on  her  right 
wing),  Duke  Albrecht  of  Wurtemberg,  the  Imperial  Crown 
Prince,  the  Bavarian  Crown  Prince,  and  General  von 
Heeringen  (on  her  left  wing).  The  most  northerly  of  the 
routes  into  France  from  Germany  begins  at  Cologne  and, 
passing  through  Aix-la-Chapelle,  enters  Belgium,  either  at 
Vise  on  the  Meuse,  or  at  Verviers,  and  thence  runs  to  the 
Meuse  at  Liege,  and  after  crossing  Belgium,  enters  France 
through  a  natural  gap  in  the  hills  on  the  head-waters  of  the 
Oise  and  Sambre  rivers.  In  this  direction  runs  the  most 
frequented  highway  from  Paris  to  Berlin.  It  was  by  this 
route  that  Julius  Caesar,  having  traversed  what  are  now 
France  and  Belgium,  reached  the  Rhine  where  at  Cologne 
he  built  his  famous  bridge.  South  of  this  route  is  another 
route  beginning  at  Coblenz,  which  follows  the  Moselle  to  and 
through  Luxemburg,  and  enters  France  at  Longwy,  a  town 
which  was  taken  by  Bliicher  in  his  pursuit  of  Napoleon  in 
1814,  and  again  by  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince  in  1914. 
Next  is  a  route  which  begins  at  Mayence  and,  following  the 
Rhine  to  Strassburg,  turns  west  through  the  Saverne  gap 
and  crosses  the  frontier  of  France  near  Luneville  and 
Nancy.  This  route  was  followed  by  many  early  invaders  of 
Germany  and  France  as  far  back  as  history  runs.  Riche- 
lieu's armies  and  those  of  Louis  XIV  went  this  way,  and  so 
did  the  armies  of  Napoleon.  The  German  armies  that  came 
from  the  north  in  1914  expected  to  meet  in  France  some- 
where west  of  Verdun  and  Belfort  and  thus  compel  the 
French  army  guarding  the  Alsace-Lorraine  barrier  to  fall 
back.  This  would  have  opened  a  way  for  German  forces 
from  the  Rhine  to  enter  France  from  Metz  and  Strassburg. 
A  concentration  before  Paris  of  three  German  armies  could 
thus  have  been   affected. 

On  August  2  a  German  advance  guard  in  automobiles 
crossed  the  frontier  into  Luxemburg  and  on  the  same  day 
clashes  between  border  patrols  occurred  at  Longwy  and 
Luneville.  On  August  3  a  formal  demand  was  sent  by  the 
German  to  the  Belgian  Government  for  permission  to  cross 

246 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Belgian  territory.  Permission  being  refused,  the  Germans 
boldly  entered  Belgium.  The  resistance  made  by  the  Bel- 
gians delayed  the  German  advance  long  enough  to  give  the 
French  and  the  English  the  necessary  time  in  which  to 
collect  armies  for  defense.  It  was  military  necessity  that 
led  the  Germans — so  they  declared — to  go  through  neutral 
Belgium,  it  being  important  for  them  to  get  their  armies 
into  France  promptly.  Not  only  would  it  have  been  im- 
possible  for   them   to   do   this   from   the   lower,    or   Franco- 


fik^ti4J^h 


ALBERT,  KING  OF  BELGIUM,  AND  A  GROUP  OF  HIS  OFFICERS 

German,  frontier,  with  Verdun,  Toul,  Epinal,  and  Belfort 
guarding  that  front,  and  behind  them  a  second  line  hardly 
less  formidable,  but  that  frontier  was  mountainous  and  had 
few  roads,  such  roads  as  it  had  running  through  narrow 
valleys  and  among  gaps  in  hills.  None  of  the  frontier 
fortresses  was  strictly  impregnable,  but  the  work  of  smash- 
ing through,  when  a  French  field-army  was  defending  them, 
would  have  consumed  an  amount  of  time  which  Germany 
could  not  give.  Hence  her  violation  of  the  neutral  gate- 
ways. 


247 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

The  railroad  from  Aix-la-Chapelle  to  Liege  was  one  of  the 
^reat  trunk  lines  of  Europe.  West  of  Liege  it  opened  into 
several  double-track  routes,  one  of  which  led  across  the 
Belgian  plain  to  Brussels,  and  to  Paris  over  level  country, 
destitute  of  large  rivers,  high  mountains,  or  other  natural 
obstacles  to  the  rapid  advance  of  an  invading  army.  If 
Germany  was  to  crush  France  by  one  blow,  here  was  her 
only  possible  avenue  of  approach.  Five  main  railway  lines 
cross  Belgium  from  east  to  west  and  follow,  generally, 
ancient  and  natural  highways.  Two  of  them  connect  with 
Antwerp.  Two  others  are  branches  of  international  trunk- 
lines  that  run  from  Cologne  to  Ostend  and  Paris,  and 
divide  Liege,  the  one  for  Brussels,  the  other  for  the  French 
frontier,  through  the  Meuse-Sambre  valleys,  and  obviously 
the  path  for  the  Germans  to  choose.  Here  had  been  placed 
three  of  Belgium's  four  fortresses,  while  the  frontier  of 
France  was  covered  by  one  at  Maubeuge.  But  Liege  had 
first  to  be  reduced,  after  which  it  would  be  possible  for  the 
Germans  to  break  westward  along  the  Meuse  to  Namur. 

Those  parts  of  Belgium  and  Northern  France  over  which 
were  now  to  march  for  weary  years  the  armies  of  Germany 
and  the  Allies  had  long  been  known  as  ''the  Cockpit  of 
Europe."  They  had  been  battle-grounds  from  the  earliest 
times  of  which  we  have  any  records,  either  written  or 
legendary.  As  C^sar  traversed  them  half  a  century  before 
the  birth  of  Christ,  so  back  of  him,  for  uncounted  ages, 
prehistoric  and  aboriginal  people  here  have  met  to  fight  out 
their  quarrels.  Caesar  fought  the  Belgse  and  their  allies  in 
France  (or  Gaul)  before  he  reached  the  valley  of  the  Meuse 
at  Namur.  In  Book  III  of  his  "Commentaries"  are  set 
forth  the  causes  of  his  war  with  them.  "While  in  winter 
quarters,"  runs  this  account,  "frequent  reports  were  brought 
to  him  that  all  the  Belga  were  entering  into  a  confederacy 
against  the  Roman  people  and  that  the  reasons  of  the  con- 
federacy were  the^e :  First,  that  they  feared  our  army 
would  be  led  against  them ;  secondly,  that  they  were  in- 
stigated by  several  of  the  Gauls,"  all  of  which  reads  almost 
as  if  it  had  been  written  of  events  in  July,  1914.  After  a 
fifteen  days'  march,  Caesar  arrived  on  the  frontier  of  lands 
then  occupied  by  the  Belgae.     He  halted  among  the  friendly 

248 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Remi,  a  people  who  dwelt  in  the  Champagne  country,  north 
of  the  Marne,  and  whose  name,  slightly  altered,  is  preserved 
to  our  time  in  that  of  the  celebrated  royal  and  cathedral  city 
of  Reims.  Close  neighbors  of  the  Remi  were  the  Suessiones, 
or  the  people  of  Soissons. 

When  Cgesar  heard  of  the  approach  of  the  Belgian  Allies 
from  the  north,  he  ''hastened  to  lead  his  army  over  the 
Axona  (now  the  Aisne)  and  on  the  other  side  pitched  his 
camp.'*  Csesar  probably  reached  the  Aisne  by  moving  along 
the  main  traveled  road  from  the  capital  of  the  Remi 
(Reims),  across  the  Aisne  to  Laudunum  (Laon).  If  he 
crossed  at  Berry-au-Bac,  he  followed  almost  exactly  the 
battle-line  of  General  Joffre  in  September,  1914.  The  ground 
he  had  for  battle  was  a  place  "naturally  convenient  and 
suitable  for  marshaling  an  army,  since  the  hill  where  the 
camp  was  pitched,  rising  gradually  from  the  plain,  extends 
forward  in  breadth  as  far  as  the  space  which  the  marshaled 
army  could  occupy,  and  has  steep  declines  on  the  sides  in 
either  direction  and,  gently  sloping  in  front,  gradually  sinks 
to  the  plain."  On  either  side  of  a  hill  Caesar  "drew  a 
trench."  The  place  here  described  is  believed  to  be  the 
plateau  of  Craonne,  across  which  were  dug,  within  rushing 
distance  of  each  other,  the  German  and  French  trenches  of 
September,  1914. 

Caesar  prest  on  to  Soissons,  meeting  with  only  faint- 
hearted resistance,  and  going  west  and  north,  moved  past 
the  elbow  of  the  Axona  and  the  Isara  (that  is,  the  Aisne 
and  the  Oise),  through  the  chief  town  of  the  Ambiani 
(which  is  Amiens),  thus  anticipating  the  famous  turning 
movement  of  the  Allies  in  1914.  More  fortunate  than  Gen- 
eral Joffre,  Csesar  was  able  to  swing  east  and  north  of  the 
Oise  into  the  country  of  the  Nervii,  the  most  warlike  mem- 
bers of  the  Belgian  confederacy,  who  were  holding  against 
him  the  line  of  the  Sambre,  then  called  the  Sabis.  Four 
miles  southwest  of  Maubeuge,  Caesar  fought  the  most  des- 
perate of  all  his  Gallic  battles.  His  camp  at  one  time  was 
actually  taken  possession  of  by  the  Nervii,  and  his  allies 
were  in  flight,  but  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  enabled 
him  to  win  a  crushing  victory.  The  Nervii  were  annihilated, 
or  "overcome"  as  Shakespeare  puts  it  in  the  play,   where 

V.  1—18  249 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

Mark  Antony,  who  seems  to  have  been  with  Caesar  on  this 
campaign,  says: 

''You  all  do  know  this  mantle:  I  remember 
The  first  time  ever  Caesar  put  it  on ; 
'Twas  on  a  summer's  evening-,  in  his  tent, 
That  dav  he  overcame  the  Nervii." 


The  Belgian  cities  still  fought  on.  The  Aduatiei,  from 
lands  along  the  Mosa  (or  Meuse),  between  the  Sambre  and 
Liege,  while  advancing  to  the  aid  of  the  Nervii,  heard  of 
the  catastrophe  near  Manbenge,  and  immediately  concen- 
trated on  their  principal  stronghold  at  the  confluence  of 
the  Sambre  and  the  IMeuse,  Aduaticorum  oppidum — that  is 
at  Namur — "which  place  they  fortified  with  a  very  lofty 
double  wall  and  besides  placed  stones  of  great  weight  and 
sharpened  stakes  upon  the  walls."  In  57  B.C.  as  in  1914 
A.D.  the  value  of  fortified  places  was  to  receive  a  shock  at 
Namur.  Caesar  brought  his  heaviest  siege  gun  into  action 
against  this  ''lofty  double  wall,"  pushed  his  storming  plat- 
form close  to  the  wall,  sent  forward  movable  towers;  and 
made  use  of  cupolas.  In  consequence,  the  Aduatiei  sent 
ambassadors  to  C^sar  asking  for  peace.  These  ambassadors 
declared  that  they  "did  not  believe  the  Romans  waged  war 
without  divine  aid  {sine  ope  decorum),  since  they  were 
able  to  move  forward  machines  of  such  height  with  so  great 
speed."  It  was  heavy  siege  guns  then  as  now  that  "over- 
came" Namur. 

Belgium  alone  furnished  in  Waterloo  the  most  famous  of 
all  these  battle-fields,  but  other  still  famous  battles,  Ligny, 
Quatre-Bras  and  Fontenoy,  were  fought  in  Belgium.  Water- 
loo lies  on  the  Brussels  and  Charleroi  road,  only  a  few 
miles  distant  from  Brussels.  On  this  field  are  the  hamlets; 
or  farms,  called  Mont  St.  Jean,  La  Haye  Sainte,  Hougo- 
mont,  La  Belle-Alliance  and  Plancenoit.  The  ground  on 
which  Wellington  took  up  his  position  after  the  battle  of 
Quatre-Bras  was  Mont  Saint  Jean,  where  the  highroads 
from  Vivelles  and  Genappe  unite.  Thence  the  main  route 
leads  to  Brussels.  In  front  of  this  village  extends  a  long 
chain  of  low  hills  with  gentle  slopes,  presenting  advantages 

250 


:5i 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

for  concealment.  Undulating  ground  afforded  every  facility 
for  posting  cavalry  and  reserves,  and  screening  them  from 
the  enemy.  Here  Wellington  was  able  to  hold  his  own 
against  a  stronger  enemy,  until  the  assistance  promised  by 
Bliicher  arrived. 

Genappe,  a  village  with  1,700  inhabitants,  is  often  men- 
tioned in  connection  with  Waterloo.  About  two  and  a  half 
miles  to  the  south  of  it  lies  Quatre-Bras,  which  derives  its 
name  from  the  "four  arms"  of  roads  that  lead  to  Charleroi, 
Nivelles,  Brussels  and  Namur.  This  point  was  of  great 
strategic  importance  to  Napoleon.  Its  capture  by  the 
French  would  have  made  it  impossible  for  the  British  and 
Prussians  to  render  each  other  effective  support.  It  was 
on  June  16,  1815,  that  this  battle  of  Quatre-Bras  was 
fought  between  Ney's  division  and  the  Allies.  The  French 
numbered  about  17,000  men,  the  Allies  18,000.  Of  the 
latter  8,000  were  British  and  Germans  and  10,000  Nether- 
landers.  After  a  series  of  indecisive  preliminary  operations, 
Ney,  at  the  head  of  9,000  men,  attacked  the  Netherlanders. 
The  battle  raged  with  the  utmost  fury  till  dark.  About  four 
o'clock  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  ("Brunswick's  fated  chief- 
tain") fell  while  endeavoring  to  rally  his  troops.  The  spot 
where  the  Duke  fell  to  the  right  of  one  of  the  roads,  a  few 
hundred  paces  from  Quatre-Bras,  is  still  marked  by  a  lion, 
which  with  pedestal,  is  twenty-six  feet  in  height.  At  the 
close  of  the  day  success  turned  in  favor  of  the  Allies.  Ney's 
discomfiture  was  complete.  Under  cover  of  the  darkness  he 
retreated  to  his  original  position. 

One  of  the  chief  incidents  in  Scott's  "Quentin  Durward" 
takes  the  reader  to  the  valley  of  the  Meuse,  and  the  Forest 
of  Ardennes,  where  ruled  "the  Wild  Boar  of  Ardennes." 
Here  the  Meuse  flows  through  a  country  rich  in  the  still 
older  romances  of  Charlemagne's  time.  Vine-lands  and  hop- 
gardens now  line  its  upper  banks.  Eastward  it  washes 
great  industrial  cities,  gathering  to  itself  ashes,  rust,  and 
acids.  Further  on  it  drifts  slowly  through  the  flatlands  of 
Holland,  where  it  supplies  numerous  canals  with  water. 
Between  Namur  and  Liege  it  cuts  a  narrow  passage  between 
wooded  hills  whose  difficult  sides  are  dotted  with  villas.  Be- 
fore   reaching   the    sea    the    Meuse,    now    called   the    Maas, 

252 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

divides  slowly,  one  branch  flowing  to  the,  west,  the  other 
mingling  its  waters  with  the  Rhine  and  so  running  past 
Rotterdam  to  the  Hook  of  Holland. 

At  the  beginning  of  its  course  in  northeastern  France,  the 
Meuse  runs  through  wide  meadowlands,  then  breaks  through 
a  gorge,  fringed  with  broken,  tangled  banks,  a  wealth  of 
scenic  beauty  marking  its  way,  with  chateaux,  castles,  cot- 
tages and  farmsteads.  But  far  older  than  these  evidences  of 
the  living,  are  other  names  kept  from  forgetfulness  by  fire- 
side legends  and  historic  records.  Up  and  down  this  river's 
course  two  thousand  years  of  intermittent  warfare  have  been 
waged.  The  valley  of  the  Meuse  has  been  a  battleground 
more  often  than  any  other  valley.  As  at  Liege,  the  first 
battle  of  the  World  War  (Aug.  9,  1914)  was  fought,  so  was 
the  great  struggle  continued  along  this  wild,  rugged-banked 
stream,  southward  through  Belgium  into  France.  Liege, 
Namur,  Dinant,  Givet,  Verdun,  anl  St.  Mihiel — all  are 
towns  on  the  Meuse  familiar  to  the  mind  while  the  war 
lasted.  The  Meuse  rises  in  France,  flows  northward  through 
Belgium,  then  crosses  the  Dutch  frontier,  and  sweeps  west- 
ward through  Holland.  Its  journey  to  the  sea  is  one  of 
580  miles,  of  which  460  are  navigable.  Its  source  is  in 
the  south  of  the  French  Department  of  Haute  Marne,  the 
Monts  Faucilles,  whence  it  crosses  the  departments  of  the 
Vosges,  Meuse,  and  Ardennes  into  Belgium  near  Sedan, 
northward  into  Holland  near  Maestricht,  and  thence  west- 
ward to  the  sea.  It  bears  several  names  along  its  course — 
Meuse  (French),  Maas  (Dutch),  Maes  (Flemish),  Mer- 
wede  (German).  The  valley  of  the  Meuse  has  been  a 
channel  for  the  ebb  and  flow  of  armies  for  so  long  that  it 
might  be  said  to  drain  one  vast,  historic  battle-field.  Caesar 
pursued  its  path  into  the  unknown,  barbaric  North.  Four 
centuries  afterward  wild  Teutonic  tribes  prest  down  be- 
tween its  banks  toward  the  wealth  of  Rome.  Christian 
Europe  has  been  settling  its  differences  along  the  valley  of 
the  Meuse  by  force  of  arms  from  the  days  of  Clovis  to  the 
pf-esent  time. 

Mons,  where  the  British  were  first  to  meet  the  Germans, 
August  21-23,  1914,  and  outside  of  which  they  lay  when  the 
armistice    was    signed,    Nov.    11,    1918,    is    the    capital    of 

253 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

Hainault,  and  a  Flemish  town  with  29,000  inhabitants,  situ- 
ated on  a  hill  above  the  Trouille.  It  owes  its  origin  to  the 
fortress  erected  there  by  Julius  C^sar  during  a  campaign 
against  the  Gauls.  The  town  was  fortified  by  Jean 
d'Avesnes  in  the  fourteenth  century.  Prince  Louis  of 
Orange  took  Mons  by  surprize  on  the  24th  of  May,  1572, 
and  held  it  against  the  Duke  of  Alva  till  September  19,  thus 
giving  the  northern  provinces  their  opportunity  of  finally 
shaking  off  the  Spanish  yoke.-^ 

1  Principal  Sources  :  The  New  York  Times,  New  York  Evening  Post,  London 
Times,  "History  of  the  War,"  Baedeker's  "Holland  and  Belgium,"  "Harper's 
Book  of  Facts,"  "Bulletins"  of  the  National  Geographic  Societj-,  and  "Nelson's 
History  of  the  War"  by  John  Buchan. 


OFF  FOR  THE  FRONT 
German  soldiers  starting  witli  "Nach  London"  written  on  their  car 


254 


II 

LIEGE  AND  LONGWY 

August  1,  1914— August  28,  1914 

THE  German  invasion  of  France,  made  by  way  of  Belgium 
and  Luxemburg,  was  a  violation  of  territory  guaranteed 
as  neutral  by  Great  Britain,  France,  Prussia,  Austria,  and 
Russia.  The  invasion  was  defended  by  official  Germany  as 
made  under  ''military  necessity."  The  Imperial  Chancellor, 
Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  in  a  speech  to  the  Reichstag  on 
August  3,  said: 

^'Gentlemen,  we  are  in  a  position  of  necessity  [energ-etic  as- 
sent];  and  necessity  knows  no  law  {Not  kennt  hein  Gebot). 
[Energetic  applause].  Our  troops  have  occupied  Lux'emburg 
[energetic  'Bravo!'];  perhaps  they  have  already  entered  Belgian 
territory  [energetic  applause].  Gentlemen,  this  is  in  contradiction 
to  the  rules  of  international  law.  The  French  Government  has 
declared  in  Brussels  that  it  is  willing  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  so  long  as  it  is  respected  by  the  enemy.  But  we  knew 
that  France  stood  prepared  for  an  inroad  ['Hear,  hear'  from 
Right].  France  could  wait,  but  we  could  not.  A  French  inroad 
on  our  flank  on  the  lower  Rhine  could  have  been  fatal  to  us  [ener- 
getic assent].  So  we  were  forced  to  set  aside  the  just  j^rotests  of 
the  Luxemburg  and  Belgian  Governments  ['Quite  right!'].  The 
wrong — I  speak  openly — the  wrong  that  we  now  do  we  will  try  to 
make  good  again  as  soon  as  our  military  ends  have  been  reached. 
When  one  is  threatened  as  we  are,  and  all  is  at  stake,  he  can  think 
only  of  how  he  can  hack  his  way  out  [long,  stormy  applause  and 

clappino"  from  all  sides  of  the  House] Our  army  stands  in 

the  field,  our  fleet  is  ready  for  battle — behind  them  is  the  whole 
German  people  [long  enthusiastic  applause  and  clapping  of  hands 
from  all  sides  of  the  House  and  from  the  Government  benches — 
all  the  Members  stand  up].  The  Avhole  German  people  to  the  last 
man!  [Repeated  stormy  applause.]  You,  gentlemen,  know  your 
duty  in  all  its  greatness.  The  bills  before  you  need  no  further 
explanation.  I  ask  you  to  pass  them  as  soon  as  possible.  [Stormy 
applause.]- 

2  As  printed  in  the  North  German  Gazette  of  August  5,  1914. 

255 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

Neutral  Luxemburg,  a  tiny  European  State  called  a  grand 
duchy,  separating  a  part  of  northeastern  France  from  the 
Rhine  Provinces  of  Germany,  and  lying  immediately  south 
of  Belgium,  was  the  first  territory  subjected  to  German  in- 
vasion. Belgium  was  not  entered  until  the  following  day, 
at  points  about  sixty  miles  north  of  Treves.  From  the  Rhine 
at  Cologne  the  Germans,  bound  for  Belgium,  passed  through 
Charlemagne's  old  capital,  Aix-la-Chapelle,  and  thence 
crossed  the  Belgian  frontier.  Aix-la-Chapelle  is  one  of  the 
most  ancient  towns  in  Germany,  the  Aqufe  Grani  of  the 
Carlovingian  period,  and  lies  in  a  fertile  basin  surrounded 
by  gently  sloping,  wooded  hills.  From  the  days  of  Charle- 
magne's son,  Louis  the  Pious  (814-840),  to  the  accession  of 
Ferdinand  I  in  1531,  Aix  had  witnessed  the  coronations  of 
thirty-two  German  emperors  and  kings.  It  had  been  called 
the  free  city  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and  in  the  Middle 
Ages  was  the  scene  of  many  imperial  diets  and  ecclesiastical 
convocations. 

Beyond  Aix-la-Chapelle  runs  the  chief  German  railway 
communication  with  the  valley  of  the  Meuse,  the  frontier 
German  towns  being  Gemmenrich  and  Herbesthal.  Here 
German  troops  on  August  3  crossed  the  German  border  to 
Vise,  Lemberg,  Herve,  and  Verviers  in  Belgium,  whence 
they  could  reach  Liege.  Vise,  one  of  their  first  objectives, 
lies  on  the  Meuse  about  ten  miles  north  of  Liege,  and  is  the 
frontier  town  on  the  way  to  Holland  and  the  site  of  an  im- 
portant custom-house.  Normally,  Vise  would  have  been  cap- 
tured in  advance  of  Liege,  but  the  destruction  of  its  bridge 
by  its  citizens  caused  delay.  The  Belgian  position  at  Vise 
was  defended  obstinately  on  the  fourth  and  fifth  by  the 
Twelfth  Infantry  regiment,  aided  by  the  Meuse  (which  was 
bridged  only  at  one  place),  by  the  Dutch  frontier  on  the 
left,  and  by  the  Liege  forts,  which  covered  the  Belgian 
right.  Pontoon-bridges  built  by  the  Germans  were  repeatedly 
destroyed.  "When  a  crossing  was  finally  effected  by  the  Ger- 
mans, a  number  of  civilians  in  Vise  were  seized  and  shot  on 
the  ground  that  they  had  fired  at  German  soldiers  from 
their  houses,  killing  an  officer,  a  sergeant,  and  four  men,  and 
wounding  six.     German  soldiers  entered  some  of  the  houses, 

256 


I— 25f 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

which  they  set  on  fire,  after  turning  out  the  inhabitants. 
Men  were  marched  to  the  railway  station  where  they  were 
kept  until  morning  surrounded  by  a  military  guard,  and  in 
the  afternoon  were  taken  to  Aix-la-Chapelle  as  prisoners. 
The  women  were  told  that  they  must  leave  by  four  o'clock, 
and  by  6.30  many  had  reached  Maestricht,  in  Holland,  with 
their  children.  Few  had  with  them  any  other  possessions 
than  the  clothes  in  which  they  stood,  and  were  "pictures  of 
utter  despair."  They  were  cared  for  by  the  Dutch  who 
housed  them  in  schools. 

Liege  lies  astride  the  Meuse  at  a  point  that  is  of  strategical 
importance,  since  it  is  in  the  center  of  the  narrow  trouee  ^ 


• 

1 

1 

^ 

^dKunM 

ite 

ii 

■ 

1 

31 

1 

^H^^HHm^^^^^^'^^^H^S 

m 

T 

■ 

1 

®  INTERNATIONAL   FILM   SERVICE.    N.   Y. 

BRIDGE  OVER  THE  MEUSE  AT  VISfi 
Destroyed  by  the  Belgians  to  halt  the  German  invasion 

between  the  Dutch  frontier  and  the  Ardennes.  Through 
Liege  runs  the  trunk  line  from  Cologne  to  Brussels.  It  had 
been  fortified  for  many  years,  the  modern  works  having  been 
constructed  by  Brialmont  in  the  seventies.  They  consisted 
of  six  large  pentagonal  forts  and  an  equal  number  of  small 
triangular  ones,  with  communicating  trenches,  all  situated 
about  8,000  to  9,000  yards  from  the  center  of  the  town,  half 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse  and  half  on  the  left,  the  dis- 
tance between  each  work  varying  from  4,000  to  7,000  yards. 
Brialmont  had  planned  his  works  for  a  garrison  of  30,000, 
but  the  Belgians  were  taken  by  surprize  by  the  Germans  and 

*  Gap. 

257 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

no  more  than  20,000  were  available  to  oppose  the  attack. 
General  Leman,  an  engineer  officer,  more  famous  as  a 
mathematician  than  as  a  soldier,  was  in  command  of  the 
garrison.  In  the  short  time  available  he  did  the  best  he 
could  to  prepare  the  defense. 

The  story  of  Liege  in  1914  is  destined  to  be  famous  in  all 
histories  of  this  war.     On  August  4,   Albert,  King  of   the 


©  INTERNATIONAL   FILM   SERVICE      u      Y 

A  CHURCH  IX  VISE  AFTER  THE  BOMBARDMENT 
The  first  of  Belgian  churches  to  be  destroyed  by  the  Germans 


Belgians,  caused  to  be  made  known  a  telegram  he  had  re- 
ceived from  King  George,  saying  Great  Britain  would  re- 
spect the  independence,  integrity,  and  neutrality  of  Belgium. 
On  the  day  before,  at  an  extraordinary  meeting  of  the  Bel- 
gian people,  he  declared  that  "never  since  1830  had  a 
graver  situation  confronted  a  neutral  nation."  It  was 
imperative  that  every  Belgian  should  do  his  duty  and  '/re- 
sign himself  to  every  sacrifice  that  might  be  necessary  to 
prevent  the  violation  of  Belgian  soil."  "Let  me  make  an 
appeal,"  said  he,  "to  you,  my  brothers.  At  this  supreme 
hour  the  entire  nation  must  be  of  one  mind.     I  have  called 

258 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

together  the  two  houses  of  Parliament,  so  that  they  may 
support  the  Government  in  declaring  that  we  will  maintain 
untarnished  the  sacred  patriotism  of  our  fathers.  Long  live 
independent  Belgium ! ' ' 

The  defenders  of  Liege  in  1914,  the  Third  Belgian  Di- 
vision, reinforced  l-y  militia,  reservists,  and  Civil  Guards,  a 
total  of,  perhaps,  40,000  men,  had  to  face  three  Prussian 
Corps,  estimated  at  about  120,000  men.  The  Belgians  could 
expect  no  reinforcements,  since  England  and  France  were 
nowhere  near  to  help  them  and  their  ow^n  main  army  had 
not  yet  been  concentrated.  The  forts,  however,  were  pro- 
visioned, and  thousands  of  civilians  were  ready  to  help  dig 
trenches  and  put  up  wire-entanglements.  On  the  night  of 
August  4-5,  the  German  attack  began  on  the  southeastern 
side  of  the  city.  The  apparent  object  was  to  seize  the  river- 
crossings  and,  after  masking  Liege,  to  hasten  up  the  river 
to  Namur.  The  moon  was  then  at  the  full,  and  searchlights 
flashed  to  and  fro  over  the  scene.  Liege,  itself,  was  entered 
on  August  7  by  troops  under  command  of  General  von 
Emmich,  but  some  of  the  forts  held  out  longer.  Details  of 
the  siege  and  capture,  as  first  printed,  w^ere  confused,  owing 
to  the  severe  press  censorship.  Three  months  later  German 
newspapers  compiled  accounts,  from  which  it  appeared  that 
the  first  assault  on  August  4  was  delivered  by  six  German 
brigades  on  a  peace  footing,  or  about  45,000  men,  with  some 
field-artillery.  They  had  been  rushed  forward  while  the 
German  mobilization  was  under  way,  because  information 
came  to  the  Germans  that  French  officers  were  to  take 
charge  of  the  defenses  of  the  city  or  would  take  the  city 
by  a  coup  cle  main.  The  Germans  first  entered  Liege  after 
storming  a  bastion  between  two  of  the  forts  on  the  east  bank 
of  the  ^leuse.  From  within  the  city  they  then,  with  field- 
artillery,  began  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Fleron  on  the  east 
bank,  next  made  an  assault  over  the  glacis  and  across  a 
twenty-foot  deep  moat,  and  after  savage  hand-to-hand  fight- 
ing in  the  casemates  planted  their  flag  on  the  fortress. 

Once  in  possession  of  Liege,  the  German  Government  made 
a  second  offer  of  peace  and  amity  to  the  Belgians.  Its  over- 
tures were  rejected.  On  August  11  they  began  the  bom- 
bardment of  forts  on  the  western  bank,   and  notably  Fort 

259 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 


Loncin.  The  attack  began,  according  to  General  Leman, 
with  four-  and  six-inch  guns.  On  the  following  day,  eight- 
inch  guns  took  up  the  work.  It  was  only  on  August  15 
that  the  great  16y2-inch  guns  were  employed.  The  smaller 
guns  had  already  produced  a  devastating  effect.  A  Belgian 
woman,  married  to  a  Serbian  army  officer  who  served  in  the 
French  army,  was  in  Liege  at  the  time  of  its  capture.     She 


LIERS  Q}         -'f^PONTISSE 

^itadeC! 


lantinO 


LONCIN  {^& 


o 

HOLLOGNE 


'/Z  J/A 


LIfiGE  AND  ITS  RING  OF  FORTS 

escaped  to  Paris,  where  she  afterward  wrote  an  account^  of 
all  she  saw  in  Liege.   In  the  course  of  this  narrative  she  said : 

''There  was  absolute  astonishment  when  our  Government  or- 
dered a  general  mobilization.  In  Liege,  people  in  a  state  of  con- 
sternation made  a  run  upon  the  banks.  The  police  were  powerless 
to  keep  the  crowds  in  check.  Assistance  was  called  for  from  the 
fire  brigade,  who  were  obliged  to  use  their  arms,  but  it  was  only 
by  means  of  streams  of  water  that  they  were  able  to  disperse  the 
crowds.     Early  next  day  the  roads  were  full  of  our  soldiers  on  the 

*  Printed  in  The  London  Times. 

260 


INVASION  OF  BELGII^M  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

way  to  their  barracks.  They  all  spoke  cheerfully,  thinking  that 
at  the  last  moment  all  difliculties*  would  be  arranged.  It  is  true 
that  we  had  believed  war  between  France  and  Germany  was  al- 
most inevitable  soon.  But' we  knew  we  had  the  signature  and  the 
word  of  Germany  guaranteeing  our  neutrality.  The  French  Am- 
bassador once  again  promised  that,  in  the  event  of  war,  France 
would  on  no  account  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  while  the  German 
Ambassador  had  given  only  an  evasive  answer.  At  the-  same 
time,  we  now  learnt  of  the  outrageous  ultimatum  Germany  had 
sent  to  our  country,  and  then  suddenly  understood  we  had  to 
struggle  wath  all  our  strength  and  to  the  bitter  end. 

^'The  awakening  from  our  dream  was  a  painful  one.  A  notice 
from  our  gallant  General  Leman,  the  defender  of  Liege,  told  us 
that  Germany  Respite  her  strength,  had  invaded  our  territory, 
regarding  the  treaty  as  being  only  a  scrap  of  paper.'  At  once 
the  expulsion  of  Germans  from  the  town  was  decided  on.  They 
were  given  two  hours  to  leave.  All  day  long  the  police  Avere  busy 
in  arresting  spies,  several  of  w^hom  were  caught  trying  to  poison 
our  Belgian  soldiers.  It  was  an  absolute  man-hunt.  At  each 
arrest  the  croAvd  tried,  in  a  state  of  rage,  to  lynch  the  victims, 
who  for  the  most  part  had  been  living  for  a  long  time  in  our 
towns  and  had  founded  large  businesses  there. 

*'In  the  evening  we  learnt  that  a  German  envoy  had  arrived 
to  demand  the  surrender  of  the  town  under  threat  of  bombardment. 
The  conversation  between  oui-  authorities  and  the  German  envoy 
took  place  in  the  grand  hall  of  our  hotel  de  ville,  where  the  officer 
had  been  brought  Avith  a  bandage  over  his  eyes  and  from  which  he 
was  taken  away  similarly  blindfolded.  At  five  the  envoy  left 
with  our  refusal,  and  at  six  we  heard  the  first  cannon  fired  from 
one  of  our  forts.  For  two  days  and  two  nights  our  forts  con- 
tinued to  fire.  All  the  large  shops,  and  even  several  private 
houses,  were  turned  into  hospitals,  and  there  was  an  incessant  flow 
of  wounded  through  the  town. 

'^  Everyone  waited  for  the  end  of  that  terrible  night.  Many 
people,  including  my  family,  stayed  watching  at  their  windows. 
Suddenly  we  heard  cries  of  distress  and  saw  unhappy  maddened 
women,  half  naked,  carrying  their  little  children,  wrapt  up  in 
bedclothes,  flying  wildly,  not  having  time  to  look  around,  and 
crying  out  in  terror,  'The  Germans  are  on  us!'  They  had  escaped 
from  their  burning  houses  just  as  the  Germans  broke  in  through  a 
gap  between  the  forts.    It  was  all  over:  the  enemy  was  in  the  town. 

''Suddenly  we  heard  the  blare  of  music,  and  realized  that  troops 
were  entering.  For  two  hours  fresh  troops,  brought  up  to  make  the 
triumphal  entry,  passed  through  at  the  goose-step,  with  bands  at 

2f)l 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

their  heads,  singirig  their  national  anthem  at  the  tops  of  their 
voices.  For  the  rest  of  my  life,  that  moment  will  remain  engraved 
on  my  memory.  Who  in  such  conditions  could  have  recognized  the 
gay  and  laughing  little  town  of  Liege?  Everywhere  the  streets 
were  strewn  with  windows  that  had  been  broken  by  bombs,  with 
beams  that  had  fallen  from  houses,  with  huge  fragments  of  stone 
torn  from  the  fronts  of  buildings ;  and  all  the  time  there  was  a  gray 
sky,  with  a  fine  rain  falling  mournfully.  Even  the  stones  of  our 
city  seemed  to  be  in  pain.  My  cup  of  suffering  overflowed  when 
two  hours  later  I  saw  them  replace  our  beloved  flag  that  was 
floating  over  the  Palais  de  Justice  with  their  ugly  colors.  It 
was  as  if  they  had  torn  out  our  hearts.  For  the  first  time  in  my 
life  I  saw  tears  in  my  father's  eyes." 

Many  striking  items  pertaining  to  the  siege  and  fall  of 
Liege  were  printed  in  letters  and  dispatches  to  London  and 
American  newspapers.  An  aviator  said  that,  when  the  guns 
of  the  forts  could  not  be  deprest  further,  and  so  bear  on  the 
storming  parties,  the  Belgians  brought  up  their  field-artillery, 
which  did  ''tremendous  execution."  The  War  Minister 
spoke  in  admiration  of  the  bravery  of  the  Belgian  troops, 
who  had  held  in  check  the  Germans  and  poured  into  them  a 
rain  of  shells.  This  dogged  defense  of  the  town  promised  to 
be  of  incalculable  value.  It  upset  for  the  time  Germany  ^s 
plans  of  campaign  and  brought  enthusiastic  messages  of 
praise  from  both  French  and  Russian  War  Ministers.  Many 
buildings  were  set  on  fire  by  German  shells  which  burst  in 
streets  and  squares,  killing  innocent  citizens.  The  Belgian 
troops  went  forward  to  the  attack  singing  their  national 
songs  and  unmoved  by  the  terrible  fire  of  the  modern  Ger- 
man weapons.  They  proved  themselves  good  shots  and  did 
not  waste  their  ammunition.  Some  of  the  wounded  Bel- 
gians, eye-witnesses  of  the  fighting,  said  that,  as  the  Ger- 
mans were  mown  down  in  front  of  the  trenches,  their  places 
were  taken  by  others,  ''who  crawled  forward  like  weasels." 
In  some  places  in  the  fighting  zone  the  ground  was  covered 
with  dead,  the  burial  of  whom,  it  was  said,  would  take  a 
week.  The  forts  east  of  the  city  conducted  an  exceptionally 
efifective  defense  for  thirty-six  hours.  All  this  time  the  out- 
lying forts  east  of  the  river  held  out.  These  events  at  Liege 
were  regarded  at  the  time  as  merely  the  raising  of  the  cur- 

262 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

tain  in  a  great  war  drama.  It  was  felt  that  Belgium  might 
once  more  be  the  country  where  the  destinies  of  Europe 
would  be  decided. 

In  the  bombardment  those  parts  of  the  town  which  suf- 
fered   most    were    the    Rue    de    I'Universite,    the    Quai    des 
Pecheurs,    and    the    Rue    des    Pitteurs,    all    of    which    were 
burned   or   destroyed.      There 
were    twelve    forts    surround- 
ing the   city.      As   Liege   lies 
in  a  hollow  in  the  valley  of 
the     Meuse,     surrounded     by 
hills,    the    forts    had    a    com- 
manding    position     over     the 
town   and   surrounding   coun- 
try.    They  were   subdued  by 
the    heavy    siege-guns    of    the 
Germans,   two   of   the   largest 
of    which    were    of    forty-two 
centimeter   caliber.      Some   of 
the    guns    were    stationed    six 
or     seven    miles     away.       As 
soon  as  the  Germans  got  into 
the  town,  the  Belgians  evacu- 
ated the   forts,   the  bombard- 
ment   having    rendered    them 
practically  useless.    After  the 
evacuation    the    G,ermans    en- 
deavored to  repair  the  forts  as  far  as  possible,  in  order  that 
they  might  be  used  in  case  any  attempt  was  made  by  the 
Allies  to  relieve  the  city.     Had  the  forts  been  effective,  the 
Germans  might  never  have  obtained  possession  of  the  city. 
Correspondents   found   it   difficult   to   describe   the   effect   of 
the   German  shell-fire.     First  of  all  there  was   a   deafening 
noise,  "followed  by  an  extraordinary  sense  of  compression 
in   the  ears   owing  to  the   displacement   of   air,"   when   the 
noise  became  "absolutely  deafening."     It  drove  women  into 
a  sort  of  frenzy;  dumb-founded,  they  shrieked  and  vanished 
into  cellars.     Everybody  lived  in  a  cellar  and  few  went  to 
bed   during   the   period   of   the   bombardment.      One    corre- 
spondent   saw    from    his    bedroom    window    shells    bursting 


General  vox   Emmich 

Commander    of    the    German    forces 

at  the  seige  of  Liege 


263 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

through  the  whole  night.  ''The  sky  was  absolutely  lurid — 
blood-red  relieved  by  the  green  flames  caused  by  lyddite." 
Of  the  final  act  in  the  drama  General  Leman  wrote  in  his 
report : 

''About  two  o'clock  the  bombardment  was  renewed  with  incon- 
ceivable fury.  It  seemed  to  us  that  the  Germans  were  firing 
entire  batteries  at  a  time.  Later  we  discovered  that  they  were 
using  the  42-centimeter  (16V2-inch)  howitzers,  hurling  shells  a 
ton  in  weight  and  of  unprecedented  explosive  force.  We  heard 
them  come,  heard  the  moaning  of  the  air  swell  to  the  proportions 
of  a  raging  hurricane,  and  end  in  a  fearful  thunder  crash.  Inde- 
scribable clouds  of  dust  and  smoke  rolled  over  the  trembling 
ground.  I  set  out  for  the  central  observation  post,  but  had  hardly 
set  foot  in  the  gallery  when  a  mighty  rush  of  air  threw  me  on  my 
face  to  the  ground.  I  picked  myself  up  and  tried  to  walk  on, 
but  found  my  way  blocked  by  a  veritable  flood  of  poisonous 
fumes.  I  made  my  way  out.  To  my  horror  I  saw  that  the  fort 
had  collapsed  and  that  its  fragments  filled  the  ditch.  Soldiers 
were  running  about,  and  I  thought  they  were  Belgian  gendarmes. 
I  called  to  them,  but  choked,  vertigo  seized  me,  and  I  fell  fainting 
to  the  ground.  When  I  regained  consciousness  1  saw  myself  sur- 
rounded by  the  members  of  my  suite,  but  there  was  a  German 
captain  among  them,  and  he  gave  me  a  drink  of  water.  I  was 
a  prisoner." 

The  effect  of  the  German  entry  into  Liege  was  extra- 
ordinary. Citizens  had  suffered  for  three  days  and  nights 
from  the  terrific  bombardment,  but  there  followed  now  a 
"curious  quiet,"  until  "you  could  almost  "have  heard  a  pin 
drop,  so  profound  was  the  hush  which  came  over  the  whole 
place."  All  traffic  and  movement  ceased,  and  few  inhabi- 
tants dared  leave  their  houses.  The  entry  of  the  Germans 
was  effected  quietly,  save  for  the  singing  of  national  songs — 
"Die  Wacht  am  Rhein,"  "Deutschland,  Deutschland,  iiber 
alles,"  among  others.  The  first  German  troops  passed  over 
the  bridges  about  half-past  seven  on  the  morning  of  August 
7.  From  that  day  the  movements  of  the  inhabitants  were 
strictly  controlled.  After  a  time,  when  there  was  no  re- 
sistance, the  streets  became  more  lively.  But  all  bridges 
were  guarded  by  German  sentries.  Of  the  seven  only  two 
were  left  open  to  pedestrians.     The  famous  old  stone  bridge, 

264 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  Pont  des  Arches,  had   been   blown  up   by  the  Belgians 
before  the  Germans  arrived. 

Several  days  elapsed  before  things  became  normal.  For 
three  weeks  there  were  no  street-cars,  taxicabs  or  other 
vehicles  available.  When  the  Germans  entered  the  city,  almost 
the  first  thing  they  did  was  to  seize  the  banks  and  occupy 
railway  stations,  post  and  telegraph  offices,  and  other  public 
buildings.  Hardly  was  there  a  house  in  Liege  in  which  Ger- 
man soldiers  were  not  billeted.     The  occupants  were  driven 


(CJ    INTERNATIONAL    FILM    SERVlCt      N      Y 

FORT  LONCIN,  NEAR  LIfiGE,  AFTER  THE  BOMBARDMENT 


upstairs,  and  the  lower  rooms  and  cellars,  usually  well 
stocked  with  wine,  were  taken  possession  of.  As  to  the 
conduct  of  the  Germans,  citizens  in  Liege  suffered  much 
less  from  them  than  did  citizens  later  in  Malines,  Louvain, 
and  still  more  outlying  districts.  The  siege  of  the  Liege 
forts  was  still  in  progress  w^hen  large  bodies  of  cavalry  went 
across  the  Meuse  to  screen  the  movement  of  troops  which  had 
crossed  the  river  between  Li^ffe  and  Namur,  the  Belgian 
army  falling  back  behind  the  Dyle  River  before  the  advance. 
Tirlemont  was  occupied  on  August  17,  Louvain  on  the  19th, 
and  Brussels  entered  on  the  20th. 


V.  1—17 


265 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

On  August  18,  when  all  but  two  of  the  forts  had  been 
silenced,  the  German  advance  from  the  city  began.  A  strange 
spectacle  was  presented  by  a  seemingly  countless  and  end- 
less host,  as  it  defiled  along  'every  main  road  leading  to 
the  northeast.  No  words  could  adequately  picture  the 
movement  of  this  army,  or  rather  combination  of  armies, 
totaling  nearly  three-quarters  of  a  million  men.  It  might 
well  be  asked  what  human  force  could  withstand  such  a 
multitude,  welded  into  a  machine  of  destruction  and  death. 
Onward  it  flowed,  like  a  tide  sweeping  through  channels 
ready  to  burst  in  angry  breakers  upon  any  obstacles.  Lines 
of  lancers  moved  among  forests  of  bayonets.  Endless  trains 
of  guns  and  automobiles,  field-kitchens,  field-bakeries,  huge 
wagons  bearing  pontoons  and  drawn  by  'long  teams  of  horses, 
ponderous  caissons,  camp  equipment,  portable  smithies — all 
these  rumbled  past.  The  dust  rose  from  hot  roads  and 
floated  over  deserted  and  trampled  fields.  Sabers  and 
bayonets  flashed  back  the  August  sunlight.  For  hour  after 
hour  the  mass  rolled  on  seemingly  without  end.  Not  in 
centuries  had  western  Europe  seen  such  a  spectacle ;  nor  had 
it  been  paralleled  probably  since  the  Goths  rolled  up  and 
down  the  Alps  into  the  plain  of  northern  Italy.  Twelve 
army  corps  traversed  the  Belgian  plain.  A  German  corps 
on  a  war  footing  comprised  63,000  men.  The  total  of  this 
vast  host  could  not  therefore  have  been  far  short  of  700,000 
even  allowing  for  losses.  Commonly,  an  army  corps  is 
spoken  of  as  tho  it  was  an  inconsiderable  host,  but  an  army 
corps  is  really  a  complete  army. 

Tho  it  might  look  complex,  and  was  indeed  a  triumph  of 
machinery,  the  plan  of  advance  was  simple.  The  right  flank 
was  covered  by  an  overwhelming  mass  of  cavalry.  It  was 
estimated  that  65,000  out  of  the  83,000  sabers  in  the  Ger- 
man army  were  in  that  column.  The  army  advanced  in 
three  main  columns,  heading  for  roads  between  Brussels  and 
Namur.  Originally  it  had  been  the  German  intention  to 
push  on  to  the  French  frontier  before  the  French  could 
assemble  in  sufficient  strength  to  stem  the  onset.  A  host  of 
this  magnitude  would  take  two  days  and  a  night  to  pass 
any  given  point.  The  distance  between  the  van  and  the 
rear  was  half  the  breadth  of  Belgium.     Writers  co'nfest  to 

266 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

a  thrill  at  the  spirited  resistance  made  by  the  Belgians 
against  so  powerful  an  invader,  as  well  as  at  the  thought  of 
allied  France,  England,  and  Belgium  fighting  Germany  on 
Europe's  old  battleground — the  battleground  of  the  armies 
of  Louis  XIV,  and  Marlborough,  of  the  Revolution,  and, 
finally,  of  Napoleon  in  his  last  stand. 

Meanwhile,  another  and  simultaneous  German  advance 
took  place  on  the  Moselle,  three  miles  east  of  the  Luxemburg 
border,  at  the  ancient  Roman-German  city  of  Treves.^  Dur- 
ing the  night  of  August  1,  following  Germany's  declaration 
of  war  against  Russia.  German  soldiers,  newly  arrived,  took 
possession  of  the  railway  station  and  the  bridges  that  cross 
the  Moselle.  On  the  following  day,  trains  loaded  with  Ger- 
man soldiers  entered  Treves  and  thence  passed  on  to  the  city 
of  Luxemburg,  a  distance  over  the  border  of  less  than  ten 
miles,  entering  it  unannounced.  A  show  of  resistance  was 
made  by  the  youthful  Grand  Duchess,  the  reigning  sovereign, 
and  by  a  member  of  her  cabinet.  The  latter  presented  to 
the  German  commanding  officer  a  copy  of  the  treaty  by 
which  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  had  been  guaranteed,  to 
which  the  officer  replied  that  he  ''had  his  orders."  To  the 
commandant  of  the  city,  who  then  appeared,  the  officer  is 
said  to  have  presented  a  revolver.  On  the  same  day,  a  tele- 
gram came  from  the  Imperial  German  Chancellor,  saying 
no  hostile  act  against  the  grand  duchy  was  intended,  but 
that  only  such  measures  were  to  be  taken  as  would  secure 
the  safety  of  German  troops  in  protecting  Luxemburg  rail- 
ways against  possible  attack  from  the  French.  In  a  few 
days  it  w^as  made  known  in  Luxemburg  that  the  intended 
German  advance  into  France  would  be  delayed,  due  as  after- 
ward learned,  not  to  German  volition,  but  to  the  resistance 
Belgium  had  offered  to  the  Germans  at  Liege. 

The  Germans  who  entered  Luxemburg  on  August  2  were 
only  an  advance  guard,  or  a  flying  expedition  made  up  from 
garrisons  in  frontier  German  fortresses.  As  soon  as  other 
forces  arrived  the  Germans  moved  westward  toward  Longwy, 
a   French    frontier   fortress   town.      Fighting   first    occurred 

s  The  ancient  Roman  Treveri,  or  Augusta  Trevirorum ;  the  German  Trier. 
The  city  was  captured  by  the  French  in  1794  and  was  the  capital  of  the 
department  of  the  Sarre  until  1815  when  by  treaty  it  was  assigned  to 
Prussia. 

267 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

when  the  mass  of  the  Army  of  the  Moselle  reached  the 
French  frontier.  By  August  9  it  had  made  some  advance  on 
the  road  to  Verdun,  but  further  delays  in  Belgium  increased 
its  difficulties,  or  its  hesitation.  The  Germans  thus  far  had 
been  able  to  clear  the  country  of  hostile  troops  only  as  far 
as  the  French  frontier,  altho  at  several  points  they  had 
crossed  the  frontier  and  were  advancing  slowly  without  in- 
terruption. In  some  quarters  a  great  battle  in  that  region 
was  forecasted.  This  German  army,  under  command  of  the 
Crown  Prince,  was  of  great  strength.  From  the  direction 
of  Verdun  which  held  guard  southward,  an  attack  in  force 
had  been  made  by  the  French  on  its  left  wing.  According 
to  a  German  war  bulletin  the  attack  was  repulsed.  It  was 
evident  from  official  German  reports  that  a  powerful  in- 
vasion of  France  was  being  made  through  Luxemburg  and 
the  gap  of  Treves  and  from  the  direction  of  Metz  and 
Thionville.  French  bulletins  admitted  a  retreat  toward 
Verdun,  but  German  dispatches  announced  a  complete  vic- 
tory at  Neufchateau,  with  the  capture  of  several  generals 
and  thousands  of  soldiers.  On  August  28  it  was  definitely 
announced  that  Longwy  had  been  captured,  after  a  cour- 
ageous resistance.  The  region  from  Longwy  to  Longuyon 
and  Spincourt  had  been  occupied  by  the  Germans  during  the 
first  few  days  of  the  war,  but  Longwy,  which  still  held  out, 
sustained  a  siege  for  at  least  a  fortnight,  or,  as  a  French 
report  said,  one  of  twenty-four  days.  A  participant  on  the 
German  side,  an  eye-witness  of  the  capitulation,  wrote  the 
following  account  of  the  final  scene: 

* 'During  an  interview  between  Captain  Richter  and  his  general 
at  Halangy,  an  artillery  captain  on  August  28  came  racing  up 
in  an  automobile,  and  while  still  at  a  distance  shouted:  'Excel- 
lency, Longwy  is  ready  to  surrender,  and  requests  a  meeting  at  the 
waterworks  before  the  fortress.'  Several  available  automobiles 
were  found  and  immediately  filled  with  officers.  Captain  Richter, 
the  general  and  two  staff  officers  entered  our  automobiles  and 
after  a  strenuous  ride  we  reached  the  waterworks  before  Longwy 
about  2  o'clock.  We  were  met  by  a  French  major  and  a  sergeant 
who  acted  as  interpreter.  The  negotiations  lasted  almost  two 
hours  and,  because  of  rain,  took  place  in  the  automobiles.  The 
agreement    of   capitulation    was   drawn   up   in   both   German   and 

268 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

French.  The  French  insisted  on  having-  a  clause  whereby  the 
French  prisoners  were  to  retain  possession  of  their  personal 
property  and  ready  cash.  Our  generals  assured  them  we  were  no 
robbers,  that  personal  property  would  be  respected,  and  so  the 
clause  would  be  unnecessary.  The  clause,  altho  superfluous,  was, 
however,  embodied  in  the  agreement.  The  release  of  a  German 
uhlan  officer,  taken  prisoner  by  the  French  in  a  skirmish,  also 
caused  some  delay.  In  general  the  agreements  were,  I  suppose, 
the  usual  ones.  Soldiers  in  the  fortress,  whose  number  was  given 
as  3,300,  were  to  become  prisoners.  Papers  in  the  fortress  were 
to  remain  in  our  possession  for  the  present.  It  was  half-past 
four  when  the  capitulation  took  place. 

"During  the  negotiations  our  sanitary  corps,  with  stretchers, 
made  their  Avay  into  the  fortress,  after  the  roads  had  been  made 
passable.  About  600  wounded  were  brought  out,  among  them  six" 
German  uhlans  and  dragoons,  who  had  been  taken  prisoners  by 
the  French.  The  joy  of  these  men  on  seeing  German  comrades 
again  w^as,  of  course,  great.  In  the  meantime  regiments  quar- 
tered in  the  neighborhood  had  marched  up  and  taken  their  posi- 
tions, with  music  at  the  head.  The  entire  staff  now  gathered  at 
the  entrance  to  the  fortress,  where  the  French  laid  down  their 
arms.  The  last  to  come  out  was  the  commandant,  with  his  secre- 
tary and  a  servant.  In  the  presence  of  the  commanding  general, 
the  commandant  then  handed  Captain  Richter  his  sword.  After 
a  few  words  of  praise  for  the  brave  defense  of  the  fortress,  the 
commandant  was  given  to  understand  that  he  was  our  prisoner. 
In  an  automobile  we  then  went  away,  taking  the  commander. 

"At  about  half-past  seven  we  arrived  at  headquarters  where 
many  officers  had  gathered,  and  the  inhabitants  had  flocked  to- 
gether as  news  of  the  capitulation  had  spread  abroad.  Shortly 
after  the  Crown  Prince  made  his  appearance,  the  sword  of  the 
commandant  and  the  papers  of  the  fortress  were  handed  to  him. 
With  a  few  courteous  words,  the  Crown  Prince  returned  the 
sword  to  the  commandant,  who  seemed  visibly  affected  by  this 
act.  Our  regiments,  and  especially  our  artillery,  fought  valiantly 
before  Longwy.  The  fortress  had  been  defended  by  the  French 
with   the  greatest  bravery." 

Longwy  lies  on  the  Chiers  River  and  is  a  town  of  10,000 
inhabitants,  with  a  fortress  .of  the  second  class.  It  had  be- 
longed to  France  since  1678,  but  was  taken  by  the  Prussians 
in  1792,  in  1815,  and  in  1871.  It  consists  of  two  districts, 
Longwy-Bas  and  Longwy-Haut,  which  are  united  by  a  tram- 
way that  goes  on  to  Mont  St.  Martin.     In   the  lower  town 

269 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

are  several  important  mines,  iron-works,  and  a  porcelain 
factory.  The  picturesque  upper  town  lies  nearly  one  and  a 
half  miles  by  road  from  the  station,  tho  there  are  short-cuts 
for  pedestrians,  and  commands  a  fine  view.  Several  weeks 
after  the  fall  of  Longwy,  an  American  tourist  visited  the 
place  and  wrote  anonymously  an  account  of  it. 

^' After  a  rather  lengthy  but  beautiful  drive  throuoh  autumn- 
tinged  woods  we  reached  Longwy,  the  famous  fortress  bombarded 
and  stormed  by  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince.  Coming  from  the 
south,  we  reached  Longwy-Bas.  It  is  situated  in  a  deeply  cut 
valley,  the  houses  dotting  the  steep  southern  bank  to  the  hill-tops. 
A  railroad  Avinding  its  way  through  the  valley,  and  numerous 
smokestacks  towering  skyward,  tell  of  industrial  activity.  The 
streets  Avere  fairly  crowded  with  men,  women,  and  children,  ming- 
ling- freely  with  German  soldiers  who  were  distributed  over  the 
whole  town,  billeted  on  French  families.  This  part  of  the  city 
showed  hardly  any  signs  of  war,  and  no  damage  at  all.  But  the 
picture  was  entirely  different  as  soon  as  the  visitor  arrived  at  the 
top  of  the  high,  steep  hill  on  the  other  side  of  the  valley  Longwy- 
Haut.  This  round  hilltop  was  croAvned  Avith  Avhat  Avas  once  a 
fortress,  consisting  of  strong  works,  surrounding  and  protecting  a 
small  toAA^i.  All  this  Avas  one  large  heap  of  ruins — a  field  of  de- 
struction and  death — Ai'hich  it  Avas  impossible  to  describe  in  Avords. 
The  Avildest  imagination  can  not  surpass  Avhat  Ave  saAV  there.  The 
toAvn  consisted  of  about  400  houses.  Not  a  single  one  is  standing. 
Only  a  fcAv  pieces  of  masonry,  remnants  of  a  church,  and  heaps  of 
stoiie,  bricks,  furniture,  iron  beams,  an  indescribable  medley  of 
all  sorts  of  things  Avhich  once  Avere  used  by  human  beings  living 
and  working,  loving  and  hating  each  other,  speak  of  the  past. 

''I  happened  to  discoA^er  among  the  ruins  of  one  house  an  album 
Avith  card-AdeAvs  belonging  to  a  young  lady.  God  knoAvs  Avhat  be- 
came of  her!  The  strong  fortifications  Avere  totally  smashed  to 
pieces.  One  side  Avas  almost  leA^eled  so  that  the  German  troops 
could  easily  march  in.  Casemates  bedded  in  thick  cement-Avalls, 
covered  Avith  heavy  masonry  and  earth  Avere  pierced  by  shells  like 
boards  of  Avood.  Other  parts  of  the  Avails  which  had  not  been 
fired  at  Avere  almost  unharmed.^ 

« Principal  Sources  :  The  New  York  Eveninn  Post,  The  Literary  Digest,  The^ 
New  York  Times,  The  London  Mornino  Post,  J.  M.  Kennedy's  "Campaign' 
Around  Liege."  Baedeker's  "Holland  and  Belgium."  Edmund  Kane's  "Hacking 
Through  Belgium,"  The  London  Times,  The  Illustrierte  Geschichte  des  Welt- 

krieges,  and  The  Fortnightly  Revieiv. 

* 

270 


271 


Ill 

THE   DASH   INTO   ALSACE-LORRAINE 
August  4,  1914— August  25,  1914 

THE  Germans,  having  entered  Luxemburg  on  August  2d, 
and  Belgium  on  August  3d,  were  storming  the  forts  of 
Liege  from  the  3d  to  the  5th.  Two  days  later  (August  7) 
when  a  French  army  was  moving  northward  to  succor  the 
Belgians,  other  French  troops  crossed  the  eastern  frontier  and 
entered  Alsace.  Eastern  frontier  towns  were  now  as  full  of 
stirring  scenes  as  they  were  of  stirring  memories.  At  Nancy, 
Toul,  Chalons,  and  Epernay  observers,  in  those  August  days, 
saw  thousands  of  field-troops  marching  eastward  and  masses 
of  other  troops  on  the  way  to  reinforce  garrisons.  Along 
the  entire  Franco-German  border  some  four  hundred  thou- 
sand French  soldiers  were  soon  concentrated.  Officers  exprest 
admiration  for  the  spirit  of  the  men  and  the  rapidity,  en- 
thusiasm, and  confidence  with  which  mobilization  had  been 
effected.  Soldiers  who  went  forward  laughing,  singing, 
and  shouting,  were  never  tired  of  crying  out  "A  Berlin!" 
"A  Berlin!"  Among  the  witticisms  heard  were  such  sayings 
as  ''We'll  have  to  eat  sauerkraut  for  desert,"  or  such 
sallies  as  "Bring  back  plenty  of  Strassburg  clocks."  From 
the  windows  of  troop-trains  the  strains  of  the  "Marseillaise" 
were  heard  at  railway  stations.  Every  soldier  seemed 
supremely  confident  of  wiping  out  the  defeat  of  1870  by  a 
series  of  victories  which  would  leave  Germany  crusht.  To 
recover  the  "Lost  Provinces"  was  the  supreme  ambition  of 
every  French  soldier  who  had  entered  the  war. 

To  the  war  with  France  in  1870  Germany  owed,  not  only 
her  existence  as  an  empire,  but  Alsace-Lorraine  and  much 
of  her  recent  great  commercial  prosperity.  Her  industrial 
development,  which  had  surprized  the  world,  rested  largely 
on  coal  and  iron,  and  while  before  1870  she  had  coal-beds, 
it  was  in  Alsace-Lorraine  that  she  had  got  the  iron-ore  she 
needed  to  go  with  the  coal.     In  this  sense  Bismarck  did  not 

272 


ifNETH.    j 

Maastricht  w  j  I 

il  _         V   r 


\ 


1  Cologne 


s 


M 


(o  Malmedy 


") 


^ 


Coblentz 


/Mainz 


^ 


HE 


Darmstadt 


Kaiserslautern 
D  A  T    A  n 


AVARIAN 


Mannheim 


PALATINATE 


f  \ 

?  v. 

V  LUXEMBURG  7  /-     irier 
^.  i-<(  (Treves) 

^         .^Aiuxemburgn 

LongwyV^-'^Th^\... .. 

:       ,iftyfDiedenhdfen)  ^  ,    . 

Morhanlf  ^  Wloui«  Germershe.m  ^ 

?^'-^-       r^li^  I  O*  /o  Karlsruhe 

'  Pont-a-Mou\son^^^    ^  chateai"<  Zabern        ^  R*«^*" 

Couronne^'uTr-.r-N^  Saarburg         /^^  ^ 

^      ^  '  Ololslieimo    ^pf 

F      r' 


A     N 


Chaumont 


Langres 


#  REFERENCE 
Fortresses 


E  S     ^     ^  * 

St.Dieo     /       ^  j^    / 
Epinal  <•       -^  /xeuJBreisach         '^ 

/CohT^aV^     )   ^^      F?eiburg 

-r^Mulhausenj     °/Banzenheim 
Belfort"\ 

n 


o      lA\tk 
Scale  of  Miles 


rch 


0    S   10       -JO 


iles  \       ^  Cy'^'y 

au       40        >.  p^l-aselswiTZERLAND 


THE  RHINE  FRONTIER  OF  GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 
The  above  map  is  intended  to  illustrate  the  French  dash  into  Alsace-Lor- 
raine in  August,  1914,  when  Colmar,  Mulhausen,  and  Altkirch  were  objectives 
in  the  extreme  south,  and  Strassburg  and  Metz  objectives  further  north. 
Two  important  events  occurred  in  this  offensive  :  the  French  defeat  at  Mor- 
hange  and  the  German  defeat  at  the  Grand  Couronne.  The  map  also  shows 
Longwy  which  the  Crown  Prince,  after  a  siege  of  about  three  weeks,  finally 
captured  in  the  fourth  week  of  August.  In  the  lower  left-hand  part  of  the 
map  are  shown  Toul,  Chaumont.  and  Langres,  towns  closely  identified  with 
American  operations  after  we  got  into  the  war.  Near  Toul  our  first  men  went 
into  training  and  north  of  Toul  had  their  first  experience  in  actual  battle. 
Chaumont  was  the  headquarters  of  General  Pershing  and  at  Langres  was 
established  a  great  supply  base. 
1—272 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

know  how  great  a  thing  he  was  doing  for  his  country  when 
he  took  Alsace-Lorraine  as  a  spoil  of  war,  for  he  was  a 
diplomat  not  a  metallurgist,  and  he  thought  mainly  of  the 
superiority  of  a  mountain  boundary  to  a  river  boundary  for 
Germany  against  France — that  is,  he  and  Moltke,  and 
mainly  Moltke,  for  Bismarck  did  not  at  first  personally 
favor  taking  both  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 

Even  a  metallurgist  would  probably  at  that  time  have 
called  the  iron  deposits  of  Lorraine  of  little  value,  because 
they  contained  phosphorus  and  phosphorus  spoils  steel.  It 
was  two  Englishmen,  Thomas  and  Gilchrist,  who  put  into 
the  hand  of  Germany  the  means  by  wiiich  she  could  outstrip 
their  own  country  in  the  steel  business,  when  in  1878  they 
invented  a  modification  of  the  Bessemer  process,  which  re- 
moved phosphorus  from  steel  and  became  a  source  of  other 
profit  in  producing  "Thomas"  or  "basic  slag,"  which  is 
good  as  a  fertilizer.  The  German  steel  industry,  and  all  the 
manufactures  dependent  upon  it,  thereafter  went  forward 
by  leaps  and  bounds,  until  by  1906  Germany  had  distanced 
England  in  steel  and  finally  stood  second  only  to  the  United 
States. 

Before  1871  Germany  produced  only  half  a  million  tons 
of  steel;  in  1911  she  produced  fifteen  million  tons  and  about 
one-third  of  the  ore  for  it  came  from  Lorraine  and  Luxem- 
burg. Just  across  the  Rhine,  in  Westphalia,  lies  Germany's 
coal.  Coal  and  iron  brought  forth  in  Germany  such  new 
industrial  towns  as  Essen  and  Dusseldorf,  which  were  the  ad- 
miration of  the  sociologist  and  the  metallurgist.  We  think  of 
the  Krupps  chiefly  as  makers  of  munitions  of  war,  but  for 
some  time  before  the  war  Krupp  iron,  of  a  peaceful  sort, 
had  absorbed  a  greater  share  of  attention  at  Essen.  On  the 
French  side  of  this  Franco-German  frontier,  coal  and  iron 
are  found  in  close  proximity  and  the  region  had  been  trans- 
formed by  the  French  into  a  great  industrial  center,  and  a 
great  prize  for  successful  war — sufficient  in  itself  perhaps 
to  account  for  war,  since  whoever  had  possession  of  West- 
phalia, Rhenish  Prussia,  Belgium,  Luxemburg,  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, and  northern  France,  could  dominate  Europe  in  steel, 
wdth  no  important  rival  except  the  United   States. 

The  common  land  frontier  of  France  and  Germany,  from 

273 


ON  -THE  WESTERN  FRONT 


a  corner  of  Switzerland  just  south  of  Belfort  northward  to 
Longwy,  on  the  Luxemburg  border,  covered  a  distance  of 
about  150  miles.  It  has  great  variety  of  physical  charac- 
teristics. Between  Switzerland  and  the  southern  end  of  the 
Vosges  Mountains  is  a  piece  of  flat  land  known  as  the 
Trouee  or  Gap  of  Belfort,  the  passage  through  which  is 
dominated  by  the  fortress  of  that  name.  Thence  northward, 
for  seventy  miles,  the  line  follows  the  crest  of  the  Vosges 
till  it  sinks  into  the  plain  of  Lorraine.     On  the  French  side 

of  this  frontier  are  the  upper 
valleys  of  two  rivers — the 
]\Ieuse  and  the  Moselle.  In 
all  its  parts  the  line  is 
strongly  defended.  From  Bel- 
fort  north  to  Epinal  runs  a 
line  of  formidable  forts,  while 
to  the  east  the  difficult  Vosges 
country  affords  a  natural  pro- 
tection. Between  the  two 
first-class  fortresses  of  Toul 
and  Verdun,  lies  the  forti- 
fied area  of  the  upper  Meuse, 
while  opposite  Verdun,  and 
commanded  by  it,  lies  a 
gateway  into  France  from 
the  German  fortress  of  Metz 
— a  gap  some  thirty  miles 
wide. 

Of  the  fortresses  erected  by 
the  French,  the  most  south- 
erly was  Belfort,  distant  about  ten  miles  due  west  from 
the  Alsatian  town  of  Altkirch.  One  of  the  best  fortified 
cities  in  France,  Belfort,  lies  only  fifteen  miles  from  the 
intersection  of  Alsace  and  Switzerland,  commands  the  valley 
between  the  Vosges  and  Jura,  and  is  on  roads  from  Paris 
to  Basel,  and  from  Lyons  to  Strassburg  and  Muelhausen. 
Its  population  and  industries  were  greatly"  increased  by  an 
immigration  of  Alsatians  that  followed  the  Franco-Prussian 
War.  In  that  war  Belfort  held  out  for  three  months  against 
the  Germans,  the  defenders  capitulating  only  on  receipt  from 


General  de  Castelnac 

Who  commanded  in  the  Alsace- 
Lorraine  campaign  and  was  Chief 
of  Staff  to  Joffre  early  in  the  war 


274 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  government,   two  weeks   after  the   fall   of  Paris,   of   an 
order  to  do  so.     It  has  a  population  of  about  30,000. 

Toul,  sixty  miles  northwest  of  Belfort,  is  one  of  the  most 
ancient  towns  in  France,  its  bishopric  having  been  founded 
by  an  Irish  monk,  St.  Mansuy,  who  died  about  350.  It  is  a 
fortress  of  the  first  class,  and  was  taken  by  the  Germans  in 
1870.  It  is  situated  between  a  canal  and  the  Moselle,  fifteen 
miles  west  of  Nancy,  and  twenty-three  miles  from  the  Lor- 
raine border.  Immediately  after  the  Franco-Prussian  War, 
when  the  whole  system  of  frontier  defense  in  France  was 
revised,  Toul  was  made  the  most  formidable  of  all  the  new 
fortresses  on  the  Meuse  and  :\Ioselle.  The  perimeter  of  the 
defenses  proper  is  nearly  thirty  miles,  and  their  mean  dis- 
tance from  the  town  about  six  miles.  Toul  is  connected 
with  Verdun  by  the  ''Meuse  Line"  of  barrier  forts.  Toul 
has  been  sacked  successively  by  Goths,  Burgundians,  Vandals 
and  Huns,  and  was  conquered  by  the  Franks  in  451. 

Verdun,  a  first-class  fortress  and  an  episcopal  see  with 
21,706  inhabitants,  is  situated  on  the  Meuse,  which  here 
divides  into  several  branches.  It  was  known  to  the  Romans 
as  Verodunum,  and  holds  an  important  place  in  early 
European  history.  By  the  Treaty  of  Verdun  in  843,  the 
empire  of  Charlemagne  was  here  divided  among  his  three 
grandsons,  Lothaire,  Louis  the  German,  and  Charles  the 
Bald.  The  French  and  German  parts  of  his  empire  have 
never  since  been  united.  The  town  Avas  early  the  seat  of  a 
bishop,  and  remained  a  free  imperial  town  until  1552,  when 
it  was  taken  bj  the  French,  altho  not  formally  ceded  to 
France  until  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  in  1648,  when  Austria 
gave  up  the  three  famous  bishoprics  of  Verdun,  Toul,  and 
Metz.  Verdun  was  bombarded  by  the  Prussians  in  1792 
and,  having  surrendered  after  a  few  hours,  the  inhabitants 
accorded  an  amicable  reception  to  the  conquerors,  to  whom 
a  party  of  young  girls  made  an  offering  of  bonbons 
C'dragees")  ior  which  Verdun  is  still  noted.  When  the 
Revolutionists  recovered  the  town  from  the  Prussians  after 
the  battle  of  Valmy,  three  of  these  ingenuous  maidens  were 
sent  to  the  scaffold.  The  town  was  bombarded  by  the  Ger- 
mans in  1870  and  taken  after  a  gallant  resistance  of  three 
weeks. 

275 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

Metz,  the  fortified  capital  of  German  Lorraine,  and  the 
headquarters  of  the  Sixteenth  German  Army  Corps,  with 
54,000  inhabitants  (including  the  suburbs),  much  more  than 
half  of  whom  are  Germans,  and  a  garrison  of  25,000  men, 
lies  in  a  wide  basin  on  the  Moselle,  which,  at  the  lower  end 
of  the  town,  is  joined  by  the  Seille.  Its  origin  antedates  the 
Roman  era.  The  town  is  surrounded  by  a  ring  of  strong 
forts,  new  advanced  ones  having  been  erected  at  a  distance 
of  six  miles.  Great  alterations  have  taken  place  in  Metz 
since  the  inner  walls  were  pulled  down.  Various  new  quar- 
ters have  risen,  extending  on  the  south  to  the  villages  of 
Montigny  and  Sablon,  and  on  the  east  (beyond  the  Seille)  to 
Plantieres  and  Quenleu.  The  intericfr  of  the  old  town  has 
been  greatly  altered  by  the  erection  of  new  buildings.  As 
the  result  of  a  battle  on  August  14,  1870,  a  French  army 
under  Bazaine  was  cooped  up  in  Metz  and  the  fortress  sur- 
rendered. 

Thirty  miles  north  of  Verdun,  on  the  southern  frontier 
of  Luxemburg,  lies  Longwy,  and  at  the  same  distance  west 
of  Longwy  lies  Sedan,  a  town  of  nearly  20,000,  where  the 
French  and  Prussians  met  in  1870,  and  the  French  were 
forced  into  the  unconditional  surrender  of  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  III,  Marshal  MacMahon  and  an  army  of  2,600 
officers  and  83,000  men,  558  guns,  and  an  immense  amount 
of  stores.  In  this  battle  the  Germans  lost  9,000  men  and 
the  French  17,000.  It  was  fought  September  1,  and  raged 
fiercely  in  the  neighborhood  of  Bazeilles.  Marshal  Mac- 
Mahon, acting  under  orders  from  Paris,  dictated  by  political 
rather  than  military  considerations,  while  endeavoring  to 
march  to  the  relief  of  Bazaine,  who  was  ''bottled  up"  in 
Metz,  had  been  forced  back  on  Sedan  by  the  victorious 
armies  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  and  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony. 

The  two  main  routes  from  eastern  France  into  south  Ger- 
many are  the  one  through  the  Belfort  trouee  into  Baden,  and 
the  one  through  the  Palatinate  into  Bavaria.  After  crossing 
the  Rhine  between  Strassburg  and  Bale  an  invading  army 
using  the  first  of  these  routes  comes  up  against  the  Black 
Forest,  which  is  not  the  obstacle  it  used  to  be,  but  is 
none  the  less  not  well  adapted  to  rapid  movements  of  large 

276 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

bodies  of  troops.  The  more  natural,  direct,  and  historic  line 
for  an  invasion  passes  through  the  plateau  of  Lorraine  on 
the  west  side  of  the  northern  Vosges  Mountains.  This  has 
always  been  the  main  thoroughfare  to  and  from  France,  and 
into  and  out  of  Bavaria.  An  advance  along  this  route  has 
for  its  first  objective  Mannheim,  which  is  the  weakest  point 
on  the  Rhine  frontier.  The  question  of  fortifying  it  has 
often  been  raised,  but  it  remains  an  open  town  altho  the 
place  could  speedily  be  put  into  a  state  of  defense  by  the 
same  system  of  field  trenches  which  enabled  the  Germans  to 
oppose  so  successful  a  resistance  to  the  Allies'  offensive  in 
Flanders  and  the  north  of  France.  Two  bridges  connect 
the  city,  which  is  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  with  the 
port  of  Ludwigshafen  on  the  left  bank,  where  there  is  a 
large  military  station  with  platform  accommodation  for 
loading  eight  military  trains  at  the  same  time.  The  railway 
station  at  Mannheim  is  one  of  the  largest  in  Germany,  and 
a  depot  for  vast  railway  stores.  Mannheim  would  be  the 
point  of  passage  of  any  French  army  which  had  been  vic- 
torious in  the  Palatinate. 

After  crossing  the  Rhine  at  Mannheim  the  next  objective 
for  an  invading  army  would  be  the  line  of  the  I\Iain  River, 
which  Napoleon  Bonaparte  made  his  advanced  base  for  his 
Jena  campaign  of  1806;  but  no  advance  could  be  made  up 
this  river  till  after  the  subjugation  and  occupation  of  ]\Iainz 
by  the  Allied  forces.  Mainz  is  situated  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine  just  where  the  Main  flows  into  it.  Its  frontier 
is  strategically  important,  standing  as  it  does  as  sentinel 
over  the  main  line  of  advance  into  southern  Germany,  and 
commanding  several  lines  of  railway.  Mainz  is  the  central 
German  point  d'appui  on  the  Rhine,  and  has  been  called 
the  "key  of  Germany."  The  fortifications  are  very  com- 
plicated, having  been  built  at  different  periods  since  1604. 
Large  sums  of  money  have  been  spent  on  them  since  1870. 
Mainz  has  been  converted  into  an  intrenched  camp  requir- 
ing a  garrison  of  21,000  men;  but  even  now  the  place  is  not 
considered  secure  against  attack  from  such  heavy  howitzer 
batteries  as  were  being  constructed  in  England  with  a  view 
to  the  bombardment  of  the  Rhine  fortresses.  Germans  are 
said    to    trust    much    more    to    men    and    railways    than    to 

277 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

fortresses  both  for  offensive  and  defensive  purposes.  There 
are  six  fortresses — Wessel,  Cologne,  Coblentz,  Mainz,  Ger- 
mersheim,  and  Strassburg — along  the  whole  length  of  the 
Rhine  (340  miles)  from  Holland  to  Switzerland,  the  greater 
part  of  the  French  fortresses  which  fell  into  German  hands 
after  the  rectification  of  the  frontier  in  1871  having  been 
razed.  More  than  a  dozen  railways  from  all  parts  of  Ger- 
many lead  to  the  Rhine  frontier,  to  connect  the  whole  sys- 
tem, and  enable  a  superiority  of  force  to  be  concentrated  in 
a  few  hours  at  any  threatened  point,  a  double  line  of  rail- 
way follows  each  bank  of  the  Rhine  throughout  its  length.  ' 

Before  attempting  the  invasion  of  Bavaria  through  Lor- 
raine it  was  first  necessary  for  the  French  to  secure  their 
extreme  right  flank  by  the  effective  occupation  of  Alsace. 
Therefore,  while  the  Germans  were  pouring  into  Belgium  and 
storming  Liege,  the  French  garrison  at  Belfort  made  a 
reconnaissance  into  Upper  Alsace  in  order  to  ascertain  the 
strength  of  the  German  forces  between  the  Vosges  and  the 
Rhine.  A  brigade  left  Belfort  on  August  7  and  occupied 
Altkirch  the  same  night  without  serious  fighting.  Next  day 
Mulhausen  was  entered  and  about  the  same  time  a  force  was 
detached  to  Thann.  At  that  time  only  small  German  de- 
tachments were  intrenched  before  Altkirch.  Mulhausen  was 
without  permanent  fortifications;  it  had  nothing  but  in- 
trenchments,  and  these  were  deserted.  There  was  some 
desultory  fighting  in  neighboring  woods,  but  the  resistance 
offered  was  insignificant,  all  of  which  gave  the  French  false 
ideas  of  German  strength.  French  airmen  brought  reports 
that  the  German  army  under  Von  Heeringen,  which  had  its 
headquarters  at  Metz,  was  apparently  too  weak  to  hold  Lor- 
raine between  the  Rhine  and  the  Vosges.  They  had  failed 
to  discern  that  the  Germans  further  back  were  in  great 
strength.  On  the  ninth  a  German  corps,  having  concentrated 
around  Colmar  and  New  Breisach,  moved  toward  Mulhausen 
and  sent  an  advance  guard  to  Cernay.  The  French  finding 
their  retreat  threatened,  fell  back  on  Altkirch  and  the  Ger- 
mans reoccupied  Mulhausen, 

General  Joffre,  in  deciding  to  take  the  initiative  in  the 
east,  had  hoped  by  a  rapid  advance  into  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine to  obtain  possession  of  passages  over  the  Rhine  before 

278 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  Germans  could  concentrate  for  a  counter-attack.  He 
sent  three  corps  under  General  Pau  into  Alsace;  three  others 
under  General  Castelnau  into  Lorraine.  His  immediate  pur- 
pose was  to  separate  the  army  of  Heeringen  from  that  of 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria.  For  five  days,  from  August 
10  to  15,  blue-coated  and  red-trousered  soldiers  of  France 
advanced  along  stream-watered  ravines  on  the  west  slopes 
of  the  Vosges,  and  artillery  was  dragged  to  elevated 
plateaus.  In  Lorraine  the  Germans  moved  to  counter  the 
French,  but  were  driven  back  from  before  Spincourt  and 
another  German  force,  moving  south  from  Blamont,  was 
compelled  by  Castelnau 's  left  wing  to  retreat  on  ]Metz.  At 
Altkirch  the  French  had  a  succession  of  minor  victories  in 
which  they  captured  Dannemaire  and  Thann,  and  on  August 
17,  Saarburg,  on  the  railway  between  Strassburg  and  Metz, 
fell  into  French  hands.  Mulhausen  was  again  occupied, 
twenty-four  guns  being  taken,  and  Colmar  appeared  to  be 
within  French  grasp.  B}^  August  19,  French  field-com- 
manders seemed  warranted  in  sending  optimistic  bulletins  to 
Paris.  These  roused  much  enthusiasm.  The  more  optimistic 
went  so  far  as  to  think  the  French  flag  might  soon  get 
across  the  Rhine.  The  French  were  already  in  possession 
of  nearly  the  whole  of  Upper  Alsace,  and  could  almost 
touch  the  Rhine,  while  on  their  left  wing,  between  Saarburg 
and  Chateau-Salins,  they  seemed  to  threaten  Metz.  The 
French  dream  of  a  ^'revanche"  (revenge)  apparently  might 
come  true  with  a  possible  recovery  of  the  "lost  provinces." 
The  following  proclamation  by  General  Joffre  was  circulated 
among  Alsatians : 

"Children  of  Alsaee:  After  forty-four  years  of  sorrowful  wait- 
ing French  soldiers  once  more  tread  the  soil  of  our  noble  country. 
They  are  the  pioneers  in  the  great  work  of  revenge.  From  them 
what  emotions  are  called  forth  and  what  pride!  To  complete  the 
work  they  have  made  the  sacrifice  of  their  lives.  The  French 
nation  unanimously  urged  them  on,  and  in  the  folds  of  their  flag 
are  inscribed  the  magic  words,  'Right  and  Liberty.'  Long  live 
Alsace !     Long  live  France ! ' ' 

Alsatians  in  Paris  marched  in  pilgrimage  to  the  famous 
black-draped  statue  of  Strassburg  on  the  Place  de  la  Con- 

279 


ON  THE   WESTERN  FRONT 

corde.  The  procession  was  led  by  women  in  Alsatian  cos- 
tume carrying  palms  and  branches.  Behind  came  others 
with  the  standard  of  the  Alsatian  Federation  and  the  Bel- 
gian flag,  followed  by  Alsatian  men  who  marched  bare- 
headed. A  ladder  having  been  placed  against  the  pedestal, 
an  Alsatian  mounted  to  a  place  beside  the  statue  and  wound 
a  broad  tricolor  sash  around  it,  while  the  crowd  shouted 
•'Away  with  the  crepe."  In  an  instant  all  those  signs  of 
mourning  that  had  surrounded  the  statue  for  twoscore  and 
four  years  were  torn  away.  After  a  patriotic  speech  by 
the  president  of  the  association  the  ''Marseillaise"  was 
sung  and  the  throng  dispersed. 

Paris  in  general,  and  apart  from  the  Alsatians,  received 
news  of  the  eastern  successes  with  something  of  the  sang- 
froid that  characterized  the  city  when  the  first  suspicion 
arose  late  in  July  that  war  was  likely  to  burst  over  Europe. 
When  newsboys  ran  along  the  boulevards  shouting  "Good 
news,"  men  and  women  seized  papers  but  merely  read  and 
smiled.  It  was  a  smile  of  confidence,  such  as  had  become 
characteristic  of  the  French  within  a  week.  Every  citizen 
had  had  one  fact  instilled  into  his  soul — that  when  "the 
next  time"  came  to  cross  swords  with  Germany  there  would 
be  no  defensive  tactics,  but  at  the  very  start  a  straight  lunge 
into  the  enemy's  heart.  Frenchmen  thought  they  saw  the 
German  Empire  tottering  already,  but  they  kept  quiet  about 
it,  knowing  that  many  more  props  would  first  have  to  be 
knocked  away. 

Castelnau's  army  was  the  first  to  move  in  Lorraine.  Foch 
commanded  its  vanguard  which  was  the  Nancy  Corps.  He 
left  Nancy  on  August  15  and  on  the  18th  occupied  Chateau- 
Salins  and  established  headquarters  there.  Castelnau  de- 
cided to  attack  on  the  19th,  and  so  began  the  battle  of 
Morhange,  the  chief  part  being  assigned  to  Foch's  two 
divisions.  The  attack  soon  came  to  a  dead  stop  under  enemy 
fire,  whole  batteries  being  put  out  of  action  by  howitzer 
shells.  Foch  prepared  for  a  withdrawal  when  artillery  fire 
northwest  of  Delme  indicated  that  the  battle  was  extending 
in  a  new  direction,  German  reserves  having  been  sent  across 
the  Rhine  to  reinforce  Heeringen.  Moving  in  full  force  from 
Metz    they    struck    at   the    French    left,    the    main    German 

280 


FERDINAND  FOCH, 


Now  a  Marshal  of  France,  who  in  August,  1914,  had  a  command  in  Lorraine 

under  General  de  Castemau,  and  was  detailed  by  Joffre  at  the  end  of  the 

month  to  command  an  army  on  the  Marne,  where  he  delivered  the  final  and 

decisive  thrust 

I. 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

counter-attack  being  delivered  on  the  21st,  and  the  French 
left  was  driven  back,  the  Germans  being  in  overwhelming 
numbers.  Foch  was  able  to  save  the  Provencal  corps  from 
destruction,  covering  its  retreat  by  counter-attacking.  He 
fought  rear-guard  actions  with  troops  of  the  German  right, 
as  they  prest  toward  Chateau-Salins,  and  made  the  Grand 


GENERAL  VON  IIEERINGEN. 
"The  Victor  of  Saarburg."  or  Morhange  (on  the  right),  talking 
von  Emmich,  '"the  Victor  of  Liege'' 


with  General 


Couronne  secure  as  a  pivot  for  a  further  retirement.  Mor- 
hange was  the  first  serious  encounter  of  the  French  with  the 
Germans  and  the  only  great  battle  fought  within  the  Ger- 
man frontier  on  the  Western  Front  during  the  whole  war. 

The  German  Fifth  Army,  based  on  Metz,  had  sent 
probably  four  corps  against  the  French.  It  was  clear  that 
before   the   attack,   in   which   the   French   were   heavily   out- 


V.  1—18 


281 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

numbered,  they  had  felt  compelled  to  retire  on  the  left,  and 
this  forced  the  falling  l)ack  of  their  center.  Having  retired 
behind  the  Meurthe,  resting  their  left  on  Nancy,  the 
Bavarians  occupied  Luneville,  and  advanced  on  Nancy,  push- 
ing out  their  right  to  the  barrier  forts  north  of  Toul.  By 
August  22,  the  day  when  the  great  German  offensive  coming 
down  from  Belgium,  was  advancing  to  the  Sambre,  the 
French  offensive  in  the  east  had  been  sharply  ohecked.  When 
the  Germans  ordered  the  advance,  their  front  extended  for 
more  than  sixty  miles  from  near  Metz,  southward  through 
Remilly,  Morhange,  Bensdorf,  and  Finstingen,  to  Pfalz- 
burg,  which  is  near  Zabern.  The  fiercest  fighting  occurred 
at  Saarburg  on  the  German  left,  and  at  Conthil  and  Vergavil 
near  Dieuze,  on  the  center.  The  battle  around  Saarburg 
began  with  a  heavy  German  artillery  bombardment,  and 
cleared  the  surrounding  woods  of  the  French,  but  within 
the  town  itself  the  French  held  out  desperately,  and  were 
not  driven  out  till  the  following  day.  The  First  Bavarian 
Corps  which  fought  at  Saarburg  had  opposed  to  it — accord- 
ing to  German  accounts — the  Eighth  and  the  Thirteenth 
French  Corps,  from  which  it  took  thirty-one  guns.  The 
German  losses  ''were  in  proportion  to  the  importance  of  re- 
sults achieved";  some  regiments  had  casualties  ranging  from 
25  to  50  per  cent.  But  regardless  of  cost  it  was  a  German 
victory,  and  a  rapid  French  retreat  followed. 

By  the  French  this  battle  was  named  Morhange,  by  the 
Germans,  Metz.  Details  of  it  were  never  made  quite  clear 
while  the  war  lasted.  What  seemed  to  have  happened  was 
this:  The  first  day  saw  the  Germans  established  on  the 
line  Delme-Chateau-Salins-Dieuze-Saarburg.  On  August 
21,  their  right  wing  crossed  the  French  frontier  at  Moncel 
and  Arracourt,  their  center  at  Bourdonnaye  and  Con- 
drexange,  their  left  at  Hessen,  Walscheidt,  and  Saarburg. 
The  main  direction  of  their  drive  was  toward  Luneville. 
During  the  next  two  days  the  French  delivered  strong 
counter-attacks  against  the  German  right  from  Nancy,  and 
succeeded  in  holding  it  fast,  but  further  south  the  German 
advance  continued.  Luneville,  after  a  sharp  battle,  was 
occupied  on  the  23d,  the  heights  of  the  Donon  were  stormed 
on  the  following  day,  and  on  August  25   the  army  of  the 

282 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria  was  on  French  soil  on  a  line 
stretching  from  a  point  south  of  Nancy  through  Blainville, 
Gerbeviller,  Pole,  and  Cirey  to  near  St.  Die,  the  French 
still  giving  way.  On  August  28,  the  fortress  of  Manonville, 
near  Beaumont,  one  of  the  strongest  fortified  places  in  the 
world,  was  taken. 

The  Germans  reached  the  edge  of  the  Grand  Couronne, 
hardly  eight  miles  from  Nancy,  and  about  as  far  in  French 
territory  as  the  French  had  been  in  German  territory  when 
the  battle  began.  The  victory  was  without  real  consequence 
to  either  side,  altho  it  was  a  severe  defeat  for  the  French 
as  it  wrecked  their  eastern  offensive.  But  they  were  able 
to  rally  and  save  Nancy,  and  so  to  aid  in  the  work  of  win- 
ning at  the  Marne  a  fortnight  later.  ]Morhange  was  the  first 
considerable  Franco-German  battle  since  the  War  of  1870. 
A  German  priest  went  to  Luneville  a  few  days  after  the 
battle,  looking  for  the  body  of  a  German  officer  who  had 
been  killed.  His  account  ^  of  what  he  saw  was  illuminating 
as  showing  what  horrors  war  already  had  developed: 

*'We  left  Limeville  at  daybreak,  and  arrived  almost  at  once  on 
the  immense  battlefield.  In  the  ditches  by  the  roadside,  on  every 
mound,  in  the  fields  and  meadows,  mixed  up  with  the  dead  bodi-es 
of  horses,  lay  the  mangled  corpses  of  the  enemy.  Some  had  their 
arms  bent  as  if  in  a  last  movement  to  defend  themselves;  the 
clenched  fingers  of  others  bore  witness  to  the  horror  of  their  last 
moments,  and  blood  and  dust  still  further  disfigTired  features 
already  distorted  by  rage  and  terror.  Ammunition  wagons,  upset 
and  with  broken  wheels,  scraps  of  uniforms,  and  arms  of  every 
kind  were  heaped  as  far  as  the  eye  could  see.  No  German  dead 
were  to  be  seen.  Great  mounds  of  recently  dug  earth,  all  in  line, 
carefully  raked  over,  and  marked  with  wooden  crosses,  show  the 
places  where  the  fa  en  heroes'  comrades  piously  did  their  last 
duty  by  them.  After  every  battle  our  soldiers'  first  thought  is 
for  those  who  are  no  more. 

''Our  way  took  us  to  Einville,  where  is  the  Seventh  Military 
Hospital.  Great  God,  what  a  spectacle!  For  two  evenings  I 
have  had  it  continually  before  my  eyes,  and  I  shall  never  be  able 
to  forget  the  horror  of  it.  In  the  country  house  of  a  French 
notary  were  lying  side  by  side  the  most  seriously  wounded  and  the 
dying,  perhaps  already  dead.     They  were  lying  thus  side  by  side 

» Published  in  the  London  Standard. 

283 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

out  of  doors,  even  on  the  lawn  in  front  of  the  house.  For  days 
and  nights  they  had  been  waiting  for  someone  to  attend  to  them, 
for  most  of  them  had  not  even  had  their  wounds  drest.  And  yet 
the  doctors  were  doing  their  work  with  unparalleled  devotion,  but 
there  were  not  enough  of  them  to  overtake  it.  In  the  dusk  we  had 
to  walk  carefully  for  fear  of  knocking  against  the  wounded  or 
treading  on  the  dying.  After  stepping  over  the  last  line  of  them, 
we  stood  still  a  few  minutes  to  look  around  the  dark  field  in  which 
they  were  lying,  so  close  together  as  to  touch  one  another.  The 
silence  was  death-like,  tho  from  time  to  time  it  was  broken  by 
some  feeble  groan,  after  which  absolute  calm  prevailed  once  more. 
We  wondered  whether  the  poor  sufferers  still  lived  or  whether  they 
were  at  the  end  of  their  sufferings.  All  my  life  long  I  shall  re- 
member this  sight,  at  Einville,  on  the  canal  from  the  Marne  to  the 
Rhine,  that  hospital  open  to  the  sky,  with  the  wounded  unattended 
to  day  and  night. 

*'At  length  we  found  the  dead  man  for  whom  we  were  looking, 
and  whom  we  had  promised  to  bring  back  to  his  own  people  that 
they  might  bury  him  in  his  native  earth.  He  was  a  young  officer, 
whose  marriage  I  had  solemnized  a  few  days  before  mobilization. 
And  now  we  were  confronted  with  his  corpse.  Some  Einville  peo- 
ple, poor  day  laborers,  helped  me  to  discover  the  body,  and  took 
infinite  pains  over  doing  so,  nor  would  they  accept  anything  for 
their  trouble.  ^We  won't  take  anything,'  they  said;  Sve  are 
Christians.'  Indeed,  their  whole  thought  was  for  the  tragic  fate 
of  the  offieer  and  of  his  young  wife.  Toor,  brave  fellow!  Poor 
woman,'  said  they.  I  shook  hands  with  them  and  went  away, 
deeply  touched. 

''In  the  village  street  we  met  a  more  than  usually  mournful  fun- 
eral procession,  headed  by  the  curSy  a  venerable,  white-haired  priest, 
with  the  vicaire  beside  him,  and  behind  them  six  large  wagons, 
drawn  by  horses  and  led  by  some  peasants.  The  wagons  were 
transporting  heaps  of  corpses  to  their  common  grave,  dug  alongside 
the  cemetery  wall. 

''With  the  body  of  my  young  officer,  I  overtook  an  ambulance, 
in  which  a  colonel  had  died  of  his  wounds  that  very  morning.  He 
had  been  laid  on  the  ground,  with  his  long  cloak  over  him  and  his 
military  cap  and  sword  on  his  breast.  His  orderly  had  piously 
scattered  flowers  about  his  improvised  deathbed.  Despite  his 
serious  wounds,  the  officer  looked  as  if  he  had  fallen  peacefully 
asleep.  A  coffin  having  been  improvised,  I  took  his  dead  body  also 
home  to  his  country  on  the  motor-van  put  at  my  disposal." 

On  August  21 — the  morrow  of  Morhange — reinforcements 

284 


INVASION  OP  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

made  up  of  three  infantry  brigades  and  several  batteries  of 
artillery  from  Tours  reached  the  French.  While  Castelnau's 
army  was  taking  up  positions  to  hold  Nancy  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  was  fighting  its  first  battle  at  Mons; 
late  that  evening  (August  23)  its  retreat  began,  and  Namur 
had  fallen.  Then,  on  August  24,  Castelnau  began  the  battle 
of  the  Trouee  de  Charmes.  He  knew  that  there  had  been 
Allied  defeats  in  the  north,  and  that  the  German  invasion 
was  pouring  into  France  like  a  flood.  Pau  was  withdrawing 
from  Mulhausen  and  the  Alsatian  plain.  This  second  battle 
in  Lorraine  began  on  a  front  of  forty  miles.  Besides  the 
Saxon  and  Bavarian  troops,  who  had  fought  at  Morhange, 
the  Germans  had  a  considerable  part  of  Heeringen's  army. 
Advancing  on  both  sides  of  Gerbeviller,  they  flung  them- 
selves against  ground  from  Saffais  to  Rozelieure.  The  first 
attack  was  repulsed  and  Castelnau  organized  a  counter- 
attack. As  the  Germans  had  not  ventured  to  attack  in- 
trenched ground  at  the  Grand  Couronne,  Castelnau  detached 
a  force  from  its  garrison  and  placed  them  at  Foch's  disposal, 
after  which  Rupprecht  of  Bavaria  was  made  to  realize  that 
to  prolong  the  battle  would  be  to  court  disaster,  and  so  a 
German  retreat  began.  Gray  masses  streamed  back,  fight- 
ing as  they  went,  through  a  wide  gap  between  the  Chateau- 
Salins  road  and  the  Vosges  toward  their  own  frontier.  They 
finally  halted  on  the  border,  having  lost  heavily  in  massed 
attacks  after  their  victory  at  Morhange.  This  battle  was  the 
first  victory  of  France  in  this  war.  Had  the  Germans  forced 
the  Trouee  de  Charmes,  a  new  tide  of  German  invasion 
would  have  poured  through  the  gap  in  the  eastern  barrier 
and  probably  isolated  Verdun  from  the  upper  Marne  region. 
Foch  had  a  decisive  part  in  this  French  success  which  pre- 
pared the  way  for  the  battle  that  soon  followed  at  the  Grand 
Couronne  by  which  so  much  w^as  done  to  make  possible 
Joffre's  success  on  the  Marne. 

Pau's  original  object  had  been,  if  possible,  to  cut  in  be- 
tween Metz  and  Strassburg,  and  so  secure  the  French  flank 
for  an  attack  on  Lorraine.  He  hoped  thus  to  weaken  the 
German  concentration  in  Belgium.  But  when  the  fall  of 
Namur  was  announced,  and  the  Germans  were  sweeping 
across  Belgium   into   France,   Pau   was   summoned   away   to 

285 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 


assist  on  the  Western  Front  against  the  army  of  Kluck, 
which  was  advancing  rapidly.  Thus  it  was  that  by  August 
23 — the  day  after  the  defeat  of  the  French  at  Charleroi; 
the  day  of  the  defeat  of  the  British  at  Mons  and  of  the  fall 

of  Namur — the  French  who  had 

been  beyond  the  Meurthe  re- 
tired from  Alsace.  The  consola- 
tion was  that  the  arrival  of  Pau 
before  Paris  materially  helped 
to  save  the  French  capital  from 
Kluck.  Foch  also  was  sum- 
moned west  at  this  time  to  see 
Joffre  at  Chalons,  the  result  of 
which  was  that  Joffre  ordered 
him  to  assemble  a  new  army  and 
take  his  stand  at  La  Fere  Cham- 
penoise. 

News  of  German  successes  in 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  received  in 
Germany  and  Austria  with  re- 
joicing. The  German  people 
were  informed  simultaneously 
of  a  victory  in  Lorraine  and  of 
the  entry  of  German  troops  into 
Brussels,  which  explained  their 
indignant  amazement  at  what 
they  called  the  ''lies"  of  Paris 
and  London  papers,  which 
chose  to  overlook  these  facts  and 
to  concentrate  attention  on  the 
supposed  wrecking  of  German 
plans  in  Belgium.  In  Lorraine, 
a  French  army  of  more  than 
300,000  had  been  defeated,  10,- 
000  prisoners  and  150  guns 
taken,  and  the  morale  of  the 
French — so  said  the  German  accounts — shattered.  But  there 
was  another  side  of  the  story.  Either  the  magnitude  of  the 
victory  was  intensified  in  the  German  press  or  the  French 
armies  were   to   reveal   amazing   recuperative   powers.      En- 


Genekal  Paul  Pau 

Who,    on    August    7,    1914.    with 

three  army  corps,   invaded  Alsace 

and    occupied    Altltirch    and    Mul- 

hausen 


286 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

thusiastic  German  observers  had  declared  that  it  would  take 
the  French  from  four  to  six  weeks  to  put  their  beaten  army 
into  shape,  and  yet  in  less  than  two  weeks  the  French  were 
able  to  inflict  severe  defeats  on  the  Germans  at  the  Trouee 
des  Charmes  and  at  the  Grand  Couronne.  More  than  any 
other  events,  these  battles  caused  the  German  defeat  on  the 
Marne  a  few  days  later. 

Thi  French  offensive  had  had  two  phases.  One  con- 
templated a  movement  through  southern  Alsace  by  Belfort 
and  the  passes  of  the  Vosges,  the  other"  by  Luneville,  be- 
tween IMetz  and  Strassburg,  toward  Mainz  (Mayence)  on 
the  Rhine,  the  plain  purpose  being  to  roll  back  any  German 
forces  that  might  be  collected  in  that  region  and  compel  the 
Germans  to  weaken  their  strength  in  western  Belgium.  Just 
as  the  Germans,  avoiding  the  barrier  forts  from  Epinal  to 
Yerdun,  undertook  to  sw^eep  across  Belgium  into  northern 
France,  so  the  French  sought  to  enter  Germany  between  the 
fortress':S  of  Strassburg  and  Mainz  (Mayence).  Had  the 
French  been  successful,  they  would  have  been  able  to  isolate 
]\Ietz  and  then  to  attack  the  rear  flank  of  the  German  army 
coming  dow^n  from  the  north.  As  early  as  the  16th  of 
August,  however,  they  had  won  a  victory  east  of  Luneville, 
Avhere  they  drove  back  the  invaders  and  advanced  their  line. 
A  victory  apparently  of  almost  equal  importance,  from  a 
strategic  point  of  view,  w^as  their  recapture  of  Thann,  in 
southern  Alsace,  fourteen  miles  west  of  ]\Iulhausen.  With 
their  center  holding  the  passes  of  St.  Marie,  Bonhomme,  and 
Saales  in  the  Vosges,  their  right  resting  at  Thann  and  their 
left  on  a  point  across  the  border  of  Lorraine,  the  French, 
for  the  time  being,  established  themselves  for  an  advance  on 
Strassburg,  the  first  goal  of  the  French  invasion.  A  greater 
thing,  however,  than  any  other  accomplishment  on  the  east- 
ern front  was  the  successful  French  defense  at  the  Grand 
Couronne. 

While  the  French  invasions  of  Alsace-Lorraine  failed  of 
their  immediate  purpose,  they  left  open  the  question  whether, 
as  strategical  movements,  they  were  altogether  failures.  Be- 
yond question  they  stiffened  the  morale  of  the  French;  con- 
vinced them  that,  man  for  man,  they  could  fight  the  Ger- 
mans.   Moreover,  they  prevented  the  Germans  from  flinging 

287 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRO.NT 

themselves  through  the  gap  at  Nancy.  The  advance  on 
Saarburg  and  Luneville  forced  the  German  leaders  to  draw 
off  for  the  Meurthe,  soldiers  whom  they  could  otherwise  have 
used  effectively  on  the  Meuse.  Other  reasons — and  the 
French  being  sentimental,  perhaps,  powerful  reasons — existed 
for  Joffre's  action  in  throwing  troops  at  once  into  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  The  inhabitants  of  those  provinces  were  believed 
to  be  largely  French  at  heart,  tho  they  were  German  geo- 
graphically, and  many  of  them  Germans  by  remote  racial 
origins.  But  large  numbers  of  them-  had  never  taken  kindly 
to  German  imperialism,  or  to  the  efforts  made  by  Germany 
to  impose  upon  them  German  literature,  customs,  and  habits. 
The  year  before  the  war  began,  the  discontented  part  of 
the  population  had  been  newly  irritated  by  an  incident  at 
Zabern,  in  Alsace,  where  a  Lieutenant  von  Forstner  had 
offered  to  reward  a  recruit  if  he  would  stab  a  "Wacke,"  a 
local  opprobrious  term  applied  by  Germans  to  natives  of 
Alsace.  Disturbances  followed  and,  in  the  course  of  them, 
Forstner,  with  his  sword,  cut  the  head  of  a  lame  cobbler. 
Great  was  the  indignation  that  ensued  throughout  Germany 
— so  great  in  fact  that,  supported  by  the  Minister  of  War, 
military  authority  had  to  be  made  to  supersede  the  civil 
administration  at  Zabern.  The  Minister  of  War,  General 
von  Falkenhayn — afterward  made  Chief  of  Staff  and  de- 
feated so  disastrously  at  Verdun  that  he  was  superseded 
by  Hindenburg — declared  in  the  Reichstag  that,  if  the  mili- 
tary authorities  had  given  way  in  this  matter,  there  might 
have  been  momentary  peace,  but  '"'it  would  have  been  a 
treacherous  peace."  What  Falkenhayn  called  ''the  recent 
scandals''  now  ''cried  to  heaven."  Unless  the  authorities 
supprest  the  agitation  with  vigor,  they  must  expect  to  see 
a  German's  life  at  Zabern  "less  safe  than  on  the  Kongo." 
The  Reichstag,  however,  gave  a  vote  of  censure,  and  the 
Military  Court  at  Stras^sburg  sentenced  Forstner  to  forty- 
three  days'  imprisonment.  German  militarists  boldly  at- 
tacked the  conduct  of  the  Reichstag  and  the  IMilitary  Court 
in  this  matter.  Herr  von  Jagow,  the  Foreign  Minister, 
described  Alsace-Lorraine  as  "almost  an  enemy's. country." 
Finally  the  superior  Military  Court  of  the  Strassburg  Army 
Corps   reversed   the   sentence   passed   on   Forstner   and    ac- 

288 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

quitted  Colonel  von  Reuster  and  Lieutenant  Schad,  who,  be- 
tween them,  had  substituted  military  for  civil  rule  in  Zabern, 
During  these  proceedings,  the  Crown  Prince  by  telegram 
had  signified  his  approval  of  the  acts  of  Forstner,  Reuster, 
and  Schad.  With  the  Zabern  outrages  fresh  in  their  memo- 
ries, it  was  therefore  believed  in  France  that  Alsatians  and 
Lorrainers  would  flock  to  the  Tricolor  with  enthusiasm  once 
the  French  crossed  the  frontier.^ 

The  French  strategy  in  the  eastern  offensive  was  well  con- 
ceived. If  the  six  corps  under  Pau  and  Castelnau  had 
been  ready  to  take  the  offensive  in  the  middle  of  August, 
the  whole  course  of  the  western  campaign  might  have  been 
altered ;  but  they  were  not  ready,  and  the  Germans  were. 
When  Castelnau  advanced  to  the  Saar  the  mobilization  of 
his  three  corps  was  still  incomplete,  while  the  German  army, 
based  on  Metz,  was  ready  for  immediate  operations.  Joffre 
had  counted  on  the  Meuse  fortresses  being  able  to  detain  the 
Germans  in  Belgium  long  enough  to  enable  his  troops  to 
overrun  the  Rhine  provinces,  and  threaten  the  invasion  of 
Bavaria.  The  thoroughness  of  the  German  preparations, 
and  the  rapidity  with  which  their  armies  were  concentrated 
on  the  northern  frontier,  upset  Joffre 's  calculations,  and 
compelled  him  to  abandon  the  offensive  in  order  to  concen- 
trate for  the  defense  of  Paris.^ 

*  In  August.  1915,  it  was  announced  from  Berlin  that  Forstner  was  reported 
among  ttie  German  dead  at  the  front. 

*  Principal  Sources:  The  London  Standard,  The  Independent,  "Bulletins" 
of  the  National  Geographic  Society,  The  Fortnightly  Revieic,  "Nelson's  History 
of  the  War"  by  John  Buchan,  Associated  Press  Dispatches,  A.  Hilliard 
Atteridge's  "Marshal  Ferdinand  Foch"   (Dodd,  Mead  &  Co.) 


289 


IV 

HAELEN,  LOUVAIN  AND  BRUSSELS 

August  12,  1914— August  26,  1914 

AT  Haeleu,  northwest  of  Liege,  was  fought  on  August  12 
an  engagement  which  was  the  first  field-battle  of  the  war 
in  any  way  notable.  Others,  and  still  smaller,  engagements 
had  been  fought  earlier,  such  as  the  one  at  Vise.  The  Haelen 
battle,  and  others  at  Tirlemont,  Aerschot,  and  Louvain,  oc- 
curred as  features  of  a  German  movement  to  penetrate  the 
defensive  screen  that  shielded  Brussels.  In  comparison  with 
later  battles  of  the  war,  they  were  scarcely  more  than 
skirmishes,  being  entirely  affairs  of  outposts.  But  the  re- 
sults inspired  Belgian  soldiers  with  new  self-confidence,  and 
at  the  same  time  led  them  to  underrate  the  military  prowess 
of  the  invaders.  Small  tho  they  were,  the  eyes  of  the  entire 
world,  American  as  well  as  European  and  Asiatic,  were  fixt 
intently  on  these  early  Belgian  battles.  Minute  details  of 
them,  with  many  errors  and  much  exaggeration,  were  printed 
over  all  the  world. 

At  these  places  in  five  days  was  probably  achieved  all  that 
the  German  commander  aimed  at,  but  under  difficulties.  His 
cavalry  acted  as  a  true  screen  for  the  German  host  that  was 
behind  and  already  on  the  way.  In  numbers,  both  of  men 
and  guns,  the  Belgians  were  hopelessly  overpowered.  The 
force  of  German  cavalry  which  flung  itself  upon  Haelen  and 
Diest,  situated  about  three  miles  apart,  was  estimated  as 
high  as  5,000.  It  was  accompanied  by  artillery  and  machine- 
guns.  Preparations  had  been  made  by  the  Belgians  for 
blowing  up  the  bridge  over  the  Gethe,  but  the  German  at- 
tack came  so  suddenly  that  the  engineers  had  not  time  to 
complete  their  task  and  retire  before  the  enemy  reached  the 
river.  The  German  advance  was  covered  by  heavy  artillery- 
fire,  to  which  Belgian  guns  replied,  causing  considerable  loss 
to  the  invaders.  A  force  consistins:  of  drajxoons,  two  field- 
guns,  and  four  machine-guns,  made  a  bold   dash   on  Diest. 

290 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE    , 

They  would  probably  have  succeeded  in  their  aim  but  for 
the  resistance  of  the  military,  assisted  by  Civil  Guards.  The 
German  column,  advancing  at  full  gallop,  on  reaching  a 
small  village  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  Diest,  met  a 
barricade  of  farm-wagons.  A  road  immediately  in  front  of 
them  had  been  so  torn  up  as  to  make  an  advance  by  cavalry 
impossible.  Behind  this  hastily  constructed  fortification,  a 
mixed  force  of  Belgians  with  machine-guns  was  intrenched. 
Fire  was  opened  on  the  Prussian  dragoons  who,  being  with- 
out cover  and  under  Belgian  bullets,  were  cut  down.  The 
surviving  Germans  fought  with  great  bravery.  Intrenched 
behind  a  rampart  of  dead  horses  and  dead  comrades,  they 
resisted  with  desperate  courage. 

Other  columns,  unable  to  force  their  way  into  Haelen,  re- 
tired in  confusion,  leaving  behind  them  many  dead,  wounded, 
and  prisoners.  A  number  who  were  surrounded  and  sub- 
jected to  a  merciless  fire,  threw  down  their  arms  and  sur- 
rendered. The  retreat  of  those  who  escaped  was  a  moving 
spectacle.  Spent  and  half-starved  horses  bravely  and  mutely 
made  their  last  efforts,  and  under  pressure  of  renewed  exer- 
tions dropt  dead  on  the  roadway,  so  that  the  German  line  of 
retreat  was  clogged  by  carcasses  of  horses  which  had  died 
from  exhaustion.  Some  of  their  riders  who  escaped  harm 
in  the  fight  also  collapsed  at  the  roadside,  and  were  so 
incapable  of  physical  resistance  that,  when  taken  prisoners 
by  Belgian  patrols,  they  were  unable  to  walk  on  to  Diest. 
German  prisoners  declared  they  had  had  no  food  for  twenty- 
four  hours.  Veterinary  surgeons  with  the  Belgian  forces, 
who  made  autopsies  on  some  of  the  horses,  stated  that  the 
poor  brutes  could  not  have  had  any  forage  for  days. 

Across  the  battlefield  afterward  was  to  be  seen  a  brown 
stretch  of  harrowed  ground,  half  a  furlong  in  width,  con- 
taining the  graves  of  Germans  who  fell  in  the  fight,  and 
elsewhere  were  other  graves — some  of  Belgians,  some  of 
Germans,  some  of  horses.  Peasants  with  long  mattocks  and 
spades  turned  the  soil  for  two  days,  sick  at  heart,  their  corn 
ripe  for  cutting  in  the  same  field,  but  little  of  it  harvested. 
Dark  paths  in  their  turnip  fields  were  sodden  with  the 
blood  of  men  and  horses.  This  battleground  ought  to  be 
called  Haelen  rather  than  Diest,  for  it  was  in,  and  through, 

291 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

and  behind  the  little  village  of  Haelen,  not  the  larger  town, 
that  the  deadly  test  of  strength  took  place.  The  Germans 
were  said  to  have  lost  three-fifths  of  their  force  of  5,000 
men,  two  thousand  being  killed,  800  wounded,  and  300  taken 
prisoners — the  numbers  probably  much  exaggerated.  While 
the  fight,  so  far  as  numbers  went,  was  small  compared  with 
the  enormous  armies  in  the  field,  there  was  ample  evidence 
that  it  was  fierce  and  out  of  proportion  to  its  size.  The 
battleground  was  roughly  three  miles  long.  Near  one  end 
was  Haelen,  which  was  held  by  Belgian  troops  when  at- 
tacked by  Uhlans,  artillery,  and  infantry.  Traces  of  the 
fighting  in  the  village  and  surrounding  area  were  only  too 
conspicuous  afterward.  Walls  were  pierced  by  bullet-holes 
and  windows  broken.  The  church-spire  stood  half  uncovered 
— the  work  of  a  passing  shell — and  the  clock  was  wrenched 
from  its  place.  A  pathetic  letter,  picked  up  on  the  field, 
written  in  ink  on  half  a  sheet  of  thin  note-paper,  dating 
probably  from  the  eve  of  battle,  in  the  hope  that  it  would 
reach  its  destination  if  the  writer  died,  read  as  follows: 

** Sweetheart  {Bonne  Awie)  :  Fate  in  this  present  war  has 
treated  us  more  cruelly  than  many  others.  If  I  have  not  lived  to 
create  for  you  the  happiness  of  which  both  our  hearts  dreamt, 
remember  that  my  sole  wish  is  that  now  you  should  be  happy. 
Forget  me.  Create  for  yourself  some  happy  home  that  may  restore 
to  you  some  of  the  greater  pleasures  of  life.  For  myself  I  shall 
have  died  happy  in  the  thought  of  your  love.  My  last  thought  has 
been  for  you  and  for  those  I  leave  at  home.  Accept  this,  the 
last  kiss  from  him  who  loved  you." 

Broken  lances,  both  German  and  Belgian,  were  found  side 
by  side,  with  scabbards  and  helmets,  saddles  and  guns. 
Peasants  collected  them  in  a  pile  to  be  removed  by  the  mili- 
tary. One  day,  high  up  over  the  grave  of  twelve  hundred 
men,  a  German  biplane  was  seen  hovering  like  a  vulture. 
At  Haelen  300  men  surrendered  the  moment  they  lost  their 
officers.  Some  who  were  caught  in  a  cross-fire  immediately 
cast  away  their  rifles  and  threw  up  their  hands.  They  did 
not  know  what  else  to  do.  None  had  been  trained  in  the 
art  of  taking  cover. 

On   August   15,   after   bombarding   it,   the    Germans   took 

292 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Tirlemont,  twenty  miles  south  of  Diest,  and  next  morning 
guns  were  heard  from  the  vicinity  of  Aerschot,  twelve  miles 
west.  The  defense  of  Louvain,  fifteen  miles  west  of  Tirle- 
mont,  was  being  organized.  A  company  of  the  Third  Regi- 
ment of  the  Belgian  infantry,  supported  by  two  machine- 
guns,  prepared  to  contest  the  entrance  to  the  town.  Mean- 
while, Pellenberg,  Bautersem,  Corbeek-Loo,  and  Lovenojul 
were  observed  to  be  in  flames.  Prussian  guns  were  only 
650  yards  away.  On  August  19  the  Germans  entered 
Louvain,  the  ultimate  fate  of  which  awakened  world-wide 
sympathies,  and  next  day  they  entered  Brussels. 

Louvain  lies  on  the  Dyle,  which  flows  through  the  town 
and  is  connected  by  canal  with  the  Rupel.  Louvain  had 
42,400  inhabitants.  In  the  Middle  Ages  it  was  the  capital 
of  Brabant  and  noted  for  its  cloth-factories.  Its  name  is 
derived  from  Loo,  signifying  ''a  wooded  height,"  and 
Veen,  ''a  marsh."  Its  central  building  was  a  late  Gothic 
church,  St.  Peter's,  designed  in  1425  by  Sulpice  van  Vorst 
to  take  the  place  of  an  earlier  building.  It  was  originally 
intended  that  the  highest  of  its  five  towers  should  rise  535 
feet,  but  the  foundations  proved  insufficient  to  bear  the 
weight.  The  interior  had  a  majesty  and  solemnity  all  their 
own,  and  in  art-treasures  was  peculiarly  rich.  At  one  time 
it  was  the  fortunate  possessor  of  the  famous  triptych  by 
Quentin  Matsys,  who  originally  was  an  ironsmith,  but  be- 
came an  exquisite  worker  in  metal  as  well  as  in  oil.  He 
was  born  in  Louvain  in  1466,  and  became  the  greatest  of 
Flemish  colorists,  founder  of  the  Antwerp  school.  The 
town  hall  of  Louvain,  which  survived  the  destruction,  is  an 
extraordinary  architectural  production.  Its  towering  walls 
speak  eloquently  of  town  pride,  its  statues  of  an  active 
religious  faith,  but  the  town  hall  w^as  eclipsed  in  fame  by 
the  University.  Originally  built  as  the  Cloth  Hall,  this 
edifice  in  the  first  half  of  the  fifteenth  century  was  made 
over  to  the  University.  When  Louvain  declined  in  com- 
mercial eminence,  she  rose  in  another  direction  and  so  next 
to  Paris  became  the  most  famous  university  town  in  Europe. 
''The  Athens  of  Belgium,"  she  was  called  by  one  of  her 
professors,  who  was  also  one  of  her  greatest  scholars,  Justus 
Lipsius.      The    University    produced    or    employed    a    large 

293 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

number  of  famous  humanists,  having  a  peculiarly  close  con- 
nection with  England.  One  of  these,  Jerome  de  Busleyden, 
was  sent  to  England  to  offer  congratulations  from  Brabant 
on  the  accession  of  Henry  VIII.  But  the  fame  of  this  univer- 
sity is  forever  linked  with  a  greater  name,  that  of  Erasmus. 
The  destruction  of  Louvain  by  the  Germans  was  not  ac- 
cidental, nor  was  it  the  result  of  shell-fire,  but  was  carried 
out  by  soldiers  provided  with  special  appliances  for  the 
work.     The  officer  who  gave  the  order  was  said  at  the  time 


LOUVAIN  AFTER  THE  GERMAN  BOMBARDMENT 


to  be  Major  von  IManteuffel,  who,  about  the  end  of  Septem- 
ber, was  superseded  in  his  command.  The  Germans  pleaded 
in  defense  that  their  troops  were  engaged  in  a  conflict  with 
the  inhabitants  of  the  city  for  twenty-four  hours,  and  in  the 
course  of  this  fight  the  town  was  damaged.  They  said  fur- 
ther that  the  son  of  the  burgomaster  fired  on  the  German 
Chief  of  Staff,  who  commanded  at  Louvain,  and  this  became 
a  signal  for  the  Civil  Guard  of  Louvain  to  fire  on  the  Ger- 
man soldiers,  fifty  being  killed  or  wounded.     A  civilian  wit- 

.     294 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

ness  gave  the  following  account  of  what  followed  to  an  Eng- 
lish war  correspondent : 

'At  6  o'clock,  when  everything  was  ready  for  dinner,  alarm 
signals  sounded,  and  the  soldiers  rushed  into  the  streets;  shots 
whistled  through  the  air,  cries  and  groans  arose  on  all  sides,  but 
we  did  not  dare  leave  our  house,  and  took  refuge  in  the  cellar, 
where  we  stayed  through  long  and  fearful  hours. 

''At  the  break  of  dav  I  crawled  from  the  cellar  to  the  street 


THE  LIBRARY  AT  LOUVAIN  BEFORE  IT  WAS  DESTROYED  BY  THE 

GERMANS 


door,  and  saw  nothing  but  a  raging  sea  of  fire.  At  9  o'clock  the 
shooting  diminished,  and  we  resolved  to  make  a  dash  to  the 
station.  Abandoning  our  homes  and  all  our  goods  except  what 
we  could  carry,  and  taking  all  the  money  we  had,  we  rushed  out. 
What  we  saw  on  our  Avay  to  the  station  is  hardly  describablo. 
Everything  was  burning;  the  streets  Avere  covered  Avith  bodies  shot 
dead  and  half  burnt.  Everywhere  proclamations  had  been  posted 
summoning  every  man  to  assist  in  quenching  the  flames,  and  or- 
derino-  the  women  and  children  to  stay  inside  the  houses. 

*'The  station  was  crowded  with  fugitives,  and  I  was  just  trying 

295 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

to  show  an  officer  my  legitimation  papers  when  the  soldiers  sep- 
arated me  from  my  wife  and  children.  All  protests  were  useless 
and  a  lot  of  us  were  marched  off  to  a  big  shed  in  the  goods-yard, 
from  where  we  could  see  the  fnest  buildings  of  the  city,  the  most 
beautiful  historical  monuments,  being  burned  down. 

"Shortly  afterward  German  soldiers  drove  before  them  300 
men  and  lads  to  the  corner  of  the  Boulevard  van  Tienen  and 
Maria  Theresa  street,  opposite  the  Cafe  Vermalen.  There  they 
were  shot.  The  sight  filled  us  with  horror.  The  burgomaster, 
two  magistrates,  the  rector  of  the  University,  and  all  police  offi- 
cials had  been  shot  already. 

*'With  our  hands  bound  behind  our  backs  we  were  then  marched 
off  by  the  soldiers,  still  without  having  seen  our  wives  or  chil- 
dren. We  went  through  the  Juste  de  Lipse  street,  along  the  Diest 
boulevard,  across  the  Vaart,  and  up  the  hill.  From  the  Mont 
Cesar  we  had  a  full  view  of  the  burning  town,  St.  Peter's  in  flames 
while  the  troops  incessantly  sent  shot  after  shot  into  the  unfortu- 
nate city." 

The  district  most  thoroughly  wiped  out  was  that  in  which 
were  situated  the  University,  the  Library,  and  the  chuich  of 
St.  Peter's.  It  was  at  first  reported  that  the  famous  Town 
Hall  had  been  destroyed.  Later  it  was  learned  that  the 
Germans  themselves  prevented  the  flames  from  attacking  it. 
It  now  stood  alone  amid  a  waste  of  blackened  ruins,  but  the 
interior  was  much  injured.  The  damage  to  St.  Peter's  was 
not  altogether  irreparable,  tho  the  marvelous  and  exquisite 
rood-screen  was  destroyed.  Its  pictures  were  rescued  by 
soldiers. 

Quite  apart  from  the  burning  of  Louvain  by  the  Germans 
as  a  military  atrocity,  art-lovers  in  all  parts  of  the  world 
mourned  the  artistic  and  historical  treasures  that  were  irre- 
parably lost.  The  Germans  might  say,  on  the  one  hand, 
that,  in  the  stern  exigencies  of  war,  it  was  impossible  to 
exempt  art  treasures;  but,  on  the  other,  it  was  only  natural 
that  this  destruction  should  be  denounced  by  an  English 
paper  like  the  London  Daily  Chronicle  as  '' treason  to 
civilization"  and  'Svar  on  posterity  to  the  remotest  genera- 
tions." For,  said  the  Chronicle,  while  it  is  "tragic  for  in- 
dividuals to  die,  in  a  few  years  we  must  each  die  anyhow, 
and  others  will  come  after  who  may  more  than  replace  us; 
these    trophies    and    stepping-stones    of    the    human    soul 

296 


INVjVSION  of  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

need  never  have  died ;  and  now  that  they  are  dead,  they  are 
irreplaceable. "  Journals  of  neutral  nations  echoed  the  same 
feelings.  The  Rotterdam  Telegraph  declared  that  ''a  wound 
that  can  never  be  healed"  had  been  inflicted  "on  the  whole 
of  civilized  humanity."  The  New  York  Trihiine  reminded 
us  that,  while  Napoleon  robbed  Italy  of  a  wealth  of  pictures 
and  statues,  he  was  never  guilty  of  the  wanton  destruction 
of  works  of  art.  The  great  works  he  carried  off  still  exist 
and  are  accessible  to  art-lovers — '^  partly  in  the  Louvre,  and 
partly  in  Italy,  whither  some  of  them  were  later  returned." 
Under  the  ironical  title.  ''We  Barbarians,"  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung  published  a  spirited  article  in  which  the  opprobrium 
heaped  upon  Germany  for  attacking  Louvain  was  charac- 
terized as  undeserved  as  well  as  intentionally  slanderous. 
Germ^an  soldiers,  and  the  Kaiser's  subjects  in  general,  were 
declared  to  be  quite  incapable  of  the  cruelties  and  outrages 
attributed  to  them :  for  the  Germans  were  not  only  leaders 
in  art,  literature,  and  philosophy,  but  ^  felt  deeply  the  de- 
struction of  architectural  monuments  which  lay  within  the 
line  of  battle,  and  the  desolation  of  villages  and  towns  which 
followed  their  triumphal  march.  The  interest  of  the  article 
referred  to  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung  was  an  especially  important  journal  and  carried 
with  it  at  least  the  approval  of  the  Berlin  Government. 
The  writer  put  forth   an   amazing  outburst   of  indignation  : 

''Teutonic  Barbarians,  Vandals!  Such  are  the  terms  which 
French  and  English-speaking  trumpets  are  shrieking  into. the  ears 
of  the  world.  After  lies  comes  calumnious  opprobrium.  By  no- 
body is  the  fate  of  Belgium,  the  burning  down  of  every  building, 
the  destruction  of  Louvain,  so  deeply  deplored  as  by  the  German 
people,  and  by  our  brave  troops  who  felt  bound  to  carr>'  out  to  the 
bitter  end  the  chastisement  they  were  compelled  to  inflict.  Ger- 
many and  her  army  aimed  to  carry  on  a  war,  which  w^as  forced 
upon  them,  with  a  vigor  tempered  by  humanity,  such  as  the 
German  nation  is  trained  in ;  to  observe  carefully  the  rules  of 
international  law,  and  at  least  to  soften  the  horrors  of  battle.  It 
lias  long  been  imprest  upon  all  German  minds,  and  again  and  again 
reiterated  in  their  hours  of  military  instructions,  that  soldiers 
must  fight  only  against  soldiers,  that  private  citizens  were  to  be 
left  unmolested.     We  all  of  us  had  taken  this  for  granted.  Could 

V.  1—19  297 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

it  be  iDossible  we  should  suddenly  forget  all  this,  and  from  mere 
bloodthirstiness  have  shot  down  unarmed  civilians,  and  for  the 
sake  of  robbery  and  destruction  reduced  to  ashes  villages  and 
towns?  Our  youth  go  to  war  with  the  watchword  ^Germany  first 
of  all.'  They  could  not  understand  that  the  inhabitants  of  cap- 
tured towns  and  villages  Avould  lodge  in  their  backs  the  murderous 
bullet  as  soon  as  it  was  dark,  firing  at  them  from  windows  and 
cellars.  Soldiers  were  almost  stupefied  by  such  atrocities,  and  as 
soon  as  their  officers  gave  the  order  would  of  course  wreak  pun- 
ishment on  the  offenders,  set  fire  to  the  houses  from  which  their 
comrades  had  been  shot,  and  execute  the  offenders." 

After  these  events  in  Louvain  wiser  heads  knew  that 
Brussels,  the  capital,  lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  Germans.  They 
did  not  expect  a  permanent  military  occupation,  however; 
the  worst  they  feared  was  a  cavalry  raid  ''for  moral  effect." 
By  August  20  an  advance  was  already  under  way,  and  the 
Government,  with  the  Queen  and  most  of  the  foreign  minis- 
ters, moved  to  the  fortified  city  of  Antwerp.  Almost  alone 
among  the  diplomatic  corps  the  American  Minister,  Brand 
Whitlock,  remained,  hoping,  since  he  represented  the  strong- 
est neutral  power,  to  do  something  for  Belgium,  as  he  had 
already  done  much  for  Germans  stranded  in  an  enemy's 
country.  A  wave  of  panic  swept  down  the  streets  of 
Brussels  like  squalls  across  still  ponds.  Stout  housewives 
gathered  up  their  children,  closed  the  wooden  shutters  of 
their  homes  and  flung  bars  across  them — the  Germans  were 
actually  coming.  General  von  Arnim,  who  was  in  command, 
served  throughout  the  war  to  perish,  in  1919,  at  the  hands  of 
peasants  on  a  farm  in  Bohemia.  The  peasants  killed  him  in 
retaliation  for  having  been  fired  on  when  gathering  wood 
from  the  farm. 

Down  a  straight,  well-paved  highway  outside  the  city,  at 
the  further  end  of  an  avenue  of  elms,  which  framed  them  in 
like  a  tunnel,  was  seen  a  band  of  horsemen,  coming  at  an 
easy  trot,  half  a  dozen  in  single  file  on  either  side  of  the 
road.  Men  could  see  their  lances,  held  upstanding  on 
saddles,  tails  of  horses  whisking  to  and  fro.  Tears  mean- 
while rolled  down  the  cheeks  of  women  huddled  inside  door- 
ways. Coming  nearer  and  nearer  down  that  long  tunnel  of 
trees,  a  little  gray  spot  of  moving  figures  grew  to  strange 

298 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

proportions;  it  was  the  front  of  an  avalanche,  A  few  hun- 
dred yards  away  riders  pulled  their  horses  dowm  to  a  walk, 
and  peering  sharply  out  from  helmets,  slowly  entered  what 
had  become  a  silent  street.  Another  moment  and  a  leader 
came  forward  and  was  alongside.  He  was  not  more  than 
twenty  years  old,  with  blue  eyes  and  a  clean-cut,  gentle  face, 
and  passed  without  a  look  or  word,  but  behind  him  was  a 
young  officer,  soldier-like  and  smart  in  Prussian  fashion, 
with  a  half-opened  map  in  his  hand,  who  asked  the  way. 
These  men  formed  only  one  of  hundreds  of  such  squads  of 
light  cavalry,  uhlans  for  the  most  part,  now  ranging  over 
western  Belgium  as  far  as  Ostend,  a  dozen  squad  of  a  dozen 
or  so  men  each  in  a  hostile  country,  prepared  to  cut  or  to 
be  cut  to  pieces,  when  they  found  the  enemy  they  were 
looking  for,  or  to  be  caught  in  ambush  at  any  time  by 
some  squad  of  civic  guards. 

The  main  body  of  Germans  entered  Brussels  shortly  after 
2  P.M.  without  a  shot  being  fired.  After  a  day  of  wild  panic 
citizens  had  passed  a  slumberless  night.  Lights  had  burned 
at  night  in  every  window  and,  indeed,  few  had  sought  their 
couches.  The  morning  had  broken  brilliantly  and  the  city 
w^as  astir  soon  after  dawn.  On  all  lips  were  the  words, 
"'They  are  coming!"  "They  are  here!'^  Germans  were 
already  outside  the  city  boundaries  in  great  force,  artillery 
parked  off  on  the  road  to  Waterloo,  while  horse,  foot,  and 
sappers  w^ere  packed  deep  on  the  Louvain  and  Tervueren 
roads.  Shortly  after  two  the  booming  of  cannon,  and  later 
the  sound  of  military  music,  conveyed  an  intimation  that  a 
triumphal  march  had  begun.  On  they  came  with  siege- 
train  complete — a  special  feature  being  a  procession  of  100 
motor-cars  in  which  were  mounted  quick-firers.  Every  regi- 
ment and  battery  was  headed  by  its  band.  Now  came  the 
drums  and  fifes  and  now  the  blare  of  brass  instruments,  and 
continuous  singing  of  "Die  Wacht  amRhein"  and"Deutsch- 
land,  Deutschland,  iiber  alles." 

Along  the  Chaussee  de  Louvain,  past  St.  Josse,  past  the 
Botanic  Gardens,  to  the  great  space  in  front  of  the  Gare  du 
Nord,  in  normal  times  the  lounging  place  of  all  the  otiose 
twaddlers  of  the  city,  came  German  legions.  To  a  quick 
step  the   men   marched   to   the   great  square,   where,   at   the 

299 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

sound  of  a  whistle,  the  infantry  broke  into  goose-step,  while 
people  gazed  open-mouthed  in  wonder.  Passing  the  station 
the  troops  defiled  through  the  boulevards  to  camp  on  the 
heights  near  Kochelberg.  Men  muttered  under  their  breath, 
"They'll  not  pass  through  here  on  their  return.  Les  Allies 
en  feront  leurs  affaires — 'The  Allies  will  fix  them/  "  Many 
seemed  exhausted  after  a  long  and  forced  march.  The  Ger- 
man force  was  estimated  at  from  35,000  to  40,000,  Behind 
them  were  believed  to  be  not  less  than  150,000  men  of  all 
arms.  In  the  procession  were  two  Belgian  officers  manacled 
and  attached  to  the  stirrup-leathers  of  uhlans.  A  low  growl 
was  evoked  by  this  spectacle,  which  was  instantly  resented 
by  the  officers,  who  at  once  backed  their  horses  into  the 
ranks  of  the  spectators,  threatening  them  not  with  words  but 
with  raised  sabers. 

This  stream  seemed  to  Richard  Harding  Davis  ^^  not  so 
much  men  marching  as  a  force  of  nature,  a  tidal  wave,  an 
avalanche,  or  a  river  flooding  its  banks.  For  three  hours  armed 
men  passed  in  one  unbroken,  steel-gray  column.  When 
there  was  no  halt,  the  scene  became  uncanny.  Gray  uni- 
forms added  to  the  air  of  mystery.  Only  the  sharpest  eye 
could  have  detected  the  slightest  difference  among  the  thou- 
sands that  passed.  That  this  uniform  was  selected  to  clothe 
and  disguise  the  German  when  he  fights  was  typical  of  the 
German's  striving  for  efficiency.  For  the  German  soldier  it 
was  his  strongest  weapon.  The  most  expert  marksman  could 
not  hit  a  target  he  could  not  see.  The  uniforms  were  a 
gray-green,  not  the  blue-gray  of  our  Southern  Confederates, 
but  the  gray  of  the  hour  just  before  daybreak,  the  gray  of 
unpolished  steel,  of  mist  among  green  trees. 

It  was  impossible  to  tell  in  a  large  square  whether  there 
was  a  regiment  or  a  brigade.  One  saw  only  a  fog  that  melted 
into  the  stones,  blended  with  ancient  house-fronts,  that 
^shifted  and  drifted,  but  left  you  nothing  at  which  you  could 
point.  As  the  army  passed  under  the  trees  of  the  Botanical 
Park,  it  merged  and  was  lost  against  green  leaves.  At  a 
hundred  yards  you  could  see  the  horses  on  which  the  uhlans 
rode,  but  could  not  see  the  men  who  rode  them.     The  de- 

10  Correspondent  of  The  New  York  TriMne,  who  personally  saw  the  Ger- 
mans' entry  and  whose  account  became  famous  at  the  time. 

300 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

tails  of  the  German  outfit  appealed  to  Mr.  Davis  as  most 
remarkable.  This  army  had  been  on  active  service  for  three 
weeks,  and  so  far  there  was  apparently  not  a  chin-strap,  not 
a  horseshoe,  missing.  The  infantry  came  on  in  files  of  five, 
two  hundred  men  to  each  company;  the  lancers  in  columns 
of  four,  with  not  a  pennant  missing.  The  quick-firing  guns 
and  field-pieces  were  one  hour  in  passing,  each  gun  with  its 
caisson  and  ammunition-wagon  taking  twenty  seconds  to 
do  so. 

Middle-aged  and  elderly  men  recalled  how  they  had  heard 
of  the  Prussians  entering  Paris  in  1871,  and  how  with  a 
show  of  arrogance,  born  of  armed  strength  and  weight  of 
numbers,  they  '  had  marched  up  the  Avenue  de  la  Grande 
Armee,  blithely  singing  their  songs,  underneath  Napoleon's 
monument,  the  Arc  de  Triomphe,  and  down  the  Champs 
Elysees  to  their  bivouac  in  the  Place  de  la  Concorde  and 
the  Jardins  des  Tuileries.  At  first  the  Kaiser's  army  ex- 
perienced in  Brussels  the  cold  comfort  of  deserted  streets, 
and  houses  still  as  the  grave,  but  toward  the  center  of  the 
city  crowds  ten  and  twelve  deep  gathered  on  the  pavements. 
In  stony  silence  they  watched  the  Germans  pass.  Children 
appeared  interested  in  the  spectacle ;  women  trembled  and 
whispered  beneath  their  breath ;  old  men,  and  men  too  young 
for  the  Belgian  colors,  stood  white  as  ghosts  and  speechless. 
The  German  troops  refrained  from  firing  on  the  populace, 
who  in  their  turn  accepted  with  loyalty  the  advice  of  their 
Burgomaster  not  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  soldiers. 
Some  500  men  occupied  the  Caserne  of  the  carabiniers  in 
the  Place  d'Ailly;  small  companies  took  possession  of  the 
railway  stations,  post-offices,  town  hall,  and  roads  leading 
to  and  from  the  city,  but  the  50,000  who  had  formed  the 
triumphal  procession  passed  out  of  Brussels  by  evening 
toward  the  south.  The  German  soldiers  behaved  as  they 
had  been  ordered  to  behave.  They  could  not  be  said  to  have 
outraged  ordinary  laws  of  war,  but  arrogance  and  lack  of 
tact  came  out  in  the  actions  of  officers  who  laughed  de- 
risively in  the  faces  of  defenseless  crowds,  and  mockingly 
tore  down  Belgian  flags  from  deserted  dwellings  and  ar- 
ranged them  over  the  hindquarters  of  their  chargers.  They 
ordered   hotels   and   cafes   to   be   thrown   open,   and   on   the 

301 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

terrasse  near  the  Gare  du  Nord  ate,  drank,  smoked,  and 
made  merry.  Some  mounted  stairs  in  different  hotels  in 
popular  quarters,  took  possession  of  rooms,  and  sat  smoking 
and  drinking  at  open  windows  or  on  balconies  far  into  the 
night. 

Under  cover  of  darkness  thousands  of  refugees  left 
Brussels,  many  of  them  walking  twenty  and  thirty  kilo- 
meters on  the  road  to  Alost,  Ghent,  and  Ostend.  Next  morn- 
ing it  was  impossible,  except  at  great  risk,  to  leave.  The 
enemy  commandeered  motor-cars,  but  many  cars  and  other 
conveyances  had  already  gone  with  as  many  of  the  Belgian 
wounded  as  could  safely  be  moved  from  hospitals.  Over 
their  coffee  and  cigars  officers  talked  of  their  military  inten- 
tions, paying  no  heed  to  waiters  or  such  members  of  the 
public  as  happened  to  be  near.  They  were  going  on  to 
Iffre  to-day,  Nivelle  to-morrow,  and  so  on  in  a  torrent  to 
France,  through  the  gap  between  Mons  and  Charleroi.  The 
troops  which  provided  this  imposing  spectacle  in  Brussels 
were  a  first  but  important  part  of  the  vast  army  that,  for 
fifteen  days,  the  Germans  had  been  forming  behind  the 
fighting  screen  and  which  was  destined  to  be  hurled  directly 
at  France.  The  officers  believed  that,  having  overcome  Bel- 
gian opposition,  they  had  only  to  take  the  line  of  least  re- 
sistance and  invade  the  country  of  their  hereditary  foes. 

Reginald  Wright  Kauffman,  the  American  novelist,  was  in 
Ostend.  during  the  night  of  the  day  that  the  German  army 
occupied  Brussels,  and  advanced  to  Ghent.  Only  a  few 
weeks  before  he  had  seen  Ostend,  as  "one  of  the  gayest  and 
most  fashionable  seaside  resorts  in-  the  world."  Set  in  the 
midst  of  a  countryside,  industrial  and  agricultural,  was  a 
city  of  pleasure,  with  a  winter  population  of  about  43,000, 
which  in  summer  became  875,000.  From  nine  in  the  morn- 
ing until  five  at  night  the  broad  beach  was  alive  with  laugh- 
ing men  and  pretty  women  in  bathing  suits.  A  week  of 
war  had  not  then  wiped  out  a  century  of  peace. 

But  late  in  August  he  found  the  city  ''still  overcrowded, 
but  not  with  merrj^makers ;  the  beach  still  alive,  but  not  with 
laughter."  Hotels  were  closed;  villas  shuttered;  bands 
silent;  idlers  gone,  and  feet  that  had  danced  had  fled. 
Where  the  gambler  clinked  his  coins  "there  now  rattled  the 

302 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

bones  of  poverty;  on  sands  where  lovers  whispered,  fear 
elbowed  fear;  trains  brought  soldiers;  roads  poured  in 
refugees,  and  boats  except  those  used  for  governmental  pur- 
poses, had  ceased  to  run."  With  its  holiday  guests  de- 
parted, its  industries  discontinued,  its  port  empty,  Ostend, 
the  garish,  had  become  a  "city  of  dreadful  night";  little 
better  than  it  was  in  1604,  when,  with  the  French  and  Eng- 
lish, as  now,  its  allies,  it  capitulated,  after  a  three-years' 
siege,  to  the  Genoese,  under  Ambrogio  di  Spinola. 

Ostend  is  at  least  as  old  as  the  eleventh  century.  It  was 
connected  by  a  canal  with  Bruges  in  1284  and  became 
prominent  in  the  sixteenth  century  as  the  last  stronghold 
of  the  Dutch  in  the  south.  After  repulsing  two  attacks  by 
the  Spaniards,  it  underwent  in  1601-1604  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  sieges  on  record,  during  which  the  States- 
Generals  were  assisted  by  the  English  and  French  and  other 
foes  of  Spain.  Most  of  the  town  was  laid  in  ruins  before  it 
surrendered.  As  Mr.  Kauffman  saw  it  crowded  with  Bel- 
gian people  in  that  late  August  day  of  1914,  he  wrote  :^^ 

"Picture  to  yourself  Atlantic  City  closed  in  mid-season — its 
gaiety  stopt  as  by  a  single  shot ;  its  visitors  fled  in  fright ;  all 
its  accustomed  life  brought  to  a  standstill,  sudden  and  complete. 
Imagine  the  bulk  of  its  male  citizens,  as  its  music  ceased  in  the 
middle  of  a  bar,  whisked  away  to  battle.  Imagine  military  rule  then 
as  suddenly  substituted  for  civil  law — the  banks  closed ;  food  prices 
mounting;  the  electric  cars  with  women  conductors,  and  old  men 
in  the  drivers'  places;  no  boats  in  the  inlet;  no  rolling  chairs,  no 
ponies,  no  bathers  in  view;  hotels  shut  up;  sentinels  at  the  cor- 
ners; Philadelphia  captured  by  an  advancing  enemy;  Camden  oc- 
cupied; a  line  of  flaming  battle  all  along  the  Pennsylvania  boun- 
dary to  New  York ;  and  the  enemy,  with  death  in  his  hands,  com- 
ing nearer — nearer — over  the  flatlands,  perhaps  through  the  water, 


now  and  then  visibly  through  the  clouds  of  the  air ! 

"Pour  into  that  Atlantic  City,  thus  disorganized,  stunned, 
panic-stricken,  three  times  its  accustomed  population,  in  the  shape 
of  all  the  country-folk  from  the  Delaware  River  on  the  west,  and 
from  nearby  towns  on  the  south  and  north.  Fill  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad  Station  with  them,  and  the  Reading;  crowd  them  along  all 
the  pavements  of  all  the  streets,  up  the  Boardwalk  and  down ;  toss 
them  on  to  the  beach — women,  children,  and  old  men,  some  wound- 

"  In  The  Saturday  Evening  Post,  Philadelphia. 

303 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

ed,  more  ill,  all  robbed  of  their  material  possessions,  and  many 
robbed  of  the  lives  of  those  they  loved  best  on  earth !  Do  this, 
and  you  have  Ostend  as  I  saw  it.  It  was  a  town  of  wandering  and 
frightened  ghosts — a  town  full  of  those  who  mourned  their  dead, 
and  themselves  expected  to  die  at  any  hour."^^* 

Ha  Principal  Sources :  The  New  York  Times,  The  London  Times,  The 
London  Morning  Post,  The  Literary  Digest,  The  London  Times'  "History  of 
the  "War,"  The  New  York  Tribune,  The  Saturday  Evening  Post  (Philadelphia), 
"Bulletins"  of  the  National  Geographic  Society,  a  dispatch  from  Richard 
Harding  Davis  to  The  New  York  Tribune. 


304 


V 

NAMUR  FALLS— AS  TO  MODERN  SIEGE  GUNS 
August  13,   1914— August  23,  1914 

WHILE  the  army  under  Kluek  was  thus  projecting  its 
right,  or  western  wing,  across  Belgium  by  way  of  Brus- 
sels, a  second  army  under  Biilow,  after  crossing  the  Meuse  at 
Huy,  was  moving  on  Namur  and  a  third  and  fourth,  under 
Hansen  and  the  Duke  of  Wiirtemberg,  were  penetrating  the 
Ardennes  country,  the  former  toward  Dinant  and  Givet, 
the  latter  toward  Mezieres.  Meanw^hile,  the  main  body  of 
the  Fifth  French  Army  was  moving  northward  bet\\^een  the 
Sambre  and  the  Meuse,  and  the  Belgians  were  strengthening 
their  small  garrison  at  Namur  till  it  numbered  about  26.000 
men.  Namur.  tho  a  smaller  town  than  Liege,  was  supposed 
as  a  fortress  to  be  quite  as  strong.  Tt  had  five  large  and 
four  smaller  forts  distributed  around  the  confluence  of  the 
Meuse  and  Sambre  By  August  13  it  had  barricaded  its 
streets  and  made  other  preparations  for  a  siege.  German 
aviators  were  already  soarin-g  above  its  forts.  All  eyes  were 
looking  eagerly  for  an  army  of  relief  from  France. 

On  August  17  a  bomb  fell  on  the  roof  of  the  railway 
station,  but  not  until  August  21  was  Namur  actually  placed 
under  siege.  Huge  guns  on  caterpillar  tractors  then  under- 
took the  work  and  next  day  the  city  fell.  At  that  time 
the  French  had  not  sufficiently  far  advanced  to  render  anv 
aid  to  Namur,  whose  fall  was  due  to  the  tremendous  fire  of 
siege  guns,  some  of  them  of  eleven-inch  caliber,  and  requir- 
ing teams  of  thirty-five  horses  to  move  them.  Thirty  bat- 
teries at  one  time  were  in  action  at  Namur,  with  one  or  two 
guns  to  a  battery.  The  howitzers  were  concentrated  simul- 
taneously on  the  forts,  which  they  smothered  with  fire.  Th^ 
inhabitants  had  hoped  until  August  13  that  the  Belgian 
army,  joined  by  French  and  English,  might  be  able  to  rout 
the  Germans  before  they  reached  Namur.    Meanwhile,  prepa- 

305 


ON  -THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

rations  had  been  -made  for  a  strong  resistance.  While  the 
people  were  thus  occupied  three  shells  burst  over  the  town. 
One  struck  a  bridge  on  which  were  onlookers  and  five  were 
killed.  From  that  moment  the  town  received  shells  every 
day.  On  August  15,  a  cannonade  at  Dinant  was  distinctly 
heard.  Here  the  Germans,  in  trying  to  force  a  passage 
over  the  Meuse,  were  repulsed  by  French  machine-guns. 
When,  on  August  18,  German  cavalry  were  seen,  it  was 
evident  that  Namur  was  being  surrounded.  On  August  20, 
the  besieged  lost  hope  of  any  decisive  battle  in  their  favor 
north  of  Namur,  and  news  had  come  of  the  occupation  of 
Brussels.  During  that  night,  a  cannonade  began.  On 
August  21  fighting  became  general  and  lasted  all  day.  The 
attacks  extended  over  a  line  of  ten  miles  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Meuse,  and  over  a  similar  line  on  the  right.  On 
August  23,  when  the  defenders  were  unable  longer  to  con- 
tinue heavy  artillery  fire,  Namur  was  evacuated. 

Like  Liege,  Namur  was  fortified  by  a  ring  of  detached 
forts  constructed  of  concrete,  armed  with  six-inch  guns  and 
howitzers  behind  armor-plated  turrets.  But  unlike  Liege,  it 
had  had  a  considerable  time  in  which  to  strengthen  its 
fortifications.  General  Michel,  who  commanded  its  garrison 
of  25,000  men,  had  closed  the  spaces  between  forts  with 
trenches,  covered  them  in  front  with  barbed  wire  and  further 
provided  them  with  mines  along  lines  of  approach.  Accord- 
ing to  him  it  was  the  German  28-centimeter  guns  that 
destroyed  these  defenses.  The  fire  was  so  continuous  that 
it  was  impossible  to  repair  the  damage  done  between  the 
forts  w^here  the  Germans  first  of  all  concentrated  their  fire. 
For  ten  hours  the  Belgian  infantry  bravely  bore  the  fire  of 
huge  shells,  supplemented  by  fire  from  a  multitude  of 
smaller  weapons,  to  which  they  could  practically  make  no 
reply.  After  the  majority  of  the  officers  had  been  killed 
a  ^'sauve  qui  pent*'  took  place,  and  the  demoralized  troops 
abandoned  their  positions,  leaving  a  large  gap  through  which 
the  Germans  could  advance. 

Nor  did  the  forts  on  which  the  Germans  next  turned  their 
fire  fare  better.  Their  old-fashioned,  feebJe  armament  was 
useless;  it  was  simply  snuffed  out.  One  of  the  forts, 
Maizeret,  fired  only  ten   shots  and  received  in  reply  1,200 

306 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

at  the  rate  of  twenty  a  minute.  At  Marchovellette  75 
men  were  killed  in  batteries.  The  bombardment  of  Suarlee 
began  on  Sunday  morning,  August  23,  and  the  fort  fell 
on  the  25th  at  five  in  the  afternoon.  Three  German 
batteries,  armed  with  a  28-centimeter  howitzer,  fired  600 
shells,  each  weighing  750  pounds,  on  the  23d,  1,300  on  the 
24th,  and  1,400  on  the  25th.  These  shells  destroyed  the 
whole  massive  structure  of  concrete  and  wrecked  all  the 
turrets.  Further  resistance  was  impossible.  The  forts  of 
Andoy  and  Cognelee  sufiPered  a  like  fate. 

The  number  of  28-centimeter  howitzers  employed  is  said 
to  have  been  32,  the  nearest  being  three  miles  from  their 
targets — a  range  at  which  Belgian  guns  could  do  no  damage 
even  if  they  had  been  able  to  identify  German  positions. 
The  German  troops  engaged  numbered  perhaps  four  army 
corps.  Their  fire  literally  swept  off  the  face  of  the  earth 
forts  and  improvised  defenses,  troops  and  guns.  For  four 
days  and  a  half  the  Belgians  withstood  the  attack  of 
Germans  ten  times  more  numerous  than  they  were.  At 
Namur  as  at  Liege,  and  afterward  at  Maubeuge,  some  of 
the  42-centimeter  guns  fired  from  a  distance  of  seven  and 
a  half  miles.  Large  guns  and  smaller  ones  poured  in  1,200 
shells  at  the  rate  of  twenty  a  minute.  One  fort  was  reduced 
to  fragments.  Position  inside  the  city  became  untenable. 
No  provision  had  been  made  for  a  retreat,  and  so  the 
evacuation  was  effected  in  disorder.  While  French  reinforce- 
ments were  still  expected  from  Dinant,  seventeen  miles  south 
of  Namur,  the  French  at  Dinant  had  now  suffered  defeat, 
and  could  send  only  two  regiments  to  aid  the  Belgians. 
These  fought  their  way  through  at  great  loss.  They  joined 
the  Belgians  only  when  the  latter  were  falling  back. 

The  failure  of  Namur  to  offer  a  more  protracted  resistance 
became  a  matter  of  surprize  to  the  world  outside.  It  was 
known  to  have  been  strongly  protected  by  modern  forts, 
and  these  during  three  weeks  had  been  further  strength- 
ened. Large  areas  had  been  mined,  the  field  for  firing  from 
the  forts  largely  cleared,  all  obstacles  in  the  way  of  guns 
blown  up  by  dynamite,  and  barbed  wire  obstructions  carry- 
ing electrical  currents  of  1,500  volts  covered  the  approaches. 
In  Namur  itself  immense  stores  of  ammunition  and  provi- 
so? 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

sions  had  been  accumulated.  It  was  confidently  anticipated 
that  the  siege  of  Namur  would  occupy  the  Germans  for 
weeks  and  its  capture  cost  them  at  least  50,000  men.  Instead 
of  that  it  fell  practically  at   the  first   attack. 

According  to  the  views  generally  held,  and  based  on 
accounts  given  by  members  of  the  garrison,  the  Namur 
general  staff  made  two  mistakes:  First,  they  let  the  enemy 
come  too  close  without  attacking  them,  and,  secondly,  waited 
too  long  for  the  help  they  expected  from  the  French,  who 
were  fully  occupied  elsewhere.  For  a  week  Belgian  forces 
on  one  bank  of  the  IMeuse  waited,  without  any  movement, 
for  Germans  on  the  other  bank  to  deliver  their  attack, 
happy  in  a  belief  that  every  day  thus  passed  was  a  day 
gained..  During  this  time  the  Germans  were  bringing  up 
slow-moving,  enormously  heavy  siege-artillery,  the  power  and 
even  the  existence  of  which  were  only  revealed  after  the 
outbreak  of  war.  Taught  by  their  losses  before  Liege,  the 
Germans,  instead  of  hurling  their  regiments  at  the  Namur 
forts,  preferred  at  Namur  to  wait  for  the  arrival  of  these 
big  guns,  the  movement  of  which,  and  of  the  main  German 
forces,  they  carefully  screened  by  a  curtain  of  cavalry. 

Under  cover  of  a  fog,  the  Germans  finally  got  their  siege- 
guns  into  position  at  two  points,  from  which  they  could 
concentrate  their  fire  on  a  single  sector  of  the  defenses. 
They  were  placed  at  a  minimum  distance  of  three  miles 
from  the  Belgian  trenches,  and  consequently  were  out  of 
range  of  Belgian  guns.  As  usual,'  the  Germans  had  been 
accurately  informed ;  a  German  officer  who  was  taken  pris- 
oner had  upon  his  person  photographs  of  the  Belgian 
trenches. 

The  line  of  retreat  of  the  Belgians  was  on  St.  Gerard, 
where  they  hoped  to  join  a  French  brigade,  and  ask  for 
reinforcements  from  Dinant.  Tramping  over  the  fields  with 
ranks  broken,  regiments  hopelessl}^  intermingled,  the  Belgians 
continued  their  retreat,  'pursued  and  harassed  until  they 
tumbled  into  the  path  of  the  French  in  retreat  from  Char- 
leroi.  It  was  not  till  they  got  to  Philippeville  that  the 
Belgian  troops  were  reformed.  Next  day  they  continued 
their  retreat,  by  way  of  Hirson,  Laon,  and  Amiens  to  Rouen, 
which   was   reached   after   a   march    of   seven   days.      From 

308 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Rouen  they  were  sent  to  Havre,  where  they  embarked  on 
boats  much  too  small  in  number,  and  after  an  uncomfortable 
voyage  of  thirty  hours  were  landed  on  their  own  shores  at 
Ostend.  The  Namur  garrison  and  the  troops  sent  to  occupy 
ground  between  the  forts  numbered  26,000  men.  Those 
who  afterward  returned  from  Rouen  and  Havre  to  Belgian 
soil  numbered  12,000  so  that,  including  the  sick  and  wounded 


BELGIANS  DIGGING  TRENCHES 


left   in  the   French   hospitals,    Namur   cost   Belgium   14,000 
men.-^" 

About  a  year  after  the  war  began,  the  Belgian  Govern-, 
ment  issued  a  history  of  events  as  they  affected  Belgians 
during  the  first  six  months,  which  contained  interesting 
statements  as  to  Liege  and  Namur.  Before  that  the  size 
of  the  Belgian  army  had  been  variously  estimated ;  now  it 
appeared  that  its  actual  strength  was  93,000  rifles,  6,000 
sabers,  324  guns,  and  102  mitrailleuses — fewer  than  100,000 
all  told.  The  division  that  assumed  the  mobile  defense  of 
Liege,  and  for  five  days  kept  in  check  the  Germans,  num- 

"  statement  of  a  survivor  made  to  a  Reuter  correspondent  at  Ostend. 

309 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

bered  18,500  infantry,  500  sabers,  and  60  guns,  with  24 
mitrailleuses.  After  this  division  rejoined  the  rest  of  the 
army,  the  forts  held  on  for  days  longer,  bombarding  Ger- 
mans who  passed  within  range,  until  the  latter  brought  up 
their  heavy  artillery  and  demolished  them,  one  after  the 
other,  with  280,  305,  and  420  shells.  Fort  Loncin  was  held 
for  eleven  days,  until  one  of  the  huge  420  shells  reduced 
it  to  ruins  by  blowing  up  the  magazine. 

This  account  explained  how  Namur  was  crusht  under  an 
avalanche  of  projectiles  of  unexpected  weight  and  power. 
The  Germans  did  not  bring  infantry  in  masses  to  the  attack 
on  Namur,  but  kept  them  to  repel  sorties  of  the  garrison, 
while  the  capture  of  the  city  was  effected  by  heavy  artillery. 
The  cannonade  at  Namur  could  be  heard  as  far  as  Antwerp. 
Andoj^  Maizeret,  Marchovelette,  Cognalee,  and  Dave  each 
received  big  shells  about  every  thirty  seconds.  Two  thou- 
sand were  fired  into  Maizeret.  Marchovelette  was  blown  up. 
Other  forts  became  little  more  than  ruins.  When  the  Ger- 
mans entered  on  August  24,  the  fort  of  Suarlee  continued 
in  action  until  smothered  with  1,300  shells.  At  the 
siege  of  Antwerp  roofs  and  cupolas  of  forts,  that  were 
proof  against  21-centimeter  guns,  cracked  under  the  shock 
of  the  first  shell  and  crumbled  under  the  second.  ^lodern  as 
they  were,  they  were  utterly  incapable  of  withstanding  the 
unforeseen  power  of  the  assault. 

Nothing  came  as  a  greater  surprize  in  the  early  weeks 
of  the  war  than  the  rapidity  with  which  modern  fortresses 
crumbled  away  under  shell-fire  from  German  siege-guns. 
The  capability  of  modern  forts  to  withstand  long  sieges  had 
been  judged  largely  from  the  six  months'  resistance  Port 
Arthur  gave  to  the  furious  attacks  of  General  Nogi's  army 
in  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  All  theories  based  on  that 
wonderful  struggle  had  now  to  be  revised.  The  defenses 
of  a  European  city  had  become  different  from  those  of 
Port  Arthur.  Forts  were  placed,  as  at  Antwerp,  at  intervals 
on  favored  ground,  about  ten  miles  away  from  the  town 
itself.  Each  formed  an  isolated  position.  An  enemy  could 
concentrate  the  fire  of  guns  on  one,  two,  or  three  of  them 
without  the  others  being  able  to  offer  assistance.  The 
Germans  at  Liege  and  Namur  used  heavier  howitzers  than 

310 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  Japanese  and  charged  them  with  far  more  deadly  explo- 
sives. Earthworks,  concrete  emplacements,  and  barracks 
simply  crumbled  away  under  the  hail  of  their  16-inch  shells. 
Once  the  outer  perimeter  of  a  defense  was  pierced  at  any 
given  point,  the  remainder  of  a  fort  was  isolated  as  at  Liege. 

Of  sixteen  French  forts  which  the  Germans  had  to 
encounter  in  the  Franco-Prussian  war,  only  three  were 
really  modern,  namely,  Metz,  Belfort,  and  Paris,  and  Metz 
held  out  for  ten  weeks,  Belfort  for  three  months  and  Paris, 
after  a  siege  of  four  months,  surrendered  only  when  starved 
out.  Even  old-fashioned  forts  offered  considerable  resistance; 
as  at  Verdun,  which  was  held  for  two  months,  and  Strass- 
burg,  which  stood  for  seven  weeks.  In  striking  contrast 
to  these  examples  were  the  results  achieved  in  the  World 
War.  From  experience  in  other  wars,  it  had  been  concluded 
that  a  really  modern  fortress  could  only  be  taken  by  infantry 
assault  under  cover  of  artillery.  But  at  Liege  where  the 
new  method  was  used  for  the  first  time,  the  German  flag 
was  flying  over  five  forts  in  six  days,  and  in  a  few  days 
more  the  entire  town  had  fallen  to  the  enemy.  Instead  of 
employing  a  large  number  of  small  projectiles,  there  was 
thrown  into  each  fort  a  shell  so  powerful  as  to  destroy  all 
the  guns  of  the  fort  at  one  blow.  Shells  were  thrown  by  a 
42-centimeter  mortar,  whose  bore  is  twice  as  large  as  that 
of  the  largest  caliber  gun  of  land-artillery.  It  was  argued 
that  such  a  weapon  would  have  to  be  enormously  effective 
to  justify  so  heavy  a  tax  on  transport  facilities.  Namur 
and    Liege    thoroughly    proved    the    value    of    these    guns. 

In  case  Paris  had  been  besieged,  these  howitzers  would 
undoubtedly  have  been  tried.  But  Paris  was  fortunate  in 
having  many  of  its  outer  forts  constructed  on  hills  rising 
500  and  even  600  feet  above  the  surrounding  plains,  and 
the  effectiveness  of  howitzer-guns  on  level  ground  against 
such  elevated  forts  was  not  known.  These  guns  were  Krupp 
howitzers  and  were  sometimes  confused  with  large  caliber 
naval  guns,  which  are  heavier  and  more  powerful.  For 
instance,  the  42-centimeter  (16i/o-inch)  German  howitzer 
was  not  comparable  with  a  British  15-in,ch  gun  as  mounted 
on  battleships.  It  was  often  asked  why,  if  Germany  em- 
ployed  a   161/2-inch  gun  in  the  field,   Great  Britain   should 

311 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

not  have  retaliated  by  using  her  13.5-inch  and  15-inch  guns. 
The  answer  was  tliat  the  large  calibers  which  the  Germans 
used  on  land  were  howitzers — short  weapons  which  cast 
heavy  projectiles,  but  with  comparatively  small  muzzle 
velocity.  They  were  heavy  weapons,  not  easily  transported 
on  land,'  and  only  with  difficulty  brought  into  position.  On 
the  other  hand,  naval  guns,  such  as  the  British  15-inch  and 
13.5-inch  guns,  while  of  somewhat  similar  diameter,  were 
weapons  which  measured  forty  or  fiftv  feet  in  length,  and 
possest  high  muzzle  velocity.  Added  to  this  was  their 
weight,  which  was  in  the  region  of  100  tons.  They  could 
not  be  transported  on  roads.  After  they  were  manufactured 
they  were  carried  by  rail  to  battleships  for  which  they  were 
intended,  and  hoisted  on  board  with  the  aid  of  powerful, 
specially  constructed  cranes. 

The  heavier  German  howitzers  were  principally  of  28- 
centimeter  (11-inch)  and  42-centimeter  (16V2-inch)  caliber. 
Particulars  of  the  11 -inch  howitzer  were  known,  but  the 
Germans  had  not  allowed  any  details  of  the  larger  weapon 
to  become  known.  As  regards  the  11-inch  siege-howitzer, 
despite  its  weight  of  ten  tons,  it  could  be  transported  over 
roads  by  means  of  a  specially  designed  motor-tractor.  Its 
carriage  had  wheels  of  a  peculiar  pattern,  which  permitted 
of  a  broad  surface  bearing  upon  the  road  at  any  moment. 
The  shell  fired  weighed  748  pounds,  and  the  muzzle  velocity 
was  1,133  feet  per  second.  When  in  action  the  total  weight 
of  the  howitzer,  with  girdles,  was  15  tons.  It  could  be 
elevated  to  65  degrees.  The  maximum  ranging  capacity  of 
the  11-inch  was  a  little  over  six  miles.  To  attain  this  range 
the  howitzer  was  elevated  to  45  degrees,  which  caused  the 
shell  in  its  flight  of  50  seconds  to  reach  a  height  of  9,000 
feet.  The  angle  of  descent  was  50  degrees,  and  the  striking 
energy  nearly  5,000  foot-tons. 

When  raised  to  its  maximum  elevation  of  65  degrees,  the 
range  of  the  howitzer  was  reduced  to  five  miles.  .  The 
altitude  that  could  be  reached  by  the  shell  was  nearly  equal 
to  the  height  of  IMont  Blanc  (15,781  feet),  and  it  took  over 
a  minute  to  accomplish  the  journey,  at  the  end  of  which  it 
had  a  striking  energy  of  nearly  6.000  tons.  Altho  no 
authoritative  figures  were  issued  concerning  the  mysterious 

312 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

16i/2-i"ch  howitzer,  considerations  made  it  possible  to  gage 
approximately  its  capabilities.  Assuming  that  it  did  not 
fire  at  a  lower  muzzle-velocity  than  1,000  feet  per  second, 
and  that  an  effect  comparably  larger  than  with  the  11-inch 
was  desired,  the  shell  which  it  fired  in  all  probability 
weighed  little  less  than  a  ton.  Such  a  powerful  weapon 
had  necessarily  great  weight,  which  was  in  the  neighborhood 
of  25  tons. 

Difficulties  of  transport  on  land  for  a  ponderous  weapon 
of  thi'^  character  were  great.     Motor-traction  had  to  be  em- 


AUSTRIAN  SEI(iK-(;rN  T^ED  UY  THE  GERMANS  T(J  REDUCE 
BELGIAN  AND  FRENCH  FORTRESSES 

ployed,  after  conveyance  by  rail  had  ceased.  When  horses 
were  employed,  the  draught  power  of  the  team  not  exceed- 
ing 1,000  pounds  per  horse,  convevance  of  a  mass  of  25  tons 
by  road  made  necessary  the  employment  of  61  horses.  From 
these  considerations  it  is  doubtful  whether  this  howitzer  had 
the  same  ranging  power  as  the  28-centimeter,  yet  there  was 
no  doubt  about  the  superiority  of  the  striking  power  of  its 
shell.  The  operations  of  these  siege-weapons,  therefore,  had 
their  limitations.  The  difficulties  of  moving  and  erecting 
them  were  so  great  that  it  was  only  when  they  were  in 
unassailable  positions  that  they  could  be  used  advantageously. 
Of  these  howitzers  nothing  was  heard  in  the  later  stages 


V.    1—20 


313 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

of  the  war,  the  only  places  where  they  were  used  being 
Liege  and  Namur.  The  172  pieces  required  twelve  railway 
wagons  for  their  transportation.  The  cement  emplacement 
for  the  huge  fabric  had  to  be  at  least  8  meters  deep.  The 
total  weight  of  a  mortar  was  about  30  tons;  to  this,  how- 
ever, should  be  added  the  weight  of  the  base,  which  was 
reckoned  at  between  37  and  38  tons.  The  actual  gun  was 
short,  a  characteristic  of  all  mortars.  The  shell,  standing 
upright,  was  3  feet  high.  To  lay  this  monster  gun  with 
accuracy  was  a  labor  of  five  or  six  hours  under  the  most 
favorable  circumstances.  The  concussion  from  the  firing  was 
so  terrible  that  the  250  men  who  formed  part  of  the  gun- 
team  was  provided  with  special  protective  shields  for  eyes, 
nose,  ears,  and  mouth.  The  cost  of  every  round  fired  was 
$2,500.     The  range  attained  at  Liege  was  nearly  14  miles. 

Contrary  to  general  opinion,  the  ''42"  was  not  employed 
in  the  bombardment  of  Antwerp.  The  heaviest  gun  used 
there  was  the  305-millimeter  gun,  of  the  1914  model,  first 
tried  in  January,  1914.  The  effect  of  its  fire  was  devas- 
tating; the  Belgian  forts  were  simply  blown  to  atoms.  This 
gun  was  used  against  Liege,  Namur,  and  IMaubeuge, 
and  proved  much  more  serviceable  than  the  "42,"  around 
which  popular  terror  spun  a  legend.  These  guns  could  be 
divided  into  sections  susceptible  of  motor  transport.  The 
motors  used  were  of  100  horsepower,  each  capable  of  drag- 
ging a  weight  of  thirty-five  metric  tons  at  the  rate  of  ten 
kilometers  an  hour.  The  caterpillar-wheels  of  these  motor- 
tractors  enabled  them  to  travel  over  ground  impassable  to 
ordinary  traffic.  This  comparative  mobility,  with  greater 
facility  in  handling  and  almost  equal  effectiveness  of  fire, 
constituted  the  superiority  of  the  305-millimeter  gun  over 
the  ''42"  mortar,  and  permitted  use  of  it  in  the  field. 

In  operations  to  the  north  and  southwest  of  Ypres  in 
November  the  Germans  encountered  a  new  weapon  which 
terrorized  their  rank  and  file  and  nonplused  their  generals. 
This  was  a  French  gun  that  razed  whole  forests,  so  that 
the  Germans  showed  no  disposition  to  intrench  themselves 
systematically  in  the  thick  woods  around  Ypres,  Lille,  and 
La  Bassee.  In  places  where  they  advanced  were  found 
corpses,  battered  and  mangled  by  fallen  trees  and  branches, 

314 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

and  lying  in  German  trenches.  So  terrific  was  the  work 
of  the  shells  that  over  a  score  of  the  5,000  prisoners  captured 
within  a  week  were  found  almost  insane.  The  Germans  had 
no  effective  counter-weapons  to  this  field-gun. 

Frequent  references  were  made  in  the  autumn  and  winter 
to  the  superiority  of  the  French  artillery  wnth  which  both 
the  Belgian  and  the  French  forces  were  armed.  These 
weapons  were  made  at  Le  Creusot,  whose  works  were  to' 
France  what  Krupp's  were  to  Germanv.  One  did  not  hear 
so  much  about  them,  but  the  high  quality  of  their  guns  was 
no  new  story.  It  had  been  generally  recognized  in  the 
Balkan  Wars  and,  before  that,  in  the  South  African  War. 
the  Boers  used  Creusot  guns,  and  the  superiority  of  their 
artillery  to  the  English  was  repeatedly  mentioned. 

Le  Creusot,  seldom  visited  and  little  known,  is  a  remark- 
able place.  Men  who  had  been  over  the  Knipp  works  at 
Essen  and  the  great  ordnance  factories  at  Sheffield.  Man- 
chester, and  Tyneside  in  England,  had  found  their  French 
counterpart  more  interesting.  Le  Creusot  is  an  ancient  town 
with  a  long  and  varied  industrial  history,  which  began  in 
1502  with  the  discovery  of  coal  on  a  farm  bearing  the  name 
of  Le  Creusot,  or  ''the  hollow."  This  farm  is  mentioned 
under  the  same  name  as  early  as  1253,  when  it  was  bought 
by  the  Duke  of  Burgundy  from  Henri  de  Monestoy.  Among 
Burgundian  hills  55  miles  west  of  Dijon,  the  works  lie 
stretched  out  at  the  bottom  of  a  hollow.  When  one  looks 
down  after  dark  from  above  on  the  great  furnaces  and 
forges,  the  vast  workshops  and  yards,  lit  up  w4th  arc-lamps 
and  an  occasional  blinding  glare  of  molten  steel  in  the 
casting,  all  seen  through  wreaths  of  steam  and  smoke  dark 
against  the  outline  of  the  hills  behind,  the  spectacle  is  as 
impressive  as  if  it  were  a  Titanic  caldron  glowing  with 
infernal  fires.  There  is  a  mingled  splendor  and  gloom,  a 
majesty  and  mystery  that  produce  an  incomparable  picture. 
The  establishment  is  not  so  extensive  as  Krupps,  or  as  the 
combined  works  of  the  great  Sheffield  firms ;  but  its  concen- 
tration, its  position  at  the  bottom  of  ''the  hollows,"  and 
its  isolation  among  the  hills  make  it  unique. 

These   works   were    created   by   the    industrial    genius    of 
three  generations  of  the  Schneider  family,  into  whose  posses- 

315 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

sion  Le  Creusot  passed  in  1836.  Iron-works  have  been 
associated  with  the  old  coal-mine  since  1782.  The  date  is 
almost  contemporary  with  the  starting  of  iron-works  in  Ger- 
many at  which  the  first  Krupp  learned  his  business.  During 
the  French  Revolution  the  Le  Creusot  works  were  comman- 
deered by  the  Government,  and  under  the  Empire  supplied 
Napoleon  with  artillery.  A  period  of  collapse  set  in  after 
1815,  and  continued,  in  spite  of  attempts  at  resuscitation, 
with  the  help  of  an  English  firm,  until  M.  Eugene  Schneider 
took  charge  in  1836.  That  period  saw  the  dawn  of  railway 
and  steam  navigation,  and  in  partnership  with  his  brother, 
M.  Adolphe  Schneider,  Eugene  seized  the  occasion  with  an 
energy  that  led  to  success.  In  1838  they  built  the  first  rail 
locomotive  produced  in  France,  and  rapidly  developed  the 
manufacture  of  locomotives  and  marine  and  other  steam- 
engines.  In  the  Crimean  War  they  supplied  a  large 
number  for  naval  purposes,  and  also  plates  for  ironclads. 
The  installation  at  Le  Creusot  included  all  the  processes 
from  the  reduction  of  ore  to  the  finished  articles.  The 
output  was  not  confined  to  artillery  or  other  munitions  of 
war,  but  embraced  civil  appliances  in  great  variety.  The 
principal  units  of  installation  in  1914  were:  Five  blast 
furnaces,  each  averaging  80  tons  a  day,  worked  in  conjunc- 
tion with  a  coke-battery  of  155  cells,  20  hot-blast  Cowper 
stoves,  30  gas-boilers,  and  six  horizontal  Corliss  engines; 
four  Siemens-Martin  steel  furnaces,  each  of  a  casting  ca- 
pacity of  35  tons,  two  Bessemer  converters  of  eight  tons' 
capacity,  a  steel  foundry  for  large  and  complicated  castings, 
with  forges  and  rolling  mills  en  suite,  including  an  armor- 
plate  mill;  three  foundries  for  machinery-castings  with  an 
output  of  10,000  tons,  forges,  boiler-shops,  and  machine- 
shops,  etc. ;  two  special  artillery-shops ;  a  testing  range, 
laboratories,  and  power-houses,  warehouses,  etc.  In  normal 
times  about  10,000  men  are  employed  at  Le  Creusot,  but  in 
times  of  pressure  12,000  or  more.  The  total  number  of  men 
employed  at  the  several  establishments  of  the  firm,  when 
in  full  work,  probably  approximated  20,000.^^ 

"  Principal  Sources :  G.  H.  Perris'  "Campaign  of  1914  in  France  and 
Belgium,"  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  The  London  Times'  "History  of  the 
War,"  Roger  Ingpen's  "The  Fighting  Retreat  to  Paris,"  The  Manchester 
Guardian,  The  Field-Artillery  Journal,  and  The  London  Standard. 

316 


VI 

DINANT,  TAMINES,  MALINES,  AERSCHOT, 

TEHMONDE   AND   MAUBEUGE 

August   15,    1914 — September   7,   1914 

AS  early  as  August  15,  1914,  there  had  been  an  engage- 
ment at  Dinant  on  the  upper  Meuse  beyond  Namur,  in 
which  the  troops  on  either  side  were  said  to  number  about 
3,000.  The  noise  made  by  big  German  guns  was  described  as 
''tremendous."  At  the  hottest  moments,  the  roar  "kept 
changing  curiously  and  horribly  and  then  slackening  its 
pace."  Sometimes  deafening  volleys  '''sounded  like  the 
clattering  of  a  clumsy,  lumbering  wagon,  jolting  heavily 
over  the  ruts  of  a  badly  made  country  lane ;  sometimes  like 
the  brisk  hammering  of  thousands  of  hammers  on  wood, 
regular  and  spasmodic,  and  then  regular  and  relentless ;  some- 
times like  the  roar  of  hundreds  of  heavy  freight-trains  thun- 
dering and  bumping  along,  only  to  meet  in  hideous  collision." 
The  battle  of  Dinant,  tho  inconsiderable,  compared 
with  many  that  were  yet  to  be  fought,  had  special  interest 
because  it  was  the  first  collision  on  the  Northern  Front 
between  French  and  German  troops.  It  occurred  nearly  a 
week  before  their  meeting  at  Charleroi.  Altho  Dinant  was 
bombarded,  it  suffered  little.  Only  a  few  houses  afterward 
bore  signs  of  fighting,  but  the  attack  lasted  thirteen  hours. 
On  the  following  day  the  French  retired  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  Meuse,  where  they  remained  until  the  order  was  given 
for  a  general  retreat.  IMasses  of  German  troops  then  arrived, 
and  over  2;000  Belgians,  including  old  men  of  75  and 
boys  of  12  and  14,  fathers  and  sons,  were  driven  to  the 
Place  d'Armes,  where  bombs  were  used  in  setting  fire  to 
houses.  Saint  Medard,  between  the  station  and  the  bridge, 
was  wiped  out  and  the  Place  de  la  Meuse,  except  for  one 
or  two  houses,  a  restaurant  and  a  few  other  garrison  build- 

317 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

ings,  a  barracks  and  a  communal  school  in  which  the  German 
garrison  was  lodged,  was  destroyed. 

Nearly  four  months  after  the  siege,  the  Telegraf  of 
Amsterdam  published  details  of  the  destruction  done  at 
Dinant,  written  by  a  Dutchman  who  had  been  there  since 
the  war  began.  According  to  him,  the  Germans,  on  entering 
the  town,  seized  153  burghers  and  during  the  next  few  days 
killed  in  Dinant  and  in  the  villages  of  Anseremme,  Leffe, 
and  Neffe  over  800  persons,  all  citizens,  including  women 
and  children.  The  reason  given  for  these  acts  was  that  the 
civil  population  had  fired  on  them.     The  Dutchman  denied 


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THE  FORTRESS  OF  DINANT,  IN  BELGIUM,  ON  THE  MEUSE 

that  people  of  the  town  had  fired  on  the  Germans,  saying 
French  soldiers  had  fired  on  them  from  the  other  side  of 
the  river.  Describing  the  slaughter  that  took  place  in  the 
Place  d'Armes,  the  man  said  the  women  were  separated 
from  the  men,  the  latter  placed  on  one  side  of  the  little 
square  and  the  women  and  children  on  the  other.  The 
firing  party  was  placed  between  them  and  then  ordered  to 
shoot.     His  detailed  account  proceeds: 

*' After  a  scene  of  heartrending  agony,  during  which  the  women 
and  children  knelt  before  the  officers,  153  victims  fell  writhing  in 


318 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

• 

a  welter  of  blood.  Two  men  who  fell  unhurt  and  four  others  who 
were  slightly  wounded  pretended  to  be  dead.  The  officer  said: — 
'Those  able  to  rise  must  stand  as  the  soldiers  will  not  fire  again.' 
The  six  men  mentioned  rose.  The  officer  ordered  another  volley 
and  the  men  fell.  The  officer  then  ordered  the  machine  gunners 
to  fire  for  some  time  on  the  bodies.  The  women  and  children  were 
present  all  this  time  and  were  rendered  distracted  by  grief  and 
terror.  The  officer  was  unmoved  and  said  in  bad  French,  'Mes- 
dames,  I've  done  my  duty.' 

^^  Meanwhile  the  pillaging  of  the  town  had  begun.  The  Germans 
possest  most  modern  implements  and  appliances  for  opening  safes, 
and  they  employed  also  chemical  means  for  that  purpose.  A 
banker  and  his  son  who  refused  to  say  where  the  safes  were  were 
shot.  The  plundering  did  not  cease  with  houses — men  in  the 
streets  were  searched  for  money. 

'^M,  Poncelet,  one  of  the  most  respected  merchants  in  Dinant, 
fled  with  his  wife  and  six  children.  They  were  overtaken.  An  officer 
ordered  him  to  be  shot,  and  on  a  soldier  refusing  to  shoot,  the 
officer  shot  Poncelet  with  his  revolver.  M.  Himers  was  killed  in 
similar  circumstances  at  Neffe  under  the  eyes  of  his  wife.  He 
was  the  owner  of  a  factory  and  Consul  of  the  Argentine  Republic. 
His  wife  offered  the  officer  a  million  of  francs  to  spare  her  hus- 
band, but  it  was  refused. 

^^  Other  atrocities  are  related.  The  soldiers  who  committed  them 
were  replaced  later  by  the  First  Landsturm  Infantry  Battalion  of 
Dresden  under  Commandant  Beeger,  and  a  period  of  relative  tran- 
quility ensued.  Permission  to  reinter  the  bodies  w^as  obtained 
and  tiiey  were  all  identified.  The  narrator  made  a  list  of  800.  Of 
1,500  houses  only  300  are  standing." 

Tamines,  a  rich  and  populous  village  on  the  Sambre 
between  Charleroi  and  Namur,  was  occupied  on  August 
17-19  by  detachments  of  French  troops.  On  the  20th,  a 
German  patrol  appeared  before  Vilaines,  a  smaller  place 
nearby,  and  several  uhlans  were  killed  by  the  fire  of  French 
soldiers  and  a  party  of  civic  -guards  from  Charleroi.  This 
was  the  supposed  origin  of  a  massacre  at  Tamines  which 
took  place  on  the  following  day  when  the  village  was  occu- 
pied by  the  Germans,  the  French  having  retired.  Houses 
were  sacked  and  set  on  fire,  most  of  the  inhabitants  arrested, 
and  a  good  many  burned  to  death  or  suffocated  in  the  264 
houses  that  were  set  on  fire.     An  eye-witness  wrote: 

**0n  the  evening  of  Saturday,  August  22,  a  group  of  between 
400  and  450  men  was  collected  in  front  of  the  church,  not  far  from 

319 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

the  bank  of  the  Sambre.  A  German  detachment  opened  fire  on 
them;  but,  as  the  shooting  was  a  sh)w  business,  the  officers  ordered 
up  a  machine-gun,  which  soon  swept  off  all  the  unhappy  peasants 
still  left  standing.  Many  of  them  were  only  wounded,  and,  hoping 
to  save  their  lives,  got  with  difficulty  on  their  feet  again.  They 
were  immediately  shot  down.  Many  wounded  still  lay  among  the 
corpses.  Groans  of  pain  and  cries  for  help  were  heard  from  the 
bleeding  heap.  On  several  occasions,  soldiers  walked  up  to  such 
unhappy  individuals  and  stopt  their  groans  with  a  bayonet  thrust. 
At  night,  some  who  still  survived  succeeded  in  crawling  away. 
Others  put  an  end  to  their  own  pain  by  rolling  themselves  into  the 
neighboring  river.    About  100  bodies  were  found  in  the  river." 

Next  day  another  party  of  villagers  were  compelled  to 
dig  trenches  for  the  burial  of  the  b.odies,  while  soldiers 
with  fixt  bayonets  stood  over  them.  Fathers  thus  buried 
their  sons,  and  sons  their  fathers.  Women  watched  while 
German  officers  were  drinking  champagne.  The  number  of 
victims  at  Tamines  was  placed  at  over  650.  Survivors  posi- 
tively asserted  that  none  of  the  inhabitants  had  fired  on 
the  Germans. 

Malines  met  its  fate  not  long  afterward.  Malines — or 
Mechlin,  as  it  was  formerly  known  to  the  English,  and 
especially  to  ladies  who  had  bought  Mechlin  lace — was  a 
town  of  great  antiquity,  of  much  charm  and  beauty  and 
the  capital  of  Belgium  before  Brussels  was.  An  unde- 
fended town,  it  was  several  times  bombarded,  first  on 
August  27,  when  the  Belgian  army  lay  between  Willebroeck 
and  Termonde.  The  town  hall  was  reduced  to  ruins,  the 
roof  of  the  Cathedral  of  St.  Rombaut  broken  up,  large  holes 
knocked  in  the  walls  of  one  side,  and  stained  glass  shattered. 
The  population  almost  immediately  left.  Shops  were  barri- 
caded, and  upon  Malines.  silence  fell.  At  the  second  bom- 
bardment damage  yet  more  serious  was  inflicted.  Shells 
fell  upon  the  church  of  Notre-Dame,  but  care  had  been 
taken  to  remove  a. famous  Rubens  to  a  place  of  safety.  On 
September  2,  Malines  was  a  third  time  bombarded  for  two 
hours.  Nearly  100  shrapnel  shells  were  exploded  in  the 
town.      Guns   knocked    the    bells    of   Notre-Dame    to   pieces. 

Early  in  September  news  came  of  attempts  on  Aerschot 
and  Alost.     Aerschot  lies  a  few  miles  north  of  Louvain,  on 

320 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

the  line  from  Antwerp  to  Maastricht  and  Aix-la-Chapelle. 
It  had  a  Gothic  Church,  St.  Sulpice,  chiefly  remarkable  for 
a  carved  rood-loft  and  choir-stalls,  of  fifteenth  century  work. 
In  Aerschot,  as  elsewhere,  houses  were  burned.  The  burgo- 
master, his  son,  and  brother  were  shot  in  the  presence  of 
inhabitants.  Over  forty  others  were  killed.  Full  details 
of  Tirlemont,  Louvain,  and  Malines  were  printed  in  con- 
temporary dispatches,  but  far  less  of  Termonde,  whose 
destruction    came    later — later    in    fact    than    the    battle    of 


MALINES.   AFTER  THE  GERMAN  BOMBARDMENT, 

But  with  the  Cathedral  still   standing.     This  picture  was  published  in   the 
Hamburger  Nachrichten  with  the  descriptive  line.   "Malines.  devastated  by 

the  Belgians" 

Mons  and  Charleroi;  later  than  the  German  drive  on  Paris, 
so  that  interest  by  that  time  was  centered  elsewhere.  Ter- 
monde was  only  a  community  of  12,000  inhabitants,  but  as 
pretty  and  quaint  a  town  as  any  province  of  Flanders  could 
boast.  It  was  a  prosperous  center  of  rope  and  cordage 
manufacturers,  with  1,500  houses,  and  a  barracks,  two  public 
statues,  a  town  hall,  five  churches,  an  orphan  asylum,  and 
a  convent.  One  of  the  churches  still  stood  after  the  city's 
destruction  by  the  Germans,  as  well  as  buildings  where 
officers  were  quartered,   and  perhaps   a   dozen  others.     The 

321 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

rest  of  the  town  was  blotted  out — not  as  the  hot-tempered, 
impetuous  work  of  uhlans,  nor  was  any  fire  started  in  anger 
and  driven  by  wind  through  the  town.  There  was  not  a 
breath  of  wind,  the  night  being  calm.  Ho^e  and  there  a 
single  house,  even  houses  built  of  boards,  were  spared  at 
the  commander's  words,  but  others  were  drenched  with 
naphtha  from  garret  to  cellar  and  then  fired.  When  the 
work  was  over,  hundreds  of  gallons  of  naphtha  no  longer 
needed  for  the  work  were  tossed  into  the  Scheldt. 

Termonde  is  situated  twenty-ones  miles  southeast  of  Ghent, 
at  the  southwest  corner  of  a  square  formed  by  Louvain  and 
Termonde  on  the  south,  by  Ghent  and  Antwerp  on  the  north. 
It  controls  a  bridge  over  the  River  Scheldt,  and  so  was  an 
important  approach  to  Antwerp.  Heavy  German  siege-guns, 
capable  of  demolishing  a  first-class  fort  at  a  range  of  several 
miles,  could  not  have  crossed  the  river  easily  at  any  other 
point.  For  this  reason,  the  Germans,  wanting  Antwerp,  wanted 
Termonde.  After  its  destruction  one  could  wander  for  an 
hour  through  the  silence  of  ashes  and  stone — stumbling  occa- 
sionally over  timber  or  debris,  tangled  wire,  a  fallen  statue, 
or  the  crosspiece  of  a  spire.  One  saw  what  had  been  a 
convent ;  one  walked  over  charred  beds  from  an  orphan 
asylum,  or  went  through  narrow  alleys  that  reminded  him 
of  Naples,  where  walls  still  stood  so  close  as  to  hide  the  sun. 
Perhaps  a  cat  would  jump  across  the  street  and  for  a 
moment  break  the  solitude.  Not  far  away  the  road  widened 
and  before  one  stood  a  wooden  cross  above  a  heap  of  cobble- 
stones. Termonde,  tho  an  open  town  in  1914,  was  bom- 
barded and  captured  despite  the  fact  that  the  surrounding 
country  had  been  flooded.  A  good  many  buildings  were 
destroyed  by  shells.  The  suburb  of  St.  Gilles  was  wiped 
out.  On  the  entry  of  the  invading  troops,  the  town  was 
sacked  and  the  bridges  were  blown  up.  Villages  around 
Termonde  suffered  a  similar  fate.  Heavy  guns  were  turned 
on  houses,  and  by  the  evening  of  September  6  not  a  house 
stood  whole ;  the  place  had  become  practically  a  smoldering 
ruin.  Some  days  afterward  it  was  again  bombarded,  and 
the  town  hall  shared  the  common  fate.  A  famous  peal  of 
bells  was  brought  down,  the  interior  of  the  building  gutted, 
and  paintings  and  other  art  treasures  destroyed. 

322 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

A  little  force  of  6,000  men  had  made  a  gallant  defense, 
but  the  enemy  outnumbered  them.  The  Belgians  were  un- 
able to  reply  effectively  to  the  deadly  fire  of  siege-guns. 
From  early  morning  until  9  the  rain  of  shells  was  inces- 
sant. The  Germans  set  the  town  on  fire  after  entering  it. 
Throughout  the  morning  dense  clouds  of  smoke  overhung  it. 
Not  three  miles  away  peasants  were  still  working  in  their 
gardens,  sometimes  turning  to  watch  the  smoke.  Only  chil- 
dren seemed  afraid;  they  ran  away  and  hid  themselves. 
Termonde  had  some  4,000  houses.  Of  these  less  than  100 
afterward  stood  intact.  Utter  was  the  desolation,  not 
brought  about  by  accidental  conflagration,  or  by  bombard- 
ment in  the  course  of  war,  but  by  house-to-house  visitations 
to  a  surrendered  and  helpless  town.  Troops  went  through 
street  after  street  firing  each  building  separately.  Many 
doors  were  found  open,  but  when  they  were  not,  were 
forced.  Interiors  on  lower  floors  were  sprayed  with  com- 
bustible liquids  from  syringes  or  pumps,  and  the  houses  then 
set  on  fire.  The  destruction  was  absolute.  Even  where 
fragments  of  walls  remained  they  were  useless  for  purposes 
of  rebuilding.  Termonde  was  simply  like  Troy;  it  was  not. 
Only  three  buildings  of  importance  were  spared.  First, 
was  the  town  hall,  which  had  been  ransacked,  every  drawer 
searched,  the  safe  forced,  and  the  cash-boxes  emptied,  the 
building  and  pictures  which  it  contained,  some  of  them  of 
considerable  value,  being  spared.  The  two  others  were  the 
church  of  Notre-Dame,  and  the  Museum  which  were  left 
intact.  Other  buildings  spared  w^ere  either  in  the  quarter 
occupied  by  the  very  poor,  or  were  small  provision  shops 
and  cabarets.  The  beautiful  Catholic  Cathedral,  with  paint- 
ings by  Rubens  and  Van  Dyck,  towered  untouched  above 
the  ruins.  Up  and  down  the  street  one  gazed  on  blackened 
pieces  of  brickwork  which  once  were  houses.  Here  and 
there  perhaps  half  a  house  would  be  found  standing  upright ; 
elsewhere  masses  of  brick  were  strewn  across  streets.  Out- 
side the  town  a  large  mound  marked  the  last  resting-place 
of  citizens  who  had  been  burned  to  death.  For  two  days 
Belgian  soldiers  were  engaged  in  searching  for  the  remains 
of  their  countrymen.  In  ruins  were  found  gasoline-bombs 
that  had  been  thrown  into  houses. 

323 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

Horace  Green/^  met  there  Henri  Verhagen,  a  tall,  gray 
alderman  of  Termoncle,  not  at  all  bitter,  but  quite  calm  as 
he  was  standing  at  a  mound  in  Termonde  where  Belgian 
soldiers  were  buried.  He  pointed  to  a  pile  of  bricks  which 
represented  the  house  where  he  had  lived.  In  two  nights  he 
had  lost  his  son  and  340,000  francs — his  factory  and  his 
home.  Another  alderman,  a  friend  of  Verhagen,  who  was 
allowed  to  remain  in  Termonde  most  of  the  four  days  that 
the  Germans  stayed,  wrote  an  account  in  a  pocket  diary. 
He  was  just  leaving  his  rope-  and  twine-factory  on  Septem- 
ber 3  when  he  heard  sounds  of  musketry  from  the  south, 
where  a  small  force  of  Belgian  outposts  had  been  completely 
surprized  by  a  part  of  the  Ninth  German  Army  Corps  under 
General  von  Bohm.  Tho  outclassed,  the  Belgians  let  the 
enemy  have  a  couple  of  volleys  before  retreating.  In  the 
return  fire  they  lost  six  men. 

Nothing  happened  after  dark,  but  the  next  morning  at 
nine  o'clock  the  cannonading  began.  Inside  of  half  an  hour, 
uhlans  and  infantry  entered  the  town  simultaneously  by 
three  different  roads.  The  burgomaster  was  ordered  imme- 
diately to  provide  rations  for  the  regiment.  Being  absent, 
he  was  allowed  twelve  hours  in  which  to  return,  and  when 
he  did  not  return  the  burning  began.  Four  uhlans  entered 
his  house,  helped  themselves  to  his  cellar,  drank  a  toast  to 
his  wife,  put  his  chairs  in  the  street,  sat  down  outside  and 
played  with  his  phonograph.  They  said  they  were  sorry, 
but  the  house  must  be  burned.  Before  pouring  on  the 
naphtha  and  lighting  the  flame  they  freed  .his  canary  bird. 

Contemporary  with  the  burning  of  Termonde  was  the  fall 
of  Maubeuge,  on  the  frontier  of  France.  When  the  Germans 
were  in  retreat  from  the  Marne,  word  came  that  this  fortress, 
after  having  been  for  twelve  days  under  fire,  had  fallen.  In 
the  advance  on  Paris,  Maubeuge  had  been  left  behind.  It 
lies  thirteen  miles  south  of  Mons.  Its  investment  was  .not 
begun  until  August  26,  the  first  shell  falling  on  the  27th. 
Forts  de  Boussols,  de  Essarts,  and  de  Cerfontaine  were 
completely  destroyed  by  heavy  siege  artillery  within  a  few 
days.      The   town   suffered   severely   from   the   bombardment 

"  Correspondent  of  The  New  York  Evening  Post. 

324 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

which  was  continued  with  violence,  over  1,000  shells  falling 
in  a  single  night.  The  loss  of  life  was  comparatively  small. 
At  noon,  on  September  7,  the  white  flag  was  hoisted  over 
the  church  tower  and  trumpets  sounded  "Cease  firing." 

The  fall  of  Maubeuge  was  important  to  the  Germans,  as 
it  released  a  considerable  force  for  action  near  Paris  and 
gave  them  a  strongly  fortified  position  on  the  Franco-Belgian 
frontier  which  might  be  useful  in  dividing  the  Allied  forces. 
It  also  removed  a  menace  to  their  line  of  communication 
through  Belgium,  Luxemburg,  and  the  north  of  France.  It 
lies  on  the  main  highway  from  Mons  and  southern  Belgium 
to  central  France.  The  railroad  from  Paris  to  Namur, 
Brussels,  and  Cologne  passes  through  it.^^ 

1^  Principal  Sources  :  The  Amsterdam  Telegraaf,  G.  H.  Perris'  "Campaign 
of  1914  in  France  and  Belgium,"  Baedeker's  "Holland  and  Germany,"  Tbe 
London  Times,  The  New  York  Sun,  The  London  Daily  Mail,  The  London  Daily 
Express,  The  London  Daily  Chronicle,  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  "Bul- 
letins" of  the  National  Geographic  Society. 


325 


VII 

ZEPPELIN  BOMBS  ON  ANTWERP— THE  SIEGE, 
FALL  AND  EXODUS 

August   25,   1914— October   15,    1914 

AFTER  the  fall  of  Liege,  Brussels,  being  unfortified,  be- 
came no  longer  safe  as  the  seat  of  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment, which  in  consequence  was  removed  to  Antwerp,  whose 
fortifications  were  regarded  as  among  the  strongest  in  Europe. 
Tourists  who  had  been  in  Antwerp  in  June  had  seen  a 
settled,  comfortable,  and  decorous  city,  full  of  ease  and 
prosperous  business,  and  with  every  sign  of  long-enduring 
peace.  Antwerp  had  had  stirring  episodes  in  the  past, 
chief  among  them  the  sack  and  massacre  of  1576,  which  was 
called  "the  Spanish  fury."  In  1648  the  Treaty  of  Munster 
closed  her  great  river,  the  Scheldt,  and  so  broke  her  pros- 
perity; but  in  1914,  after  changing  fortunes,  she  had  so 
prospered  as  to  bear  no  signs  of  her  unhappy  past.  In  the 
seventeenth  century,  a  Venetian  envoy  reported  that  more 
business  was  done  at  the  wharves  of  Antwerp  in  a  fortnight 
than  in  Venice  during  a  whole  year.  Within  forty  recent 
years  the  city  had  acquired  real  commercial  preeminence. 
With  a  population  of  between  300,000  and  400,000,  and  an 
annual  trade  of  more  than  $500,000,000,  she  had  become  by 
1914  one  of  the  largest  and  richest  ports  in  the  world. 
With  her  broad  streets  and  handsome  buildings,  above  which 
towered  the  delicate  spire  of  her  cathedral,  she  was  one  of 
the  comeliest  of  cities.  Museums,  libraries,  halls,  and  public 
buildings  testified  to  her  wealth  and  her  great  variety  of 
interests.  If  one  had  been  asked  to  name  a  city  which  was 
a  shrine  of  peace  and  a  citadel  of  that  bourgeoise  civiliza- 
tion 'which  it  was  fondly  hoped  had  made  war  impossible, 
the  odds  are  that  Antwerp  would  have  been   chosen. 

On  the  night  of  August  24  a  Zeppelin  dropt  eight  bombs 
on  Antwerp,  killing  ten  civilians,  four  of  whom  were  women, 
wounding  eight  others,  and  damaging  many  buildings.   Much 

.326 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

indignation  was  exprest  over  this  slaughter  of  non-com- 
batants in  their  sleep.  The  Belgian  Government  sought  to 
make  it  an  international  issue,  as  a  violation  of  Article 
XXVI  of  the  Fourth  Convention  of  The  Hague.  That 
article  provides  that  'Hhe  officer  in  command  of  an  attack- 
ing force  must,  before  commencing  a  bombardment,  except 
in  cases  of  assault,  do  all  in  his  power  to  warn  the  authori- 
ties." The  New  York  Staats-Zeitung  maintained  that  Ameri- 
can newspapers  had  no  right  to  ''join  in  a  hypocritical  cry 
of  protest."  If  bombs  had  been  falling  on  Berlin  or  Strass- 
burg,  instead  of  on  Antwerp,  ''the  matter  would  have 
been  dismissed  with  .the  statement  that  such  is  war."  An 
eye-witness  of  the  attack  described  it: 

^'I  have  just  lived  through  the  most  tragic  night  of  the  war. 
For  the  first  time  in  history  a  great  civilized  community  has  been 
bombarded  from  the  sky.  I  was  awakened  at  one  o'clock  this 
morning  by  a  frightful  cannonade.  A  Zeppelin  had  been  sighted 
about  700  feet  above  the  town.  J  at  once  went  out  into  the  streets 
and  for  eleven  hours — from  one  hour  after  midnight  until  noon — 
I  have  scarcely  left  the  scene  of  the  catastrophe.  I  have  explored 
every  one  of  the  devastated  streets.  So  far  I  have  found  ten 
bombs  in  ten  different  streets.  In  my  calculation  there  are  about 
900  houses  slightly  damaged  and  about  60  houses  nearly  destroyed. 
The  number  of  victims  is  unknown.  In  a  single  house  I  found 
four  dead.  One  room  was  a  chamber  of  horrors,  the  remains  of  the 
mangled  bodies  being  scattered  in  every  direction.  In  the  house 
opposite  a  husband  and  wife,  whose  only  son  had  just  died  in 
battle,  were  killed — a  whole  family  wiped  out.  The  Place  du  Poids 
Public,  where  the  tragedy  happened,  surpasses  in  horror  anything: 
I  ever  saw.  ^he  Zeppelin  bombs  were  all  aimed  at  public  build- 
ings, at  barracks,  at  Government  offices,  and  especially  at  the  royal 
palace.  I  received  from  the  King's  secretary  two  fragments  of  a 
bomb  that  had  been  found  a  few  yards  from  the  palace.  When 
the  Zeppelin  appeared  it  threw  searchlights  over  the  city.  Almost 
immediatelv  there  followed  an  explosion  which  was  repeated  thrice. 
Then  the  Scheldt  forts  and  guards  started  a  heavy  fire,  but  the 
bomb-throwins:  continued.  The  towns-people  were  alarmed  and 
rushed  into  the  streets  in  their  night  clothes.  Most  of  them 
thoudit  that  the  siege  had  begun.  The  dropping  of  bombs  lasted 
about  twenty  minutes.  The  barracks  of  the  Fifth  Regiment  were 
damaged,  as  well  as  other  barracks  and  the  military  hospital. 

327 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

''The  first  doctor  to  arrive  on  the  scene  was  Major  Louis  Living- 
ston Seaman  of  ilie  American  Red  Cross.  Dr.  Seaman  has  been 
attending  the  wounded.  He  says  that,  in  all  his  eight  campaigns, 
of  which  one  was  against  the  boxers  in  China,  he  has  never  seen 
an  act  of  war  so  ruthless  and  so  horrible  as  the  sight  of  three 
young  girls  mutilated  by  the  bombs  and  of  a  dead  young  mother — 
all  attacked  in  their  beds  at  night. 

''One  of  the  houses  w^recked  w^as  situated  only  300  yards  from 
the  palace  of  King  Albert.  Seven  persons  were  killed  and  six 
seriously  injured.  Some  other  houses  were  half  demolished  by 
the  falling  bombs.  The  Zeppelins  apparently  took  advantage 
of  its  being  a  very  dark  night  and  therefore  suited  for  a  sudden 
raid.  One  bomb  fell  in  the  Rue  des  Navets  and  made  a  hole  six 
feet  six  inches  in  diameter  and  twentj^-two  inches  deep.  It  was 
probably  filled  wdth  shot.  All  the  houses  in  the  neighborhood  were 
struck  by  bullets.  It  appeared  as  tho  a  battle  had  taken  place. 
All  doors  and  windows  nearby  were  broken;  ceilings  fell  in,  and 
the  streets  were  covered  with  dust  half  an  inch  thick  Three 
men  were  Avalking  through  the  Rue  de  la  Corne  when  a  bomb 
fell.  One  of  them  was  killed  and  the  other  two  men  w^ere  mortally 
wounded.  Another  passerby  had  a  leg  blown  off.  A  terrible  panic 
prevailed,  the  people  rushing  into  the  street,  shouting  and  weep- 
ing and  begging  for  assistance.  A  married  couple  who  were  sit- 
ting at  a  window  were  both  killed.  The  woman  's  head  was  torn 
off.  Several  other  persons  in  this  house  were  injured.  In  another 
street  a  doctor's  servant  was  killed." 

A  Zeppelin  appeared  again  over  Antwerp  on  September  2. 
Since  the  first  attack,  the  Germans  had  been  active  in  many 
places  elsewhere  in  Belgium,  had  threatened  the  line  from 
Termonde  to  Alost,  had  burned  several  villages,  and  Malines 
for  the  fourth  time  had  been  bombarded.  Compared  with  the 
first  visit,  the  second  was  insignificant.  The  Belgian  artil- 
lery was  better  prepared  for  it.  Major  Louis  L.  Seaman,  in 
his  account  ^^  of  the  first  attack,  described  other  conditions  in 
Belgium : 

"Fragments  of  the  bombs  proved  that  their  weight  must  have 
been  150  kilograms  (about  330  pounds).  They  were  undoubtedly 
suspended  from  the  Zeppelin  ready  to  be*  dropt  when  the  airship 
was  in  position.  A  leg  of  one  of- the  victims  was  blown-off ;  slivers 
of  the  shell  perforated  coins  in  his  pocket  and  blew  them  into  his 

16  Cabled  by  him  to  tlie  New  Yorlc  Independent. 

323 


\St.Gilles 

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I— 3>::8 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

body.  That  the  explosive  was  of  the  most  powerful  kind  was 
proved  by  the  complete  fragmentation  of  the  shells  which  fell  at 
the  palace,  the  Cathedral,  and  the  Ex:change.  The  arsenal  nar- 
rowly escaped  destruction.  At  the  Bo  auical  Gaidens,  adjoining 
the  Hospital  of  St.  Elizabeth,  the  explosion  shattered  windows, 
sending  fragments  through  the  wall  and  shattering  a  crucifix  which 
hung  over  a  sleeping  child  in  the  hospital.  The  locations  of  the 
explosion  all  indicate  that  the  object  was  the  assassination  of  the 
royal   family.      The    condition    at    Antwerp   was   pathetic.      Many 


I'AUT  OF  THE  WATER-FKO.NT  AT  ANTWERP 

At  the  right  is  seen  the  cathedral  spire,  which  the  Emperor  Charles  V  said 

•'ought  to  be  preserved  In  a  glass  case" 

thousands  of  refugees  from  Malines,  Liege,  Louvain,  and  the  sur- 
rounding country  thronged  the  streets,  carrying  little  handker- 
chief-bundles, containing  their  entire  possessions.  Forty  military 
Red  Cross  hospitals  were  crowded  with  wounded  soldiers. 

''The  Germans  have  broken  the  rules  of  The  Haoue  tribunal 
and  have  fired  upon  the  white  flag  and  upon  Red  Cross  ambulances. 
A  Red  Cross  officer  Avas  killed  while  buryina'  German  dead.  Chil- 
dren and  old  men  have  been  bayoneted.  The  soldiers  burned  vil- 
lages of  non-combatants,  thereby  repeating  the  tactics  of  the 
Boxer  wars,  in  which  Chinese  villages  were  burned  and  their  in- 
habitants murdered,  when  the  ransom  demanded  by  punitive  expe- 
ditions was  not  paid. 


After  the  Zeppelin  attacks  Antwerp  at  night  became  the 
V.  I— ?^  329 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

darkest  city  in  the  world.  Not  the  faintest  glimmer  of  light 
was  shown  anywhere;  nor  was  a  sound  heard.  Even  the 
footfalls  of  privileged  persons  allowed  to  be  out  after  8 
o'clock  were  deadened.  Under  a  dark  and  lowering  sky, 
Antwerp  thus  became  a  real  "city  of  dreadful  night."  But 
it  was  all  bustle  and  stir  in  the  daytime.  So  long  as  day- 
light lasted,  the  whole  city  lived  in  the  streets.  Every  visitor 
was  taken  to  places  where  Zeppelin  bombs  had  fallen.  In 
one  street  the  walls  of  houses  on  both  sides  were  filled  with 
so  many  holes  that  they  looked  as  if  bullets  had  been 
sprayed  on  them  from  a  hose.  To  the  city  gates  w^as  as 
far  out  as  one  could  go.  Here  were  plenty  of  soldiers, 
mostly  volunteers  in  nondescript  uniforms.  But  the  Belgian 
army  could  not  long  expect  to  play  the  part  of  a  fox-terrier, 
dashing  out,  biting  and  snapping  at  the  heels  of  the  big 
German  dog  without  the  big  dog  turning  on  it.  Some 
thought,  however,  that  it  would  take  at  least  200,000  men 
to  take  Antwerp,  and  that  the  Germans  would  lose  100,000 
before  the  other  100,000  walked  in. 

Alva  had  demolished  the  old  walls  of  Antwerp  and  re- 
fortified  it  with  a  citadel  and  bastioned  rampart.  These 
were  the  works  in  which  Carnot  held  out  against  the  Allies 
in  the  last,  days  of  Napoleon's  empire.  When  Belgium  won 
her  freedom,  it  was  realized  that  the  city  must  have*  space 
in  which  to  grow,  and  so  the  reconstruction  of  the  fortress 
was  entrusted  to  Brialmont.  His  plans,  as  completed  in 
1859,  provided  for  a  wholesale  reorganization  of  the  system. 
Belgium's  chief  danger  was  believed  to  lie  in  the  ambitions 
of  Napoleon,  III.  Brialmont 's  aim  was  to  make  of  Antwerp 
an  entrenched  camp,  into  which  in  the  last  resort  an  army 
could  retire  to  await  succor  from  Great  Britain.  For  this 
reason  the  main  citadel  was  erected  at  a  point  within  easy 
reach  to  reinforcements  from  the  sea. 

Brialmont 's  works,  begun  in  1861,  were  completed  ten 
years  later.  The  old  ramparts  were  replaced  by  a  line  of 
boulevards  around  which  new  quarters  grew  up,  and  a 
fresh  line  of  ramparts,  with  huge  bastions  and  a  ditch  like 
a  canal,  were,  erected  more  than  a  mile  in  front  of  the 
boulevards,  with  a  circle  of  outlying  forts  two  miles  beyond 
these   ramparts.      For   the   range    of   siege-artillery    at    that 

330 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

time,  it  was  believed  that  such  a  line  would  afford  absolute 
protection.  This  entrenched  camp  had  a  circuit  of  twenty- 
seven  miles,  and  formed  the  most  extensive  fortress  in  Eu- 
rope. It  was  expected  that  the  alliance,  or  the  friendly 
neutrality,  with  Holland  would  permit  supplies  to  enter  from 
the  Scheldt,  so  that  complete  investment  would  be  impossible. 
To  meet  the  objection  that  it  would  take  the  Belgians  more 
than  a  fortnight  to  put  the  place  on  a  war  footing,  Brial- 


ANTWERP  AND  ITS  RING  OF  FORTS 

mont  added  to  his  plan  two  strong  forts  on  the  Nethe,  with 
which  to  delay  the  approach  of  an  invader  from  the 
southwest. 

Much  had  happened,  however,  in  w^ar  methods  since  1861. 
The  time  had  come  when  it  was  essential  to  replace  earth- 
works and  stone  casements  with  concrete  and  steel.  As 
Antwerp  had  prospered  beyond  her  dreams,  new  suburbs 
had  been  demanded.  Brialmont's  ramparts  were  cramping 
the  city.  Moreover,  the  longer  range  of  modern  artillery 
had  made  the  city  no  longer  safe  from  distant  bombardment. 
So  it  was  proposed  to  demolish  Brialmont's  inner  works, 
and  construct  a  new  rampart  along  the  line  of  outer  forts, 

331 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

to  serve  as  bastions.  To  protect  the  city  from  long-range 
guns  a  new  circle  of  outlying  forts  was  built  some  ten  miles 
in  the  open  country,  on  the  same  plan  as  those  at  Liege. 
They  were  completed  only  on  the  eve  of  the  war.  Probably 
the  eastern  and  northern  sections  were  not  yet  fully  armed. 
The  great  entrenched  camp  was,  therefore,  strong  for  its 
extent  and  for  its  contiguity  to  the  sea,  while  the  Dutch 
frontier  seemed  to  make  its  investment  practically  impossible. 
But,  as  events  proved,  Antwerp,  so  far  as  bombardment 
went,  had  a  strength  that  was  no  more  than  the  strength 
of  its  advanced  forts.  What  that  was,  Liege  and  Namur 
had  already  shown. 

Late  in  September,  when  the  Allied  left  was  mounting 
steadily  from  the  Aisne  toward  Belgium,  in  order  to  join 
hands  with  the  remnant  of  the  Belgian  army  along  the 
Scheldt  and  thus  to  threaten  German  communications — that 
is,  just  after  a  German  attempt  to  open  a  short  road  from 
Germany  into  France  through  Alsace-Lorraine,  it  became 
clear  that  German  strategy  would  deal  with  Antwerp,  in 
order  to  complete  the  conquest  of  Belgium  and  so  make 
secure  German  communications  before  Belgian,  British,  and 
French  troops  became  united  on  their  flank  and  rear.  The 
progress  made  by  the  Allies  in  the  west,  and  the  repulses 
the  Germans  received  on  the  eastern  frontier,  precipitated 
this  new  Belgian  campaign,  involving  one  of  the  best-fortified 
cities  in  Europe. 

Two  army  corps  were  detailed  and  all  available  siege-guns 
brought  into  position,  including  the  28-centimeter  howitzers, 
which  had  been  used  at  the  siege  of  Maubeuge,  and  two 
new  42-centimeter  howitzers.  Added  to  these  siege  pieces, 
used  to  subjugate  the  outer  forts,  were  field-guns  and  other 
howitzers  employed  to  bombard  the  town.  The  siege  was 
short  and  sharp,  the  first  gun  being  fired  on  the  27th  of 
September,  and  the  last  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  of 
October.  The  Germans  apparently  made  up  their  minds  on 
September  28  that  the  immediate  capture  of  the  city,  which 
they  had  been  investing  in  a  perfunctory  way  for  weeks, 
was  a  necessity.  On  that  day,  using  Alost,  twenty-five  miles 
to  the  southwest,  as  a  base  of  operations,  they  moved  against 
Termonde   and   Malines.      Termonde   is   about   half-way   be- 

332 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

tween  Antwerp  and  Brussels.  After  Termonde  and  iMalines 
were  again  bombarded  and  occupied,  they  moved  up  to 
Schoonaerde  and  Lierre,  the  center  of  the  outer  rin^  of 
fortifications.  At  Schoonaerde  they  found  the  Belgians  in 
force  and  for  a  few  days  delayed  their  attack.  At  Lierre 
they  drove  citizens  out  under  bombardment,  but  before  they 
could  occupy  Lierre  Belgian  troops  entrenched  themselves 
there  and  the  Germans  fell  back  on  Duffel,  which  is  about 
half-way  to  Malines.     This  was  on   September  30. 

When  Duffel  had  fallen,  the  Germans  attacked  the  forts. 
The  forts  replied  valiantly,  but  on  October  3  had  been 
converted  into  mere  holes  in  the  ground,  filled  with  piles  of 
steel  and  masonry,  under  which  lay  the  bodies  of  remnants 
of  the  garrison.  jMean while,  there  was  fighting  at  Schoonaerde, 
where  the  Belgians  checked  the  Germans  and  then  Avithdrew 
toward  Antwerp,  leaving  one  bridge  across  the  Scheldt 
which  the  Germans  determined  to  control.  A  furius  engage- 
ment ensued,  but  the  marshy  ground  between  Schoonaerde 
and  Antwerp  made  it  difficult  to  operate  effectively,  and  at 
points  the  Belgians  waded  waist-deep  in  water.  AYhen  the 
Germans  brought  up  reinforcements  of  artillery,  the  Bel- 
gians were  compelled  to  withdraw.  Two  of  their  field- 
batteries  were  completely  destroyed,  and  ever}'-  man  operating 
a  gun  was  killed.  The  Belgians  had  not  an  effective  battery 
left  with  which  to  reply  to  German  shrapnel.  Incidents 
telling  of  the  valor  of  the  Belgians  are  numberless,  but  valor 
was  useless  against  overwhelming  odds  and  a  concentrated 
artillery-fire.  The  forces  gathered  around  Antwerp  were 
believed  to  include  five  German  corps,  or  perhaps  200,000  men, 
with  an  uncounted  number  of  heavy  field-  and   siege-guns. 

When  a  German  officer  bearing  a  white  flag  approached 
the  Belgian  field  army  as  the  bearer  of  a  message  that  the 
bombardment  of  the  city  w^ould  begin  in  a  few  hours  and 
that  all  non-combatants  must  leave  or  stay  at  their  own 
risk.  General  Beguise,  the  Belgian  commander,  said  he  would 
so  inform  all  Antwerp  citizens.  The  utmost  formality  and 
politeness  marked  these  momentous  proceedings.  By  after- 
noon the  wide  Avenue  de  Keyser,  leading  to  the  Gare 
Centrale,  became  a  mass  of  slowly  moving  humanity.  Men 
and  women  carried  other  men  and  women  on  their  backs — 

333 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

these  latter  the  maimed  and  crippled,  of  whom  there  were 
many  in  that  densely  populated  country.  Imbeciles  and 
even  lunatics  were  in  the  crowd,  all  taken  care  of  by 
friendly  hands.  The  station  became  filled  with  a  surging 
throng.  Many  who  had  been  weeping  and  wringing  their 
hands  in  the  afternoon,  by  sundown  gathered  quietly  in 
cafes.  Rumors  then  came  of  a  Zeppelin  visit  and  panic 
seized  the  populace.  Shops  were  closed,  lights  extinguished, 
and  whole  families  huddled  in  the  cellars  of  their  homes. 
Throughout  the  night  they  stayed  there,  shivering  with  fear, 
only  to  learn  in  the  morning  that  no  Zeppelin  had  appeared. 
Next  day,  however,  a  Zeppelin  did  come.  It  dropt  a  dozen 
or  more  bombs,  wrecked  several  houses  and  killed  a  score. 
Next  morning  shells  from  siege-guns  began  to  whistle  over 
the  city.  The  flight  of  fugitives  from  Antwerp  was  then 
renewed  by  river,  rail,  and  road. 

A^  fast  as  they  went  out,  others  came  into  the  city — 
refugees  from  the  stricken  district  between  the  inner  and 
outer  forts.  Of  eighty  or  more  villages  that  crowded  the 
plain,  fully  ten  had  been  burned  or  battered  down  by  shell- 
fire.  Everybody  started  to  move  into  the  city,  carrying  all 
they  were  able  to  save.  One  could  see  the  smoke  of  half  a 
dozen  burning  villages.  The  Germans  found  in  Antwerp 
no  ships  with  which  to  operate  a  transport  service.  The 
boilers  in  all  German  vessels  held  in  the  docks  since  the  war 
l)egan  had  been  blown  up  and  the  ships  sunk,  while  all  British, 
French,  and  Belgian  shipping  had  left  the  port.  When  the 
reports  made  by  the  exploding  boilers  were  heard,  they  con- 
vinced many  people  that  the  town  itself  was  being  blown 
up  by  mines  laid  by  German  spies,  or  by  bombs  from 
mysterious  sources.  Antwerp's  greatest  treasures,  master- 
pieces of  Rubens,  Van  Dyck  and  other  painters,  were  no 
longer  visible  in  the  Cathedral  and  Museum,  having  been 
removed  to  safer  places.  They  had  probably  been  moved 
to  a  city  far  from  Antwerp — perhaps  to  London. 

The  Belgian  Government  made  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
British  Government  for  reinforcements.  A  Marine  Brigade 
and  two  Naval  Brigades  with  some  heavy  naval  guns, 
manned  by  a  detachment  of  the  Royal  Navy,  the  whole 
under  command  of  General  Paris,  were  sent  to  the  defense 

334 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

of  Antwerp  in  the  last  week  of  the  attack.  Winston  Churchill 
himself  accompanied  the  expedition,  remaining  in  Antwerp 
nearly  to  the  end.  As  a  result  of  these  facts,  coupled  with 
the  purely  naval  character  of  the  force,  there  was  a  tendency 
in  England  to  represent  the  expedition,  after  Antwerp  had 
fallen,  as  in  the  nature  of  a  personal  adventure  on  the  pa^-t 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  and  there  was  a  good 
deal  of  criticism  of  "amphibious  warfare."  Point  and  bitter- 
ness were  lent  to  criticism  of  Mr.  Churchill  by  the  fact  that 
a  large  proportion  of  the  Naval  Brigade  consisted  of  very 


(C;    INTERNATIONAL    FILM    SERVICE.    N.    Y. 

PROTECTING  A  RUBENS  IN  ANTWERP 
Removing  his  "Assumption"  from  the  Cathedral  before  the  bombardment 

young  men  who  had  so  recently  entered  the  navy  and  were 
so  untrained  that  some  of  them  literally  did  not  know  how 
to  use  a  rifle.  In  not  a  few  details  the  equipment  was  sadly 
inadequate.  Such  action,  however,  could  not  have  been  taken 
without  the  approval  of  the  Cabinet  as  a  whole,  or  the  con- 
sent of  the  War  Office. 

The  first  detachment   of  British  troops   reached   Antwerp 
late  in  the  evening  of  October  3.     The  effect  on  the  people 

335 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

and  soldiers  was  electrical.  Not  only  were  the  khaki-clad 
companies  received  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm,  but  ''for 
the  first  time  since  I  have  been  here,"  wrote  a  special  corre- 
spondent of  the  Times  from  Antwerp,  "I  have  heard  the 
Belgian  soldiers  singing  triumphantly  as  they  marched;  not 
a  few  or  a  single  regiment,  but  every  troop  that  passed 
through  the  streets  swung  along  joyously  singing.  And  for 
the  first  time  since  I  have  been  here  everywhere  the  crowds 
rushed  to  cheer  them.  I  sincerely  believe  that  it  is  no  exag- 
geration to  say  that  every  Belgian  soldier  in  the  trenches  is 
worth  three  of  what  he  was  yesterday." 

The  fact  had  soon  to  be  recognized,  however,  that  British 
help  had  come  too  late.  Whether  the  number  of  troops  that 
were  actually  sent,  with  such  guns  as  they  had,  would  at 
any  time  have  been  of  material  assistance,  is  another  ques-- 
tion.  It  has  been  said  that  had  five  times  the  number  of 
men  and  ten  times  the  number  of  guns  been  sent  a  fortnight 
earlier,  Antwerp  could  have  been  held  indefinitely.  Mr. 
Churchill  stated  that  the  Naval  Division  was  sent  to  Ant- 
werp, "not  as  an  isolated  incident,  but  as  part  of  a  large 
operation  for  the  relief  of  the  city,"  but  other  and  more 
powerful  consideration  "prevented  this  from  being  carried 
through."  Arriving  as  late  as  they  did,  it  is  doubtful  if  a 
much  stronger  force  at  that  time  could  have  been  successful 
in  materially  delaying  the  inevital)le  end,  except  at  the  cost 
of  a  prolonged  bombardment  and  wrecking  of  the  city. 

On  the  morning  of  October  7  the  streets  of  Antwerp 
presented  an  extraordinary  spectacle.  It  was  known  that 
the  city  now  lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy's  guns.  Some- 
how a  rumor  had  got  abroad  that  a  bombardment  was  to  begin 
at  10  o'clock  in  the  morning,  as  if  it  were  some  new  and 
portentous  kind  of  theatrical  entertainment.  Notification  of 
the  intention  to  bombard  the  city  if  it  did  not  surrender  had 
been  sent  to  its  defenders  on  October  6,  and  General  Deguise 
had  replied  refusing  to  surrender  and  accepting  the  conse- 
quence. It  was  not  until  three  or  four  minutes  before 
midnight  of  October  7,  that  the  actual  bombardment  of 
Antwerp  began.  The  Germans  did  not  bring  up  their 
heaviest  guns  against  the  city  itself.  From  the  beginning 
until  the  end  when  high-explosive  shells  were  employed,  the 

336 


INVASION  OF  BELGIOI  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

great  majority  of  the  projectiles  used  were  shrapnel,  which 
generally  burst  above  the  roofs.  The  actual  destruction  of 
the  fabric  of  buildings,  therefore,  was  at  no  time  large  in 
proportion  to  the  severity  of  the  bombardment.  The  object 
of  the  attacking  force  was  evidently  to  terrorize  and  kill, 
rather  than  to  destroy  buildings.  From  the  first  the  fire 
was  distributed  with  curious  impartiality  all  over  the  city. 
This  had,  indeed,  been  the  German  plan  throughout  the 
approach  to  the  city.     So  long  as  the  outer  forts  presented 


©    INTERNATIONAL    FILM    SERVICE      N      Y 

BELGIAN  ARMORED  TRAIN  USED  DURING  THE  BOMBARDMENT 
OF  ANTWERP 

a  definite  and  stationary  objective,  fire  had  been  concen- 
trated on  one  or  another  until  the  big  howitzers  battered  it 
to  pieces. 

The  bombardment  continued  with  varying  severity  through- 
out the  8th.  As  the  Germans  drew  nearer  to  the  city  all 
the  inner  forts,  on  the  south  and  east  sides  of  the  ring,  took 
part  in  replying  to  their  cannonade.  Some  of  these  forts, 
notably  forts  2,  3,  4,  and  5,  were  badly  battered,  but  with 
the  guns  posted  between  and  before  them  they  continued  to 

337 


ON  THE  AVESTERN  FRONT 

answer  the  enemy's  fire  vigorously,  while  trenches  two  miles 
in  advance  were  still  held  by  British  and  Belgian  troops. 
The  Germans  made  no  attempt  to  rush  either  these  trenches 
or  the  zone  of  barbed-wire  entanglements  which  had  to  be 
crossed  in  order  to  reach  the  city;  but  contented  themselves 
w^ith  pouring  shell-fire  on  the  trenches  and  forts,  and  the 
city  itself  from  beyond  the  reach  of  rifles. 

The  havoc  that  ensued  was  heightened  by  bombs  thrown 
down  from  Zeppelins,  especially  in  the  southern  quarter, 
which  caused  destructive  fires.  Viewed  from  afar,  this  great 
and  beautiful  seat  of  commerce,  industry,  and  art  looked 
during  those  terrible  hours  like  the  crater  of  a  volcano  in 
eruption,  with  a  shower  of  shooting  stars  falling  into  it. 
Silhouetted  against  the  glare,  its  towers  stood  luminous  amid 
fiery  lights.  Highest  of  all,  the  incomparable  spire  of  its 
cathedral  pointed,  as  tho  a  warning  finger,  to  the  dark  sky. 
Some  time  before  midnight  on  October  7,  the  roar  of  the 
cannonade  ceased.  The  enemy's  guns  for  a  spell  became 
silent.  To  the  deep  bay  of  cannon  on  the  defenses  there 
came  no  answering  defiance.  Even  the  guns  on  the  defenses 
had  suspended  speech. 

The  first  shell  to  fall  brought  numbers  of  women  into  the 
streets,  their  anxious  purpose  being  to  discover  whether  the 
bombardment  had  really  begun.  Ver^^  closely  did  the  roar 
of  guns,  the  explosion  and  crash  of  striking  shells,  follow 
each  other.  All  over  the  southern  section  of  the  city  shells 
struck  mansion,  villa,  and  cottage  indiscriminately.  Then 
the  fortress  guns,  the  field-batteries,  and  the  armored  trains 
opened  out  in  one  loud  chorus,  and  the  din  became  terrific, 
while  the  reflection  in  the  heavens  was  seemingly  one  huge, 
tossing  flame.  From  the  roof  of  a  suburban  hostelry  the 
spectacle  was  an  amazing  one.  The  nerve-racking  screech 
of  shells — roof-tops  alternately  dimmed  and  illuminated  by 
sudden  red  lights,  which  left  the  darkness  blacker  than 
before — and  then  the  tearing  out  of  roof  or  wall  by  the 
explosion,  made  a  picture  which  fell  little  short  of  an 
inferno.  Shells  were  falling  all  over  the  town.  The  smoke 
from  blazing  petroleum  and  burning  houses  rose  in  great 
columns,  and  must  have  formed  an  appalling  sight  for 
people  as  far  north  as  Roosendael  in  Holland. 

338 


'   INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Shelling  the  city  after  the  noon  of  October  8  could  do 
little  harm  to  the  remaining  inhabitants,  for  Antwerp  was 
no  longer  a  living  city,  only  the  husk  of  one.  Streets 
usually  so  busy  and  gay  were  shuttered,  silent,  and  deserted. 
By  the  shells  that  continued  to  fall — now  chipping  a  corner 
off  a  building,  now  crushing  through  a  wall  or  falling  harm- 
lessly in  an  empty  square  or  garden — there  was  hardly  a 
human  being  to  be  either  hurt  or  frightened,  except  devoted 
nurses  and  doctors  struggling  to  get  wounded  patients  to 
places  of  safety.  Craft  of  various  kinds  was  still  passing  out 
of  dock  basins  into  the  Scheldt,  and  in  the  immediate  neigh- 
borhood of  the  wharves  a  few  cabarets  kept  open.  Two  or 
three  hotels,  in  safer  positions  in  the  city,  with  much  reduced 
staffs,  also  had  not  closed.  These  exceptions — the  nurses 
and  their  wounded,  the  military,  some  of  the  city  officials, 
half  a  dozen  British  newspaper  correspondents,  and  certain 
citizens  who  had  reason  to  know  they  had  nothing  to  fear 
from  falling  into  German  hands — represented  practically  the 
population  of  Antwerp.  In  shuttered  and  desolate  streets 
not  a  vehicle  moved.  Now  and  again  a  solitary  figure  hur- 
ried along,  stopping  for  shelter  in  a  doorway  as  a  shell 
screamed  overhead.  Otherwise  Antwerp,  which  the  day 
before  had  held  half  a  million  people,  was  like  a  city  of 
the  dead. 

As  dusk  fell  a  detail  of  Belgian  soldiers  sank  by  rifle  fire 
a  number  of  lighters  in  the  channel  leading  from  the  outer 
to  the  inner  dock  basin,  thus  closing  the  last  exit  by  water. 
Then  followed  a  night  which  offered,  to  those  few  who 
witnessed  it,  what  was  perhaps  one  of  the  most  terrible 
spectacles  the  world  had  seen.  Across  the  river  still  rose 
into  the  sky  the  great  triple  pillar  of  smoke  from  the  burn- 
ing oil-tanks.  The  air  was  windless  and  the  thick  vapor 
rose  straight  upward  some  hundreds  of  feet  when  appar- 
ently it  encountered  a  light  breeze,  for,  very  slowly,  still, 
black  and  solid  as  a  pall,  it  drifted  steadily,  but  almost 
imperceptibly,  northeastward,  spreading  out  till  it  covered 
half  the  sky.  By  nightfall  this  heavy  curtain  overlay  the 
greater  part  of  the  city  and  stretched  away  into  the  distance. 
In  the  darkness  the  blaze  of  the  burning  oil  became  visible, 
tossing  into  the  air  and  throwing  off  great  masses  of  flame 

339 


ON  THE  AYESTERN  FRONT 

to  float  away  like  individual  clouds  of  fire.  The  red  glow 
from  below  lighted  up  the  whole  underside  of  the  black 
canopy,  making  such  a  scene  as  a  man  might  dream  of  in 
visions  of  the  inferno. 

Resting  almost  stationary  overhead,  so  slow  was  its  drift 
to  east  and  north,  this  cloud  rested  to  the  southwest  on  a 
strip  of  clear  starlit  sky,  ranging  one-third  of  the  horizon. 
Against  this,  looking  from  the  quays  or  the  river,  the  out- 
line of  Antwerp  was  silhouetted;  the  stately  spire  of  the 
cathedral,  the  noble-  tower  of  St.  Jacques,  the  dome  of  the 
Central  Station,  and  other  conspicuous  buildings  clearly 
distinguishable  above  the  dark  mass  of  the  town.  Then,  as 
the  night  wore  on,  out  of  this  mass  rose  other  fires — one, 
two,  three,  six,  ten,  fifteen — making  almost  a  continuous  ring 
around  the  southern  and  eastern  sides  of  the  city.  Some 
of  these  fires  were  burning  dwelling-houses  which  had  bt;en 
set  on  fire  by  shells;  others  had  been  caused  by  the  Allies, 
who  were  destroying  whatever  stores  might  be  of  comfort 
to  the  enemy.  These  flames  of  burning  oil  and  lesser  fires 
threw  their  glow  upward  on  the  pall  overhead,  caught 
points  of  buildings,  and  were  again  reflected  in  the  water 
of  the  Scheldt,  until,  above  and  below,  heaven  and  earth 
and  water  were  all  blood-red — the  inside  of  a  hideous  fur- 
nace the  lid  of  which  was  the  terrible  black  cloud  of  smoke. 
And  inside  that  furnace,  adding  immeasurably  to  the  horror, 
were  guns  that  roared,  shells  that  burst  in  little  lightning 
flashes  of  quick  spurts  of  white  flame  against  black  and  red. 

All  was  intermittent  and  desultory — perhaps  not  more 
than  one  shot  to  the  second.  For  the  earlier  part  of  the 
night — about  half-past  ten — the  cannonade  became  truly  ter- 
rific, by  far  the  heaviest  that  had  occurred  at  any  stage  of 
the  siege.  In  the  continuous  and  deafening  uproar  it  was 
no  longer  possible  to  distinguish  the  screaming  of  shrapnel, 
the  bursting  of  high-explosive  shells,  or  the  hurling  of  pro- 
jectiles from  long  naval  guns.  All  blended  into  one  great 
roll  of  thunder.  Chaos  had  come  again.  Antwerp  was  in 
its  last  agony;  and  never  surely  did  great  city  have  a  more 
terrific  passing.  Yet  the  actual  damage  done  to  Antwerp 
by  the  bombardment  was  comparatively  slight.  Tho  a  cer- 
tain number  of  high-explosive  shells  were  used,  by  far  the 

340 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

greater  portion  of  the  projectiles,  as  has  been  said,  were 
shrapnel,  which  generally  burst  well  over  the  roofs.  Neither 
the  Cathedral,  nor  any  of  the  most  precious  historic  build- 
ings in  the  city  was  damaged,  tho  all  had  narrow  escapes, 
as  was  inevitable  in  a  bombardment  so  promiscuous  and 
diffused.  The  most  notable  building  which  suffered — but 
that  not  very  seriously — was  the  Palais  de  Justice.  All 
parts  of  the  city  bore  some  traces  of  their  experience.  There 
was  considerable  miscellaneous  wreckage  about  the  Place 
Verte  and  in  the  business  section  of  the  town,  notably  in 
the  ]\Iarche  aux  Souliers.  The  chief  injury  was  to  private 
houses  about  the  Boulevard  Leopold  and  the  rich  residential 
quarters  on  the  northeast  side  of  the  city. 

Roads  to  the  south  of  Antwerp  on  October  12  were 
jammed  with  unbroken  columns  of  siege-artillery,  mortar- 
batteries,  and  baggage-trains  trekking  away  from  the  just- 
captured  fortress.  The  infantry  and  field-artillery  of  General 
von  Beseler's  beseiging  army  were  well  on  their  way  south, 
to  turn  the  scale,  if  possible,  like  Nogi's  army  at  Mukden, 
or  in  the  great  battle  of  the  Aisne.  Bluejackets  and  marine 
infantry  from  Kiel,  Cuxhaven,  and  Wilhelmshaven,  smelling 
salt  water  again  after  a  campaign  of  more  than  a  month 
through  Belgium,  were  waiting  at  Antwerp  for  further  dis- 
position, but  whether  to  engage  in  a  naval  campaign  from 
their  new  base,  or  merely  to  garrison  that  quarter  of  Bel- 
gium was  not  known.  Detachments  of  sailors,  recruited  from 
the  German  mercantile  marine  and  armed  only  with  cutlass 
and  revolver,  had  lain  for  several  weeks  behind  the  army, 
taking  no  part  in  the  fighting  and  evidently  destined  for 
sea  duty  after  the  capture  of  the  port.  The  story  of  the 
siege  of  Antwerp  from  the  German  side,  as  related  by  an 
officer  attached  to  the  staff,  was  largely  the  story  of  the 
marine  division,  of  the  pioneers  and  of  the  artillery,  which 
formed  the  backbone  of  the  heterogeneous  army  of  Landwehr, 
Landstrum,  and  reserve  formations  intrusted  to  General  von 
Beseler. 

Antwerp  fell  eight  days  earlier  than  General  von  Beseler 
expected.  This  was  due  in  part  to  the  discouragement  of 
the  Belgian  forces,  disheartened  by  nine  weeks  of  defeat, 
and  with  little  hope  of  prolonging  the  resistance  until  relief 

341 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

could  arrive,  and  partly  to  the  fact,  discovered  by  the  Ger- 
mans when  they  took  possession  of  the  city,  that  the  fortress 
lines  had  been  practically  penetrated  when  the  fortified 
positions  behind  the  Nethe  River  were  carried  on  October 
6  and  7.  Belgian  engineers,  apparently  realizing  that  the 
inner  girdle  of  forts  was  too  close  to  the  city,  set  up  a  second 
line  of  defense  behind  the  flood  barrier  of  the  Nethe, 
dammed  up  to  inundate  a  belt  of  land  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
wide,  and  had  robbed  the  inner  forts  of  their  heavy  guns 
to  arm  this  improvised  but  exceedingly  strong  position. 
Once  this  line  was  carried,  the  inner  forts  could  offer  com- 
paratively little  resistance,  and  the  city  itself  lay  open  to 
bombardment. 

The  artillery-park  with  which  the  fortress  was  reduced 
was  far  stronger  than  was  publicly  known,  containing  in 
addition  to  the  widely  heralded  16Vi>-inch  mortars  a  large 
number  of  12-inch  Krupp  siege-guns,  the  existence  of  which 
had  not  been  mentioned,  and  which  were  in  efficiency  only 
slightly  inferior  to  their  larger  sisters.  Two  Austrian  auto- 
mobile batteries  of  12-inch  guns  were  attached  to  von  Bese- 
ler's  army.  The  effect  of  these  great  guns  on  the  forts  and 
the  so-called  Railroad  Redoubt,  protecting  the  line  of  the  rail- 
road from  Brussels  to  Antwerp,  was  even  more  striking  than 
on  the  forts  at  Liege.  Two  of  the  big  armored  turrets  at 
St.  Catherine  were  struck  directly  and  put  out  of  action  with 
single  shots.  In  one  the  heavy,  steel  beds  for  the  guns  were 
broken  in  two,  and  the  heavy  masses  of  metal  hurled  bodily 
five  or  six  -yards  from  their  original  positions.  In  another 
the  -concrete  embankment,  tho  capable  of  resisting  any  shell, 
was  pierced  like  cheese  and  the  steel  turret  uprooted.  A 
turret  in  the  Railroad  Redoubt  was  up-ended  completely 
and  lay  with  its  base  pointing  skyward  and  the  gun  buried 
below.  Behind  the  embankment  of  Fort  Waelhem,  where 
a  12-inch  shell  penetrated  the  magazine,  a  heavy  engine  that 
furnished  power  for  *the  electric-light  plant  was  blown 
twenty  yards  from  its  base.  The  whole  top  of  the  fort  here 
was  blown  off.  Sixty  men  of  the  .garrison  were  said  to  have 
been  buried  beneath  the  ruins.  Other  turrets  were  put  out 
of  action  by  shells  striking  the  concrete  embankments  or 
the  earth  in  front  of  them  and  cracking  or  displacing  the 

342 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

cement  walls  so  that  the  turrets  could  no  longer  be  turned. 

The  fall  of  Antwerp  after  so  short  a  siege  produced  a 
moral  effect  incommensurate  with  its  material  value.  The 
surrender  could  not  be  regarded  by  the  Allies  other  than  as 
a  regrettable  disaster,  the  consequences  of  which  could  not 
be  minimized.  The  strategical  gain  to  the  Germans,  tho 
less  appreciable  than  the  moral  loss  to  the  Allies,  was  none 
the  less  considerable,  especially  at  this  phase  of  the  cam- 
paign, for  Antwerp  was  a  strong  place  cVarmes,^'^  situated 
within  forty  miles  of  the  German  line  of  communications 
with  their  Rhine  base.  It  had  served  as  a  powerful  jjoint 
cVappid  for  the  Belgian  field  army,  from  which  it  could 
harass  the  German  communications  should  a  retreat  become 
inevitable.  Of  still  greater  importance  was  the  release  of 
the  German  army  of  observation,  which  had  been  watching 
the  fortress  since  the  Belgian  Army  retreated  under  cover 
of  its  guns.  This  army,  after  the  surrender,  became  avail- 
able to  reinforce  Germany  in  the  field.  The  Germans  were 
thus  able  to  extend  their  battle  line  from  Lille  to  the  sea- 
coast  without  further  weakening  their  defensive  position 
north  of  the  Aisne.  Antwerp,  however,  could  not  be  used 
as  a  naval  base  for  operations  against  Great  Britain,  even  if 
the  German  navy  had  had  access  to  its  harbor.  The  Dutch 
claim  to  absolute  sovereignty  over  the  Scheldt  entrance 
under  the  Treaty  of  1839  the  German  Government  had  always 
supported,  and  could  not  now  repudiate  without  striking  a 
blow  at  the  neutrality  of  Holland.  The  defense  of  Antwerp 
did  not  appear  to  have  been  well  organized.  The  Belgians 
trusted  too  much  to  their  forts,  too  little  to  mobile  defenses, 
and  British  help  was  sent  too  late.  When  it  arrived,  more- 
over, it  was  not  the  kind  of  help  needed. 

Following  so  soon  after  the  fall  of  Liege,  Namur,  and 
Maubeuge,  the  fate  of  Antwerp  raised  convictions  in  many 
minds  as  to  the  utility  of  fixt  defenses  in  modern  war.  It  was 
said  that  the  offensive  power  of  artillery  had  increased  in 
greater  degree  than  its  defensive  power,  which  was  true  of 
fortress  warfare  as  waged  under  existing  conditions.  The 
modern  howitzer  can  be  brought  into  action  in  a  concealed 

"  Fortress. 

343 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

position  without  the  fort  being  able  to  locate  that  position, 
or,  even  if  it  can  do  so,  to  reply  effectively  to  its  fire.  The 
attacking  howitzer  can  move,  but  the  defending  fort  is 
stationary.  All  the  defender  can  do  is  to  sit  in  his  cupola 
till  the  first  well-directed  shot  buries  him  in  its  debris. 
When  it  was  asked  if  fortresses  had  any  longer  a  role  in 
modern  war,  the  answer  was  that  they  had  the  same  strateg- 
ical and  delaying  purpose  as  they  had  always  had,  but  that 
purpose  had  to  be  exercised  under  altered  conditions  both 
of  construction  and  defense.  The  day  for  concrete  and  iron 
had  passed  away.  Closed  works  had  to  be  replaced  by  open 
earthwork-redoubts,  massively  built,  connected  with  overhead 
cover,  and  so  devised  as  to  admit  of  rapid  improvised  exten- 
sion to  meet  the  ever-changing  conditions  of  attack. 

The  collapse  of  Antwerp's  defenses  continued  to  evoke 
surmises  as  to  Germany's  motives  in  turning  back  to  attack 
Antwerp  after  having  ignored  that  city  so  long,  and  as  to 
the  probable  consequences  of  its  fall.  Some  regarded  its 
capture  as  the  prelude  to  a  direct  German  attack  on  Great 
Britain  by  air  and  sea ;  others  that  German  forces  were 
maneuvering  for  another  dash  against  Paris;  that  they  were 
preparing  a  way  for  a  retreat;  that  they  desired  Antwerp 
for  its  own  sake  as  a  prize  of  war,  and  as  virtually  com- 
pleting the  occupation  of  Belgium;  that  they  needed  it  as  a 
right  base  of  a  new  and  stronger  line  of  defense  against 
which  the  Allies  were  expected  to  spend  their  strength  in 
vain,  while  Germany  devoted  her  chief  attention  to  crushins^ 
Russian  armies  in  the  east.  Whether  Antwerp  might  not  be 
used  as  a  naval  and  Zeppelin  base  for  operations  against 
Great  Britain  was  much  discust.  Walter  F.  Ives,  a  former 
lieutenant  in  the  Prussian  Army,  said  ^^  that  in  a  military 
sense  Antwerp  was  "the  key  of  Northern  France,"  that  its 
possession  by  Germany  would  frustrate  the  flanking  strategy 
of  the  Allies.  He  contended,  moreover,  that  the  Teutons, 
with  their  flanks  now  covered  and  amply  protected,  would 
be  able  to  "withdraw  their  advanced  lines  in  the  center  by  de- 
grees until  they  reached  the  line  Antwerp-]\Iaubeuge-Mezieres- 
Montmedy-Metz, "  and  as  they  withdrew  their  lines  "would 
close  up  and  thus  gain  in  firmness  and  power  of  resistance  in 

'^  In  an  article  in  The  New  York  Times. 

344 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

proportion  to  the  narrowing  of  the  territory  which  they  would 
have  to  defend."  At  the  same  time,  he  said  the  great  guns 
that  overthrew  Antwerp  would  be  free  for  the  investment  of 
Belfort  or  Verdun,  and  "should  Verdun  share  the  fate  of 
Antwerp,  the  way  to  Chalons  and  Paris  would  be  opened." 
A  British  military  critic  observed  that  if  the  Flemish  port 
was  "a  pistol  pointed  at  the  heart  of  England,"  the  pistol 
in  1914  was  not  loaded,  since  owing  to  the  neutrality  of  the 
Scheldt,  below  Antwerp  the  city  could  not  be  used  as  a 
base  for  naval  attack  on  England.  The  Germans  might 
disregard  this  neutrality,  as  they  had  that  of  Belgium,  but 
to  do  this  would  probably  have  brought  Holland  into  line 
with  the  Allies,  since  Holland  was  a  guarantor  of  this 
neutrality. 

In  effect,  the  Germans,  in  capturing  Antwerp,  had  re- 
leased a  Belgian  army,  which  by  a  swift  and  splendid 
retreat  reached  the  left  flank  of  the  Allies  at  the  moment 
of  their  gravest  peril.  For  Germany,  the  triumph  came  to 
relieve  the  gloom  which  followed  the  defeat  on  the  Marne 
and  the  Austrian  disasters  in  Galicia,  and  was  hailed  as  the 
prelude  to  new  victories  in  the  West.  For  the  Turks  who 
were  still  hesitating,  the  capture  of  Antwerp  became  an 
assurance  of  German  victory,  and  German  diplomacy  re- 
doubled its  efforts  at  the  Golden  Horn  and  achieved  success. 
Morally,  the  taking  of  Antwerp  was  of  incalculable  ad- 
vantage to  the  Germans,  but  the  military  side  was  a 
rather  empty  triumph ;  it  had  freed  but  not  destroyed  a 
hostile  army.  This  view  was  reflected  in  the  commodities 
markets,  where  the  price  of  wheat  jumped  on  the  announce- 
ment of  Antwerp's  capitulation. 

Driven  from  its  strongest  citadel  the  Belgian  Government 
moved  to  Ostend,  and  later,  by  courtesy  of  France,  to  Havre. 
In  the  retreat  of  the  defending  army,  some  20,000  Belgians 
and  1,500  British  were  forced  across  the  border  into  Holland, 
and  there  interned  until  the  end  of  the  war.  According  to 
a  Belgian  diplomat  Belgium  still  had  ''an  army  of  80,000 
men,  practically  intact,  headed  by  the  King,  and  prepared 
to  fight."  Antwerp  had  surrendered,  but  the  tragedy  was 
lightened  by  the  gallantry  with  which  the  city  was  defended. 
Only  at  the  last,  to  save  the   historic  buildings  and   other 

v.  1-22  345 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

precious  possessions,  was  its  further  defense  abandoned. 
Much  of  it  had  been  shattered  by  the  long-range  German 
guns  and  prolonged  resistance,  against  these  tremendous 
engines  of  war  was  impossible.  The  siege  was  perhaps  the 
shortest  that  a  fortified  city  ever  sustained.  When  the 
Germans  entered  and  the  city  was  formally  surrendered  by 
the  burgomaster,  Antwerp  had  been  under  shell-fire  for  only 
forty  hours.  The  final  assault  consisted  of  a  continuous 
bombardment  of  two  hours'  duration,  from  7.30  o'clock  in 
the  morning  until  9.30.  It  was  extraordinary  to  notice  the 
precision  with  which  shells  dropt  just  where  they  would  do 
the  most  damage.  The  Germans  used  captive  balloons,  whose 
officers  signaled  to  the  gunners  the  points  at  which  they 
should  aim.  The  German  guns  were  concealed  with  such 
cleverness  that  their  position  could  not  be  detected.  Against 
such  terrible  guns  the  Belgian  artillery  seemed  quite  inef- 
fective. The  garrison  escaped,  leaving  the  ruins  behind 
them.  In  order  to  gain  time  for  an  orderly  retreat,  a  heavy 
fire  was  maintained  against  the  Germans  up  to  the  last 
minute.  The  forts  were  then  blown  up  by  the  defenders 
as  the  Germans  came  in  at  the  Gate  of  Malines. 

Mr.  Alexander  Powell  ^^  saw  the  melancholy  procession  of 
refugees  on  the  Ghent  road  and  described  it  vividly: 

^'I  saw  women  of  fashion  in  fur  coats  and  high-heeled  shoes 
staggering  along  clinging  to  the  rails  of  the  caissons  or  to  the  ends 
of  wagons;  white-haired  men  and  women  grasping  the  harness  of 
the  gun-teams  or  the  stirrup-leathers  of  the  troops,  who,  them- 
selves exhausted  from  many  days  of  fighting,  slept  in  their  sad- 
dles as  they  rode;  springless  farm-wagons,  literally  heaped  with 
wounded  soldiers  with  piteous,  white  faces;  the  bottoms  of  the 
wagons  leaked  and  left  a  trail  of  blood  behind  them ;  a  very  old 
priest,  too  feeble  to  walk,  trundled  by  two  young  priests  in  a 
handcart;  a  young  woman,  an  expectant  mother,  tenderly  and 
anxiously  helped  on  by  her  husband;  a  group  of  Capuchin  monks 
abandoning  their  monastery;  a  little  party  of  white-faced  nuns 
shepherding  a  flock  of  children — many  of  them  fatherless — who 
had  been  entrusted  to  their  care.  Confusion  was  beyond  all 
imagination,  the  clamor  deafening;  the  rattle  of  wdieels,  the  throb- 
bing of  motors,  the  clatter  of  hoofs,  the  cracking  of  w^hips,  the 

'•^  Correspondent  of  The  New  York  World. 

34G 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

curses  of  the  drivers,  the  groans  of  the  wounded,  the  cries  of  the 
women,  the  whimpering-  of  children,  threats,  pleadings,  oaths, 
screams,  imprecations,  and  always  the  monotonous  shuffle,  shuffle 
of  countless  weary  feet." 

On  October  9  when  the  inner  forts  had  fallen  the  gates 
of  the  city  were  opened,  and  about  one  o'clock  German 
motor-cars  entered  by  the  Porte  de  Malines,  an  officer  in- 
forming the  burgomaster  that  Antwerp  was  now  a  German 
city.  During  the  rest  of  that  day  and  next,  the  army 
marched  in,  its  vanguard  hastening  across  the  Scheldt  in 
pursuit  of  the  retreating  Belgians.  When  Admiral  von 
Schroeder  made  his  stately  entrance  down  the  broad  boule- 
vards to  the  town  hall,  a  very  different  sight  met  his  eye 
from  that  which  had  greeted  von  Arnim's  forces  when  they 
entered  Brussels.  In  Antwerp  there  were  no  spectators  to 
admire  the  Prussian  parade,  or  be  imprest  by  the  precision 
of  the  march.  The  route  might  have  been  an  avenue  of 
sepulchers,  instead  of  one  of  the  gayest  streets  in  Europe. 
Nevertheless  the  occupation  of  the  city  by  the  Germans  was 
an  impressive  martial  spectacle,  of  which  Mr.  Powell  said: 

^'Hard  on  the  heels  of  the  infantry  rumbled  artillery,  battery 
after  battery,  until  one  wondered  where  Krupp  found  time  or  steel 
to  make  them.  These  were  the  forces  that  had  been  in  almost  con- 
stant action  for  the  last  two  weeks  and  that  for  thirty-sis:  hours 
had  poured  death  and  destruction  into  the  city,  yet  the  horses 
were  well  gToomed  and  the  harness  well  polished.  Behind  the 
field  batteries  rumbled  the  quick-firers.  And  then,  heralded  by 
a  blare  of  trumpets  and  a  crash  of  kettle-drums,  came  the  cavalry, 
cuirassiers  in  helmets  and  breastplates  of  burnished  steel,  hus- 
sars in  befrogged  jackets  and  fur  busbies,  and  finally  the  uhlans, 
riding  amid  forests  of  lances  under  a  cloud  of  fluttering  pennons. 

^' After  the  uhlans  came  the  blue-jackets  of  the  naval  division, 
broad-shouldered,  bewhiskered  fellows,  with  caps  worn  rakishly 
and  a  roll  of  sea  in  their  gait.  Then  the  Bavarian  infantry  in 
dark-blue,  the  Saxon  infantry  in  light  blue,  and  Austrians  in  uni- 
forms of  beautiful  silver  gray,  and,  last  of  all,  a  squadron  of  gen- 
daiTnes  in  silver  and  bottle  green.  As  that  great  fighting  machine 
swung  past  I  could  not  but  marvel  at  how  the  gallant,  chivalrous 
and  courageous  but  ill-prepared  little  army  of  Belgium  had  held  it 
back  as  long  as  it  had." 

347 


ON  THE  AVESTERN  FRONT 

Altlio  the  thirty-six  hours'  bombardment  which  preceded 
the  taking  of  the  city  caused  enormous  damage  to  property, 
there  was  comparatively  small  loss  of  life,  this  being  due 
to  the  almost  complete  exodus  of  the  population.  Out  of 
Antwerp's  300,000  inhabitants  it  was  doubted  if  more  than 
5,000  were  in  the  city  when  the  bombardment  began,  and 
most  of  these  were  hidden  in  cellars.  Probably  less  than  one 
hundred  civilians  were  killed.  The  Germans  made  every 
effort  to  clean  the  city  and  restore  it  to  a  normal  condition. 
The  first  thing  they  did  was  to  set  a  sanitary  department 
at  work  and  to  restore  the  lighting  system.  They  issued 
proclamations  assuring  residents  they  could  return  to  their 
homes  and  pursue  their  usual  occupations  in  perfect  security. 
The  field-army  of  Belgium,  commanded  by  its  King,  had 
crossed  the  Scheldt  on  pontoons  and  moved  west  along  the 
Dutch  frontier,  accompanied  by  the  British  contingent,  and 
so  made  good  its  escape  and  joined  the  Allied  armies,  still 
moving  up  from  the  south.  The  main  military  headquarters 
were  moved  to  Havre.  The  inhabitants,  as  fast  as  ships 
could  be  provided  for  them,  were  sent  to  England.  As 
hospitals  had  to  be  emptied,  piers  were  lined  with  injured 
soldiers.  Hundreds  had  to  be  carried  on  litters,  while 
those  less  severely  wounded  hobbled  on  canes  and  crutches, 
supported  by  Red  Cross  nurses,  doctors,  nuns,  and  priests. 
On  transports  the  wounded  were  given  preference,  while 
25,000  struggling  people  remained  massed  on  piers  and  in 
terminals.  A  German  tanhe  that  flew  over  the  harbor  struck 
terror  to  those  below,  many  of  whom  had  made  their  way 
from  Antwerp,  in  fear  that  aeroplanes  might  attempt  to 
drop  bombs  on  wharves  and  the  great  glass  shed  which 
covered  the  joint  terminal  of  railways  and  steamers.  Belgian 
soldiers  guarding  the  docks  opened  fire  on  aeroplanes  and 
continued  the  fusillade  for  ten  minutes.  This  created  still 
greater  consternation  among  thousands  of  women  and  chil- 
dren, many  of  whom  had  sat  for  three  days  on  the  cement 
floor  of  the  great  terminal  sheds,  their  nerves  at  the  break- 
ing-point. Escape  was  cut  off  from  all  sides  by  land,  and 
thousands  remained  at  the  docks  when  the  last  relief  ship 
left. 

Pathetic  scenes  were  witnessed  at  Dover,  Folkestone,  and 

348 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Lowestoft,  when  the  refugees  arrived  from  Ostend.  j\Iany 
had  eaten  nothing  for  two  or  three  days  and  had  suffered 
terribly  from  exposure.  Thirteen  thousand  landed  at  Dover. 
A  steam  collier  brought  two  thousand  to  Folkestone.  Eleven 
hundred,  mostly  women  and  children,  crossed  to  Lowestoft 
in  fishing-boats.  In  one  boat  a  child  three  days  old  died 
from  exposure.     In  another  was  a  woman  with  a  baby  two 


GER:\rAX  SOLDIERS  IX   ANTWERP   SHARING 
THEIR  FOOD  WITH  BELGIAN  ORPHANS 

days  old.  Thousands  of  men,  women,  and  children  arrived 
at  Charing  Cross,  and  other  London  stations,  and  streets 
became  blocked  with  them.  Every  effort  was  made  to  find 
homes  for  the  refugees.  They  were  distributed  all  over 
England. 

It    was    estimated    at    the    end    of    October    that    nearly 
7,000,000  persons  in  Belgium  would  face  famine  unless  they 

349 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

had  help  from  outside.  The  American  Minister,  Brand 
Whitlock,  said  less  than  two  weeks'  supply  of  food  remained 
in  cities,  while  conditions  in  country  districts  were  even 
worse.  The  Germans  seized  food  for  their  soldiers,  and  dis- 
claimed all  responsibility  for  feeding  the  Belgians.  Mr. 
Whitlock  had  only  peasants'  black  bread  for  two  weeks,  and 
the  supply  of  that  was  short.  One  hundred  soup-kitchens 
were  set  up  in  Brussels  and  fed  over  100,000.  Families 
formerly  rich  but  now  bankrupt  discharged  their  servants. 
Noblemen  were  seen  slipping  into  soup-kitchens. 

Reports  received  by  Mr.  Whitlock  from  Louvain,  Liege, 
and  Namur  said  conditions  in  those  cities  were  worse  than 
in  Brussels.  Louvain  had  only  a  four  days'  supply  of 
flour,  while  Liege  had  no  flour  at  all.  Peasants  in  many 
districts  were  forced  to  exist  on  legumes,  as  the  crops  of 
beets  and  cabbage  had  been  ruined.  The  meat  and  milk 
supply  had  been  cut  off,  as  the  army  had  taken  the  cattle. 
It  was  declared  to  be  absolutely  essential  that  food  be 
obtained  from  England.  Nearly  half  of  those  who  remained 
in  Belgium  were  wandering  helplessly  from  town  to  town, 
seeking  shelter  with  friends  and  relatives.  Malines,  which 
formerly  had  60,000  inhabitants,  had  few  undamaged  houses 
standing.  A  similar  situation  existed  at  Namur  and  Louvain. 
The  road  from  Antwerp  to  Brussels  was  black  with  proces- 
sions of  people  moving  in  either  direction.  W^agons  and 
carts  were  filled  with  the  wreckage  of  household  effects, 
thousands  on  foot  carrying  bundles  or  pushing  dogcarts, 
always  moving,  but  with  no  definite  destination.  Other 
crowds  were  gathered  about  the  ruins  of  forts  and  rifle  pits, 
staring  blankly  at  mounds  that  were  covered  with  withered 
flowers  and  surmounted  by  wooden  crosses  upon  which  the 
helmets  of  dead  Germans  had  been  placed  to  mark  their 
graves.  Similar  conditions  were  found  in  small  villages 
between  Antwerp  and  Brussels."^ 

20  Principal  Sources  :  "Nelson's  History  of  the  War"  by  John  Buchan,  The 
Literanj  Digest,  The  New  York  Times,  The  New  York  Tribune,  The  London 
Daily  News,  The  London  Times,  The  London  Daily  Chronicle,  The  Independent, 
The  London  Daily  Telegraph,  Associated  Press  dispatches,  The  London  Times' 
"History  of  the  War,"  Edmund  Dane's  "Hacking  Through  Belgium,"  The 
Fortnightly  Review,  The  New  York  World. 

350 


VIII 

AS  TO  ATROCITIES  IN  BELGIUM— EDITH  CAVELL'S 
DEATH— DEPORTATIONS  AND  RELIEF  WORK 

A  GRAPHIC  picture  of  the  desolation  of  Belgium  was 
brought  to  London  on  October  1,  1914,  a  week  before  the 
fall  of  Antwerp,  by  J.  H.  Whitehouse,  a  member  of  Parlia- 
ment from  Lanarkshire.  He  had  just  made  a  tour  of  the 
country  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  in  relief  measures.  Com- 
menting on  his  report,  the  New  York  Evening  Post  said  it 
did  not  require  so  graphic  and  yet  sober  an  account  to 
''establish  the  awful  truth  about  the  state  of  that  ravaged 
country.  Nobody  denies  it ;  nobody  even  pretends  that  the 
tale  of  woe,  to  which  fresh  chapters  have  been  added  day 
after  day  for  two  months,  is  exaggerated."  The  Post  would 
say  nothing  about  causes,  nothing  about  the  guilt  for  it  all, 
but  merely  cite  "the  fearful  desolation  and  ruin,  the  heart- 
rending distress,  the  unspeakable  agony  of  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  non-combatants,  who,  a  few  short  weeks  ago, 
were  dwellers  in  quiet  and  happy  homes,  and  who  are  now 
wanderers  on  the  face  of  the  earth — fatherless,  perhaps 
widowed;  homeless  and  forlorn,  and  almost  hopeless,  surely." 
Concerning  their  state  of  wretchedness  there  was  no  room 
for  doubt  or  controversy,  for  ''with  cities  and  towns  and 
villages  given  to  the  flames,  and  the  whole  country  side 
ravaged  by  the  countless  hosts  of  the  invaders,  no  voice  can 
be  lifted  up  to  say  that  the  thing  is  not  fully  as  appalling 
as  it  is  imagined!"  Mr.  Whitehouse  made  a  journey  outside 
of  Antwerp  with  two  military  cars,  attended  by  Belgian 
officials.    He  said: 

'^Hundreds  of  thousands  of  trees  had  been  cut  down  so  that  at 
some  points  of  our  journey  Ave  had  the  impression  of  passing 
through  a  wilderness  of  roofs.  The  tree-trunks  had  all  been  re- 
moved so  as  to  afford  no  cover  to  the  enemy.  All  houses  had 
been  blown  up  or  otherwise  destroyed.    Later  we  passed  through 

351 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

the  country  which  had  been  flooded  as  a  further  measure  of 
defense.  The  damage  resulting  from  these  precautionary  measures 
alone  amounted  to  £10,000,000,  ($50,000,000). 

^'In  the  villages  all  ordinary  life  was  arrested.  Women  and 
children  were  standing  or  sitting  dumb  and  patient  by  the  road- 
side. Half  way  to  Teimonde  we  (Ojld  plainly  hear  the  booming  of 
guns  and  saw  many  evidences  of  the  battle  which  was  then  raging. 
Termonde,  a  few  weeks  ago,  was  a  beautiful  city  of  about  16,000 
inhabitants — a  city  in  which  the  dignity  of  its  buildings  har- 
monized with  the  natural  beauty  of  its  situation;  a  city  which 
contained  some  buildings  of  surpassing  interest.  I  went  through 
street  after  street,  square  after  square,  and  I  found  every  house 
entirely  destroyed  with  all  its  contents.  It  was  not  the  result  of 
bombardment;  it  was  systematic  destruction.  In  each  house  a 
separate  bomb  had  been  placed,  v.hieh  liad  blown  up  the  interior 
and  set  fire  to  the  contents.  All  that  remained  in  every  case  were 
portions  of  the  outer  w^alls,  which  were  still  constantly  falling, 
and  inside  the  cinders  of  the  contents  of  the  buildings.  Not  a 
shred  of  furniture  or  anything  else  remained.  This  sight  continued 
throughout  the  entire  extent  of  what  had  been  a  considerable 
town.  It  had  an  indescribable  influence  upon  observers  which  no 
printed  description  or  even  pictorial  record  could  give.  This  influ- 
ence was  increased  by  the  utter  silence  of  the  city,  broken  only  by 
the  sound  of  the  guns. 

''Of  the  population,  I  thought  that  not  a  soul  remained.  I  was 
wrong,  for  as  we  turned  into  a  square  where  the  wreck  of  what 
had  been  one  of  the  most  beautiful  of  Gothic  churches  met  my 
eyes  a  blind  woman  and  her  daughter  groped  among  the  ruins. 
They  were  the  sole  living  creatures  in  the  whole  town.  Shops, 
factories,  churches,  and  houses  of  the  wealthy,  all  were  similarly 
destroyed.  I  inquired  what  had  become  of  the  population.  It 
w^as  a  question  to  which  no  direct  reply  could  be  given.  They 
had  fled  in  all  directions.  Some  had  reached  Antwerp,  but  a 
greater  number  were  wandering  about  the  country,  panic-stricken 
and  starving.  Many  were  already  dead.  Comparatively  few 
refugees  have  reached  this  country  [England].  Others  remain 
wandering  about  Belgium,  flocking  into  other  towns  and  villages  or 
flying  to  points  a  little  way  across  the  Dutch  frontier. 

''The  whole  life  of  the  nation  has  been  arrested.  Food  supplies 
which  would  ordinarily  reach  the  civilian  population  are  being 
taken  by  the  German  troops  for  their  own  support.  The  peasants 
and  poor  are  without  the  necessities  of  life,  and  conditions  of 
starvation  grow  more  acute  every  day.  Even  where  there  is  a  sup- 
ply of  wheat  available,  the  peasants  are  not  allowed  to  use  their 

352 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

wind-mills,  owing-  to  the  German  fear  that  they  will  send  signals  to 
the  Belgian  Army.  We  are,  therefore,  face  to  face  with  a  fact 
which  has  rarely,  if  ever,  occurred  in  the  history  of  the  world — 
an  entire  nation  is  in  a  state  of  famine  and  that  within  half  a  day's 
journey  of  our  own  shores. 

'*The  completeness  of  the  destruction  in  each  individual  case 
was  explained  to  me  later  by  the  Belgian  Ministers  who  described 
numerous  appliances  which  the  German  soldiers  carried  for  de- 
stroying property.  Not  only  were  hand  bombs  of  various  sizes 
and  descriptions  carried,  but  each  soldier  was  supplied  with  a 
quantity  of  small  black  disks  a  little  bigger  than  a  sixpenny  piece. 
I  saw  some  of  these  disks  which  had  been  taken  from  German 
soldiers  on  the  field  of  battle.  These  were  described  to  me  as 
co'^iposed  of  comprest  benzine.  When  lighted,  they  burned 
brilliantly  for  a  few  minutes  and  are  sufficient  to  start  whatever 
fire  is  necessary  after  the  explosion  of  a  bomb." 

From  the  stories  of  atrocities  printed  in  many  news- 
papers, American  public  opinion  became  well-nigh  convinced 
that  there  wa.s  no  such  thing  as  ^'civilized"  warfare.  Be- 
sides accusations  that  the  Germans  in  Belgium  were  killing 
priests  and  cutting  off  the  hands  of  w^omen  and  children, 
said  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  we  were  asked  to  believe 
that  the  Belgians  "had  dragged  German  women  naked 
through  the  streets  by  the  hair  of  their  heads;  that  a  Bel- 
gian boy  had  killed  in  cold  blood  the  German  commander  in 
Louvain ;  that  the  Austrians  had  killed  twenty  young  girls, 
in  a  single  house,  besides  executing  sixty  Serbian  prisoners 
in  one  place  and  mutilating  dead  bodies  elsewhere."  If 
SO  per  cent,  of  these  stories  were  discounted,  the  residue 
remained  "a  horrible  indictment  of  the  ease  with  which  the, 
human  being  was  turned  into  a  beast."  Of  necessity  most 
stories  came  through  London,  and  told  of  a  war  of  savage 
inhumanity  waged  by  Germany.  Of  the  offenses  specified, 
two  aroused  intense  feeling  in  this  country — the  burning  of 
Louvain  on  August  26,  and  the  killing  of  non-combatants 
in  Antwerp  by  bombs  dropt  from  Zeppelins  flying  over  that 
city.  Of  the  burning  of  Louvain,  there  were  two  stories. 
Belgians  declared  that,  after  the  unopposed  occupation  of 
the  city,  the  civil  population,  having  given  no  cause  for 
offense,    the    Germans    became    enraged   by   their    defeat    at 

353 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

^lalines,  where  they  mistakenly  tired  on  some  of  their  own 
troops.     To  quote  the  London  Morning  Post: 

''The  attack  on  the  unarmed  population  of  Louvain  came  sud- 
denly, the  Germans  tiring  in  the  street  and  going-  from  house  to 
house  pillaging,  ravishing  murdering,  and  setting  houses  on  fire. 
Neither  age  nor  sex  was  respected.  Almost  all  the  clergy  were 
shot,  inckiding  one  English  and  one  American  clergyman.  The 
monstrous  work  continued  through  the  night." 

But  an  official  dispatch  from  Berlin  gave  the  following 
description : 

''In  consequence  of  a  sudden  attack  of  Belgian  troops  from 
Antwerp,  the  German  garrison  at  Louvain  was  withdrawn  and 
went  to  meet  the  enemy,  leaving  only  one  battalion  of  last  re- 
serves and  the  army  service  corps  behind  them.  Thinking  this 
the  retreat  of  the  German  forces,  the  priests  of  Louvain  gave  arms 
and  ammunition  to  the  populace  for  use  against  the  German  troops. 
The  German  garrison  had  had  no  suspicion  of  this  when,  out  of 
windows  and  doorways  in  various  quarters  of  the  city,  came  shots 
in  a  perfect  fusillade.  Many  Germans  were  wounded.  This  street- 
fighting  lasted  for  twenty-four  hours  between  the  German  soldiers 
and  the  Louvain  citizens.  Meanwhile  parts  of  Louavin  were  set 
on  fire.  People  found  with  arms  were  considered  manifestly 
guilty  of  infringement  of  the  rules  of  war  and  were  shot." 

In  the  New  York  Staats-Zeitung,  which  represented  a 
large  body  of  German-American  opinion,  Herman  Ridder 
declared  that  ''as  an  act  of  war"  the  burning  of  Louvain 
was  "justified  as  a  measure  of  punishment  and  as  a  warn- 
ing against  the  perfidious  activities  of  civilians  in  fields 
from  which  they  should  absent  themselves.'*  Any  army  at 
war,  wrote  Theodore  Sutro,  editor  of  the  New  York  Morgen 
Journal,  whether  English,  Russian  or  American,  "would 
have  done  the  same  thing  under  the  circumstances."  This 
was  not  only  permitted  by  international  rules  of  warfare, 
but  was  "imperative  as  a  matter  of  protection."  In  the 
Bureau  des  Deutschen  Handelstages,  published  in  Berlin,  it 
was  asserted  that  the  Belgian  municipal  authorities  "had 
organized  an  uprising  among  the  people  and  had  estab- 
lished depots  of  arms,  each  firearm  being  provided  with  the 

354 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 


name  of  the  citizen  to  be  supplied."  After  Louvain  sur- 
rendered, and  when  the  inhabitants  seemed  to  be  quiet, 
"simultaneously  with  the  sortie  of  the  Belgian  garrison  in 
Antwerp,  the  inhabitants  of  Louvain  made  a  murderous 
onslauo^ht    in    their  , 1   streets.      From    all 


the  windows  and 
were  fired  ;  even 
which  were  worked 
dents.  Only  twenty- 
was  it  possible  to 
shooting."  The  Ger- 
eral,  in  a  public 
that  in  a  casual  in- 
age  done  at  Louvain 
mans  seemed  much 
actual  damage  was. 
the  ground  passed 
a  careful  estimate 
Church  after  church 
hall,  the  library,  and 
worthy  possessions 
had  were  examined, 
will  rejoice  to  hear," 
"that,  with  the  ex- 
brary,  not  only 
thing  has  been  saved 
buildings  them- 
in  a  faultless  con- 
Most  American 
English,  while  ad- 
sniper    might    be 


mDERwOOD. 


from  roofs-  shots 
from  machine-guns 
by  organized  stu- 
four  hours  later 
put  an  end  to  the 
man  Governor-Gen- 
statement,  declared 
spection,  the  dam- 
by  the  invading  Ger- 
greater  than  the 
His  report  traversed 
over,  and  attempted 
of  the  damage, 
in  Louvain,  the  town 
whatever  note- 
the  city  has  or 
"All  lovers  of  art 
said  the  report, 
ceptiori  of  the  li- 
practically  every- 
but,  barring  the 
selves,  everything  is 
dition." 

dailies  printed  in 
mitting  that  the 
handled    without 


©   UNDERWOOD 

mercy,  drew  the  line  Cardinal  mercier  of  at  the  destruction 
of  a  beautiful   city  belgilm  ^^^    ^^^    slaughter 

of  innocent  non-combatants.  The  Christmas  pastoral  letter 
of  Cardinal  Mercier,  Archbishop  of  Malines,  dealt  with 
these  matters.  An  official  report  stated  that  15,000  copies 
of  this  letter  were  seized  in  Malines  and  destroyed,  the 
printer  being  fined ;  that  the  Cardinal  was  prevented  by 
German  officers  on  January  3  from  presiding  at  a  religious 
ceremony;  that  he  was  detained  in  his  palace  during  Jan- 


355 


/  ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

uary  4;  that  they  subjected  him  to  interrogations  and  de- 
manded of  him  a  retraction,  which  he  refused  to  make. 
Following  are  considerable  parts  of  his  letter  to  which  world- 
wide circulation  was  given : 

^'I  have  traversed  the  greater  part  of  the  districts  most  terribly 
devastated  in  my  diocese,  and  the  ruins  I  beheld,  and  the  ashes, 
were  more  dreadful  than  I,  prepared  by  the  saddest  of  forebod- 
ings, could  have  imagined.  Other  parts  of  my  diocese,  which  I 
have  not  had  time  to  visit,  have  in  like  manner  been  laid  waste. 
Churches,  schools,  asylums,  hospitals,  convents  in  great  numbers 
ar ;  in  ruins.  Entire  villages  have  all  but  disappeared.  At  Werchter- 
Wackerzeel,  for  instance,  out  of  380  homes  130  remain.  At 
Tremeloo  two-thirds  of  the  village  are  overthro^Yn,  At  Bueken  out 
of  a  hundred  houses  twenty  are  standing.  At  Schaffen  189  houses 
out  of  200  are  destroyed;  eleven  still  stand.  At  Louvain  the  third 
part  of  the  buildings  are  down ;  1,074  dwellings  have  disappeared. 
On  the  town  land  and  in  the  suburbs  1,623  houses  have  been 
burned. 

''In  this  dear  city  of  Louvain,  perpetually  in  my  thoughts,  the 
magnificent  Church  of  St.  Peter  will  never  recover  its  former 
splendor.  The  ancient  College  of  St.  Ive's  the  art  schools,  the 
consular  and  commercial  schools  of  the  Universitv,  the  old  mar- 
kets, our  rich  librar}^  with  its  collections,  its  unique  and  unpub- 
lished manuscripts,  its  archives,  its  gallery  of  gTeat  portraits  of 
illustrious  rectors,  chancellors,  professors,  dating  from  the  time  of 
its  foundation,  which  preserved  for  masters  and  students  alike  a 
noble  tradition,  and  were  an  incitement  in  their  studies,  all  this 
accumulation  of  intellectual,  of  historic  and  of  artistic  riches,  the 
fruit  of  the  labors  of  five  centuries — all  is  in  the  dust. 

''Hundreds  of  innocent  men  were  shot.  I  possess  no  complete 
necrology;  but  I  know  that  there  were  nine^v-one  shot  at  Aerschot 
and  that  there,  under  pain  of  death,  their  fellow  citizens  were 
compelled  to  dig  their  graves.  In  the  Louvain  group  of  communes 
176  persons,  men  and  women,  old  men  and  sucklings,  rich  and  poor, 
in  health  and  sickness,  were  shot  or  burned.  In  my  diocese  alone, 
I  know  that  thirteen  priests  were  put  to  death.  Their  brothers 
in  religion  or  in  the  priesthood  will  wish  to  know  their  names." 

The  Cardinal  then  gave  the  names  of  priests  of  this  order 
and  their  addresses.  Besides  these  there  were,  he  said  to 
his  own  actual  personal  knowledge,  ''more  than  thirty  in 
the  diocese  of  Namur,  Tournai,  and  Liege."  The  names  of 
these    also   were    given.      The    Cardinal    added:      "Well,    I 

356 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

affirm  upon  my  honor  and  I  am  prepared  to  assert  upon 
faith  of  my  oath,  that  until  now  I  have  not  met  a  single 
ecclesiastic,  secular  or  regular,  who  had  once  incited  the 
civilians  to  bear  arms  against  the  enemy.  All  have  loyally 
followed  the  instructions  of  their  Bishops,  given  in  the 
earl.y  days  of  August,  to  the  effect  that  they  were  to  use 
their  moral  influence  over  the  civil  population  so  that  order 
might  be  preserved  and  military  regulations  observed." 

Because  the  American  people  had  just  then  had  an  object 
lesson  in  the  torpedoing  of  the  Lusitania,  and  because,  as 
the  New  York  Herahl  remarked,  "they  know  James  Bryce," 
the  Bryce  Commission's  report  on  the  accepted  German  atro- 
cities in  Belgium  and  northern  France,  printed  in  May, 
1915,  attracted  more  attention  in  the  American  press,  and. 
won,  apparently,  a  wider  credence  than  did  somewhat 
similar  reports  previously  issued  in  France  and  Belgium. 
The  Boston  Herald,  until  then  rather  skeptical  of  many 
stories  of  atrocities  with  which  the  press  had  been  deluged 
since  the  war  began,  was  convinced  that  "all  dispute  as  to 
the  character  of  the  German  conquest  of  Belgium  may  now 
be  laid  aside."  A  civilized  and  neutral  world,  recalling 
w^hat  it  knew  of  Germany  and  Germans,  had  previously 
"found  it  impossible  to  believe  that  the  things  reported  in 
Belgium  represented  Germany's  deliberate  and  reasoned 
policy,"  remarked  the  New  York  Tribune ,  "but  all  such 
incredulity,  so  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned,  sank 
with  the  Lusitajiia."  Before  bringing  in  a  final  verdict,  the 
New  York  Evening  Mail  called  for  further  investigation  by 
an  international  commission,  and  declared:  "The  honor  of 
humanity  itself  and  the  credit  of  the  faith  of  Christendom 
demand  that  either  these  terrible  charges  shall  be  disproved, 
or  that  the  men  guilty  of  committing,  ordering,  or  per- 
mitting the  outrages  shall  be  held  up,  on  the  fullest  author- 
ity, to  the  scourging  scorn  of  the  whole  world." 

The  Bryce  Commission  carried  on  its  investigation  inde- 
pendently of  the  French  and  Belgian  commissions.  It  based 
its  conclusion  on  the  depositions  of  more  than  1,200  eye- 
witnesses of  the  incidents  described,  and  on  corroboratory 
evidence  found  in  diaries  kept  by  German  soldiers  who  had 
been  killed,  wounded,  or  made  prisoners.     The  personnel  of 

357 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 


the  commission  was  as  follows:  Viscount  Bryce,  author  of 
''The  American  Commonwealth,"  and  from  1907  to  1912 
British  Ambassador  at  Washington;  Sir  Frederick  Pollock, 
Sir  Edward  Clarke,  Sir  Alfred  Hopkinson,  and  Sir  Kenelm 
E.  Digby,  all  eminent  in  the  domain  of  English  law;  Her- 
bert A.  L.  Fisher,  historian 
and  economist ;  and  Herald 
Cox,  editor  of  The  Edinburgh 
Review.  These  trained  men, 
''bound"  as  the  New  York 
Sun  remarked,  "by  their  edu- 
cation, pursuits,  experience, 
and  habits  of  mind  to  seek 
and  know  facts,"  confest 
that  they  began  their  work 
"with  doubts  whether  a  posi- 
tive result  would  be  ob- 
tained. ' '  But  after  five  months 
of  investigation,  they  were 
convinced  that,  in  the  early 
weeks  of  the  war,  "murder, 
lust,  and  pillage  prevailed 
over  many  parts  of  Belgium 
on  a  scale  unparalleled  in 
any  war  between  civilized 
nations  during  the  last  three  centuries."  They  found  the 
following  conclusion  " definitely  established  by  the  evidence": 


©  HARRIS    a    EWING. 

James,   Viscount  Bryce 


^'(1)  That  there  were  in  many  parts  of  Belgium  deliberate  and 
systematically  organized  massacres  of  the  civil  population,  accom- 
panied by  many  isolated  murders  and  other  outrages. 

*'(2)  That,  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  generally,  innocent  civil- 
ians, both  men  and  women,  were  murdered  in  large  numbers, 
w^omen  violated,  and  children  murdered. 

^'(3)  That  looting,  house-burning,  and  the  wanton  destruction 
of  property  were  ordered  and  countenanced  by  the  officers  of  the 
German  Army,  that  elaborate  provision  had  been  made  for  syste- 
matic incendiarism  at  the  very  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  that  the 
burning  and  destruction  were  frequently  where  no  military  neces- 
sity could  be  alleged,  being  indeed  part  of  a  system  of  general 
terrorization. 


358 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

*'(4)  That  the  rules  and  usages  of  war  were  frequently  broken, 
particularly  by  the  using-  of  civilians,  including  women  and  chil- 
dren, as  a  shield  for  advancing  forces  exposed  to  fire,  to  a  less 
degree  by  killing  the  wounded  and  prisoners,  and  in  the  frequent 
abuse  of  the  Red  Cross  and  the  white  flag." 

The  report  distinguished  between  two  classes  of  outrages — 
those  committed  by  individual  soldiers  on  their  own  ini- 
tiative, and  those  committed  under  orders.  It  was  upon  the 
latter  point  that  the  interest  of  the  world  became  focused 
since  it  afforded,  if  true,  an  appalling  commentary  on  Ger- 
man militarism.  The  purpose  of  these  excesses,  the  Com- 
mission found,  was  "to  strike  terror  into  the  civil  popula- 
tion and  dishearten  the  Belgian  troops,  so  as  to  crush  down 
resistance  and  extinguish  the  very  spirit  of  self-defense." 
The  Commission  said  further: 

*'The  evidence  shows  that  the  killing  of  non-combatants  was 
carried  out  to  an  extent  for  which  no  previous  war  between  na- 
tions claiming  to  be  civilized  (for  such  cases  as  the  atrocities 
perpetrated  by  the  Turks  on  the  Bulgarian  Christians  in  1876,  and 
on  the  Armenian  Christians  in  1895  and  1896,  do  not  belong  to  that 
category)  furnishes  any  precedent.  That  this  killing  was  done 
as  part  of  a  deliberate  plan  is  clear  from  the  facts  hereinbefore 
set  forth  regarding  Louvain,  Aerschot,  Dinant,  and  other  towns. 
The  killing  was  done  under  orders  in  each  place.  It  began  at  a 
certain  fixt  date.  Some  of  the  officers  who  carried  out  the  work 
did  it  reluctantly,  and  said  they  were  obeying  directions  from 
their  chiefs.  The  same  remarks  apply  to  the  destruction  of 
property.  House-burning  was  part  of  the  program,  and  villages, 
even  large  parts  of  a  city,  were  given  to  the  flames  as  part  of  the 
terrorizing  policy. 

'' Citizens  of  neutral  States  who  visited  Belgium  in  December 
and  January  report  that  the  German  authorities  do  not  deny  that 
non-combatants  were  systematically  killed  in  large  numbers  dur- 
ing the  first  weeks  of  the  invasion,  and  this,  so  far  as  we  know, 
has  never  been  officially  denied.  If  it  were  denied,  the  flight  and 
continued  voluntary  exile  of  thousands  of  Belgian  refugees  would 
go  far  to  contradict  a  denial,  for  there  is  no  historical  parallel 
in  modern  times  for  the  flight  of  a  large  part  of  a  nation  before 
an  invader. 

'^The  German  Government  have,  however,  sought  to  justify  their 
severities  on  the  grounds  of  military  necessity  and  have  excused 

359 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

them  as  retaliation  for  cases  in  which  civilians  fired  on  German 
troops.  There  may  have  been  cases  in  which  such  firing-  occurred,  but 
no  proof  has  ever  been  given,  or,  to  our  knowledge,  attempted  to 
be  given,  of  such  cases,  nor  of  the  stories  of  shocking  outrages 
perpetrated  by  Belgian  men  and  women  on  German  soldiers. 

''In  the  minds  of  Prussian  officers  war  seems  to  have  become  a 
sort  of  sacred  mission,  one  of  the  highest  functions  of  the  omnipo- 
tent State,  which  is  itself  as  much  an  army  as  a  State.  Ordinary 
morality  and  the  ordinary  sentiment  of  pity  vanish  in  its  pres- 
ence, superseded  by  a  new  standard  which  justifies  to  the  soldier 
every  means  that  can  conduce  to  success,  however  shocking  to 
a  natural  sense  of  justice  and  humanity,  however  revolting  to  his 
own  feelings.  The  spirit  of  war  is  deified.  Obedience  to  the 
State  and  its  w^ar-lord  leaves  no  room  for  any  other  duty  or 
feeling.  Cruelty  becomes  legitimate  when  it  promises  victory. 
Proclaimed  by  the  heads  of  the  Army,  this  doctrine  would  seem 
to  have  permeated  the  officers  and  affected  even  the  private  sol- 
diers, leading  them  to  justify  the  killing  of  non-combatants  as  an 
act  of  war,  and  so  accustoming  them  to  slaughter  that  even  women 
and  children  become  at  last  the  victims.  It  can  not  be  supposed 
to  be  a  national  doctrine,  for  it  neither  springs  from  nor  reflects 
the  mind  and  feelings  of  the  German  people  as  they  have  hereto- 
fore been  known  to  other  nations.  It  is  specifically  military  doc- 
trine, the  outcome  of  a  theor}^  held  by  a  ruling  caste  who  have 
brooded  and  thought,  written  and  talked  and  dreamed  about  war 
until  they  have  fallen  under  its  obsession  and  been  hypnotized  by 
its  spirit. 

''The  doctrine  is  plainly  set  iov.h  in  the  German  official  mono- 
graph on  the  usages  of  war  on  land,  issued  under  the  direction  of 
the  German  Staff.  This  book  is  pervaded  throughout  by  the 
view  that  whatever  military  needs  suggest  becomes  thereby  law- 
ful, and  upon  this  principle,  as  the  diaries  show,  the  German 
officers  acted.  If  this  explanation  be  the  true  one,  the  mystery 
is  solved,  and  that  which  seemed  scarcely  credible  becomes  more 
intelligible,  tho  not  less  pernicious.  This  is  not  the  only  case  that 
history  records  in  which  a  false  theory,  disguising  itself  as  loyalty 
to  a  State  or  to  a  Church,  has  perverted  the  conception  of  duty 
and  become  a  source  of  danger  to  the  world." 

Some  of  the  outrages  in  smaller  villages  were  of  a  charac- 
ter so  shocking  that  the  Commission  refused  to  believe  they 
were  ''contemplated  or  prescribed  by  the  responsible  com- 
manders of  the  troops  by  whom  they  were  committed, ' '  and 

360 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

explained  them  b}^  saying  that  "wheij  once  troops  have  been 
encouraged  in  a  career  of  terrorism,  the  more  savage  and 
brutal  natures,  of  whom  there  are  some  in  every  large  army, 
are  liable  to  run  to  wild  excess,  more  particularly  in  those 
regions  where  they  are  least  subject  to  observation  and  con- 
trol." Moreover,  ''It  is  to  be  noticed  that  cases  occur  in  the 
depositions  in  which  humane  acts  by  individual  officers  and 
:>oldiers  are  mentioned,  or  in  which  officers  are  said  to  have 
exprest  regret  at  being  obliged  to  carry  out  orders  for  cruel 
action  against  the  civilians."  Similarly,  were  found  entries 
in  diaries  "which  revealed  a  genuine  pity  for  the  popula- 
tion and  disgust  at  the  conduct  of  the  army."  Some  idea 
of  the  horrors  which  the  report  described  may  be  gathered 
from  the  following  passage: 

"In  Malines  one  Avitness  saw  a  German  soldier  cut  a  woman's 
breast  after  he  had  murdered  her,  and  saw  many  other  dead  bodies 
of  women  in  the  street.  Two  young  women  were  lying  in  the 
backyard  of  a  house.  One  had  her  breasts  cut  off,  the  other 
had  been  stabbed.  A  young  man  had  been  hacked  with  a  bayonet 
until  his  entrails  protruded.  He  also  had  his  hands  joined  in  the 
attitude  of  prayer.  In  Sempst  the  corpse  of  a  man  with  his  legs 
cut  off,  who  was  partly  bound,  was  seen  by  a  witness,  who  also 
oaw  a  girl  of  seventeen .  drest  only  in  chemise  and  in  great  dis- 
tress. She  alleged  that  she  herself  and  other  girls  had  been 
dragged  into  a  field,  stript  naked,  and  violated  and  that  some  of 
the  others  had  been  killed  with  bayonets.  At  Elewyt  a  man's 
naked  body  was  tied  up  to  a  ring  in  a  wall  in  the  backyard  of  a 
house.  He  was  dead,  and  his  corpse  mutilated  in  a  manner  too 
horrible  to  record.  A  Avoman's  naked  body  was  found  in  a  stable 
abutting  on  the  same  1  ackyard.  At  Haescht  a  child  of  three  with 
its  stomach  cut  open  by  a  bayonet  was  lying  near  a  house." 

The  authorities  responsible  for  "f rightfulness"  in  Bel- 
gium, remarked  the  Washington  Herald,  are  "the  same 
authorities  who  sank  the  Lusitania  and  murdered  115  Amer- 
icans because  England  interfered  with  her  commerce,  and 
because  they  doubted  America's  neutrality."  "No  denun- 
ciation could  add  to  the  force  of  this  plain  tale,"  said  the 
Philadelphia  Public  Ledger.  The  Waterbury  Repnhlican 
remarked:  "That  the  work  done  in  some  parts  of  Belgium 
proved  that  civilized  people  are  not  fit  to  make  war  upon 

v.  1—23  361 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

one  another."  As  a  result  of  this  *'tale  of  systematic 
butchery,  of  remorseless  and  calculated  terrorism,"  and  of 
the  ^^Lusitania  horror,"  remarked  the  New  York  Evening 
Post,  Germany  "stands  now  branded  with  a  mark  of  in- 
famy such  as  in  our  times  has  not  been  stamped  upon  the 
face  of  any  people."  "The  last  hope  that  German  atrocities 
in  Belgium  might  have  been  exaggerated  is  dissipated  by 
Viscount  Bryce's  report,"  said  the  Louisville  Courier- 
Journal.  The  Philadelphia  Public  Ledger  thought  the  word 
of  the  Commission  would  be  "accepted  by  Americans  as 
final." 

At  the  same  time,  many  papers  like  the  Boston  Glohe,  re- 
minded readers  that  the  report  was  "not  a  verdict,"  but  "a 
partizan  statement  full  of  partizan,  tho  strong,  evidence." 
Herman  Ridder,  in  the  New  York  Staats-Zeitung,  dismissed 
the  report  as  "a  rehash  of  stories  long  since  twice-told  and 
long  ago  disproved."  Other  papers  pointed  out  that  the  re- 
port, if  true,  was  damning  to  German  militarism,  but  not 
to  the  German  people.  Thus  the  St.  Louis  Eepuhlic  re- 
marked: "There  was  abundant  evidence  that  the  German 
private  and  non-commissioned  officer  regarded  his  policy  of 
^f  rightfulness'  exactly  as  American  privates,  corporals, 
and  sergeants  would  have  regarded  it,  and  that  only  the  cast- 
iron  discipline  of  the  German  military  machine  forced  them 
to  become  the  umvilling  instruments  of  it."  In  July,  1915, 
the  German  Government  made  a  reply  to  the  Bryce  Com- 
mission with  the  title:  "The  Conduct  by  the  Belgians  of  a 
National  War  Contrary  to  International  Law."  It  em- 
braced 332  quarto  pages.  The  gist  of  the  work  was  con- 
tained in  a  general  pronouncement  of  the  German  point  of 
view,  which  was  that  the  Belgians  invariably  sinned  against 
the  rules  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  July,  1906,  by  carry- 
ing on  a  deliberately  planned  guerrila  warfare.  But  if 
further  evidence  of  Germany's  Violations  of  the  Laws  of 
War  was  necessary  it  was  amply  supplied  at  this  time  by 
a  volume  of  382  pages  bearing  this  title,  compiled  under  the 
auspices  of  the  French  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
translated  by  Mr.  J.  0.  P.  Bland,  who  reproduced  in  fac- 
simile documents  bearing  on  the  subject. 

More  than  a  year  after  the  atrocities  occurred  a  thrill  of 

362 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

horror  came  from  neutral  nations  as  well  as  from  the 
Allies,  when  news  came  from  Brussels  of  the  execution  of 
Edith  Cavell,  an  English  nurse,  head  of  a  training-school 
and  long  resident  in  the  Belgian  capital.  She  had  been 
charged  by  German  authorities  with  helping  fugitive  British 
and  French  soldiers,  and  Belgians  of  military  age,  to  escape 
into  Holland,  whence  they  could  join  the  Allied  forces  over- 
seas. A  hurried  trial  was  followed  by  a  more  hurried  exe- 
cution, despite  a  strong  plea  for  a  respite  made  by  the 
Spanish  and  American  diplomatic  representatives.  The  act 
met  with  well-nigh  universal  reprobation  outside  of  Ger- 
many. To  it  was  applied  Talleyrand's  famous  cynicism,  "It 
is  worse  than  a  crime — it  is  a  blunder."  The  condemnation 
was  not  confined  to  those  whose  sympathies  lay  with  the 
Allies.  There  were  staunch  upholders  of  the  German  cause 
who  looked  with  disfavor  on  the  act.  Herman  Ridder,  the 
editor  of  the  New  York  Staats-Zeitung,  said  in  the  course 
of  an  interview :  "It  is  a  terrible  thing.  It  seems  too  awful 
that  such  things  should  have  to  happen.  There  should  never 
be  a  necessity  for  the  execution  of  a  woman  under  any  cir- 
cumstances.  Had  Miss  Cavell's  case  been  taken  before  the 
Kaiser,  she  would  probably  have  been  pardoned.  There  are 
times  when  German  commanders  may  do  things  in  the  heat 
of  the  war  in  which  even  their  own  people  will  not  support 
them."  In  England  papers  contrasted  the  case  of  Miss 
Cavell — who  was  not  tried  for  espionage — with  the  treat- 
ment accorded  in  the  same  week  by  an  English  court  to  Mrs. 
Louise  Herbert,  a  self-confest  German  spy;  Miss  Cavell  was 
put  to  death,  but  Mrs.  Herbert  escaped  with  a  prison-term  of 
six  months.  The  fact  that  Miss  Cavell  was  not  a  spy  was 
emphasized  in  an  official  report  from  the  American  Minister 
in  Brussels,  Mr.  Brand  Whitlock,  who  said: 

^'Miss  Cavell  was  not  even  charged  with  espionage,  and  the 
fact  that  she  had  nursed  numbers  of  wounded  German  soldiers 
might  have  been  regarded  as  a  complete  reason  in  itself  for  treat- 
ing her  with  leniency.  The  attitude  of  the  German  authorities  is, 
if  possible,  rendered  worse  by  the  discreditable  efforts  successfully 
made  by  officials  of  the  German  civil  administration  at  Brussels  to 
conceal  the  fact  that  the  sentence  had  been  passed  and  would  be 
earned  out  immediately." 

363 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

The  German-American  press  in  many  cases  defended  the 
execution,  tho  regrets  were  exprest  that  the  exigencies  of 
war  had  compelled  the  authorities  to  cause  the  death  of  a 
woman.  Most  German  newspapers  emphasized  the  un- 
disputed fact  that  the  execution  took  place  after  due  trial 
and   that    the    unfortunate    woman    made    no    denial    of   her 


EDITH  CAVELL  IN  BRUSSELS 

Miss  Cavell  (in  the  dark  uniform)  is  seated  with' Dr.  Depage.  a  distinguished 

Belgian  physician,  with  a  group  of  nurses  about  them  from  the  school  of 

which  Miss  Cavell  was  the  head 

share  in  the  offense  for  which  she  stood  accused.  The 
British  chaplain,  the  Rev.  H.  S.  T.  Gahan,  who  ministered 
to  Miss  Cavell  in  her  last  hours,  gave  a  moving  account  of 
his  final  interview  with  her: 


*^0n  Monday  evening,  October  11,  I  was  admitted  by  special 
passport  from  the  German  authorities,  to  the  prison  of  St.  Gilles, 
where  Miss  Edith  Cavell  had  been  confined  for  ten  weeks.  The 
final  sentence  had  been  given  early  that  afternoon.  To  my  astonish- 
ment and  relief  I  found  my  friend  perfectly  calm  and  resismed. 
But  this  could  not  lessen  the  tenderness  and  intensity  of  feeling 
on  either  part  during  that  last  interview  of  almost  an  hour. 

364 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 


''Her  first  words  to  me  were  upon  a  matter  concerning  herself 
personally,  but  the  solemn  asseveration  which  accompanied  them 
was  made  expressly  in  the  light  of  God  and  eternity.  She  then 
added  that  she  wished  all  her  friends  to  know  that  she  willingly 
gave  her  life  for  her  country,  and  said:  'I  have  no  fear  nor  shrink- 
ing; I  have  seen  death  so  often  that  it  is  not  strange  or  fearful 
to  me.'     She  further  said: 

"  'I  thank  God  for  this  ten  weeks'  quiet  before  the  end. 
Life  has  always  been  hurried  and  full  of  difficulty.  This  time 
of  rest  has  been  a  great  mercy.  They  have  all  been  very  kind 
to  me  here.  But  this  I  would  say, 
standing  as  I  do  in  view  of  God  and 
eternity,  I  realize  that  patriotism  is 
not  enough.  I  must  have  no  hatred 
or  bitterness  toward  any  one.' 

"We  partook  of  the  Holy  Commun- 
ion together,  and  she  received  the  Gos- 
pel message  of  consolation  with  all  her 
heart.  At  the  close  of  the  little  service 
I  began  to  repeat  the  words  Abide 
with  me,'  and  she  joined  softly  in  the 
end. 

"We  sat  quietly  talking  until  it  was 
time  for  me  to  go.  She  gave  me  part- 
ing messages  for  relations  and  friends. 
She  spoke  of  her  soul's  needs  at  the 
moment,  and  she  received  the  assur- 
ance of  God's  Word  as  only  the  Chris- 
tian can  do.  Then  I  said  'Good-by,' 
and  she  smiled  and  said  'We  shall  meet 
again.  ^ 

"The  German  military  chaplain  was 
with  her  at  the  end  and  afterward  gave  her  Christian  burial.  He 
told  me:  'She  was  brave  and  bright  to  the  last.  She  profest  her 
Christian  faith  and  that  she  was  glad  to  die  for  her  country.  She 
died  like  a  heroine.'  " 

The  first  news  of  the  arrest  of  Miss  Cavell  was  received 
at  the  American  Legation  in  Brussels  on  August  31.  Mr. 
Whitlock  immediately  w^rote  to  Baron  von  der  Lancken,  of 
the  Political  Division  of  the  Governor-General  of  Belgium, 
asking  for  information  and  for  permission  to  confer  with 
Miss  Cavell  to  make  arrangements  for  her  defense.    No  reply 

365 


Braxd  Whitlock 

American  Minister  to  Belgium 
during  the  war 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

having  been  received  on  September  10,  a  second  request  was 
forwarded,  to  which  Baron  von  der  Lancken  replied  two 
days  later  that  Miss  Cavell  was  in  the  military  prison  of 
St.  Gilles,  and  added: 

"She  has  herself  eonfest  to  having  hidden  in  her  dwelling 
English  and  French  soldiers,  as  well  as  Belgians  of  an  age  to 
carry  arms,  all  of  them  eager  to  get  tcr  the  .front.  She  has 
eonfest  equally  to  ii^ving  furnished  these  soldiers  with  the  money 
necessary  for  making  the  journey  to  France  and  to  having  facili- 


©   INTERNATIONAL   FILM   SERVICE.    N.   Y. 


LONDON  HONORS  TO  MISS  CAVELL'S  MEMORY 

Scene  outside  St.  Paul's  during  a  memorial  service  held  some  weeks 
fter  her  death 

tated  their  getting  out  of  Belgium  by  procuring  guides  for  them, 
who  made  it  possible  to  cross  the  frontier  clandestinely. '^ 

The  baron's  letter  added  that  Miss  Caveirs  defense  was 
in  the  hands  of  a  lawyer  named  Braun,  and  exprest  regret 
for  his  inability  to  procure  permission  to  see  Miss  Cavell. 
A  report  of  the  circumstances  attending  the  condemnation 
and  execution  of  Miss  Cavell  was  made  by  Mr.  Whitlock  to 
"Walter  H.  Page,  the  American  Ambassador  to  London.  How 
the  Secretary  of  the  American  Legation  in  Brussels,  Hugh 
S.    Gibson,    sought   out    Baron    von    der   Lancken,    later    at 

366 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

night,  before  the  execution,  and  with  the  Spanish  Minister 
pleaded  with  him  and  the  other  German  officers  for  the 
Englishwoman's  life,  were  related  in  a  memorandum  from 
Mr.  Gibson.  On  October  12  Minister  Whitlock  telegraphed 
to  Ambassador  Page:  ''Miss  Cavell  sentenced  yesterday 
and  executed  at  2  o'clock  this  morning,  despite  our  best 
efforts  continued  until  the  last  moment."  Mr.  Whitlock's 
final  appeal  in  Miss  Cavell's  behalf  was  in  the  form  of  a 
note,  sent  by  a  messenger  late  on  the  night  of  the  eleventh 
to  Governor  von  der  Lancken. 

''My  dear  Baron:  I  am  too  sick  to  present  my  request 
myself,  but  I  appeal  to  your  generosity  of  heart  to  support 
it  and  save  from  death  this  unhappy  woman.  Have  pity 
on  her." 

Soon  after  her  death,  a  memorial  service  was  held  in  St. 
Paul's  Cathedral,  London.  Long  before  the  appointed  hour, 
the  church  itself  was  full,  and  a  great,  silent  crowd  thronged 
St.  Paul's  churchyard  without.  Men  and  women — from 
Queen  Alexandra  to  six  hundred  nurses,  from  soldiers  in 
khaki  to  representatives  of  the  City  Corporation — were 
present.  Various  memorials  were  planned.  Probably  the 
greatest  proof  of  how  the  execution  had  touched  British 
hearts  was  the  quickening  of  recruiting,  the  increase  in 
individual  service.  Within  a  month,  steps  were  taken  for 
a  statue  of  Miss  Cavell  in  Trafalgar  Square — the  site  chosen 
and  the  sculptor  selected,  the  sculptor  offering  to  make  the 
statue  without  fee.  Frederick  Palmer,  the  accredited  Amer- 
ican war  correspondent  at  the  front  for  large  news-gathering 
organizations,  who  returned  to  New  York  on  November  11 
on  leave  of  absence,  declared  to  friends  and  reporters  that 
Miss  Cavell  had  become  "a  second  Joan  of  Arc  to  men  in 
the  trenches."  British  troops  had  "adopted  the  custom  of 
charging  with  Miss  Cavell's  name  on  their  lips."  He  said 
her  execution  had  done  more  for  recruiting  "than  all  the 
raids."  He  was  with  the  French  army  when  news  of  her 
death  was  received: 

"Its  effect  on  the  trooiDs  was  instant.  The  woman's  sacrifice  had 
a  Joan  of  Arc  character  that  struck  home  to  the  French  heart. 
Officers  spoke  of  it  as  an  event  that  had  done  more  to  cement  the 

367 


^^ 


A    MISS 


A 


aa  m^&^mm  ■ 


V^ 


©   INTERNATIONAL   FILM   SERVICE.    N.    Y. 

MEMORIAL  TO  EDITH  CAVELL 

Erected  in  Brussels  in  honor  of  England.     First  set  up  in  plaster,  to  be 

built  afterward  of  permanent  materials 

368 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

■alliance  of  France  and  England  to  figlit  to  the  last  man  than  all 
the  speeches  of  statesmen  and  conference  of  generals.  Miss 
Cavell's  picture,  taken  from  the  newspapers,  is  pinned  on  cottage 
walls  all  over  France  beside  those  of  the  Virgin  and  Joan  of 
Arc. 

^'Deep  as  the  impression  was  on  the  civil  populations  of  both 
England  and  France,  it  was  slight  beside  that  made  on  the  soldiers. 
I  returned  from  the  French  to  the  British  front  the  day  after 
the  news,  so  I  was  able  to  judge  the  effects  on  both  the  British  and 
French  armies.  The  thought  that  went  home  was  the  fact  that 
Miss  Cavell  was  a  nurse.  Men  who  have  been  wounded  know 
what  a  nurse's  care  means.  That  a  nurse,  under  any  circum- 
stances, should  be  shot  was  an  unspeakable  horror  to  them." 

Miss  Cavell  was  a  daughter  of  the  Rev.  Frederick  Cavell, 
for  forty  years  vicar  of  Swardeston,  Norfolk,  England.  She 
received  her  training  as  a  nnrse  at  the  London  Hospital 
T^hich  she  entered  in  1896  and  later  was  appointed  staff- 
mirse.  After  some  experience  in  Poor  Law  nursing,  she 
went  to  Belgium,  in  1900,  on  the  invitation  of  Dr.  Depage, 
a  distinguished  medical  man  who  had  established  a  training 
institute  for  Belgian  nurses  in  a  suburb  of  Brussels,  and 
entered  wdth  enthusiasm  into  her  work.  The  Institute, 
whose  influence  was  felt  throughout  Belgium,  grew  until  it 
became  the  center  of  a  large  nursing  organization.  When, 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  Dr.  Depage  was  called  to  military 
service  and  made  the  head  of  a  military  hospital  with  the 
Belgian  army.  Miss  Cavell  continued  the  work.  She  was  a 
capable  leader  and  a  woman  of  fine  character,  worthy  of  a 
place  on  the  list  which  had  at  its  head  the  name  of  Florence 
Nightingale.  After  the  advance  of  the  •  Germans  into 
Brussels  in  1914,  Miss  Cavell  was  allowed  to  remain.  When 
war  brought  many  German  wounded  to  the  Belgian  capital 
she  and  her  assistants  nursed  them. 

After  the  fighting  around  Namur  and  Mons,  and  the  re- 
tirement of  the  French  and  British  armies,  a  number  of 
English  and  French  soldiers  were  left  behind,  cut  off  from 
their  companies.  They  hid  themselves  in  trenches,  in 
woods,  or  in  deserted  houses,  attempting  to  avoid  capture. 
Many  were  caught  and  in  some  instances,  were  executed. 
Others  were  sheltered  by  farmers,  who   gave  them  civilian 

V.  I.— 24  369 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

clothing,  employed  them  and  allowed  them  to  remain  until 
an  opportunity  should  arise  by  which  they  could  cross  the 
frontier  into  Holland.  There  were  Belgian  soldiers  whose 
regiments  had  been  broken  up  during  the  early  fight- 
ing and  these  also  hid  about  the  country,  waiting  for 
chances  to  escape.  When  Miss  Cavell  was  asked  in  court 
at  her  trial  why  she  helped  English  soldiers  to  escape,  she 
replied  that  she  thought  that,  if  she  did  not  do  so,  they 
would  be  shot  by  the  Germans.  While  these  fugitives  were 
looking  around  for  help  they  had  approached  Miss  Cavell. 
That  she  had  helped  some  of  them  to  escape  was  not  de- 
nied. The  Germans  claimed  she  had  enabled  130  to  leave 
Belgium.  She  was  arrested  on  August  5,  1915,  arid  sent  to 
the  military  prison  at  St.  Gilles,  where  she  was  placed  in 
solitary  confinement.  She  made  no  effort  to  conceal  the  fact 
that  she  had  taken  pity  on  some  of  the  fugitives  and  had 
given  them  assistance.  At  the  trial  she  was  one  of  thirty- 
five  prisoners  brought  before  the  court.  The  Germans  be- 
lieved they  had  discovered  a  widespread  conspiracy  for  the 
escape  of  fugitives. 

''Public  opinion  alone  can  prevent  the  enslavement  of 
300,000  Belgians,"  said  Arthur  S.  Draper-^  in  a  dispatch 
from  London  on  November  17,  1916.  Germany  had  ordered 
the  enrollment  of  all  Belgian  males  over  seventeen  for 
deportation.  She  already  had  taken  40,000,  and  the  number 
was  swelling  at  the  rate  of  2,000  daily.  Germany  needed 
Belgians  for  labor — Belgians  were  now  being  treated  virtually 
as  slaves.  Antwerp  had  been  commanded  to  furnish  27,000 
men,  which  was  probably  not  more  than  10  per  cent,  of  its 
able-bodied  population.  The  commune  of  Lessines  lost  more 
than  2,000  from  a  total  population — including  women  and 
children — of  7,000,  and  representing  virtually  every  able- 
bodied  man,  excepting  officials.  The  Belgian  people  were 
entirely  helpless.  Crowds  of  hysterical  women  and  children 
gathered  at  railway  and  recruiting  stations.  Women  at 
Jemappes  threw  themselves  on  the  rails  to  prevent  the  de- 
parture of  a  train  of  emigrants,  and  had  to  be  removed 
forcibly  by  German  soldiers..  Men  were  sometimes  loaded 
into  cattle-cars  and  spent  one  or  two  days  on  the  journey. 

"  Correspondent  of  The  New  York  Tribune. 

370 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

The  Belgians  were  determined  to  refuse  to  work  in  Ger- 
many, believing  that  if  they  were  not  employed  in  military 
works  they  would  at  least  be  compelled  to  replace  Germans 
and  so  be  forced  to  work  directly  or  indirectly  against  the 
Belgian  army  and  its  Allies. 

The  Belgian  Government  asked  the  active  intervention  of 
our  Government  to  stop  these  deportations  and  to  liberate  men 
who  had  already  been  taken.  Our  State  Department,  while 
making  no  official  protest,  suggested  to  the  German  Foreign 
Office  "the  bad  effect  on  neutral  opinion  such  action  might 
have."  The  German  GcrvTrnor  of  Belgium  insisted  that 
''the  evacuation  of  Belgian  laborers  to  Germany  was  not  a 
hardship,"  but  on  the  contrary,  "at  bottom  a  blessing,"  be- 
cause "nothing  so  demoralizes  a  man  as  long  idleness,  and 
nothing  tends  more  to  weaken  a  nation  than  when  a  large 
part  of  it  is  compelled  for  years  to  do  nothing."  But  it 
was  curious,  remarked  the  Brooklyn  Eagle,  "how  humani- 
tarian reasons  in  Belgium  coincide  with  industrial  necessi- 
ties in  Germany,  whose  able-bodied  men  are  mostly  at  the 
front."  Germany's  fighting-force  had  already  been  in- 
creased by  16,000  Germans  whose  places  in  munition-plants 
had  been  filled  by  Belgians.  Following  is  part  of  an  Amer- 
ican State  Department  note  addrest  to  the  German  Chan- 
cellor : 

"The  government  of  the  United  States  has  learned  with  the 
greatest  concern  and  regTet  of  the  policy  of  the  German  govern- 
ment to  deport  from  Belgium  a  portion  of  the  civilian  population 
for  the  purpose  of  forcing  them  to  labor  in  Germany,  and  is  con- 
strained to  protest  in  a  friendly  spirit,  but  most  solemnly,  against 
this  action,  which  is  in  contravention  of  all  precedents,  and  of 
those  humane  principles  of  international  practise  which  have 
long  been  accepted  and  followed  bv  civilized  nations  in  their 
treatment  of  non-combatants.  Furthermore,  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  is  convinced  that  the  effect  of  this  policy,  if 
pursued,  will  in  all  probability  be  fatal  to  the  Belgian  relief 
work,  so  humanely  planned  and  so  successfully  carried  out,  a  result 
which  would  be  generallv  deplored  and  which,  it  is  assumed,  would 
seriously  embarrass  the  German  Government." 

Germany's    deportation     of    Belgian     citizens,    said    the 

371 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

Cologne  Volkszeitung,  was  prompted  by  "true  humani- 
tarianism,"  since  it  prevented  "thousands  of  able-bodied 
workmen  from  going  to  ruin  by  remaining  unemployed." 
An  entirely  different  'version  of  the  story  was  supplied  by 
Cardinal  Mercier,  who  in  a  protest  addrest  to  "the  civilized 
world"  under  date  of  November  7,  summed  up  the  situation 
as  follows : 

'Four  hundred  thousand  workmen  are  reduced  to  unemploy- 
men  through  no  fault  of  their  own,  and  largely  inconvenience  the 
German  occupation.  Sons,  husbands,  fathers,  respectful  of  pub- 
lie  order,  bow  to  their  happy  lot.  With  their  most  pressing 
needs  provided  for,  they  await  with  dignity  the  end  of  their  period 
of  trial. 

'^Now,  suddenly,  parties  of  soldiers  begin  to  enter  by  force 
these  peaceful  homes,  tearing  youth  from  parent,  husband  from 
wife,  father  from  children.  They  bar  with  the  bayonet  the  door 
through  which  wives  and  mothers  wish  to  pass  to  say  farewell  to 
those  departing.  They  herd  their  captives  in  groups  of  tens  and 
twenties  and  push  them  into  cars.  As  soon  as  the  train  is  filled 
the  officer  in  charge  bruskly  waves  the  signal  for  departure.  Thus 
thousands  of  Belgians  are  being  reduced  to  slavery.  The  Ger- 
mans are  not  only  enrolling  the  unemployed,  but  they  are  also  re- 
cruiting a  great  number  of  men  who  have  never  been  out  of  work. 
Each  deported  workman  releases  another  soldier  for  the  German 
Army.'' 

Near  the  end  of  December  shocking  details  of  German 
conduct  toward  recalcitrant  Belgians  came  from  Amsterdam. 
Of  twenty  Belgians  Avho  had  been  sentenced  to  death  by  a 
German  court-martial  at  Hasselt,  eleven  were  shot.  Forty- 
four  other  persons  were  sentenced  to  various  terms  of  penal 
servitude  and  sixty-four  were  ordered  deported  to  Ger- 
many. Another  court-martial  was  held  to  hear  the  cases 
of  192  Belgians  charged  with  espionage.  Citizens  of  Ghent 
deported  by  the  Germans  to  the  Somme  front  were  killed 
or  seriously  wounded  by  French  machine-guns.  A  thou- 
sand men  from  Ghent  were  compelled  to  work  on  that  front, 
and  4,000  more  were  to  be  sent  there.  Young  people  from 
villages  in  the  Belgian  province  of  Luxemburg  were  de- 
ported, among  them  children  between  twelve  and  fifteen. 

While  the  civilized  world  outside  of  Germany  was  giving 

372 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

its  sympathy  to  the  Belgian  people  in  generous  measures, 
and  Cardinal  Mercier's  protest  against  the  enforced  deporta- 
tion of  his  countrymen  renewed  and  augmented  that  kindly 
feeling,  we  were  officially  assured  by  Germany  that  all  these 
stories  were  the  result  of  a  ''slanderous  press  campaign," 
and  that  her  present  actions  in  the  conquered  territory  were 
"absolutely  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  interna- 
tional law."  Conditions  had  been  "completely  distorted  in 
the  United  States." 

Late  in  1914  there  were 
estimated  to  be  in  Belgium 
1,200,000  wholly  or  partially 
destitute  persons;  a  year 
later  their  number  was  3,500,- 
000,  or  nearly  one-half  the 
entire  population.  Their  sup- 
port during  the  year  ending 
October,  1915,  required  $54,- 
409,000;  in  the  succeeding 
year  the  cost  had  grown  to 
$10,000,000  per  month.  An 
international  organization  for 
giving  relief  was  brought  into 
existence  late  in  1914  by  the 
American  and  Spanish  am- 
bassadors in  London,  the 
American  and  Spanish  minis- 
ters at  Brussels,  the  American 
ambassador  at  Berlin,  and  the 
American  minister  at  The  Hague.  Affiliated  with  it  was  a 
woman's  section.  It  made  distributions  of  supplies  in  Bel- 
gium and  in  1915  extended  its  activities  to  Northern  France. 
Herbert  C.  Hoover  was  chairman  of  the  commission.  The 
Provisioning  Department  endeavored  to  feed  from  7,000,000 
to  10,000,000  people.  During  the  year  ending  October  31, 
1916,  1,706,774  metric  tons  of  food  were  imported  into  Bel- 
gium and  483,346  tons  into  Northern  France.  Nearly  one- 
half  of  this  food  was  purchased  in  the  United  States.  The 
remainder  came  about  equally  from  Argentina  and  the 
British  Empire,  with  small  quantities  from  Holland.     From 


©   BROWN    a    DAWSON. 

Geneual   Bauox   vox   Bissing 

Who   commanded  the  German  army 

of  occupation  in   Belgium 


373 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 


Rotterdam  food  supplies  were  distributed,  largely  by  canal, 
to  terminal  warehouses  and  from  these  to  nearly  5,000  com- 
munal warehouses.  All  citizens  who  were  able  to  pay  did 
pay  out  of  their  own  funds,  but  many  were  .assisted  by  local 
and  national  governments.  There  were  about  3,000  com- 
munal committees  in  Belgium  and  2,000  in  the  north  of 
France,  embracing  about  35,000  volunteer  workers.  Profits 
from  the  sale  of  food  tickets — amounting  to  over  $5,000,000 

in  the  first  year — were  trans- 
ferred to  the  Benevolent  De- 
partment. The  total  amount 
of  money  entrusted  to  the 
commission  during  its  first 
two  years  ending  October 
31.  1916,  was  $201,782,079. 
During  this  time  it  imported 
food  valued  at  $173,658,916; 
and  purchased  additional  food 
valued  at  $28,123,163.  Of 
these  sums  there  was  ad- 
vanced by  the  British  and 
French  through  the  Belgian 
Government  for  the  relief  of 
Belgians,  $108,121,358.  Pub- 
lic subscriptions  in  Great 
Britain  amounted  to  $13,689,- 
670;  in  the  United  States  to 
$8,747,138 ;  and  in  other  coun- 
tries to  $1,066,963.  About  $100,000,000  of  the  commission's 
funds  was  expended  in  this  country.  Public  subscriptions 
in  Great  Britain,  United  States,  and  other  countries  in- 
cluded not  only  cash,  but  food  and  clothing.  The  overhead 
expense  for  the  year  1916  was  five-eighths  of  1  per  cent.  In 
IMarch,  1917,  Mr.  Hoover  and  his  army  of  helpers  had 
to  withdraw  from  Belgium,  under  pressure  of  German 
interference.  Mr.  Hoover's  words  found  an  echo  in 
American  hearts:  "The  world  can  not  stand  by  and 
witness  the  starvation  of  the  Belgian  people  and  the  Bel- 
gian children ;  God  still  reigns,  and  other  people  must  carry 
on  the  work."     In  withdrawing  at  this  time  the  American 


(CJ   UNDERWOOD   a   UNDERWOOD.    N.   Y. 

riEUBEKT  C.  Hoover 


374 


INVASION  OF  BELGIUM  AND  ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Minister,  Mr.  Brand  Whitlock,  who  had  worked  tirelessly 
and  tactfully  for  Belgian  relief,  our  State  Department 
instructed  him  to  arrange  for  the  departure  of  the  Ameri- 
can members  of  the  Commission  for  Relief.  Their  work 
was  to  be  transferred  to  Dutch  delegates  who  had  long  been 
trained  for  such  an  emergency.  The  situation  had  become 
intolerable.  Not  all  the  patience  and  long  endurance  of  Mr. 
Whitlock  and  his  associates  could  avail  in  the  face  of  Ger- 
many's "disregard  of  its  written  undertaking"  and  its 
deliberate  sinking  of  relief  ships — a  "flagrant  violation  of 
solemn  engagements."  Our  State  Department  thus  charac- 
terized the  conduct  of  Germany,  and  pointed  out  that  only 
desire  to  see  ten  million  people  fed  had  induced  our  Gov- 
ernment to  submit  as  it  had  done  to  wrongful  restrictions 
imposed,  and  to  the  petty  persecution  of  Mr.  Whitlock,  which 
extended  even  to  a  refusal  to  allow  him  to  communicate  with 
liis  own  Government.  Meanwhile,  relief  ships  were  being 
lield  up  in  Great  Britain  because  of  the  refusal  of  Germany 
to  give  them  permission  to  pass  through  the  prohibited  zone, 
or  to  agree  to  spare  them  at  all  unless  Great  Britain  com- 
plied with  Germany's  demand  to  give  information  as  to 
their  course,  information  which  would  have  been  of  value 
to  Germany  in  her  submarine  campaign. 

Soon  after  this  extraordinary  action  by  Germany,  General 
von  Bissing,  the  Governor-General  of  Belgium,  died,  amid! 
the  rejoicings  of  the  Belgian  people  and  of  many  neutrals. 
Bissing  was  said  to  have  never  been  the  same  man  since 
]\Iiss  Cavell's  murder.  He  could  not  sleep,  was  a  nervous 
wreck,  and  imagined  her  ghost  was  haunting  him.  He  once 
exclaimed:  "I  can  state  before  God  that  I  was  not  re- 
sponsible for  her  execution;  it  was  Berlin."  The  German 
press  commented  at  length  on  the  death  of  Bissing.  The 
Berliner  TageUait  said  that  most  of  the  measures  taken 
under  his  governorship,  which  created  a  world-wide  sensa- 
tion and  aroused  a  world-wide  protest,  were  not  taken  by 
him,  but  in  spite  of  his  efforts  to  prevent  them.  In  the 
putting  of  Edith  Cavell  to  death  Bissing  had  tendered  his 
resignation  to  the  Kaiser,  as  he  personally  disapproved  of 
lier  execution  and  also  to  the  deportation  of  Belgian  work- 

375 


ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT 

men.     Both  measures   had  been   ordered   from  the   Kaiser's 
headquarters. 

The  Germans  had  dealt  a  mortal  blow  to  any  prospect  they 
may  ever  have  had  of  being  tolerated  by  the  people  of 
Flanders  for  they  had  torn  away  from  nearly  every  humble 
home  in  that  land  a  husband  and  a  father,  or  a  son  and  a 
brother.  Thus  they  had  lighted  a  fire  of  hatred  that  would 
never  go  out.  They  brought  home  to  every  heart  in  the  land 
in  a  way  that  would  impress  its  horror  indelibly  on  the 
memory  of  three  generations,  a  realization  of  what  German 
methods  meant,  not  as  with  the  early  atrocities  in  the  heat 
of  passion  and  the  first  lust  of  war,  but  by  one  of  those 
deeds  that  makes  one  despair  of  the  future  of  the  race;  a 
deed  deliberately  planned,  studiously  matured,  and  carefully 
and  systematically  executed ;  a  deed  so  cruel  that  German 
soldiers  were  said  to  have  wept  in  its  execution.  Who  it 
was  at  ''the  Kaiser's  headquarters"  that  ordered  the  shoot- 
ing of  Edith  Cavell  and  the  deportation  of  the  Belgians 
none  knew ;  the  Berlin  Tagehlatt  could  not  or  would  not  give 
the  name.  Considering  the  way  in  which  even  a  newspaper 
so  bold  as  the  Tagehlatt  was  obliged  to  guard  its  phraseology, 
the  words  "from  the  Kaiser's  headquarters"  was  in  many 
minds  regarded  as  direct  and  identifying. ' '  -^ 

22  J.  -incipal  Sources :  The  Literary  Digest,  The  New  York  Tribune,  The 
New  York  Times,  The  London  Times'  "History  of  the  War,"  The  Maastricht 
Louvelle,  The  Amsterdam  Telcgraaf,  Associated  Press  dispatches,  "The  Inter- 
national Year  Book"  (Dodd,  Mead  &  Co.). 


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NOV  1  3  1358 


